McGuireWoods Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product Case Summary Database

Showing 79 of 79 results

Chapter: 49.2
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Environnement N.A. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154717 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2014)
(analyzing work product protection for materials created by a testifying expert; "Several of the Privilege Log documents are just that. Privilege Log Nos. 275 and 277, authored by Xroads [Valuation firm], and Nos. 315-17, authored by Duff & Phelps [Valuation firm], are draft reports on the fair market value of WASCO, and come within the ambit of Rule 26(b)(4)'s protection. These documents were shared among employees of the testifying expert firms, Taxpayer, VE, outside counsel, and (for the Duff & Phelps reports) with outside tax advisors PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ('PWC') As noted in the previous Memorandum Order, the Court is persuaded that 'Taxpayer . . . Had common interests with its parent and other affiliated entities' and there was no waiver of protection by virtue of these documents being shared among members of the VE corporate family . . . In particular with regard to Nos. 315-17, the Duff & Phelps reports, the Court finds no waiver of privilege because PWC is not an adversary nor a conduit to an adversary. On the contrary, PWC was regularly consulted as a non-testifying expert.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-31 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "The scope of discoverable material under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) has varied over time. Prior to 1993, Rule 26(b)(4) permitted discovery of material only actually known and relied upon by a testifying expert. . . . From 1993, when the requirement for testifying expert reports was initially adopted, until 2010, the required disclosures included 'data and other information considered by the expert.'"; "The 2010 amendments to Rule 26(a)(2) narrowed the scope of required disclosures in testifying expert reports from 'the data and other information considered by the witness' to 'the facts or data considered by the witness.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). The Advisory Committee notes to the 2010 amendments of Rule 26 indicate that the amendments are 'intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "Consulting expert discovery is much more limited than testifying expert discovery -- materials considered by a consulting expert are generally not discoverable. . . . The 'dual hat' expert initially hired as a consulting expert and subsequently retained as a testifying expert in the same case thus presents issues regarding the appropriate scope of discovery."; "In cases involving a 'dual hat' expert, privilege applies 'only [to] those materials generated or considered uniquely in the expert's role as consultant.'. . . The party resisting disclosure of the documents must demonstrate that 'the information considered for consulting expert purposes was not also considered pursuant to the expert's testifying function.'"; "I find that Plaintiff has failed to establish a 'clear distinction' between Mr. Hansen's role as a consulting expert and his role as a testifying expert. Plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Hansen's consulting and testifying roles are separate engagements is belied by the fact that Plaintiffs have presented only one engagement agreement for Mr. Hansen. . . . The argument that the differing scope of information Mr. Hansen considered in his two roles clearly distinguishes those roles is similarly unavailing. The products and patents at issue in this case were included in the calculations Mr. Hansen performed or provided feedback on in his consulting role. Additionally, there is considerable overlap in the facts and data generally relevant to settlement analysis and damages analysis. Analyses related to settlement and damages generally include computation of a reasonable royalty using data such as the parties' market shares, sales revenues, and licensing history, among other things. Mr. Hansen considered all of these sorts of data in his testifying expert report, and the documents at issue also contain this information and additional economic information relevant to settlement and damages analyses, such as profit margins. That Mr. Hansen considered information in his consulting role beyond that which he considered in his testifying role does not establish a clear distinction. Since the information considered by Mr. Hansen for his consulting role included United States sales data and other information relevant to the current case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it did not inform the opinions in his testifying expert report concerning damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff must produce the documents it exchanged with Mr. Hansen in his consulting role.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the dual hat expert could not withhold his draft report; "Plaintiff has continually argued to distinguish Mr. Hansen's consulting worldwide settlement analysis on the basis that it encompassed more products and a larger geographic area than his testifying expert analysis. Considering this and the lack of evidence that Document 2 is a draft for some other final product, I conclude that Plaintiff's arguments that the worldwide analysis is a draft for his testifying expert analysis are meritless. Document 2 is not a draft of Mr. Hansen's testifying expert report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ('MTBE') Prods. Liab. Litig., 293F.R.D. 568, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(in an opinion by Judge Shira Scheindlin, analyzing experts playing two roles in the same case; "I conclude that the 2010 Amendment to Rule 26 does not alter the considerations applicable to dual-capacity experts in any way pertinent to this dispute. The 2010 Amendment did not change the rules (or policies) applicable to consulting expert discovery: a party seeking discovery of facts known or opinions held by a consulting expert must still demonstrate exceptional need to overcome the federal policy of encouraging parties to seek, and enabling parties to obtain, competent consultation."; "I conclude that the 2010 Amendment alters the analysis of privilege for dual-capacity experts only when 'core' work product -- e.g., attorney theories and impressions -- is involved.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ('MTBE') Prods. Liab. Litig., 293F.R.D. 568, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(in an opinion by Judge Shira Scheindlin, analyzing experts playing two roles in the same case; "Prior to the 2010 Amendment, Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) permitted discovery of 'data or other information' considered by a testifying expert in connection with her opinion, leading many courts to conclude that 'Rule 26 creates a bright-line rule mandating disclosure of all documents, including attorney opinion work product, given to testifying experts.' The 2010 Amendment to Rule 26 abrogates this bright-line approach in favor of the work-product doctrine's original function: protecting the 'orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims[]' by preventing 'unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of attorneys. . . . Among other changes -- e.g., designating drafts of expert reports as work-product through Rule 26(b)(4)(B -- the 2010 Amendment: (1) clarifies that 'communications between [a] party's attorney and' a testifying expert are within the scope of the work-product doctrine; and (2) excepts from the work-product doctrine 'facts or data' considered by a testifying expert, rather than 'data or other information[,]' thereby clarifying that attorney theories and impressions are not discoverable." (citations omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 49.4
Case Name: EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 01-339-KKC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127953 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2008)
(analyzing a non-testifying expert who also had historic knowledge; "Perilous though it may be relative to the parameters of discovery and privilege, an expert can theoretically serve both testifying and consulting roles relative to the same piece of litigation. . . . A party can segregate those roles -- and preserve a work product or other privilege claim as to the consultative role -- but material germane in any way to the testifying role must be produced, and a court will resolve all doubts in favor of disclosure."; "The Court has carefully analyzed the redacted documents tendered by Wal-Mart. None of the redacted references overtly cites involvement in settlement analysis. Certain entries on pages from the period of negotiations between the EEOC and Wal-Mart may arguably include partial-reference to settlement-related or other tasks distinct from Freeman's duties as a testifying expert. However, the vast majority of entries plainly appear to relate to the subject matter of Freeman's Report and his ultimate role as a testifying expert for Wal-Mart. At a minimum, even for the invoice pages that may involve some duties not within the testifying role, the delineation between the testifying and consultative roles is, at best for Wal-Mart, blurry and ambiguous. Under the cases, those characteristics require that the Court resolve the controversy in favor of production. The Court is not convinced that the activities enumerated within the redactions are clearly distinct from the subject matter of Freeman's testimonial role and Report, and as such, the Court compels production.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2008-08-05 Federal KY

Chapter: 49.5
Case Name: Andres v. Town of Wheatfield, Occidental Chemical Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-00377, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167465 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2017)
(holding that a defendant could obtain split samples of plaintiff's testing of a landfill; "There is nothing about the process of split sampling that requires a communication with counsel. The proposed injunction in this case would require Plaintiffs to 'preserve and maintain' records already taken. . . . It would not require Plaintiffs to reveal the results of their experts' past factual investigations, their future investigations, or their experts' opinions.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-06 Federal NY

Chapter: 49.5
Case Name: Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Case No. 15-CV-2681-DDC-GLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104130 (D. Kansas July 6, 2017)
(holding that the testifying expert's inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents to the plaintiff did not waive privilege protection under Rule 502; "Here, defense counsel affirmatively decided not to review Mr. Murphy's expert report. . . . Instead, defense counsel 'reasonably relied upon Mr. Murphy to cull out the protected documents' on his own because he had 'extensive experience in litigation in federal court' and defense counsel had briefed him about the matter. Id. Although counsel could have monitored Mr. Murphy's culling more closely, the court nonetheless finds counsel's actions reasonable."; "[D]efense counsel might have taken fuller precautions, but the court nonetheless concludes that counsel's actions did not waive work product protection. The court thus concludes that this first factor slightly weighs against waiver."; "[D]efense counsel notified plaintiff's counsel immediately when the inadvertent disclosure was revealed at the deposition."; "[T]his case involves only one inadvertently produced document. But, the court lacks information about the total number of documents defendant has produced during the entire litigation. Even without this information, this single inadvertent disclosure is minor."; "Defendant only disclosed the email to plaintiff's counsel. Indeed, plaintiff concedes that it has not shared the email with its expert or any other person. . . . Under these circumstances, no extensive disclosure has occurred."; "Also, plaintiff's counsel never questioned Mr. Murphy about the email after defense counsel timely notified them of the inadvertent disclosure.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-06 Federal KS

