McGuireWoods Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product Case Summary Database

Showing 314 of 314 results

Chapter: 22.1
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
("'The term 'internal investigation' has been used by both parties throughout this adjudication and, therefore, will be used in this opinion as well for consistency. However, technically the investigation was an 'external investigation' because it was conducted by outside counsel, not by in-house counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC

Chapter: 22.3
Case Name: Buchanan v. Sterling Construction Co., Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-3429 JURY, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39792 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with a corporate investigation (although without explaining what the investigation focused on); holding that the privilege could protect communications about the investigation; "The fact that defendants were communicating internally, or with their attorney, about the investigation does not support plaintiffs' contention that 'the Defendants or their attorneys were assisting in drafting or modifying the report.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-12 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.3
Case Name: Olson v. Shawnee Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, Case No. 12-2084-JTM-KGG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38442, at *6, *6-7 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 2013)
(finding an employment-related investigation was not protected by the privilege; "[A]fter counsel passes along responsibility for the investigation, the investigation occurs and a report is compiled by the investigator. Counsel then shares the contents of that report with the Sheriff."; "While the Court anticipates that 'legal guidance' occurs during this conversation, that does not make the contents of the underlying report -- which counsel did not draft and for which counsel did not conduct the underlying investigation -- privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-05-20 Federal KS B 3/14

Chapter: 22.4
Case Name: Rubie's Costume Co. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc., CV 16-6517 (SJF) (AKT), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168220 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018)
(analyzing work product and common interest issues in connection with an investigation into possible trademark infringement; "The Court has reviewed the transcript of Aziz's testimony and finds that in many instances, Plaintiffs' counsel improperly instructed Aziz not to answer certain questions on the grounds of attorney-client and work product privileges, as well as the common interest doctrine. Likewise, in some instances, the privilege assertion was far too broad. The relevant questions to which an instruction not to answer was given can be characterized as either (1) questions concerning the people at Amazon with whom Aziz communicated during the course of his 'test purchases' and the subject matter of those communications . . . or (2) questions concerning internal communications between Aziz and other Rubie's employees regarding his investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-28 Federal NY
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 22.4
Case Name: McSparran v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Civ. No. 1:13-CV-1932, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19993 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2016)
(allowing the plaintiff to ask the government agency's investigator about the logistics of her investigation into sexual discrimination allegations, and also ask her about the facts she uncovered; dealing first with attorney-client privilege issues; "[T]he information at issue is not a communication. Plaintiff wants disclosure of the steps Moseley took during her investigation -- what she did, who she talked to, where she looked -- not disclosure of what agency counsel told her. Thus, Plaintiff seeks disclosure of underlying facts, and those facts do not become shielded under attorney-client privilege simply because they may have been included in a communication between Moseley and counsel. Id."; "Accordingly, we will deny Defendants' motion for protective order. Plaintiff may inquire into the steps Moseley took during the course of her investigation. She may also inquire into the facts Moseley learned during that investigation. Plaintiff may not, however, discover the contents of conversations Moseley had with agency counsel or the contents of conversations Moseley had with other DEP employees while acting at the direction of agency counsel. Such conversations, whether written or oral, are privileged attorney-client communications."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-18 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.5
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that Baker Bott's investigation deserved privilege protection; "Brady [former director unsuccessfully seeking discovery] alleges that the Phase I Report was prepared in the context of rendering business advice, rather than legal advice."; "In asserting the privilege, i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts claim that i2 hired Baker Botts to deliver legal advice regarding the former officers' allegations of accounting improprieties and threats of litigation. They rely on Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, which quotes Wigmore on Evidence and states that '[i]t is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice. . . . [T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice.' 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence ยง2296 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Additionally, i2 and Baker Botts contend that even though the Phase I Report includes some business considerations, the primary source of the Report was to provide legal advice."; "An in camera review of the Phase I Report revealed that it is laced with underlying facts, legal opinions, and business advice. Additionally, the fact that the Report was the result of many i2 officer and director interviews with Baker Botts leads the court to conclude that the interviews were confidential communications between the corporate client and its counsel. The court also finds that the presentation of the Phase I Report from Baker Botts to the i2 Audit Committee was, in essence, a written communication and the equivalent of a confidential communication between an attorney and his client.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "All SoftwareONE can muster in support of its argument is that 'QTI's investigation was done at the direction of SWO's in-house and outside counsel,' and 'SWO's counsel provided legal advice and direction so to ensure that the QTI investigation moved forward in an adequate way.'"; "The first argument -- that QTI's investigation was done at the direction of SoftwareONE's counsel -- is not enough to suggest the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. . . . Even if initiated by a business's attorney, investigations undertaken for the purpose of making business decisions, as opposed to obtaining legal advice, are not privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "As for the second point -- that SoftwareONE's counsel provided legal advice and direction so as to ensure that the QTI investigation moved forward in an adequate way -- if SoftwareONE is attempting to suggest that its in-house counsel entered into an attorney-client relationship with QTI, it falls far short of establishing that."; "Only if QTI's investigators were 'professional legal adviser[s],' SoftwareONE sought their legal advice, and made confidential communications for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, would the communications plausibly be privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "Businesses routinely investigate matters for their own purposes independent of the prospect of litigation."; "The party seeking the protection of the work-product doctrine has the burden to show the doctrine applies."; "The court concludes that SoftwareONE has failed in its burden to show that the documents sought by Anderson were created in anticipation of litigation rather than for SoftwareONE's own business purposes. Although SoftwareONE could reasonably recognize based on some of the allegations in Anderson's October 1, 2015 email (ECF No. 25-1) that there was a possibility that she might sue it, Anderson's allegations were expansive, including many matters for which she could not personally seek legal redress but which any prudent business would investigate."; "The fact that SoftwareONE's in-house attorney initiated the investigation, coupled with the fact that SoftwareONE learned soon after the email complaint that Anderson had retained counsel, are insufficient without significantly more to sustain SoftwareONE's burden on this issue. Significantly, as Anderson points out, SoftwareONE does not support its motion with an affidavit or declaration from its in-house counsel, or anyone else for that matter, stating that QTI was hired in anticipation of litigation. Moreover, SoftwareONE has failed to support its claim of work-product with the sorts of relevant details the court would expect -- such as the nature and scope of QTI's engagement; details as to the actual investigation; a detailed description of the documents that were allegedly created in anticipation of litigation; details as to SoftwareONE's policies and procedures for conducting internal investigations of complaints of discrimination, etc. Without the identification and discussion of specific documents, the court is unable to analyze whether any particular document was created in anticipation of litigation."; "Essentially all SoftwareONE has offered are the assertions of its current attorney contained in its brief, where she asserts, unsupported by any evidentiary support, that SoftwareONE retained QTI in anticipation of litigation. . . . But that falls far short of showing the requisite causation between the prospect of litigation and the investigation. It is entirely foreseeable that, even if SoftwareONE were somehow assured that Anderson would not be pursuing litigation, it nonetheless would investigate her allegations. Therefore, the court will deny SoftwareONE's motion to quash the subpoena issued to QTI.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
("Defendants contend, in the privilege log as in the joint statement and at hearing, that all the identified documents are privileged because they involve an investigation that was conducted by Ryan, a non-attorney employee in Insperity's EEO division, at the direction of counsel and for the purpose of seeking legal advice. . . . The court is unconvinced by this theory, for several reasons. First, defendants provide no evidentiary support for their factual assertion that Ryan conducted the investigation pursuant to instructions from counsel, and that her investigation was solely or primarily motivated by the need to defend Titus's legal claims. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have provided evidence to dispute defendants' claim that the investigation was for the purpose of defending claims or obtaining legal advice. All three plaintiffs have submitted declarations in which they attest that Ryan told them her interviews were intended to determine whether a pattern of discriminatory practices existed within WealthCounsel and, if so, recommend appropriate remedial measures. . . . Such an internal human resources investigation is independent of the defense of Titus's claims before the EEOC or in a court of law. Accordingly, the court cannot accept defendants' unsupported allegation that Ryan's investigation was conducted 'for the purpose of obtaining advice from counsel regarding next steps and defenses.'. . . Rather, the court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the facts necessary to support the claim of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Pitkin v. Corizon Health, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-02235-AA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208058 (D. Ore. Dec. 18, 2017)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege protected an investigation undertaken by a jail health services contractor into the death of an inmate; adopting the one "primary purpose" privilege standard from the D.C. circuit court case in Kellogg Brown & Root; "I am persuaded by the Kellogg [In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 2014)] court's reasoning, and I adopt it here. Because the Ninth Circuit has not adopted a characterization of the 'primary purpose' test that aids in categorizing the kinds of mixed-motive investigations specifically at issue here, I will apply the gloss provided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Kellogg."; "Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege protects the results of the Sentinel Event investigation undertaken by Corizon in the aftermath of Ms. Pitkin's untimely and unfortunate death. Corizon has satisfied each element of the attorney-client privilege standard, showing that it sought factfinding and advice at the direction of Corizon's in-house legal team. Moreover, it showed that at least one primary purpose of the investigation was to 'assess the situation from a legal perspective, provide legal guidance, and prepare for possible litigation and/or administrative proceedings.'. . . That Corizon was fulfilling its obligations under its own corporate policies or its contract with Washington County -- or both -- is of no moment. As the Kellogg court explained, '[i]t is often not useful or even feasible to try to determine whether the purpose was A or B when the purpose was A and B.'. . . Common sense suggests that the death of an inmate would trigger numerous obligations for the organization charged with her care, not the least of which would be an assessment of liability. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege applies to the Sentinel Event investigation, and Corizon is not required to produce it.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-18 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017)
February 21, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Assessing Privilege and Work Product Claims in an Investigation Context Examine Several Factors"

Courts assessing privilege and work product claims for corporate investigations usually focus on (1) the investigation's initiation (analyzing what motivated the investigation), and (2) the investigation's course (usually looking for lawyers' involvement). Less frequently, courts also focus on (3) the corporation's use of the investigation results. That post-investigation factor can shed light on the investigation's initial motivation.

In Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017), the court overruled defendant hospital's privilege and work product claims for documents the hospital created while investigating an allegedly botched surgery. Analyzing one withheld email, the court rejected the hospital Risk Manager's affidavit claiming work product protection โ€“ noting that her statement "indicating that she would let the 'administrative team' know about the conversation . . . as opposed to in-house counsel or outside counsel โ€“ suggests that at the time of the creation of the emails, neither party crafted their emails 'in anticipation of litigation.'" Id. at *13.

Corporations and their lawyers must remember that courts examining privilege and work product protection for investigation-related documents focus on the investigation's initiation, course, and even how the client used investigation-related documents.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-15 Federal KY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S. A., LLC, 16 Civ. 1805 (JPO) (JCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126185 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017)
(in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Francis, holding that drafts of and communications relating to an investigation conducted by the Proskauer Rose law firm into client's alleged Title VII violation deserved both privilege and work product protection; also noting that the defendant had abandoned a Faragher-Ellerth defense, but that the court would have to review the withheld documents in camera to determine if defendant waived either protection by using the report for "context" in connection with its "good faith" defense; "Proskauer has declined to disclose (1) electronic and handwritten notes taken by Proskauer attorneys during the investigation interviews; (2) earlier drafts of the Proskauer Report containing attorney comments; (3) invoices submitted to the Corporate Defendants; (4) documents provided to Proskauer by JWT and the interviewees in the course of the investigation; and (5) emails among Proskauer attorneys and between Proskauer attorneys and JWT witnesses or outside counsel regarding the investigation and the lawsuit (collectively, the 'Proskauer Documents')."; "[I]t is not the Report itself that is at issue, but rather the documents generated during the investigation."; "With respect to many of the Proskauer Documents, I disagree. 'Rare is the case that a troubled corporation will initiate an internal investigation solely for legal, rather than business, purposes; indeed, the very prospect of legal action against a company necessarily implicates larger concerns about a company's internal procedures and controls, not to mention its bottom line.'. . . Yet the purpose of a communication need not be exclusively legal in order for the privilege to attach. . . . Rather, the legal purpose need only be predominant, and identification of such a purpose 'may [] be informed by the overall needs and objectives that animate the client's request for advice.'. . . Here, there were no doubt multiple motivations for commencing an internal investigation and engaging in the subject communications: to gather information to defend this lawsuit; to determine whether systemic changes were necessary; to decide on a course of action specifically with respect to Mr. Martinez; and to ameliorate a public relations problem. Yet all of these purposes were suffused with the need for legal advice triggered by a lawsuit that had already been filed. This is confirmed by the fact that the Proskauer report contains multiple references to the allegations contained in the lawsuit . . . as well as the fact that its recommendations reflect the application of legal expertise . . . . The plaintiff complains that any claim that the Proskauer investigation had a primarily legal purpose is undermined by the fact that the Corporate Defendants' outside counsel, Davis & Gilbert, had already conducted one . . . . But, surely, the fact that a client chooses to seek legal advice from multiple attorneys does not cast doubt on the privileged nature of communications with any one of them."; "This is true even where the document in its final form is intended to be disseminated publicly. . . . As discussed above, the Proskauer Report reflects the provision of legal advice so the drafts of that report are similarly privileged. Moreover, even if the drafts are not privileged in their entirety, they are also subject to work product protection, as will be discussed below."; "In this case, the Corporate Defendants raised a Faragher/Ellerth defense in their Answer. . . . However, they have since disavowed use of the Proskauer Report in connection with any Farragher/Ellerth defense. They first made this clear at a court conference. . . and they state unequivocally in their reply memorandum that 'Defendants will not be using the legal conclusions in the Proskauer Report . . . to support their position that there has been no violation of the law . . . . ' (Reply Memorandum of Law in further Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)."; "This does not, however, end the inquiry. The Corporate Defendants have indicated that they do not intend to rely on the Proskauer Report 'to provide context for the actions they took as a result of the business recommendations in the Report.'. . . Reliance by the Corporate Defendants on the conclusions of the report does not open up to discovery the details of the investigation that led to the report. . . . Therefore, there is no waiver with respect to the categories of the Proskauer Documents that could be relevant, if at all, only to the accuracy of the findings in the report, specifically, notes of interviews of JWT employees, drafts of the report, and invoices."; "However, when a party asserts a good faith defense, as the Corporate Defendants appear to do here, it may not selectively proffer the information upon which it relied. . . . Here, the extent to which the Corporate Defendants acted in good faith on the basis of the Proskauer Report is dependent upon the totality of the legal advice they received. Thus, the communications related to Proskauer's conclusions, but not the reliabililty of the investigation lending to those conclusions, are discoverable. Accordingly, if they intend to introduce the Proskauer Report in evidence, the Corporate Defendants shall produce for my in camera review any documents withheld on grounds of privilege that reflect communications between themselves and Proskauer or between Proskauer and David & Gilbert concerning the subject matter of the Proskauer Report. In that way, I can determine whether fairness necessitates the disclosure of these documents to the plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-09 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S. A., LLC, 16 Civ. 1805 (JPO) (JCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126185 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017)
(in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Francis, holding that drafts of and communications relating to an investigation conducted by the Proskauer Rose law firm into client's alleged Title VII violation deserved both privilege and work product protection; also noting that the defendant had abandoned a Faragher-Ellerth defense, but that the court would have to review the withheld documents in camera to determine if defendant waived either protection by using the report for "context" in connection with its "good faith" defense; "In this case, the Corporate Defendants raised a Faragher/Ellerth defense in their Answer. . . . However, they have since disavowed use of the Proskauer Report in connection with any Farragher/Ellerth defense. They first made this clear at a court conference. . . and they state unequivocally in their reply memorandum that 'Defendants will not be using the legal conclusions in the Proskauer Report . . . to support their position that there has been no violation of the law . . . . ' (Reply Memorandum of Law in further Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)."; "This does not, however, end the inquiry. The Corporate Defendants have indicated that they do not intend to rely on the Proskauer Report 'to provide context for the actions they took as a result of the business recommendations in the Report.'. . . Reliance by the Corporate Defendants on the conclusions of the report does not open up to discovery the details of the investigation that led to the report. . . . Therefore, there is no waiver with respect to the categories of the Proskauer Documents that could be relevant, if at all, only to the accuracy of the findings in the report, specifically, notes of interviews of JWT employees, drafts of the report, and invoices."; "However, when a party asserts a good faith defense, as the Corporate Defendants appear to do here, it may not selectively proffer the information upon which it relied. . . . Here, the extent to which the Corporate Defendants acted in good faith on the basis of the Proskauer Report is dependent upon the totality of the legal advice they received. Thus, the communications related to Proskauer's conclusions, but not the reliabililty of the investigation lending to those conclusions, are discoverable. Accordingly, if they intend to introduce the Proskauer Report in evidence, the Corporate Defendants shall produce for my in camera review any documents withheld on grounds of privilege that reflect communications between themselves and Proskauer or between Proskauer and David & Gilbert concerning the subject matter of the Proskauer Report. In that way, I can determine whether fairness necessitates the disclosure of these documents to the plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-09 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
(analyzing the waiver implications of an executive's deposition testimony about steps he took as a result of a years-earlier lawyer-run investigation into his sexual harassment; finding that the testimony waived the privilege protection because it disclosed the earlier report's recommendations, and finding a subject matter waiver; "In 2009, Ergo received complaints from two other female employees accusing Brownlee of sexual harassment and alleging claims similar to those alleged in this suit. In response, Ergo retained attorney Donald Hartman to conduct an investigation of the company and its management. As part of his investigation, Hartman created a written report of his findings and recommendations. Whether this report is discoverable is now at issue."; finding that the report deserved privilege protection; "Attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between attorneys and clients, including internal investigation reports supplied by attorneys to their clients, when one of the significant purposes of communication is legal advice, rather than only business advice. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 2014)."; "After reviewing the report in camera, the Court concludes that the report was confidential legal advice from an attorney to a client, and therefore is protected by attorney-client privilege. The Court presumes that outside counsel is retained for legal purposes. . . . Here, the presumption is borne out by the document itself. It includes legal conclusions as to the company's exposure to liability, legal recommendations for avoiding liability from these allegations and protecting against future misconduct that could lead to new allegations, and litigation strategies relating to the sexual harassment allegations at issue at the time of the report. Thus, a 'significant purpose' of the report was to provide legal advice. . . . There are also several indications that the document was intended to be a confidential communication between an attorney and his clients. The report is labeled 'Attorney-Client Privilege' and states that it is '[n]ot to be disseminated beyond ownership group,' with Ergo's owners listed by name underneath. Thus, because the report contains primarily legal advice and was a confidential communication between an attorney and his clients, the report is privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Fairway Methanol LLC and Celanese Ltd., No. 14-16-00884-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 830 (Tex. App. 14d Jan. 31, 2017)
(protecting as privileged documents created by a company's in-house lawyer investigation; noting that Texas did not following the "primary purpose" test; but finding the work product doctrine applicable after noting that a company affidavit indicated that the departments role in the investigation was not ordinary; "According to Rowen [Celanese's corporation's in-house lawyer], the primary purpose for the investigation and creation of documents and communications therefrom was to aid Celanese in preparing to defend itself in anticipated litigation. As a secondary concern, the information communicated from the investigative team to the legal department was necessary for the legal department to provide Celanese with business and legal advice with respect to the potential termination of employees involved in the accident. The team members were immediately informed that the investigation was for the purpose of assisting counsel and that all communications and documents generated during their investigation must be kept confidential and marked as 'Privileged and Confidential' or 'Attorney-Client Privilege -- Attorney Work Product.' The investigative team conducted interviews and site inspections and communicated their findings to the Celanese Law Department. They prepared a root cause analysis which was necessary for the Celanese Law Department to evaluate liability and begin developing a strategy for defending itself in likely civil and regulatory litigation. Rowen states, 'All of the communications withheld by Celanese were communications between Celanese in-house and outside counsel and their representatives made for the purposes of providing and communicating legal advice or otherwise facilitating or providing professional legal services.'"; "Plaintiffs cite no Texas authority for their position that the communication must have been made for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business advice. And the federal decisions supporting Plaintiffs' position are not binding on our court. More important, the language of Rule 503(b) does not require that the primary purpose of the communication be to facilitate the rendition of legal services; it only requires that the communication be made to facilitate the rendition of legal services.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-31 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Thomas v. Kellogg Company, Case No. C13-5136-RBL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66881 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2016)
(finding that work prepared by a consulting firm or Kellogg did not deserve privilege or work product protection; noting that plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) witness did not know who commissioned the report; also noting that the court realized the engagement letter between Kellogg and the consultant and the consultant's report itself; "A review of the report confirms that it was not prepared for Kellogg's attorneys so they could provide legal advice; it was patently prepared to assist Kellogg's in making its workforce more efficient and 'effective in growing sales' -- quintessential business advice."; "The engagement letter (sent by Willard Bishop to a Mr. Martin at 'DSD cost control'), the agreement, and the Report itself all confirm what the 30(b)(6) witness explained: the Report was a study of the efficiencies or 'effectiveness' of the RSRs."; "[N]one of the documents references any legal issue or litigation. And while virtually all business decisions can or do have 'legal implications' that does not mean that every business decision run through an in-house attorney is attorney-client privileged."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-20 Federal WA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Association v. PHL Variable Insurance Company, Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670 (D. Minn. March 30, 2016)
(finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a risk analysis prepared by Bracewell & Guiliani; including after an in camera review the risk assessment involved business rather than legal concern; "PHL has not convinced the Court that they retained Bracewell & Guiliani primarily for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Rather, the majority of the Report suggests improvements to PHL's business practices aimed at resolving what the first page of the Report refers to as the 'clear economic risk' presented by STOLI policies. Thus, to the extent that there is a presumption that communications between an attorney and client are in pursuit to legal advice, U.S. Bank has shown evidence rebutting that presumption. Accordingly, the Court will not find the Report as a whole protected by attorney-client privilege."; "For example, a November 7, 2007, email states that PHL retained 'an outside firm 'Bracewell and Giuliani' to review our current procedures and provide recommendations to us on how to improve the detection and prevention of life insurance sales intended to be investor owned. They have provided this type of service to others serious about ensuring the quality of business and bring to [PHL] expertise in this field.'. . . Another email referred to the firm's activities with PHL as 'consulting.' (Id., Ex. P) A presentation given at a risk management meeting stated, 'Bracewell and Guiliani recommendations -- majority implemented from business plan.' Finally, another presentation stated that PHL '[e]ngaged Bracewell & Guiliani law firm to assess and recommend STOLI prevention tactics.'. . .")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016)
May 25, 2016 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Finds Bracewell & Guiliani Report Unprotected by the Privilege or the Work Product Doctrine"