Chapter: 49.5
Case Name: Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. RAZ Imports, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-03028 (SRN/FLN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158183 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016)
(holding that even after the 2010 federal rules amendments, testifying experts who are not obligated to file a report are governed by the pre-2010 waiver rules which therefore require the testifying expert t produce any communications from counsel that the testifying expert "considered"; "On the basis of the advisory committee notes to the 2010 amendments, as well as a particularly scholarly and well-considered opinion of the Eastern District of California analyzing those notes, Magistrate Judge Noel ultimately determined that the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 did not change the law of waiver of privilege existing prior to the amendments, at least as applied to non-reporting expert witnesses."; "As Magistrate Judge Noel noted in the October 5 Order, the waiver of privilege attached to Patton's status as a non-reporting expert extends to any documents and information he considered in connection with his proposed testimony. (October 5 Order at 4.) In this jurisdiction, as well as others, courts have clearly and repeatedly recognized that the term 'considered' is to be interpreted broadly in this context."; "This rule recognizes that part of the purpose of expert discovery is to discover not just the information that the expert used in reaching his conclusions, but also what information he ignored or failed to properly incorporate into his analysis."; In the alternative, Luminara asks the Court to grant it leave to re-designate Patton as a reporting expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). . . . Magistrate Judge Noel carefully considered this same request in his October 5 Order and rejected it, concluding that Luminara was amply advised in both the February 25 and May 18 orders of the duties imposed by designating Patton as a non-reporting expert witness. Such decisions are well within the discretion of the magistrate judge.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-15 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.5
Case Name: Leprino Foods Co. v. DCI, Inc., Civil Action No. 13BcvB02430BRMBKMT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87822, at *27 (D. Colo. June 27, 2014)
("The court finds that DCI gains no tactical advantage in the litigation by virtue of full disclosure of any of the expert reports which would give rise to the 'unsual' [sic] subject matter waiver sought by Plaintiff and as evidenced by the plaintiff's subpoenas on MSR and SES. There is no selective or misleading purpose in releasing the reports, especially as to the four pre-meeting reports, which this court finds are covered in full by the Confidentiality Agreement's provision protecting 'all communications and materials of whatever kind or nature exchanged between the parties as part of [the settlement] process.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal CO

Chapter: 49.5
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Envt'l N. Am. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 12-mc-03-LPS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153245, at *20-21 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2013)
(applying relatively new federal rules in protecting communications between testifying experts and the client's lawyer, but not other client representatives; "On this issue the Court agrees with the government. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) only protects 'communications between the party's attorney' and that party's testifying expert (i.e., a Rule 26(a)(2) expert). Communications of 'facts or data . . . that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed' that were provided to the expert by sources other than 'the party's attorney' are not protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(C). Nor, here, has the Taxpayer identified any other source of protection from disclosure of such 'facts or data.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-25 Federal DE B 5/14

Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1:16-CV-373 (lead), Case No. 1:16-CV-497, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11117 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2018)
(analyzing the waiver effect of a school board releasing the results of an investigation into alleged sexual assaults by basketball team members; finding that the disclosure triggered a subject matter waiver that included internal communications between school board representatives and the school board's lawyer; analyzing an expert witness issue, and finding that a school board lawyer was not acting as an expert witness during the investigation, and the board did not deserve expert witness rule protections; "[T]he Board contends that the communications between the Board's attorney, Scott Bennett, and Courtney Bullard, its testifying expert, should be protected from disclosure because of the constraints imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). The Court disagrees. Attorney Bullard was not originally retained by the Board as an expert witness. Rather, she was retained to act as an attorney for the Board in anticipation of litigation. She was acting as counsel for the Board at the time she performed her investigation and prepared the Bullard Report. The documents identified in the Privilege Log were generated during the time that Attorney Bullard was acting as the Board's attorney, not after she had been designated as an expert witness. Defendant's belated designation of Attorney Bullard as an expert witness does not permit retroactive application of the disclosure protections of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) to documents that were created while she was acting as the Board's attorney and prior to the time that she was designated as an expert witness. The Court will not impose such protections here."; "Attorney Courtney Bullard was not acting as an expert witness during her investigation and preparation of the Bullard Report. Further, it is the Court's understanding that she was not acting as an expert witness during the time period that the documents reflecting communications between her and Attorney Scott Bennett were generated. Her belated designation as an expert witness does not provide Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)'s protection retroactively to communications between Attorney Bullard and Attorney Bennett for the time period that both were acting as the Board's attorneys and before Attorney Bullard was designated as an expert witness.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-12 Federal TN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the dual hat expert could not withhold his draft report; "Plaintiff has continually argued to distinguish Mr. Hansen's consulting worldwide settlement analysis on the basis that it encompassed more products and a larger geographic area than his testifying expert analysis. Considering this and the lack of evidence that Document 2 is a draft for some other final product, I conclude that Plaintiff's arguments that the worldwide analysis is a draft for his testifying expert analysis are meritless. Document 2 is not a draft of Mr. Hansen's testifying expert report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "Consulting expert discovery is much more limited than testifying expert discovery -- materials considered by a consulting expert are generally not discoverable. . . . The 'dual hat' expert initially hired as a consulting expert and subsequently retained as a testifying expert in the same case thus presents issues regarding the appropriate scope of discovery."; "In cases involving a 'dual hat' expert, privilege applies 'only [to] those materials generated or considered uniquely in the expert's role as consultant.'. . . The party resisting disclosure of the documents must demonstrate that 'the information considered for consulting expert purposes was not also considered pursuant to the expert's testifying function.'"; "I find that Plaintiff has failed to establish a 'clear distinction' between Mr. Hansen's role as a consulting expert and his role as a testifying expert. Plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Hansen's consulting and testifying roles are separate engagements is belied by the fact that Plaintiffs have presented only one engagement agreement for Mr. Hansen. . . . The argument that the differing scope of information Mr. Hansen considered in his two roles clearly distinguishes those roles is similarly unavailing. The products and patents at issue in this case were included in the calculations Mr. Hansen performed or provided feedback on in his consulting role. Additionally, there is considerable overlap in the facts and data generally relevant to settlement analysis and damages analysis. Analyses related to settlement and damages generally include computation of a reasonable royalty using data such as the parties' market shares, sales revenues, and licensing history, among other things. Mr. Hansen considered all of these sorts of data in his testifying expert report, and the documents at issue also contain this information and additional economic information relevant to settlement and damages analyses, such as profit margins. That Mr. Hansen considered information in his consulting role beyond that which he considered in his testifying role does not establish a clear distinction. Since the information considered by Mr. Hansen for his consulting role included United States sales data and other information relevant to the current case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it did not inform the opinions in his testifying expert report concerning damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff must produce the documents it exchanged with Mr. Hansen in his consulting role.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "The scope of discoverable material under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) has varied over time. Prior to 1993, Rule 26(b)(4) permitted discovery of material only actually known and relied upon by a testifying expert. . . . From 1993, when the requirement for testifying expert reports was initially adopted, until 2010, the required disclosures included 'data and other information considered by the expert.'"; "The 2010 amendments to Rule 26(a)(2) narrowed the scope of required disclosures in testifying expert reports from 'the data and other information considered by the witness' to 'the facts or data considered by the witness.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). The Advisory Committee notes to the 2010 amendments of Rule 26 indicate that the amendments are 'intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Case No. 15-CV-2681-DDC-GLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104130 (D. Kansas July 6, 2017)
(holding that the testifying expert's inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents to the plaintiff did not waive privilege protection under Rule 502; "[P]laintiff argues that because defendant's expert, Mr. Murphy, was a testifying expert witness and not a consulting expert witness like the one in Employer's Reinsurance [Emp'r's Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422, 428-31 (D. Kan. 2003)], applying the five-factor test is improper."; "[T]he court concludes that it does not matter who inadvertently produced the information only that someone inadvertently produced it. The court thus applies the five-factor test here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-06 Federal KS

Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. RAZ Imports, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-03028 (SRN/FLN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158183 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016)
(holding that even after the 2010 federal rules amendments, testifying experts who are not obligated to file a report are governed by the pre-2010 waiver rules which therefore require the testifying expert t produce any communications from counsel that the testifying expert "considered"; "On the basis of the advisory committee notes to the 2010 amendments, as well as a particularly scholarly and well-considered opinion of the Eastern District of California analyzing those notes, Magistrate Judge Noel ultimately determined that the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 did not change the law of waiver of privilege existing prior to the amendments, at least as applied to non-reporting expert witnesses."; "As Magistrate Judge Noel noted in the October 5 Order, the waiver of privilege attached to Patton's status as a non-reporting expert extends to any documents and information he considered in connection with his proposed testimony. (October 5 Order at 4.) In this jurisdiction, as well as others, courts have clearly and repeatedly recognized that the term 'considered' is to be interpreted broadly in this context."; "This rule recognizes that part of the purpose of expert discovery is to discover not just the information that the expert used in reaching his conclusions, but also what information he ignored or failed to properly incorporate into his analysis."; In the alternative, Luminara asks the Court to grant it leave to re-designate Patton as a reporting expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). . . . Magistrate Judge Noel carefully considered this same request in his October 5 Order and rejected it, concluding that Luminara was amply advised in both the February 25 and May 18 orders of the duties imposed by designating Patton as a non-reporting expert witness. Such decisions are well within the discretion of the magistrate judge.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-15 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.8
Case Name: In re S3 LTD, No. 99-22531-S, 2000 WL 1239772, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2000)
(where a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy hired a government contracts expert to assist it in a dispute with one of its major creditors, which it then settled and the bankrupt company later sought to lift a settlement-related protective order to disclose to government authorities what it alleged to be fraudulent billing of the government by the creditor; the creditor sought materials prepared by the expert, but the bankrupt company claimed that the materials were protected by the work product doctrine; discussing the interplay of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) (which allows discovery of a nontestifying expert "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances") and Rule 26(b)(3); explaining that Rule 26(b)(4) must be "narrowly construed in order to protect vigorously opinion work product"; holding that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not allow for the discovery of documents, but only permits interrogatories and depositions; finding that the consultant hired by the bankrupt company should also be deemed a non-testifying expert, so that the "substantial need" justifying discovery of nonopinion work product under Rule 26(b)(3) means that the creditor had also shown "exceptional circumstances" under Rule 26(b)(4)(B); "[t]hus, even if some or all of the Vander Schaaf Report [prepared by the consultant/non testifying expert] were not discoverable because of the work-product doctrine, MANCON [the creditor seeking the report] is not restricted from issuing interrogatories to Vander Schaaf or from deposing him in order to discover facts known or opinions held by the expert in conformity with Rule 26(b)(4)(B)"; holding that the portions of the report that are opinion work product would be protected from disclosure, except for the bankrupt company's action in providing the report to the Department of Defense, which waived the work product protection)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-08-10 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.10
Case Name: Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2012)
("The consultant's work will, by definition, be work product because the party uses the consultant 'in anticipation of litigation.' See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). The district court did not use the rule as independent authority to reject API's claim. Rather, the district court used it as an illustration. Because the rule protects 'facts known or opinions held by an expert,' the rule shows that facts and opinions alike are protected and therefore not separable. See id. (emphases added). API also cites authority for the proposition that once a party relies on the research of a nontestifying expert, it falls out of the protection of the Rule and becomes freely discoverable. True, but this is the same litigation-specific argument that API relies on throughout its brief. Parties need only disclose work product in the particular case they use it. This argument echoes the waiver argument we reject below -- that the government used a portion of the report in a consent decree does not mean that the Rule requires disclosure in every case going forward.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal B 9/13

Chapter: 49.301
Case Name: United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 288 F.R.D. 222, 229 (D.D.C. 2012)
("Plaintiff candidly admits that it wants to depose Murray [non-testifying expert] and obtain his test results to impeach Price's [testifying expert] conclusions in his report. Plaintiff asserts that Price relied on Murray's test results without one shred of evidence to support its assertion. Both Murray and Price in their declarations deny any sharing of data of the tested vests.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 9/13

Chapter: 49.302
Case Name: In re McDaniel, No. 14-13-00127-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4052, at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2013)
(holding that tests conducted on a product deserved work product protection; "A party is entitled to obtain the same information about a consulting expert whose work was reviewed by a testifying expert.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-03-28 State TX B 3/14

Chapter: 49.302
Case Name: United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 288 F.R.D. 222, 228 (D.D.C. 2012)
("In the case of collaboration, the non-testifying expert can be deposed to determine whether the work that formed the basis of the testifying expert's opinion was performed in a competent manner and if reliance on such work is common.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 9/13

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Zeiger v. Wellpet LLC, Case No. 17-cv-04056-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63019 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2018)
(holding that a consulting expert can waive his or her protection; noting that the defendant in this case relied on the consulting expert's conclusions, and therefore waived protection; "WellPet has requested certain information and documents aimed at 'uncovering the basis for Plaintiffs' allegations that WellPet's Products purportedly contain arsenic and lead and that CORE contains BPA,' including the identification of the lab and/or person that performed the 'independent lab testing.'. . . Plaintiffs responded that they would not disclose such materials as they believe they are protected under the consulting expert privilege. . . . WellPet argues that plaintiffs have waived any applicable privilege by putting the lab testing at issue in their FAC and depending on it in opposing WellPet's motion to dismiss."; "Plaintiff argues that the consulting expert privilege is not subject to waiver 'because it rooted in the fairness doctrine and is not a species of work product.'"; "In cases involving similar circumstances, judges (including two in this district) have also concluded that the consulting expert privilege is subject to waiver when the party asserting the privilege has depended on the materials in question in the pleadings or in overcoming a motion to dismiss."; "These cases are all similar to the present case, in which plaintiffs have explicitly alleged independent lab testing results and relied on those results in order to overcome WellPet's motion to dismiss. By injecting the lab results into the litigation in connection with a dispositive motion, they have affirmatively used these materials against WellPet and cannot now claim the expert consulting privilege to shield these same materials from discovery. I conclude that they have waived any applicable privilege with respect to the independent lab testing results. This waiver is limited in scope only to those results specifically mentioned in the FAC -- that is, information about the lab and the lab testing results that show that CORE contains 1,500 ppb of arsenic and 221 ppb of lead, and that Complete contains 1,200 ppb of arsenic and 220 ppb of lead. While plaintiffs argue that they do not allege that the 58.5 ppb of BPA figure was the result of 'independent lab testing' and this allegation is beyond the scope, WellPet is nonetheless permitted to discover the basis of this figure as well, whether the result of independent lab testing or some other means. Plaintiffs have no obligation to disclose other testing or communications with or opinions by consulting experts beyond that specifically referenced in the FAC.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-10 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Kurlander v. Kroenke Arena Company, LLC, Civ. A. No. 16-cv-02754-WYD-NYW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113145 (D. Colo. July 20, 2017)
(finding that the work product doctrine did not protect a non-testifying expert's survey, or responses to the survey; holding that disclosing work product did not automatically trigger a subject matter waiver; holding that one testifying expert's opinion was protected, but that the plaintiff had established exceptional circumstances; "Next, the court considers whether Rule 26(b)(4)(D) protections may be waived, and whether the circumstances of this case support finding waiver. The Parties cite to no Tenth Circuit case, and this court's own research could not find one, that resolves the issue of whether waiver applies to Rule 26(b)(4)(D). Some courts within the Circuit have found that waiver applies to the protection of facts and opinions of non-testifying experts by Rule 26(b)(4)(D)."; "[T]he Declarants' voluntary disclosures do not constitute subject matter waiver so as to implicate the correspondence involving the Putative Class Members. Courts in this District, in considering waivers of work product in other contexts, have consistently held that the subject matter waiver rule does not automatically apply to disclosure of work product, and even selective disclosure to an adversary does not necessarily result in subject matter waiver of all work product on that same topic."; "[T]his action lacks the circumstances typically attendant in cases where courts have found waiver of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) protection. For instance, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant relied upon the correspondence between Ms. Knutson and any of the third parties in this litigation, so there is no risk that Defendant is attempting to use Rule 26(b)(4)(D) as both a sword and a shield. . . . Defendant did not voluntarily provide the survey results to Plaintiff for the benefit of furthering its position in this litigation or for the settlement of this action.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-20 Federal CO
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Case No. 15-CV-2681-DDC-GLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104130 (D. Kansas July 6, 2017)
(holding that the testifying expert's inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents to the plaintiff did not waive privilege protection under Rule 502; "[P]laintiff argues that because defendant's expert, Mr. Murphy, was a testifying expert witness and not a consulting expert witness like the one in Employer's Reinsurance [Emp'r's Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422, 428-31 (D. Kan. 2003)], applying the five-factor test is improper."; "[T]he court concludes that it does not matter who inadvertently produced the information only that someone inadvertently produced it. The court thus applies the five-factor test here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-06 Federal KS

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: In re Application of International Mineral Resources B.V. For An Order To Take Discovery Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 1782, Civ. A. No. 14-mc-340 (GK), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98414 (D.D.C. July 28, 2015)
("The Parties cite conflicting authority as to whether the non-testifying expert privilege is subject to waiver at all.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-28 Federal DC

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: B.M.I. Interior Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. M/Y Claire, Case No. 13-62676-CIV-Williams/SIMONTON, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91903 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2015)
(analyzing waiver issues in connection with a non-testifying expert; "Nautical claims that by orally disclosing some or any portion of Guy Clifford's Report, the work product protection has been destroyed as to the entire Report. However, courts have held that due to the sensitive nature of work product materials and the policy behind maintaining their secrecy, generally speaking, when work product protection has been waived, it is limited to the information actually disclosed."; "This limitation is particularly adhered to where the disclosure at issue pertains to work product held or created by a nontestifying expert, as in this case. . . . Even where a court finds that a party waived protections afforded to non testifying experts, the waiver may be limited in scope."; "'The undersigned notes that, as observed in Murray v. Southern Route Mar., S.A., No. C12-1854RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58852, 2014 WL 1671581, at *1-3 (W.D. Wash. April 28, 2014), a number of courts have questioned whether the non-testifying expert privilege under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), can ever be waived. . . (collecting cases addressing waiver in context of non-testifying expert disclosure).'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-15 Federal FL

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Wreal LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 14-21385-CIV, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35082 (S.D. Fla. March 20, 2015)
(explaining that a litigant can use an expert's testimony in a preliminary injunction hearing, which did not render expert testifying at trial for purposes of the federal rules -- thus allowing the expert to return to a non-testifying status for the trial; "Those cases that found waiver of the consulting expert witness privilege base the waiver on the fact that the expert in question has offered an opinion on something more closely related to trial or the ultimate resolution of a case (i.e. a summary judgment brief), that remains outstanding. Dr. Maronick's prior participation at the preliminary injunction phase does not fall into this category. Preliminary injunction matters are not necessarily related to 'trial' -- at least not for expert witness purposes, and, in any event, the preliminary injunction phase has passed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-20 Federal FL

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Wreal LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 14-21385-CIV, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35082 (S.D. Fla. March 20, 2015)
(explaining that a litigant can use an expert's testimony in a preliminary injunction hearing, which did not render expert testifying at trial for purposes of the federal rules -- thus allowing the expert to return to a non-testifying status for the trial; "Amazon has not demonstrated that the privilege afforded such non-testifying experts by Rule 26(b)(4)(D) has been waived. First, as other courts have found, whether such waiver is even possible appears subject to some debate. . . . Second, even if Dr. Maronick's status as a non-testifying expert was somehow waived by his participation in the preliminary injunction motion/hearing (or counsel's reference to his survey at the March 6, 2015 hearing), that status has likely now been restored.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-20 Federal FL

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., Lead Case No. 12cv1592 JAH (RBB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11333 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015)
(finding a defendant waived work product protection by giving its non-testifying expert's report to the government; "Defendants voluntarily disclosed the contents of the reports by Environ (Dr. DeMott) and Exponent (Dr. Fairbrother) in communications with the authorities, presumably electing to use the analyses and conclusions to their advantage. Indeed, they cited these studies in the current litigation. . . . They cannot limit the use of these items now because their prior use constituted a waiver of any privilege."; "Defendants have waived any work product privilege in the Exponent and Environ materials because they chose to voluntarily disclose them to the opposing side.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-23 Federal CA

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., Lead Case No. 12cv1592 JAH (RBB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11333 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015)
(finding a defendant waived work product protection by giving its non-testifying expert's report to the government; "Rule 26(b)(4)(D) 'creates a safe harbor whereby facts and opinions of nontestifying, consulting experts are shielded from discovery, except upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.'. . . Several policy considerations underlie the rule, including, (1) encouraging counsel to obtain necessary expert advice without fear that the adversary may obtain such information; (2) preventing unfairness that would result from allowing an opposing party to reap the benefits from another party's efforts and expense; (3) limiting any chilling effect on the use of experts as consultants if their testimony could be compelled; and (4) avoiding prejudice to the retaining party if the opposing party were allowed to call at trial an expert who provided an unfavorable opinion to the party who first retained them.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-23 Federal CA

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: L-3 Communications Corp. v. Sparton Corp, Case No. 6:13-cv-1481-Orl-TBS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86426, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2014)
(holding that the work product doctrine protected documents prepared by a consulting expert, but that the protection was waived when the documents were provided to an adversary; "Plaintiff has not waived the work-product privilege with respect to any other communications, investigations, tests, or information obtained or prepared by Exelis. If Defendants believe this other information is discoverable, then additional litigation will be required.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-25 Federal FL

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Murray v. Southern Route Maritime, S.A., No. C12-1854RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58852 (W.D. Wash. April 28, 2014)
(finding that a non-testifying expert's report resulted in a waiver; "While there are a number of cases that question whether the non-testifying expert privilege can be waived, very few actually make a finding that waiver is inapplicable. . . . The vast majority of cases find or assume that waiver applies and proceed to make the necessary factual determinations based on the record presented. . . . The Court finds that the majority rule is persuasive. The right to keep the opinions of non-testifying experts secret is based on the same concerns that motivate the work product doctrine: counsel must have a safe space in which to investigate, analyze, and prepare his client's case without fear that the opposing party will be able to exploit his efforts. . . Neither plaintiffs nor the cases on which they rely offer a persuasive reason why the non-testifying expert privilege should be maintained despite a knowing and intelligent disclosure when virtually every other privilege, including the attorney-client privilege and work product protections, are subject to waiver. . . . The Court finds that if the facts known or opinions held by a non-testifying expert are intentionally disclosed or used in a way that is contrary to the purpose of the privilege, waiver may apply."; "Not every disclosure works against that purpose. If, for example, plaintiffs had given a copy of the CETRI report to one of his treating physicians or a third-party with whom it shared an interest and had a reasonable expectation that the report would be kept confidential, the Court would be hard-pressed to find that they had acted adversely to the purposes of the privilege. Such disclosures would not substantially increase the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information or suggest a conscious disregard of the risk that adversaries would obtain the report."; "In the circumstances presented here, however, that conclusion is obvious. Plaintiffs turned the CETRI report over to their opponent in an on-going worker's compensation case."; finding that the disclosure did not cause a subject matter waiver)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-28 Federal WA

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Murray v. Southern Route Maritime, S.A., No. C12-1854RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58852 (W.D. Wash. April 28, 2014)
(finding that disclosure of a non-testifying expert's report to an adversary (the employer in a worker's compensation dispute) caused a waiver, but not a subject matter waiver; "Although plaintiffs' disclosure of the CETRI report waived the privilege as to that document, they have preserved the confidentiality of the underlying examination records and any unreported facts or opinions held by the examining experts. Plaintiffs still have an interest in benefitting from some part of their litigation preparation, and this interest is at the core of the work product doctrine and the non-testifying expert privilege. While a party cannot shield the material which it has already disclosed or on which its witnesses rely, where the disclosure is limited, the waiver applies only to the matters disclosed or relied upon.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-28 Federal WA

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Vidal v. Metro-N. Commuter Ry.Co., No. 3:12cv0248 (MPS) (WIG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13500, at *9 (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 2014)
(analyzing an investigation of railroad policies and practices conducted by a lawyer who was not providing legal advice; using the "assist" test, and declining to apply the work product doctrine; "Estreicher [Consultant, who was a lawyer, but not acting in the legal capacity] was retained after the Class Action was settled and judgment entered. He was not retained in anticipation of this litigation or to prepare for the trial of this action. Additionally, Defendant has already produced his report, which generally waives the protections afforded a non-testifying expert by Rule 26(b)(4)(D).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-02-04 Federal CT B 6/14

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Genesco, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 559, 581, 582, 582 n.5, 584, 584-85 (M.D. Tenn. 2014)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected communications relating to a forensic expert's investigation into a cyberattack in Genesco's computer network; also concluding a non-testifying expert's disclosure did not waive the expert's protection; "Genesco next asserts the attorney client and work product privileges to bar Visa's discovery requests for Sisson's [Genesco's General Counsel] deposition and his records and communications during his investigation of the cyberattack and Visa's assessments and fines. Attorneys' factual investigations 'fall comfortably within the protection of the attorney-client privilege.'. . . This privilege extends to the Stroz firm [outside consultant who assisted inside counsel and outside counsel Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton in investigating a cyberattack on Genesco's computer system] that assisted counsel in his investigation."; "For most actions, this Court requires a privilege log, but a study of the history of law reflects that most rules eventually give rise to exceptions where the facts warrant. Moreover, Rule 26(b)(4)(D) does not require a privilege log, only information that 'describes the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed -- and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.' Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(ii) also does not require a privilege log."; "'Moreover, to disclose the details for a privilege log of documents exchanged between Sisson and Stroz would infringe upon Genesco's counsel and his consultant's mental processes that are entitled to absolute protection in this Circuit. . . . Thus, to require a privilege log for the assertion of these privileges for Genesco's counsel and his agent, the Stroz firm, would itself violate the work product privilege.'"; "These privileges arise from the relationship between Genesco and the Stroz firm for which Genesco's affidavits are appropriate and sufficient to enable the Court to decide whether the privilege attaches."; "This Court and other courts require a privilege log for most cases, but here given the international scope of this controversy and the circumstances of the retention of a consultant computer expert to assist Genesco's counsel in a complex computer investigation, this action fits squarely within Upjohn [Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)]. Given that this controversy involves Genesco's retail establishments through the world, the individual listing of each document to Genesco's counsel for determining privilege seems impracticable and unnecessary to decide this privilege issue in light of Upjohn. The Court, however, will require a privilege log for any document that was prepared by a Genesco employee, but was not addressed directly to Genesco's counsel as such factual circumstances fall outside of Upjohn. Genesco also cannot withhold documents prepared in its ordinary business, as reflected by the Court's ruling that remedial measures that Genesco took in response to Trustwave's report must be produced because the Trustwave [outside forensic investigator of cyber attack] report reflects that those measures were undertaken in the ordinary course of business, not for Genesco's counsel."; "Based upon Precision of New Hampton [Precision of New Hampton. Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp., No. C12-2020, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79847 (N.D. Iowa June 5, 2013)], the Court concludes that there is not any waiver of the attorney client privilege. Assuming a waiver based upon disclosure of the Stroz report, the limitation on the nontestifying expert consultant would still bar the Stroz discovery,as that protection arises under Rule 26(b)(4)(D) that serves different purposes and does not permit of waiver. Precision of New Hampton. Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79847, 2013 WL 2444047, at *3 ('where a party enjoys protection under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), the protection is not subject to waiver.').")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal TN B 6/14