Many clients assume that the attorney-client privilege will almost always automatically protect any law firm's report to them, and that the work product doctrine will also apply whenever they anticipate litigation. Like other common client assumptions, this overly optimistic view is frequently wrong.

In U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., defendant PHL withheld from production a 39-page report written by three lawyers from the law firm then known as Bracewell & Guiliani โ€” supporting its privilege and work product claim with a declaration that it retained Bracewell & Guiliani "for the purpose of seeking legal consultation, advice and counsel." Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016). But the court rejected both claims. Among other things, the court pointed to non-protected emails, undoubtedly written by the defendant's business folks -- announcing that the company had hired Bracewell & Guiliani "'to review our current procedures,'" because that law firm had provided services to others "'serious about ensuring the quality of business.'" Id. At *6 (internal citations omitted). Other unprotected client documents described the law firm's activities as "'consulting,'" and mentioned the firm's recommendations about the company's "'business plan.'" Id. At *7 (internal citations omitted). The court also reviewed in camera the Bracewell & Guiliani report itself โ€” noting that "the majority of the Report suggests improvements to PHL's business practices." Id. The court again pointed to its in camera review of the report in also rejecting PHL's work product claim โ€” noting that the firm's report "was not 'mapping litigation strategy.'" Id. At *16 (citation omitted).

Corporations hiring law firms should remember that a court might review business executives' description of the law firm's role, and also read the law firm's communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Motion Industries, Inc. v. Superior Derrick Services, LLC, Civ. A. No. 15-1958 Section: "H"(5), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23826 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2016)
(analyzing an internal corporate investigation into possibly improper transactions; holding that in the Fifth Circuit litigation need not be imminent to trigger the work product doctrine protection; finding plaintiff's brief provided inadequate supporting protection internal corporate investigation documents; "In the present case, there is literally nothing in the record, including the documents themselves, that would allow this Court to undertake the inquiry necessary to find these documents to be privileged. As for what the 'primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document' might have been, the Court can only guess. This is the sum total information provided by the Plaintiff in brief to explain the documents' genesis: 'An employee contacted Movant's human resources department in July 2013 and as a result of that contact, an investigation was initiated. Movant retained Asset Protection as a contractor to assist in the process of the investigation.'"; "As a statement in support of a privilege claim, this one leaves much to be desired, as it creates far more questions than it provides answers. Who was the employee that contacted human resources and why? An 'investigation was initiated' by whom and why? What is 'Asset Protection?' Where are the privilege logs referenced in the brief? Who are the six employees identified? Are any of them attorneys? Were any attorneys involved in this investigation? Why, if at all, did anyone anticipate litigation resulting from this human resources 'contact?'"; "It should be noted that the documents themselves do not in any way help the Court answer any of these questions. The mere statement by counsel in brief that '[t]he motivation for the investigation and the preparation of the documents in relation to the investigation was an anticipation of litigation' is woefully insufficient to carry Plaintiff's burden in the absence of any supporting evidence in the record.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-26 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Gillespie v. Charter Communications, Case No. 4:14CV00207 AGF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128185 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2015)
(finding that an investigation into alleged racial discrimination did not deserve privilege or work product protection; "Charter argues that the incident report is privileged because it was created by Charter's Director of Human Resources at the direction of, and following a process instituted by, Charter's compliance team, which includes three in-house attorneys. Charter provides no facts as to the overall size of the compliance team, nor to the composition of its remaining members."; "In this case, unlike Geller [2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129751, 2011 WL 5507572], the incident report was not prepared in response to any pending litigation, and the Director of Human Resources who prepared the report did so as an agent of Charter's entire corporate compliance team, rather than a single defense attorney as was the case in Geller. Therefore, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to either the EthicsPoint complaint or the incident report."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-09-24 Federal MO