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: Precision of New Hampton, Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp., No. C12-2020, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79847, at *12, *16-17 (N.D. Iowa June 5, 2013)
(analyzing the status of documents created by defendant's engineering expert; ultimately concluding that the non-testifying expert's work product claim was "dubious," but that plaintiff could not overcome any work product protection that did exist; also holding that the defendant did not waive any work product protection opinions to current plaintiff and the defendant's insurance carrier; "Tri Component did not waive the protections of FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26(b)(4)(D). It appears dubious that the waiver doctrine applies to the protections afforded to facts known or opinions held by non-testifying consulting experts. Even if the protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) can be waived, it does not appear that any actions taken by Tri Component make it unfair to insist that the privilege still exists. As in Hooker Chemicals [United States v. Hooker Chem.s & Plastics Corp., 112 F.R.D. 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1986)] -- where the party itself did not make the disclosures that formed the basis of the waiver argument -- Jones and Tri-Component's insurer, rather than Tri Component itself, made the disclosures that Precision [current plaintiff] argues amount to a waiver. These disclosures do not constitute a waiver of the protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) because only Tri Component, as holder of the protections, could waive them. Furthermore, even if the disclosures of Jones and Tri Component's insurer did amount to a waiver, the waiver would not necessarily apply broadly to allow further discovery from Jones.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-05 Federal IA B 4/14

Chapter: 49.304
Case Name: In re S3 LTD, No. 99-22531-S, 2000 WL 1239772, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2000)
("The work product doctrine is a qualified privilege and is subject to waiver."; finding that a litigant had waived the work product protection by sharing a non-testifying expert's report with the government, including the non-testifying expert's opinion)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-08-10 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1566, Base Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108444 (D. Nev. July 12, 2017)
(analyzing communications between a lawyer and a testifying expert; "The majority view that all materials provided to an expert were required to be disclosed in discovery led the American Bar Association ('ABA') to adopt a resolution in 2006 urging rule changes to preclude discovery of privileged materials exchanged between lawyers and experts. The ABA resolution recommended that until the rules were amended, lawyers should enter into voluntary stipulations protecting draft reports and communications between attorneys and experts which were related to an expert report. Id."; "The 2010 Amendment to Rule 26 changed the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) disclosure requirements from 'data or other information' considered by the expert witness to require disclosure of 'facts or data.'"; "The 2010 Amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) added Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to extend explicit protection to draft reports. It also amended Rule 26(b)(4)(C) to provide work product protection to communications between the party's counsel and testifying experts with three exceptions. The three exceptions are attorney-expert communications, regardless of form, that: (1) 'relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;' (2) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed;' and (3) 'identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i)-(iii)."; "The parties' current dispute requires the court to determine whether the summaries, spreadsheet and documents marked or annotated by counsel provided to Mr. Donkin are 'facts and data' and/or assumptions plaintiffs' counsel provided that he considered and/or relied on in reaching his opinions or opinion work product containing attorney mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. The former is discoverable. The latter is not."; "Having reviewed and carefully considered the moving and responsive papers and supporting declarations and exhibits, the court will deny defendants' motion to compel plaintiffs to produce opinion work product in the evidence notebooks provided to Mr. Donkin."; "The court finds that Mr. Donkin's answer to a single question that he 'relied on' materials provided to him in the evidence notebooks is insufficient to overcome work-product protection for core or opinion work product of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have provided a complete list of the entire content of the evidence notebooks. Defense counsel had an opportunity to inquire at Mr. Donkin's deposition whether his report and opinions relied on any assumptions provided by plaintiffs' counsel. Mr. Donkin clearly relied on the facts and data in the notebook as well as a few other materials he reviewed on his own, which he identified at his deposition. However, nothing in the record supports a finding that Mr. Donkin relied on the mental impressions, conclusions, and theories of counsel or on assumptions provided by counsel in reaching his opinions.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-12 Federal NV

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Carrion v. For Issuance of Subpoena under § 28 U.S.C. 0782(a) (In re Republic of Ecuador), 735 F.3d 1179, 1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the testifying experts' materials are governed by the specific testifying expert rule rather than the general work product rule; "Some courts held that drafts of expert reports were discoverable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). . . . Other courts held that communications between an expert and a party's attorney -- even communications containing the attorney's mental impression -- were discoverable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). . . . These decisions, according to the Advisory Committee, had the effect of raising the cost of litigation and causing attorneys to be overly cautious in their interaction with experts.."; "Thus, in 2010 the Advisory Committee abandoned the 'facts or other information' standard for expert reporting and adopted the 'facts or data' standard found in the current version of the Rules. . . . Through this change, the Advisory Committee 'intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney -- expert communications and draft reports.'"; "Contrary to Chevron's assertion that these revisions were intended to have wide-ranging effects, the revisions appear to alter only the outcome of cases either allowing discovery of draft reports or attorney -- expert communications."; "Other comments make clear that the protections of Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) are the exclusive protections afforded to expert trial-preparation materials. 'Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation, or basis of those opinions.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (2010 Comments). If Rules 26(b)(4)(B) were not exclusive, then such a statement would be unlikely."; "Thus, Rule 26(b)(4), especially subdivision (C), restores the core understanding that the work-product doctrine solely protects the inner workings of an attorney's mind.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal B 7/14

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Schwarz & Schwarz of Va., L.L.C. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Civ. A. No. 6:07cv00042, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33019, at *21, *22, *24 (W.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2009)
(finding that a testifying expert had to disclose all documents that he considered, even if the documents were otherwise protected by the opinion work product doctrine; "Whether McGreal was initially retained in a nonlitigation role, he is unquestionably Lloyd's testifying expert now. Therefore, the Rule 45 subpoena was improperly issued to Rimkus. Nonetheless, the court finds that Schwarz is entitled to Rimkus's relevant case file (including documents created or provided past October 1, 2007)."; "[A]ll the information required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must be disclosed at the time Lloyd's chose to disclose expert McGreal, including 'the data or other information considered by [McGreal] in forming [his opinions].' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). Therefore, the court finds that the time for such fulsome disclosure has already past. Contrary to Lloyd's assertion, the 'data or other in-formation considered' requirement is quite broad, encompassing even attorney opinion work product provided to a testifying expert. In Elm Grove Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs. the Fourth Circuit squarely held that in light of the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 . . . , 'draft expert reports prepared by counsel and provided to testifying experts, and attorney-expert communications that explain the lawyer's concept of the underlying facts, or his view of the opinions expected from such experts, are not entitled to protection under the work product doctrine.' 480 F.3d 278, 303 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).'"; "Schwarz is entitled to any 'data or other information that was considered' by McGreal in forming his opinions, including attorney expert communications, and information provided both before and after October 1, 2007.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-04-16 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Elm Grove Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 480 F.3d 278, 301, 303 & n.25 (4th Cir. 2007)
("[I]t is important to the proper cross examination of an expert witness that the adverse party be aware of the facts underlying the expert's opinions, including whether the expert made an independent evaluation of those facts, or whether he instead adopted the opinions of the lawyers that retained him."; "[D]raft expert reports prepared by counsel and provided to testifying experts, and attorney expert communications that explain the lawyer's concept of the underlying facts, or his view of the opinions expected from such experts, are not entitled to protection under the work product doctrine."; "We observe that, in connection with discovery issues such as those presented here, it is important to distinguish between testifying experts, on the one hand, and non testifying or consulting experts, on the other. Any such draft reports or attorney communications made or provided to non testifying or consulting experts should be entitled to protection under the work product doctrinc."; vacating the decision and remanding to the administrative law judge)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2007-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 283 & n.8 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(citing the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule 26 in concluding that materials shared with the testifying expert must be produced; holding that because "drafts [of the expert's reports] may be used for cross examination and other purposes, and are not protected by another doctrine of privilege, drafts should be disclosed where, as here, they are not solely the product of the experts own thoughts and work" (footnote omitted); concluding that there was no reason to decide whether experts must retain drafts that they themselves create, but noting that "there are cogent reasons which militate against such a requirement")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: In re S3 LTD, No. 99-22531-S, 2000 WL 1239772, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2000)
(where a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy hired a government contracts expert to assist it in a dispute with one of its major creditors, which it then settled and the bankrupt company later sought to lift a settlement-related protective order to disclose to government authorities what it alleged to be fraudulent billing of the government by the creditor; the creditor sought materials prepared by the expert, but the bankrupt company claimed that the materials were protected by the work product doctrine; discussing the interplay of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) (which allows discovery of a nontestifying expert "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances") and Rule 26(b)(3); explaining that Rule 26(b)(4) must be "narrowly construed in order to protect vigorously opinion work product"; holding that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not allow for the discovery of documents, but only permits interrogatories and depositions; finding that the consultant hired by the bankrupt company should also be deemed a non-testifying expert, so that the "substantial need" justifying discovery of nonopinion work product under Rule 26(b)(3) means that the creditor had also shown "exceptional circumstances" under Rule 26(b)(4)(B); "[t]hus, even if some or all of the Vander Schaaf Report [prepared by the consultant/non testifying expert] were not discoverable because of the work-product doctrine, MANCON [the creditor seeking the report] is not restricted from issuing interrogatories to Vander Schaaf or from deposing him in order to discover facts known or opinions held by the expert in conformity with Rule 26(b)(4)(B)"; holding that the portions of the report that are opinion work product would be protected from disclosure, except for the bankrupt company's action in providing the report to the Department of Defense, which waived the work product protection)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-08-10 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Lamonds v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302, 304 (W.D. Va. 1998)
("The work product doctrine, as distinguished from the absolute attorney-client privilege, is a qualified protection. . . . Though Rule 26(b)(3) states that courts must protect opinion work product from discovery, its text also subjects the rule to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), (b)(4). Rules 26(b)(4) and 26 (a)(2)(B), read together, allow an opposing party to discover the basis of a testifying expert's opinion and require that the expert issue a report disclosing all 'information considered by the witness in forming his opinion.' The rules, therefore, create a tension between protection of work product and discovery of information considered by an expert. This tension is perhaps most evident in this case where the issue is the discoverability of work product communicated to a retained expert."; holding that documents prepared by the plaintiff's lawyer and supplied to the plaintiff's testifying expert were discoverable even though they contained opinion work product)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1998-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.703
Case Name: Lamonds v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302, 305 (W.D. Va. 1998)
("A number of courts and commentators who have considered the effect of the 1993 amendments and advisory note to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) have concluded that where a lawyer gives work product to an expert who considers it in forming opinions which he or she will be testifying to at trial, this information is no longer privileged and must be disclosed. The Advisory Note does not distinguish between fact and opinion work product where that work product has been shared with an expert witness who considers the work product in formulating his opinions." (citations omitted; footnote omitted); holding that documents prepared by the plaintiff's lawyer and supplied to the plaintiff's testifying expert were discoverable even though they contained opinion work product)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1998-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.704
Case Name: Poole v. Gaston County, Civ. A. No. 3:15-CV-309-DCK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72802 (W.D.N.C. May 12, 2017)
(holding that a testifying expert must disclose a video tape he reviewed, even though the plaintiff testified that the video tape was disclosed to the testifying expert inadvertently; "The undersigned finds that Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B), and the Advisory Committee Notes and cases addressing that Rule, favor production of the materials provided to Plaintiff's expert, even if they were provided inadvertently.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-12 Federal NC

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "The scope of discoverable material under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) has varied over time. Prior to 1993, Rule 26(b)(4) permitted discovery of material only actually known and relied upon by a testifying expert. . . . From 1993, when the requirement for testifying expert reports was initially adopted, until 2010, the required disclosures included 'data and other information considered by the expert.'"; "The 2010 amendments to Rule 26(a)(2) narrowed the scope of required disclosures in testifying expert reports from 'the data and other information considered by the witness' to 'the facts or data considered by the witness.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). The Advisory Committee notes to the 2010 amendments of Rule 26 indicate that the amendments are 'intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the dual hat expert could not withhold his draft report; "Plaintiff has continually argued to distinguish Mr. Hansen's consulting worldwide settlement analysis on the basis that it encompassed more products and a larger geographic area than his testifying expert analysis. Considering this and the lack of evidence that Document 2 is a draft for some other final product, I conclude that Plaintiff's arguments that the worldwide analysis is a draft for his testifying expert analysis are meritless. Document 2 is not a draft of Mr. Hansen's testifying expert report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; "Consulting expert discovery is much more limited than testifying expert discovery -- materials considered by a consulting expert are generally not discoverable. . . . The 'dual hat' expert initially hired as a consulting expert and subsequently retained as a testifying expert in the same case thus presents issues regarding the appropriate scope of discovery."; "In cases involving a 'dual hat' expert, privilege applies 'only [to] those materials generated or considered uniquely in the expert's role as consultant.'. . . The party resisting disclosure of the documents must demonstrate that 'the information considered for consulting expert purposes was not also considered pursuant to the expert's testifying function.'"; "I find that Plaintiff has failed to establish a 'clear distinction' between Mr. Hansen's role as a consulting expert and his role as a testifying expert. Plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Hansen's consulting and testifying roles are separate engagements is belied by the fact that Plaintiffs have presented only one engagement agreement for Mr. Hansen. . . . The argument that the differing scope of information Mr. Hansen considered in his two roles clearly distinguishes those roles is similarly unavailing. The products and patents at issue in this case were included in the calculations Mr. Hansen performed or provided feedback on in his consulting role. Additionally, there is considerable overlap in the facts and data generally relevant to settlement analysis and damages analysis. Analyses related to settlement and damages generally include computation of a reasonable royalty using data such as the parties' market shares, sales revenues, and licensing history, among other things. Mr. Hansen considered all of these sorts of data in his testifying expert report, and the documents at issue also contain this information and additional economic information relevant to settlement and damages analyses, such as profit margins. That Mr. Hansen considered information in his consulting role beyond that which he considered in his testifying role does not establish a clear distinction. Since the information considered by Mr. Hansen for his consulting role included United States sales data and other information relevant to the current case, it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it did not inform the opinions in his testifying expert report concerning damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff must produce the documents it exchanged with Mr. Hansen in his consulting role.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202842 (D. Del. Dec. 11, 2017)
(analyzing the work product and expert testimony rules implication of a consulting expert who then becomes a testifying expert; holding that the expert could only withhold from discovery under the consulting expert rule documents that are uniquely related to that rule; holding that the expert could not plan opinion work product protection or a document he created; "The only evidence supporting Plaintiff's assertion that Document 3(c) was authored by counsel for Plaintiff is that the document contains estimates of litigation costs and outcomes. Though this confirms that the document was authored in anticipation of litigation as required for protection under the work product doctrine, it is insufficient to demonstrate that Document 3(c) was authored by an attorney. Document 3(c) was likely authored by a non-lawyer with experience in economics. Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate that the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 protect Document 3(c) as counsel's work product. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 2010 amendments; Fialkowski, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91165, 2012 WL 2527020 at *4.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-11 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: United States of Am. for the Use of Donald B. Murphy Contractors v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of Am., 8:15CV48, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115874 (D. Neb. July 25, 2017)
(holding that plaintiff's in-house lawyer acted in a legal capacity, not just a risk management capacity; also noting that he acted as a testifying expert, and therefore was required to disclose documents under that rule; "[I]t appears that some of the documents identified as privileged relate to the subject matter of Stylos' expert opinion, i.e., the REA [Request for Equitable Adjustment]. These documents contain factual information regarding scheduling problems and delays experienced on the project. Moreover, several of these documents, and the information contained therein, were likely considered by Stylos in forming his expert opinion. DBM [Plaintiff] contends that privilege has not been waived because Stylos avers he did not rely on any of the documents when preparing the REA. However, '[w]here the expert has acquired information relevant to his opinion, defendants should not be bound by his statement that he did not consider it.". . . Because the Court's in camera review reveals that certain of the withheld documents contain factual information that relates to the subject matter of Stylos' expert testimony, the Court will order that these documents be produced.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-25 Federal NE

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1566, Base Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108444 (D. Nev. July 12, 2017)
(analyzing communications between a lawyer and a testifying expert; "The majority view that all materials provided to an expert were required to be disclosed in discovery led the American Bar Association ('ABA') to adopt a resolution in 2006 urging rule changes to preclude discovery of privileged materials exchanged between lawyers and experts. The ABA resolution recommended that until the rules were amended, lawyers should enter into voluntary stipulations protecting draft reports and communications between attorneys and experts which were related to an expert report. Id."; "The 2010 Amendment to Rule 26 changed the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) disclosure requirements from 'data or other information' considered by the expert witness to require disclosure of 'facts or data.'"; "The 2010 Amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) added Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to extend explicit protection to draft reports. It also amended Rule 26(b)(4)(C) to provide work product protection to communications between the party's counsel and testifying experts with three exceptions. The three exceptions are attorney-expert communications, regardless of form, that: (1) 'relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;' (2) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed;' and (3) 'identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i)-(iii)."; "The parties' current dispute requires the court to determine whether the summaries, spreadsheet and documents marked or annotated by counsel provided to Mr. Donkin are 'facts and data' and/or assumptions plaintiffs' counsel provided that he considered and/or relied on in reaching his opinions or opinion work product containing attorney mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories. The former is discoverable. The latter is not."; "Having reviewed and carefully considered the moving and responsive papers and supporting declarations and exhibits, the court will deny defendants' motion to compel plaintiffs to produce opinion work product in the evidence notebooks provided to Mr. Donkin."; "The court finds that Mr. Donkin's answer to a single question that he 'relied on' materials provided to him in the evidence notebooks is insufficient to overcome work-product protection for core or opinion work product of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have provided a complete list of the entire content of the evidence notebooks. Defense counsel had an opportunity to inquire at Mr. Donkin's deposition whether his report and opinions relied on any assumptions provided by plaintiffs' counsel. Mr. Donkin clearly relied on the facts and data in the notebook as well as a few other materials he reviewed on his own, which he identified at his deposition. However, nothing in the record supports a finding that Mr. Donkin relied on the mental impressions, conclusions, and theories of counsel or on assumptions provided by counsel in reaching his opinions.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-12 Federal NV

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Poole v. Gaston County, Civ. A. No. 3:15-CV-309-DCK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72802 (W.D.N.C. May 12, 2017)
(holding that a testifying expert must disclose a video tape he reviewed, even though the plaintiff testified that the video tape was disclosed to the testifying expert inadvertently; "The undersigned finds that Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B), and the Advisory Committee Notes and cases addressing that Rule, favor production of the materials provided to Plaintiff's expert, even if they were provided inadvertently.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-12 Federal NC