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Eddlemon [In-house lawyer] states that she and Dow Legal were involved in all phases of the investigation and that she 'supervised meetings, oversaw the investigative process, approved written documents, and in sum, oversaw preparation of the conclusions set forth in the' Root Cause Investigation report at issue. . . . She avers that the investigation was 'closed to third parties' and that "complete confidentiality was maintained throughout' it. . . . She states that the Root Cause Investigation 'Report and legal conclusions regarding the cause of the September 13, 2012 accident were prepared and ultimately relied upon by Dow and Union Carbide management and Dow Legal to respond to the incident, make recommendations, prepare the matter for trial, and in general, perform the regular functions of legal counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Every page of the Root Cause Investigation report is marked 'attorney-client privileged.' The second page states that the report is an attorney-client communication that was prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and notifies recipients that they may not disseminate it without permission from Dow Legal or Eddlemon. . . . The report contains no other references to law, legal advice or litigation. It includes factual analyses of the root causes that led to the accident and action items to address the identified causes. None of the action items are assigned to Eddlemon. The final page summarizes what has been learned and makes a few recommendations for what appear to be longer term actions."; "I find that Eddlemon's affidavit and the Root Cause Investigation report contain only conclusory and self-serving allegations about attorney-client privilege. Viewed in light of the overall content of the report, these allegations fail to carry Dow's burden to prove that the report was not prepared in the ordinary course of business of investigating an accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 8, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part Iโ€

Some companies begin internal investigations or audits for business reasons, but later try to cloak related communications and documents with work product privilege protection. Although some companies successfully argue that a business-related investigation "morphed" into a privilege-protected investigation, most attempts fail.

In United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015), NeuroScience retained a regulatory compliance company (CodeMap) to conduct a "full, flat-fee compliance audit" of its billing practices after its billing manager suddenly resigned. About a month later, CodeMap reported that NeuroScience had overbilled Medicare and some insurance companies. In the meantime, NeuroScience's outside Minneapolis law firm learned that the ex-billing manager had accused the company of fraudulent billing practices. About ten days later, NeuroScience and its law firm agreed that the law firm "should supervise the remainder of CodeMap's audit activities." Id. at *7. CodeMap sent a Services Proposal indicating that the law firm would now direct CodeMap's "baseline" compliance audit, and stating that related communications would deserve privilege and work product protection. Id. However, CodeMap later admitted that (1) "counsel really did not provide much internal 'direction' to CodeMap at all" (id. at *8); (2) lawyers were not present when CodeMap auditors met with NeuroScience employees; and (3) lawyers generally did not receive copies of email message traffic between CodeMap and company employees during the audit. CodeMap's chief auditor later acknowledged that "'[b]y the time Counsel was involved, CodeMap already knew the work to be done and how to do it, so the legal oversight, as [he] understood it, was to maintain privilege.'" Id. at *9-10 (internal citation omitted).

Next week's Privilege Point will describe the court's work product and attorney-client privilege analysis.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 15, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part IIโ€

Last week's Privilege Point described an outside regulatory compliance consultant's work for a company which worried about its non-compliant billing practices and about possible litigation, that consultant's later agreement to work under outside lawyers' "direction," and the admitted lack of any such day-to-day direction. United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015).

The court first rejected NeuroScience's work product claim. The court held that the company hired the compliance auditor CodeMap for business purposes, and that lawyers' later involvement "was a tactic designed solely to cloak the audit documents" with some protection. Id. at *17. The court concluded that the outside lawyers "in fact provided no direction at all," and found no evidence that "CodeMap changed the focus of its audit or conducted it any differently after it was agreed that the Services Proposal should be routed through counsel." Id. at *18. Although outside lawyers used the audit's result, the court explained that "the focus is on the circumstances of the communication at the time it was made." Id. The court also rejected NeuroScience's privilege claim. The court noted that the company hired CodeMap "without any direction from counsel," and that CodeMap "conducted and completed [its] coding review and transmitted the results" to NeuroScience before any lawyer's involvement. Id. at *24. And after the lawyers' "post-hoc retention of CodeMap," there was no evidence that "the focus of CodeMap's audits changed." Id. at *25. The court therefore concluded that "there is no question that [the outside law firm's] retention of CodeMap was a subterfuge specifically designed to cloak the audits with privilege." Id. at *26.

This and other similar cases highlight the wisdom of involving lawyers at the first hint of a problem, and assuring their intense hands-on involvement in any consultants' work the company intends to withhold as privileged or as work product.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews conducted by the Jenner lawyers during the firm's investigation into General Motors ignition switch incidents; rejecting plaintiff's argument that GM's "primary purpose" in conducting the investigation was not to obtain legal advice; adopting the "one of the significant purposes" standard; "The primary purpose test, however, does not require a showing that obtaining or providing legal advice was the sole purpose of an internal investigation or that the communications at issue 'would not have been made 'but for' the fact that legal advice was sought.' In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Instead, as the D.C. Circuit has expressly held, 'the primary purpose test, sensibly and properly applied, cannot and does not draw a rigid distinction between a legal purpose on the one hand and a business purpose on the other.' Id. At 759. 'So long as obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation, the attorney-client privilege applies, even if there were also other purposes for the investigation . . . .' Id. At 758-59."; "[T]he D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with -- if not compelled by -- the Supreme Court's logic in Upjohn. Rare is the case that a troubled corporation will initiate an internal investigation solely for legal, rather than business, purposes; indeed, the very prospect of legal action against a company necessarily implicates larger concerns about the company's internal procedures and controls, not to mention its bottom line. Accordingly, an attorney-client privilege that fails to account for the multiple and often-overlapping purposes of internal investigations would 'threaten[] to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law.' Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393."; "[R]egardless of whether New GM had other purposes in retaining Jenner, and regardless of whether the Valukas Report itself contained legal as opposed to business advice -- a question this Court need not, and does not, reach -- the underlying investigation, and the interviews conducted as part of it, had a 'primary purpose' of enabling Valukas and Jenner to provide New GM with legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Chevron Midstream Pipelines LLC v. Settoon Towing LLC, Civ. A. No. 13-2809c/w13-3197, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179284 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2015)
(holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected Chevron's "legally chartered" "root cause analysis" of a fatal pipeline accident, although in-house lawyer's affidavit explained that Chevron anticipated litigation, and as such "legally chartered root cause investigations are not routine"; "On the basis of the Legal Charter and Youngblood's Declaration describing its genesis and his handling of the RCA Team's work product upon the completion of its work, Chevron seeks to protect the RCA and all documentation related to its creation under both the attorney-client and work product privileges. Importantly, Chevron, through Youngblood, claims the following: 'Within Chevron, legally chartered root cause investigations are not routine. While root cause procedures are utilized by Chevron's Health, Environmental, and Safety (HES) group to analyze incidents and near miss events, often in conjunction with outside contractors, in order to identify improvements to procedures or equipment, HES incident reviews are separate and distinct from root cause analyses conducted at the request of the Law Department pursuant to a Legal Charter.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *10 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "So long as obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation, the attorney-client privilege applies, even if there were also other purposes for the investigation and even if the investigation was mandated by regulation rather than simply an exercise of company discretion.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *14-15 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "In this case, there can be no serious dispute that one of the significant purposes of the KBR internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice. In denying KBR's privilege claim on the ground that the internal investigation was conducted in order to comply with regulatory requirements and corporate policy and not just to obtain or provide legal advice, the District Court applied the wrong legal test and clearly erred.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, *13-14 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "[I]t is clearer, more precise, and more predictable to articulate the test as follows: Was obtaining or providing legal advice a primary purpose of the communication, meaning one of the significant purposes of the communication? . . . Sensibly and properly applied, the test boils down to whether obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the attorney-client communication. In the context of an organization's internal investigation, if one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice, the privilege will apply. That is true regardless of whether an internal investigation was conducted pursuant to a company compliance program required by statute or regulation, or was otherwise conducted pursuant to company policy.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *6-7 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "KBR's assertion of the privilege in this case is materially indistinguishable from Upjohn's assertion of the privilege in that case. As in Upjohn, KBR initiated an internal investigation to gather facts and ensure compliance with the law after being informed of potential misconduct. And as in Upjohn, KBR's investigation was conducted under the auspices of KBR's in-house legal department, acting in its legal capacity. The same considerations that led the Court in Upjohn to uphold the corporation's privilege claims apply here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
July 16, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point described the legal standard and some of the factual bases for the District of Columbia District Court's denial of privilege protection for Kellogg Brown & Root's (KBR) internal corporate investigation. This weekโ€™s privilege point tells the good news -- when about three months later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a writ of mandamus reversing the District Court's holding. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014).

The District of Columbia federal appellate court first rejected the district court's legal standard, holding that the privilege could protect a company's investigation if its need for legal advice was one of the "primary" or "significant" motivating purposes โ€“ even if not the only purpose, or the primary purpose. Id. at *13-14. The appeals court also explicitly addressed several factual indicia the district court relied on, holding that (1) KBR's requirement under government regulations to investigate alleged fraud did not preclude KBR's argument that another "significant purpose[]" was seeking legal advice; (2) nonlawyers could conduct privileged employee interviews while "serving as agents of attorneys"; (3) the absence of Upjohn warnings did not prevent privilege protection, because "nothing in Upjohn requires a company to use magic words"; and (4) although the employees' confidentiality agreements did not "expressly" mention KBR's need for legal advice, employees knew the law department was conducting a "sensitive" investigation and were warned not to discuss their interviews without KBR's General Counsel's authorization. Id. at *8-10.

The appeals court's legal standard represents a much more privilege-friendly approach than most courts apply. The standard permits companies to claim privilege protection even for investigations they must undertake pursuant to external requirements -- rather than having to initiate parallel or successive investigations to gain the protection. And the court's analysis of the factual issues provides a much more lenient standard for claiming privilege than most courts would apply. Next week's Privilege Point will discuss what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' decision did not address.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: McCullough v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, No. 12 C 9359, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014)
(analyzing defendant's investigation of possible sexual harassment; holding that the investigation-related documents deserved privilege protection and work product protection; holding that the defendant could refer to remedial steps and the investigation, but would waive any protection by using investigation-related documents at the trial; "[T]he Court finds that the D'Alba Report (and associated notes and memoranda) is protected by the attorney client and work product privileges. FOP asserts that the report contains 'legal analysis and advice' from D'Alba, which was hired 'in response to a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee' and 'due to the prospect of litigation.' . . . . The firm conducted 'confidential interviews,' prepared the report, marked the report 'privileged and confidential,' and shared the report with only certain FOP management employees and no third parties. . . . "The conduct of the D'Alba attorneys during their investigation is persuasive; the attorneys conducted confidential interviews, marked their report 'privileged and confidential,' and restricted access by third parties to the report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-11 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014)
July 9, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part I"

After a decade or more of generally bad news for corporations seeking privilege protection for their internal corporate investigations, the District of Columbia Circuit has issued an opinion containing good news on all fronts.

In March 2014, the District of Columbia District Court denied attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection for documents Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) (and affiliates) created during an internal corporate investigation. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). Five days later, the court denied a stay. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014). The District Court used a narrow version of the "primary purpose" test for privilege protection -- holding that "[t]he party invoking the privilege must show the 'communication would not have been made "but for" the fact that the legal advice was sought.'" Halliburton, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490, at *7-8 (citation omitted). In applying this standard, the District Court pointed to a number of facts, including (1) the investigation "resulted from the Defendants [sic] need to comply with government regulations"; (2) nonlawyers conducted the interviews; (3) those nonlawyers did not give Upjohn warnings informing the interviewed employees "that the purpose of the interview was to assist KBR in obtaining legal advice"; and (4) the interviewed employees signed confidentiality agreements that did not mention the investigation's legal purpose. Id. at *9-10. In most courts, these factors would probably have doomed KBR's privilege claim even under a more favorable "primary purpose" test.

The next two Privilege Points will describe the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reversal of this ruling.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-11 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014)
July 9, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part I"

After a decade or more of generally bad news for corporations seeking privilege protection for their internal corporate investigations, the District of Columbia Circuit has issued an opinion containing good news on all fronts.

In March 2014, the District of Columbia District Court denied attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection for documents Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) (and affiliates) created during an internal corporate investigation. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). Five days later, the court denied a stay. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014). The District Court used a narrow version of the "primary purpose" test for privilege protection -- holding that "[t]he party invoking the privilege must show the 'communication would not have been made "but for" the fact that the legal advice was sought.'" Halliburton, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490, at *7-8 (citation omitted). In applying this standard, the District Court pointed to a number of facts, including (1) the investigation "resulted from the Defendants [sic] need to comply with government regulations"; (2) nonlawyers conducted the interviews; (3) those nonlawyers did not give Upjohn warnings informing the interviewed employees "that the purpose of the interview was to assist KBR in obtaining legal advice"; and (4) the interviewed employees signed confidentiality agreements that did not mention the investigation's legal purpose. Id. at *9-10. In most courts, these factors would probably have doomed KBR's privilege claim even under a more favorable "primary purpose" test.

The next two Privilege Points will describe the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reversal of this ruling.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-06 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Telamon Corp. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-00382-RLY-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6583, at *12, *13-14, *14 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2014)
(finding that an internal corporate investigation conducted by Barnes & Thornburg into possible theft of inventory did not deserve privilege or work product protection; addressing these issues in a first party insurance case, in which the defendant insurance company sought documents from the investigation company Chamberlain; finding attorney-client privilege protection inapplicable; "The court's in camera examination reveals that nearly all of Chamberlain's file materials could not be classified as privileged attorney-client communications because they are public records or Telamon's business records. The gathering of public and business records by an investigator, or the funneling of business documents through one's attorney's office (or through one's fraud investigator), does not make those documents privileged."; "[S]ome of the communications obviously were not made to obtain legal advice, were not maintained in confidence, or were not even intended as a confidential communication in the first place. For example, the communications include (a) an email chain sent by the lawyers to Chamberlain lauding its reputation as a fraud investigator; (b) emails to set up meetings; and (c) emails that do not involve counsel at all or any bona fide connection to legal advice. . . . [D]documents within Chamberlain's file reveal that Chamberlain's investigatory work was not inextricable from Barnes & Thornburg's provision of legal advice and that its work was conducted because Telamon had a pressing business reason to uncover what it believed was large-scale inventory fraud by one of its workers. Documents indicate that the use of Barnes & Thornburg as the nominee client to Chamberlain was for the purpose of attempting to shield Chamberlain's work as privileged. It is apparent, however, that Barnes & Thornburg did not in fact direct this investigation, but that Chamberlain designed the investigation and determined the records to gather and review, the persons to interview, the questions to be asked, and the manner of interrogation."; "Moreover, waiver principles would prevent the assertion of the privilege as to the majority of the Chamberlain investigative file. Telamon provided to the insurers a preliminary investigative report prepared by Chamberlain that it otherwise asserts was a privileged communication. That report summarizes 'key' interviews and documents. When the privilege is waived as to an attorney-client communication, the waiver extends to all communications on the same subject matter. . . . The subject matter of the preliminary report is the investigative work conducted by Chamberlain. By producing the preliminary report (apparently for the purpose of proving its insurance claim and the losses suffered), Telamon waived the privilege with respect to the documents in the investigative file that are the 'nuts and bolts' source documents of Chamberlain's work, including the interview summaries, document analyses, and investigative background summaries.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-17 Federal IN B 6/14

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013)
December 18, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Deny Privilege Protection for Compliance-Related Documents"

Many corporate clients erroneously assume that the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine will protect their compliance-related communications. However, such communications face the same impediments to either protection as other internal corporate communications.

For instance, the attorney-client privilege only protects communication primarily motivated by clients' request for legal advice. In United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., the court found that the privilege did not protect "Compliance Committee meetings and the documents drafted by [the company's CCO]," โ€“ because the company's previous agreement with the government required such meetings. Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013). The court concluded that "[t]he meetings and documents sought to comply with its contract with the United States, not to obtain legal advice." Id. The privilege also normally depends on lawyers' involvement. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013), Judge Scheindlin held that the privilege did not protect documents created during the Bank of China Chief Compliance Officer's investigation into the bank's possible dealings with terrorists. Judge Scheindlin noted that after the Bank's CCO received Plaintiff's demand letter, "'he called outside counsel, then set about performing the investigation within the Compliance Department โ€“ without the involvement of any counsel.'" Id. At *35 (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin cited an earlier case's blunt conclusion that "[p]rivilege does not apply to 'an internal corporate investigation . . . Made by management itself.'" Id. At *36 (citation omitted).

Companies and their lawyers should not assume that the compliance function automatically, or even usually, deserves privilege protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-24 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013)
December 18, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Deny Privilege Protection for Compliance-Related Documents"

Many corporate clients erroneously assume that the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine will protect their compliance-related communications. However, such communications face the same impediments to either protection as other internal corporate communications.