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. RAZ Imports, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-03028 (SRN/FLN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158183 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016)
(holding that even after the 2010 federal rules amendments, testifying experts who are not obligated to file a report are governed by the pre-2010 waiver rules which therefore require the testifying expert t produce any communications from counsel that the testifying expert "considered"; "On the basis of the advisory committee notes to the 2010 amendments, as well as a particularly scholarly and well-considered opinion of the Eastern District of California analyzing those notes, Magistrate Judge Noel ultimately determined that the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 did not change the law of waiver of privilege existing prior to the amendments, at least as applied to non-reporting expert witnesses."; "As Magistrate Judge Noel noted in the October 5 Order, the waiver of privilege attached to Patton's status as a non-reporting expert extends to any documents and information he considered in connection with his proposed testimony. (October 5 Order at 4.) In this jurisdiction, as well as others, courts have clearly and repeatedly recognized that the term 'considered' is to be interpreted broadly in this context."; "This rule recognizes that part of the purpose of expert discovery is to discover not just the information that the expert used in reaching his conclusions, but also what information he ignored or failed to properly incorporate into his analysis."; In the alternative, Luminara asks the Court to grant it leave to re-designate Patton as a reporting expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). . . . Magistrate Judge Noel carefully considered this same request in his October 5 Order and rejected it, concluding that Luminara was amply advised in both the February 25 and May 18 orders of the duties imposed by designating Patton as a non-reporting expert witness. Such decisions are well within the discretion of the magistrate judge.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-15 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Tessera, Inc. v. UTAC (Taiwan) Corp., Case No. 10-cv-04435-EJD (HRL), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118803 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2015)
("Tessera might possess some photos that must be disclosed. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires the production of 'facts or data considered' by an expert to form his opinions. An expert 'considered' information that he 'reviewed' even if the expert did not ultimately rely on that information in his final report. . . . If Tessera sent Dr. Bravman any unproduced photos of UTC packages and Dr. Bravman ultimately declined to rely on them in his report, then Dr. Bravman nonetheless considered those photos and they must be produced.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-09-04 Federal CA

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Beachfront North Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., Civ. No. 14-6706 (RBK/JS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102917 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2015)
(analyzing work product issues in a first party insurance context; "The Court adopts the majority 'pro-discovery' position that 'a party must disclose all information provided to its testifying expert for consideration in the expert's report, including information otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product [doctrine].'. . . The definition of 'considered' set forth in Synthes Spine [Synthes Spine Co., L.P. v. Walden, 232 F.R.D. 460, 462 (E.D.Pa. 2005)] is also adopted. This definition provides that an expert must disclose all information he/she 'generates, reviews, reflects upon, reads and/or uses in connection with the formulation of his [or her] opinions, even if the testifying expert ultimately rejects the information.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-08-05 Federal NJ

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Perez v. El Tequila LLC, Case No. 12-CV-588-JED-PJC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34174 (N.D. Okla. March 19, 2015)
(finding that the work product doctrine protected oral communications between a government lawyer and a third party's employees; also analyzing the government's later retention of witnesses' experts; "Defense counsel contends that once the Casio witnesses were retained as experts in August 2014, it rendered their July 24 communications with Plaintiff's counsel discoverable. Counsel has provided no authority for this position and the Court rejects it. The Defendants are entitled to know what the expert witnesses considered and relied on in forming their opinions. That information was provided in the Rule 26 expert report provided to the defense a month before Speer's deposition.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-19 Federal OK

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Environnement N.A. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154717 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2014)
(analyzing the waiver effect of lawyers' communications to testifying experts; "By enlisting Xroads [Valuation firm] and Duff & Phelps [Valuation firm] as expert witnesses in its litigation with the IRS, Taxpayer has placed them 'in a position to serve as a conduit to transmit' either these documents 'or at least [their] conclusions' to the IRS; the reason Taxpayer is submitting documents to these experts is the hope that the experts will agree with their content, incorporate them into an expert report, and thereby provide Taxpayer an opportunity to persuade the IRS to agree with Taxpayer's position. . . . Consequently, the documents submitted to the testifying experts here lose their work-product protection, unless the protection is otherwise preserved by Rule 26(b)(4)(C).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-31 Federal DE

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Republic of Ecuador v. MacKay, 742 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2014)
("The historical evolution of the rule, its current structure, and the Committee's explanatory notes make clear that the driving purpose of the 2010 amendments was to protect opinion work product -- i.e., attorney mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories -- from discovery. . . . The protections for draft reports and attorney-expert communications were targeted at the areas most vulnerable to the disclosure of opinion work product. The Committee thus sought to acknowledge the reality that attorneys often feel that it is extremely useful -- if not necessary -- to confer and strategize with their experts. But there is no indication that the Committee was attempting to do so at the expense of an adversary's ability to understand and respond to a testifying expert's analysis.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal B 6/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Republic of Ecuador v. MacKay, 742 F.3d 860, 870 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014)
("'[W]e note that an ordinary work product protection (i.e., for trial preparation materials prepared by non-attorneys that do not reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories) would typically be waived where the materials are disclosed to a testifying expert.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal B 6/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Republic of Ecuador v. MacKay, 742 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2014)
("We conclude that Rule 26(b)(3) does not provide presumptive protection for all testifying expert materials as trial preparation materials. The 2010 amendments did not fundamentally restructure Rule 26 to do so.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal B 6/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Holland v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-1983 TLN AC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157161, at *14-15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2013)
(analyzing standing issues; explaining that the defendant insurance company provided coverage for losses resulting from plaintiff's injury, and sought discovery from a personal injury lawyer who had represented plaintiff in an earlier action against the hospital and the doctor for medical malpractice following a work injury; further noting that the underlying malpractice case was resolved, after which the insurance company sought discovery from plaintiff's personal injury lawyer and defendants' lawyer; holding that plaintiff had standing to resist the insurance company's discovery of the former but not the latter; "In this case, plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent defendant seeks to discover draft reports or other disclosures and communications for those experts retained for trial, except that Steven Schultz [plaintiff's former lawyer] must disclose (1) facts or data that the attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or (2) the assumptions that the attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-31 Federal CA B 5/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Great-West Life & Annuity In. Co. v. Am. Economy Ins. Co., Case No. 2:11-cv-02082-APG-CWH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135750, at *52-53 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2013)
(finding that a litigant had failed to comply with the timing requirement of a protective order relating to inadvertent disclosures; finding that the parties could have entered into a different kind of protective order; "Outside of the rejected request to apply the claw back principles of Fed. R. Evid. 502 to the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) disclosures, the only other argument appears to be that Mr. Kezer [testifying expert] did not review or consider the documents at issue. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. There is no question that Mr. Kezer received the documents. Now, after testifying under oath at his deposition that he 'looked at the documents that were provided to me . . . went through all of them, and [] focused in on portions of them and not on some of the others,' Mr. Kezer has submitted a declaration stating otherwise. His declaration states that he 'never reviewed' the Kezer documents. The Court is not inclined to permit an expert who testifies under oath during his deposition that he looked at the documents provided to him to file a post hoc declaration that he did not see a specified set of documents -- a set of documents that happens to coincide with a contested waiver claim.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-09-23 Federal NV B 4/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ('MTBE') Prods. Liab. Litig., 293F.R.D. 568, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(in an opinion by Judge Shira Scheindlin, analyzing experts playing two roles in the same case; "In light of this framework, furnishing work-product of a factual nature to a testifying expert constitutes implied waiver of work-product protection to the extent that the expert considers the facts or data disclosed in forming her opinion. However, draft reports and disclosures continue to be protected work-product." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ('MTBE') Prods. Liab. Litig., 293F.R.D. 568, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(in an opinion by Judge Shira Scheindlin, analyzing experts playing two roles in the same case; "It is irrelevant whether the expert ultimately relies upon the facts or data in forming her expert opinion; instead, the test is whether the expert 'considered' the materials. Further, because 'a testifying expert [must] disclose all materials that he considered in reaching his opinion, . . . [a] party seeking to compel the production of [] documents should not have to rely on the [resisting party's] representation that the documents were not considered by the expert in forming his opinion.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Yeda Research & Dev. Co. v. Abbott GMBH & Co. KG, 292 F.R.D. 97, 109, 104 (D.D.C. 2013)
(in a patent case, ordering a testifying expert to produce his earlier work created when he was a non-testifying expert; holding that after federal rules changes, a testifying expert can withhold only those documents prepared "uniquely" in his or her non-testifying roles; "[T]he 2010 amendment to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) was accompanied by several other changes to the expert discovery rules governing privilege. The 2010 amendment was, in essence, an effort to reign in courts that had held that the disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) trumped all claims of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal DC B 4/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Carrion v. For Issuance of Subpoena under § 28 U.S.C. 0782(a) (In re Republic of Ecuador), 735 F.3d 1179, 1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the testifying experts' materials are governed by the specific testifying expert rule rather than the general work product rule; "Some courts held that drafts of expert reports were discoverable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). . . . Other courts held that communications between an expert and a party's attorney -- even communications containing the attorney's mental impression -- were discoverable under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii). . . . These decisions, according to the Advisory Committee, had the effect of raising the cost of litigation and causing attorneys to be overly cautious in their interaction with experts.."; "Thus, in 2010 the Advisory Committee abandoned the 'facts or other information' standard for expert reporting and adopted the 'facts or data' standard found in the current version of the Rules. . . . Through this change, the Advisory Committee 'intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney -- expert communications and draft reports.'"; "Contrary to Chevron's assertion that these revisions were intended to have wide-ranging effects, the revisions appear to alter only the outcome of cases either allowing discovery of draft reports or attorney -- expert communications."; "Other comments make clear that the protections of Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) are the exclusive protections afforded to expert trial-preparation materials. 'Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation, or basis of those opinions.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (2010 Comments). If Rules 26(b)(4)(B) were not exclusive, then such a statement would be unlikely."; "Thus, Rule 26(b)(4), especially subdivision (C), restores the core understanding that the work-product doctrine solely protects the inner workings of an attorney's mind.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal B 7/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Carrion v. For Issuance of Subpoena Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (In re Republic of Eduador), 735 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2013)
(analyzing the relatively new federal work product rule, and finding that work product protection was limited to the terms of the the rule and did not include documents provided to a testifying expert; "Rule 26(b)(4), especially subdivision (C), restores the core understanding that the work-product doctrine solely protects the inner workings of an attorney's mind. Though Chevron [intervenor-appellant] argues that 'facts or data' is to be construed narrowly to limit discovery to the barebones factual information underlying an expert's opinion, . . . the comments reinforce the strong preference for broad discovery of expert materials: '[T]he intention is that "facts or data" be interpreted broadly to require disclosure of any material considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (2010 Comments). This indifference as to the source of material refutes Chevron's contention that documents provided to an expert by a party are protected under Rule 26(b)(3). And materials containing 'factual ingredients' include far more than materials made up solely of 'facts or data.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal B 5/14