For instance, the attorney-client privilege only protects communication primarily motivated by clients' request for legal advice. In United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., the court found that the privilege did not protect "Compliance Committee meetings and the documents drafted by [the company's CCO]," โ€“ because the company's previous agreement with the government required such meetings. Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013). The court concluded that "[t]he meetings and documents sought to comply with its contract with the United States, not to obtain legal advice." Id. The privilege also normally depends on lawyers' involvement. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013), Judge Scheindlin held that the privilege did not protect documents created during the Bank of China Chief Compliance Officer's investigation into the bank's possible dealings with terrorists. Judge Scheindlin noted that after the Bank's CCO received Plaintiff's demand letter, "'he called outside counsel, then set about performing the investigation within the Compliance Department โ€“ without the involvement of any counsel.'" Id. At *35 (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin cited an earlier case's blunt conclusion that "[p]rivilege does not apply to 'an internal corporate investigation . . . Made by management itself.'" Id. At *36 (citation omitted).

Companies and their lawyers should not assume that the compliance function automatically, or even usually, deserves privilege protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-04 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Services, Inc., Misc. A. No. 12-481 (BAH), 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166088 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2012)
("If a communication would have been made even if legal advice were not explicitly being sought, then it is difficult to say that that communication's primary purpose was to seek legal advice."; "In applying these principles, the Government argues that the Audit Report was not created for the purpose of seeking legal advice. The Government posits that 'nothing about the March 2008 Audit Report indicates that it was part of a request for legal advice,' the Report was 'not directed to any attorney or a person employed by an attorney,' it 'does not contain any legends indicating that it is privileged,' and 'Inchcape's CEO waited nearly two months after it was completed to forward the Audit Report to its outside counsel.'. . . In support of this argument, the Government offers the sworn declaration of Larry Cosgriff, who served as the Senior Vice President of Inchcape Government Services during the relevant time period. As discussed above, Cosgriff states that it was his understanding that Hyldager and Tory 'undertook this internal audit to obtain information to enable Messrs. Hyldager and Tory, the Inchcape audit committee and the Inchcape Board of Directors to make a business decision as to what further action, if any, Inchcape would take to address' the allegations raised by the two Inchcape employees."; "At bottom, the respondent's claim to privilege appears to be premised on a gimmick: exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain them in a watered-down capacity to 'consult' on the investigation in order to cloak the investigation with privilege. Unfortunately for the respondent, this sort of 'consultation lite' does not qualify the Audit Report for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. First and foremost, the fact that Inchcape purposefully eschewed the involvement of outside counsel โ€“ or any attorneys whatsoever โ€“ in the internal investigation and audit militates strongly against applying the attorney-client privilege. When a company fails to involve lawyers directly in an internal investigation, the company faces a higher burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the results of that investigation. The Tory Declaration indicates that, at most, A&P generically 'recommended initiating an internal investigation' and drafted a memorandum that 'framed' the issues relating to 'potential criminal and civil liability implicated by the activities as reported.'. . . The Tory Declaration also states that A&P 'prepared a list of documents necessary to more fully assess the issues identified,'. . . though Tory notably does not specify that A&P would be the ones 'more fully assess[ing] the issues identified.' Although Tory states that he pursued the internal investigation 'in consultation with outside counsel,'. . . the record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that A&P provided any consultation to ISS Marine while the investigation was actually being conducted. A&P's framing of the issues related to potential liability and its guidance about the types of documents that would be helpful all took place before the investigation began. As Cosgriff explains: "A&P did not participate in the interview process or the review of documentary evidence.'. . . Even when Inchcape took steps to verify the information in the Audit Report, Tory indicates that Hyldager performed this 'follow up,' rather than an attorney."; "This sort of arms-length coaching by counsel, as opposed to the direct involvement of an attorney, undercuts the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in the context of an internal investigation."; "Thus, the Audit Report memoralizing the contents of the documents and information gathered from this investigation and audit does not justify the protection of the attorney-client privilege. For the results of an internal investigation to enjoy the attorney-client privilege, the company must clearly structure the investigation as one seeking legal advice and must ensure that attorneys themselves conduct or supervise the inquiries and, at the very least, the company must make clear to the communicating employees that the information they provide will be transmitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-21 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09 cv 670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *38 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that documents created during a 2006 compliance audit deserved privilege protection; "The withheld documents reflect that the information gathered by . . . corporate employee[s] and transferred to General Counsel was done so at counsel's request and in furtherance of counsel's provision of legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH B 7/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09 cv 670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *27 28 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that some documents prepared during a third party consultant's audit deserved privilege protection; "Mr. Sullivan's communication to URS demonstrates that the audit information was to be communicated only to necessary SunCoke corporate employee and was otherwise to be considered privileged and confidential. . . . Ms. Pack's affidavit confirms that the audit was prepared to assist counsel with providing legal advice to SunCoke.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH B 7/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09 cv 670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *27 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that some documents prepared during a third party consultant's audit deserved privilege protection; "[I]n July 2008, SunCoke's president directed in-house counsel to conduct an HES audit of HNCC to assess its compliance with regulatory requirements and company policies and to provide SunCoke with legal advice based on such findings. In addition, correspondence from SunCoke's outside counsel, Andrew Sullivan, to URS establishes that the audit was requested by counsel for SunCoke so that URS's investigation, analyses, and opinions could be used by counsel to provide legal advice to SunCoke. . . . Further, a review of the documents reveals that the audit reports contain more than raw information and/or data and include the advice and opinions of URS personnel directed to SunCoke on legal compliance issues.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH B 7/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Ky. 2012)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege might protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation about a plaintiff's suicide; remanding for further evidence; "But the fact that the communications were collected pursuant to hospital policy does not make them business advice or otherwise remove them from the privilege. The policies in question were promulgated by the hospital's in-house lawyer and relate to the collection of information after a potentially tortious event in the hospital. No doubt, any death in a hospital creates the risk of litigation. The attorney-client privilege is not contingent on actual or threatened litigation. Statements made by a hospital's employees in such circumstances are made as part of a comprehensive program by which the hospital seeks to determine, with the assistance of counsel, the best legal strategy to pursue in regard to the tort that may have happened on the hospital's premises. The policies here were not general business policies, such as those aimed at reducing waste or hiring qualified employees; rather, they were promulgated by the hospital's in-house lawyer for the purpose of assessing the risk of and preparing for possible litigation." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 State KY B 9/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 132 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "The fact that Inchcape [affiliate of defendant] had an obvious and compelling business purpose to conduct an internal audit to ascertain any overpayments further militates in favor of concluding that the privilege does not apply because it suggests that the Audit Report would have been created even if Inchcape was not seeking legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "For the results of an internal investigation to enjoy the attorney-client privilege, the company must clearly structure the investigation as one seeking legal advice and must ensure that attorneys themselves conduct or supervise the inquiries and, at the very least, the company must make clear to the communicating employees that the information they provide will be transmitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Ky. 2012)
("But the fact that the communications were collected pursuant to hospital policy does not make them business advice or otherwise remove them from the privilege. The policies in question were promulgated by the hospital's in-house lawyer and relate to the collection of information after a potentially tortious event in the hospital.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 State KY B 1/14

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Planicka v. Am. Anesthesiology of Va., P.C., CL 2011 1344, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 135, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2011)
("Upon review of Carey's investigation notes, the Court finds the investigation proceeded with guidance and direction from counsel, and in anticipation of litigation. Such information is privileged under Rule 4:1(b)(3) work product doctrine and under attorney-client privilege, and is not discoverable by Plaintiff Planicka in this matter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-11-22 State VA

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, No. 08-3344, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28983 (7th Cir. App. Feb. 25, 2009)
(reversing the lower court's denial of privilege protection, and holding that Sidley Austin lawyers were hired as legal advisors to conduct an investigation into possible sexual abuse at the school โ€“ so their investigation-related documents deserved privilege and work product protection; "[T]he School Board retained the law firm of Sidley Austin LLP (then Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP) to conduct an internal investigation. The School Board wanted Sidley to review the criminal charges filed against Sperlik, investigate the actions of school administrators in response to the allegations of sexual abuse, examine whether any district employees had failed to comply with district policies or federal or state law, and analyze the effectiveness the effectiveness of the District's existing compliance procedures. According to the February 4, 2005 engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board, Sidley was to 'investigate the response of the school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and to 'provide legal services in connection with' the investigation. Scott Lassar, a partner at Sidley and a former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, spearheaded the investigation."; "On the same day the engagement letter was issued, the School Board president and superintendent of schools sent a joint letter to parents announcing the District's retention of Lassar to conduct the investigation. Ten days later the superintendent sent another more detailed letter to parents explaining that the investigation had begun and would be completed as soon as possible. As the investigation proceeded, attorneys from Sidley interviewed many school-district employees, including current and former principles, social workers, administrative employees, and members of the School Board. Sidley also interviewed a handful of third parties who had never been employed by the School District. None of the interviews were recorded. Instead, the attorneys took notes of the witnesses' answers and later prepared written memoranda memorializing the interviews for future use in Sidley's legal advice to the Board. These notes and memoranda are the subject of the present discovery dispute."; "Lassar and a Sidley colleague delivered an oral report of the firm's findings at a closed executive session of the Board in April 2005, and later that month delivered a written 'Executive Summary' โ€“ marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product' โ€“ to the Board. This concluded Sidley's engagement; other lawyers have represented the defendants throughout this litigation."; "[T]he judge all but ignored the engagement letter, which should have been the most important piece of evidence. The engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board explained that Sidley had been hired to 'investigate the response of school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and 'provide legal services in connection with the specific representation.' There is no indication that the judge actually considered the engagement letter when it was brought to the court's attention in these later proceedings; rather, the judge simply reiterated his earlier rulings that Sidley had been hired as an investigator and the privilege therefore did not apply."; "This oversight was a mistake; the engagement letter brings this case squarely within the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn."; "Following Upjohn, other circuits have concluded that when an attorney conducts a factual investigation in connection with the provision of legal services, any notes or memoranda documenting client interviews or other client communications in the course of the investigation are fully protected by the attorney-client privilege."; "The same is true here. The engagement letter spells out that the Board retained Sidley to provide legal services in connection with developing the School Board's response to Sperlik's sexual abuse of his students. Sidley's investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding the abuse was an integral part of the package of legal services for which it was hired and a necessary prerequisite to the provision of legal advice about how the District should respond. . . . the conduct of Sidley attorneys during the investigation confirms that they were acting in their capacity as attorneys. During the confidential interviews with school-district employees, the attorneys provided so-called 'Upjohn warnings' emphasizing that Sidley represented the School Board and not the employee and that the School Board had control over whether the conversations remained privileged. No third parties attended the interviews, the School Board received Lassar's report of the firm's findings during an executive session not open to the public, and the written executive summary that Sidley turned over to the Board was marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product.' If more were needed, affidavits submitted into the record by Lassar, his Sidley colleagues, and the School Board president emphasized that Sidley had been hired to provide legal advice in the context of the facts it uncovered during the internal investigation. Because the Sidley lawyers were hired in their capacity as lawyers to provide legal services โ€“ including a factual investigation โ€“ the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications made and documents generated during that investigation." (emphases added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-02-25 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm'n of European Comtys., Nos. T-125/03 & T-253/03 (Ct. First Instance Sept. 17, 2007) (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:62003A0125:EN:HTML)
(assessing privilege claims for documents created in connection with an investigation conducted by Akzo Nobel and its affiliate; holding that internal documents would deserve privilege protection only if they were "exclusively" created for purposes of receiving legal advice, and their "sole aim" was to seek legal advice; also holding that Akzo's in-house lawyers based in Holland did not engage in privileged communications with Akzo employees, because the in-house lawyers were not independent; holding that the privilege did not protect documents sent by the general manager of an Akzo subsidiary to his supervisor; noting that the documents did not mention legal advice and were not sent to or from an outside lawyer; likewise finding that the privilege did not protect a business person's notes and communications with an in-house lawyer based in Holland)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2007-09-17 Other

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; explaining the court's conclusion that Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection; "Plaintiffs argue that the Restructuring Report, similarly, was designed to address only factual questions, such as (1) How did HMS actually restructure delinquent loans during 2002?; (2) What did public disclosures and company policies say about HMS's restructuring of delinquent loans during the same period?; and (3) What were the differences, if any, between HMS's practices and either its policies or the Company's public disclosures? . . . Nowhere in that Report, Plaintiffs argue, did WilmerHale provide any legal analysis or recommendations that could be subject to the attorney-client privilege."; "The mere fact that WilmerHale's report included some factual findings does not establish that the entire report falls outside the scope of the attorney client privilege. As Defendants note, 'fact-gathering is an essential element in an attorney's formation of legal conclusions.'. . . The court has reviewed the Restructuring Report and finds that WilmerHale was retained to provide legal analysis and advice. Within the Restructuring Report . . . WilmerHale considered both the quantitative and qualitative materiality of variances from disclosed restructuring policies, and provided legal advice as to whether Household should take corrective action."; "Plaintiffs make much of the fact that a Report to the Board of Directors on 2003 Audit Committee Activities stated that the Committee retained WilmerHale to investigate 'the allegations made by Ms. Markell, in order to comply with the requirements of Section 10A of the Securities Act of 1934.'. . . See also 15 U.S.C. ยง 78-j1. Section 10A requires that '[i]f, in the course of conducting an audit . . . [auditors] become[] aware of information indicating that an illegal act . . . may have occurred, the firm shall . . . determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred.' 15 U.S.C. ยง 78j-1(b)(1). This provision 'expanded independent accountants' watchdog duties,' such that KPMG was required to ascertain whether Household had engaged in any illegal acts that would directly and materially affect the Company's financial statements. . . . Nothing prohibited KPMG, however, from requesting legal assistance in meeting its obligations under 15 U.S.C. ยง 78j-1(b).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Gruss v. Zwirn, 276 F.R.D. 115, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(upholding privilege and work product claims for documents created during an internal corporate investigation undertaken by Gibson Dunn into accounting irregularities; finding that the primary purpose of the investigation was the need for legal advice; "[I]t is irrelevant that both firms' reports 'were prepared in part, for the business purpose of gaining advice on what to communicate to investors and other interested business parties, rather than legal purposes.'. . . There can be little question that both firms were engaged to investigate the accounting irregularities at the Zwirn Entities and advise management how to resolve those irregularities. . . . Their advice included instructions not only how to communicate with investors, but also on the legal ramifications of the accounting irregularities within the heavily-regulated world of investment contracts, the decision as to which employees should be held responsible and how those employees should be disciplined โ€“ advice with clear legal implications when the employee in question was party to a partnership agreement, as was Gruss . . . and both the possibility of, and strategies for future litigation. . . . Based on our review of the portions of the law firms' findings that have already been produced, it is clear that their communications with the Zwirn Entities were predominantly made with the purpose of giving legal advice. The fact that some of this advice resides in the gray area where legal advice shades into business advice does not change that conclusion.") (emphasis added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-01-01 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.6
Case Name: Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1981-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
("Defendants contend, in the privilege log as in the joint statement and at hearing, that all the identified documents are privileged because they involve an investigation that was conducted by Ryan, a non-attorney employee in Insperity's EEO division, at the direction of counsel and for the purpose of seeking legal advice. . . . The court is unconvinced by this theory, for several reasons. First, defendants provide no evidentiary support for their factual assertion that Ryan conducted the investigation pursuant to instructions from counsel, and that her investigation was solely or primarily motivated by the need to defend Titus's legal claims. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have provided evidence to dispute defendants' claim that the investigation was for the purpose of defending claims or obtaining legal advice. All three plaintiffs have submitted declarations in which they attest that Ryan told them her interviews were intended to determine whether a pattern of discriminatory practices existed within WealthCounsel and, if so, recommend appropriate remedial measures. . . . Such an internal human resources investigation is independent of the defense of Titus's claims before the EEOC or in a court of law. Accordingly, the court cannot accept defendants' unsupported allegation that Ryan's investigation was conducted 'for the purpose of obtaining advice from counsel regarding next steps and defenses.'. . . Rather, the court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the facts necessary to support the claim of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
("Defendants essentially contend that if an attorney provided any direction to Ryan about her investigation into Titus's complaint, then any subsequent communication having to do with the investigation is privileged. Defendants have not identified authority establishing such a broad proposition.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
(holding that an employment discrimination investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns; "Investigation notes are not themselves communications with counsel. Any transmission of the notes to counsel would constitute a privileged communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Hale v. Emporia State University, Case No. 16-4182-DDC-TJJ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56524 (D. Kansas April 3, 2018)
(analyzing the crime-fraud exception in connection with a University's racial discrimination internal investigation; affirming the Magistrate Judge's decision refusing to apply the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege; noting among other things that the Magistrate Judge properly applied Kansas law in analyzing the exception; "And she [Judge] applied federal common law to define the scope of the privilege and the crime-fraud exception. . . . Judge James then determined that plaintiff's allegations failed to make a prima facie showing of fraud to invoke the crime-fraud exception. Judge James cited Kansas law when she identified the elements of fraud. . . . This approach makes sense because, to determine whether the facts establish a prima facie showing that defendant had committed a crime or fraud sufficient to support the crime-fraud exception under federal common law, the court may apply the forum's law governing the alleged crime or fraud."; "Judge James had erred by using Kansas law as a point of reference, federal common law defines fraud using the same elements as Kansas law.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-03 Federal KS