Chapter: 49.706
Case Name: Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 F.3d 1185, 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 2013)
(explaining materials created by experts are not covered by the work product rule, but instead are covered by the special expert rule; "[T]he 2010 Amendments did two things. First, as outlined above, the drafters added Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) to protect draft expert reports and attorney-expert communications as work product. Second, the drafters changed the language of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) from 'data or other information' to 'facts or data.' This change rejects the outcome reached by cases that relied on the old 'other information' language in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to compel the production of draft expert reports and communications between attorneys and experts. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) was changed so that it would not conflict with new Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C), which now expressly exempt draft reports and attorney-expert communications from discovery."; "To the extent any attorney core opinion work-product is embedded in the 1,200 documents at issue here, Chevron and Dr. Hinchee may appropriately redact such portions -- subject to providing a privilege log under Rule 26(b)(5) and submitting the materials for in camera review if requested by the Republic and directed by the district court. Any redaction beyond attorney core opinion work-product is not allowed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal B 5/14

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Barbierri v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., FSTCV126014221S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2627 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2014)
(explaining that Connecticut case law was mixed on the waiver implications of disclosing work product to a testifying expert; "The above-quoted language of Practice Book §13-4 is similar to Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is therefore appropriate to look to federal law for guidance. But the opinions of District Courts cited by both parties show a split of authority on the issue of discoverability of materials provided to or generated by an expert as a basis of the expert's opinion."; "Allowing discovery of information provided to a testifying expert, even if that information has been obtained by counsel in the course of trial preparation and would otherwise be protected as attorney work product, is grounded in fundamental fairness and represents the majority position of authority on the subject as expressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Regional Airport Authority v. LFG, LLC, [460 F.3d 697, 715 (6 Cir. 2006)] supra.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-17 State CT

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: In re McDaniel, No. 14-13-00127-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4052, at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2013)
(holding that tests conducted on a product deserved work product protection; "A party is entitled to discovery of all documents, physical models, reports, compilations of data, or other material provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for a retained testifying expert. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)(6).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-03-28 State TX B 3/14

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Hodges v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 56 Va. Cir. 348, 350 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001)
("The questioning of the expert witness concerning what that expert discussed with Plaintiff's counsel prior to the deposition would provide an unfair advantage to Defendant. The answer to such a question 'would reveal [Plaintiff's] counsel's trial tactics and thoughts by way of showing [Defendant] exactly what the [Plaintiff] feels is and is not important to his case.' Shanholtzer v. Dean, 51 Va. Cir. 493 (2000). It is permissible for counsel for Defendant to ask the expert witness what if any information he obtained from counsel for the Plaintiff that affected his expert opinion. If the information divulged by the expert is information or documents already in the possession of counsel for Defendant, then the inquiry is concluded. To allow any further questioning would invade Plaintiff's counsel's legal strategy, which parallels in substance his work product. 'Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its function on wits borrowed from the adversary.' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 91 L. Ed. 451, 67 S. Ct. 385, 34 Ohio Op. 395 (Justice Jackson, concurring) (1947).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-01-01 State VA B 3/16

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Wilson v. Rogers, 53 Va. Cir. 280, 281 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
("In summary, I am persuaded that Lamonds, [Lamonds v. Gen. Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302 (W.D. Va. 1998)] represents the more modern application of discovery practice and to the extent that the materials sought relate to the preparation of expert testimony for trial they should be produced. Obviously, I do not believe that either of the two Virginia cases, Rakes [Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542 (1970)] or Edwards, [Commonwealth v. Edwards, 235 Va. 499 (1988)] preclude this result and are factually in opposite to our case. By disclosing material to an expert to assist him in preparing expert opinion for trial, counsel opens the discovery door. On the other hand, asking an expert to assist counsel in preparation for cross-examination of another expert moves into the area of legal theories which are protected by the rule.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-01-01 State VA B 3/16

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Wilson v. Rogers, 53 Va. Cir. 280, 282 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
(relying upon Lamonds v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302 (W.D. Va. 1998), as representing "the more modern application of discovery practice," and holding that "to the extent that the materials sought relate to the preparation of expert testimony for trial they should be produced"; nevertheless holding that a letter from a testifying expert to counsel for the defendant were protected from disclosure because the letter and its attachments "suggest possible theories of defense as opposed to the opinion rendered by the expert . . . . By disclosing material to an expert to assist him in preparing expert opinion for trial, counsel opens the discovery door. On the other hand, asking an expert to assist counsel in preparation for cross-examination of another expert moves into the area of legal theories which are protected by the rule."; ordering production of correspondence between the defendant's counsel and testifying expert that the testifying expert "would use . . . in preparation of his opinion")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Lamonds v. General Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302, 304 (W.D. Va. 1998)
("The work product doctrine, as distinguished from the absolute attorney-client privilege, is a qualified protection."; holding that documents prepared by the plaintiff's lawyer and supplied to the plaintiff's testifying expert were discoverable even though they contained opinion work product)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1998-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 49.707
Case Name: Moyers v. Steinmetz, 37 Va. Cir. 25-26, 29 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1995)
(ordering production of a lawyer's letter to an expert witness after redaction of the lawyer's mental impressions, opinions and legal theories; noting that no Virginia appellate court had ruled on the issue of whether making a privileged document available to an expert witness waives the privilege)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1995-01-01 State VA B 3/16

Chapter: 49.902
Case Name: Siegmund v. Bian, Case No. 16-CV-62506-MORENO/LOUIS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155507 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2018)
(analyzing both the opinion work product doctrine and Rule 612's application connection with deposition questions about the deponent's review of documents before testifying; holding that the adversary's lawyer could ask generally about what documents the witness interviewed; "It is well-settled law that except for pure opinion work product, 'any work product protection [is] lost when the witness specifically relie[s] on the document in preparation for his deposition.'. . . Moreover, 'whatever heightened protection may be conferred upon opinion work product, that level of protection is not triggered unless disclosure creates a real, non-speculative danger of revealing the lawyer's thoughts.'. . . Here, Plaintiff is not seeking production the documents on which Mr. Paskowitz relied; instead, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff should have been permitted to question Mr. Paskowitz about the general nature of the documents he used to prepare for his deposition."; "Mr. Paskowitz testified that in preparation for his deposition, he met with his counsel for about five or six hours and reviewed certain documents (ECF No. 188-1 at 18). When asked, 'can you generally describe the documents that you reviewed,' Mr. Paskowitz was instructed not to answer on grounds of work product privilege and attorney-client communication. This was error. Plaintiff should have been permitted to examine Mr. Paskowitz regarding the general nature of the documents he used to prepare himself for the deposition, absent a 'real, non-speculative danger' of revealing opinion work product."; "Defendant also claims that by identifying which groups of documents Mr. Paskowitz relied on for his preparation, he would be revealing the sorting and grouping process of his attorneys. Although federal courts disagree over whether the selection and compilation of documents by counsel may constitute opinion work product, it is clear that 'the mere selection and grouping of information by counsel for a deponent to review does not automatically transform otherwise discoverable documents into work product.' Calderon v. Reederei Claus-Peter Offen Gmbh & Co., No. 07-61022-CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130423, 2009 WL 1748089, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2009). As such, the party asserting a work product claim 'must come forward with some evidence that disclosure of the requested documents creates a real, non-speculative danger of revealing counsel's thoughts.". . . In this case, Defendant, whose burden it is to demonstrate the applicability of the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege, has not shown that the identification of the documents Mr. Paskowitz reviewed in preparation for his deposition creates a 'real, non-speculative danger' of revealing counsel's thoughts, or implicating the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff should have been permitted to question Mr. Paskowitz regarding the general nature of the documents he reviewed in preparation for his deposition.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-05 Federal FL