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Cain v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5:16-CV-221-D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47160 (E.D.N.C. March 22, 2018)
(rejecting privilege and work product protection for discovery answers that would disclose the identity of employees present at the time of an incident, employees involved in the investigation of the incident; and other information; "Interrogatory No. 2 seeks the identification of all Wal-Mart employees or agents who were involved in the investigation of the incident. Interrogatory No. 11 seeks the identification of any person involved in any way in the investigation. Production Requests Nos. 2 and 4 seek Wal-Mart's claim file relating to plaintiff's complaint and the investigation file of the incident, respectively."; "Wal-Mart objects to both interrogatories and both production requests on attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine grounds. While certainly an investigation conducted in the context of litigation may potentially be subject to protection, any investigation of the incident in the normal course of Wal-Mart's business would not be subject to the same protection. For example, a claim file kept by an insurance company often does not qualify for work-product protection."; "Plaintiff's first motion is therefore allowed with respect to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 11 and Requests for Production Nos. 2 and 4. Wal-Mart shall serve on plaintiff by 12 April 2018 supplemental answers to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 11 '[i]dentif[ing] all employees or agents of the defendants who were involved in the investigation of [the incident]' and '[i]dentif[ing] all persons involved in any way in the investigation of [the incident],' respectively. In addition, Wal-Mart shall produce to plaintiff by 12 April 2018 '[t]he claim file relating to plaintiff's claim' and '[t]he investigation file created or maintained by [Wal-Mart] which deal[s] with in any way [the incident],' respectively, pursuant to Requests for Production Nos. 2 and 4.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-22 Federal NC

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Med. Mut. of Ohio v. AbbVie, Inc. (In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2545, Case No. 14 C 1748, Case No. 14 C 8857, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41412 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with a corporate investigation; holding that a court-approved protective order claw-back agreement trumped the Rule 502 inadvertent production standards; "Goroff Exhibit A contains communications between MMO's employees and MMO's in-house attorneys who, along with outside counsel, were conducting an investigation relating to this litigation. The attorneys request information; the request reveals their legal thinking; and one of the employees provides information in response. This document is privileged. . . . although Goroff Exhibits E and F contain e-mails exchanged only between non-attorney MMO employees, they reflect Kibler's legal thinking and forward-looking strategy for the present litigation. They also contain a relevant response from an employee. These emails do relate to a business issue, but they 'indicate[] that legal advice was sought and obtained,' and they directly and indirectly reveal the communications made to that end.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-14 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Buchanan v. Sterling Construction Co., Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-3429 JURY, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39792 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with a corporate investigation (although without explaining what the investigation focused on); holding that the privilege could protect communications about the investigation; "The fact that defendants were communicating internally, or with their attorney, about the investigation does not support plaintiffs' contention that 'the Defendants or their attorneys were assisting in drafting or modifying the report.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-12 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1:16-CV-373 (lead), Case No. 1:16-CV-497, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11117 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2018)
(analyzing the waiver effect of a school board releasing the results of an investigation into alleged sexual assaults by basketball team members; finding that the disclosure triggered a subject matter waiver that included internal communications between school board representatives and the school board's lawyer; analyzing an expert witness issue, and finding that a school board lawyer was not acting as an expert witness during the investigation, and the board did not deserve expert witness rule protections; "[T]he Board contends that the communications between the Board's attorney, Scott Bennett, and Courtney Bullard, its testifying expert, should be protected from disclosure because of the constraints imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). The Court disagrees. Attorney Bullard was not originally retained by the Board as an expert witness. Rather, she was retained to act as an attorney for the Board in anticipation of litigation. She was acting as counsel for the Board at the time she performed her investigation and prepared the Bullard Report. The documents identified in the Privilege Log were generated during the time that Attorney Bullard was acting as the Board's attorney, not after she had been designated as an expert witness. Defendant's belated designation of Attorney Bullard as an expert witness does not permit retroactive application of the disclosure protections of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) to documents that were created while she was acting as the Board's attorney and prior to the time that she was designated as an expert witness. The Court will not impose such protections here."; "Attorney Courtney Bullard was not acting as an expert witness during her investigation and preparation of the Bullard Report. Further, it is the Court's understanding that she was not acting as an expert witness during the time period that the documents reflecting communications between her and Attorney Scott Bennett were generated. Her belated designation as an expert witness does not provide Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)'s protection retroactively to communications between Attorney Bullard and Attorney Bennett for the time period that both were acting as the Board's attorneys and before Attorney Bullard was designated as an expert witness.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-12 Federal TN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017)
February 21, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Assessing Privilege and Work Product Claims in an Investigation Context Examine Several Factors"

Courts assessing privilege and work product claims for corporate investigations usually focus on (1) the investigation's initiation (analyzing what motivated the investigation), and (2) the investigation's course (usually looking for lawyers' involvement). Less frequently, courts also focus on (3) the corporation's use of the investigation results. That post-investigation factor can shed light on the investigation's initial motivation.

In Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017), the court overruled defendant hospital's privilege and work product claims for documents the hospital created while investigating an allegedly botched surgery. Analyzing one withheld email, the court rejected the hospital Risk Manager's affidavit claiming work product protection โ€“ noting that her statement "indicating that she would let the 'administrative team' know about the conversation . . . as opposed to in-house counsel or outside counsel โ€“ suggests that at the time of the creation of the emails, neither party crafted their emails 'in anticipation of litigation.'" Id. at *13.

Corporations and their lawyers must remember that courts examining privilege and work product protection for investigation-related documents focus on the investigation's initiation, course, and even how the client used investigation-related documents.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-15 Federal KY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017)
January 24, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Putting Lawyers in Charge of Investigations Does Not Assure Privilege Protection"

Corporations' investigations generally deserve (1) privilege protection only if the corporations are primarily motivated by their need for legal advice; and (2) work product protection only if they are motivated by anticipated litigation, and the company would not have created the investigation-related documents in the same form but for that anticipated litigation.

In In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017), Premera claimed privilege and work product protection for its data breach investigation. The court rejected both claims. Among many other things, the court assessed Premera's work product claim for documents created by its consultant Mandiant. Premera had hired Mandiant to review its claims data management system in October 2014. On January 29, 2015, Mandiant discovered malware on the system. Premera quickly hired an outside lawyer, and on February 21, 2015, "Premera and Mandiant entered into an amended statement of work that shifted supervision of Mandiant's [later] work to outside counsel." Id. at *22. Premera predictably argued that Mandiant's later work was protected, because Mandiant was then working "on behalf of an attorney." Id. at *23. But the court rebuffed the argument -- bluntly explaining that the "flaw in Premera's argument . . . is that . . . [Mandiant's] scope of work did not change [from the October 2014 agreement] after outside counsel was retained." Id. As the court noted, the "only thing that appears to have changed involving Mandiant was the identity of its direct supervisor." Id.

Companies seeking to maximize privilege and work product protection for internal corporate investigations should carefully document the primary motivations, showing that the corporation did something different or special because of its need for legal advice or because of anticipated litigation. The documentation of course should start with law firms' and consultants' retainer letters โ€“ but all documents created before, during, and after investigations should help evidence the necessary motivational elements under the privilege and (if appropriate) the work product doctrine.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-27 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Crabtree v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-10706, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173905 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2017)
(holding that employee-to-employee communications were privileged, because the employees were gathering facts required by the lawyer; "Defendant conducted an internal investigation at the request of in-house counsel between September 22, 2011 and October 17, 2011 concerning one of its users, Western Sierra Acceptance Corporation ('WSAC'). . . . As part of the investigation, Defendant's employees gathered information from various departments to aid counsel in providing legal advice about Defendant's business relationship with WSAC."; "As Defendant asserts, the legal underpinning of Plaintiff's argument, however, is erroneous. Upjohn is not the apex of the scope of attorney-client privilege as applied to internal corporate communications. Rather, it is arguably the genesis. Indeed, subsequent case law developed from Upjohn confirms that communications between non-lawyer employees often warrant protection from disclosure."; "The Court finds that Defendant appropriately designated as privileged the communications between its non-lawyer employees. The descriptions on the log for each of these entries make clear that the challenged documents (1) relate to the investigation 'launched and conducted at the request of the Legal Department and for the Legal Department' and/or (2) 'reflect[] and contain[] communications used to facilitate the provision of legal advice and/or services' (emphasis added). . . . Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant's descriptions are boilerplate, Defendant has provided enough information about each communication to show why privilege attaches without simultaneously destroying privilege by sharing too much. Defendant's employees gathered information to assist counsel with rendering legal advice about how to proceed with WSAC. Defendant later used confidential information gathered during the initial investigation when it sought additional legal advice about WSAC. Throughout both phases, employees collected facts that presumably relied on Defendant's confidential information and those facts were eventually channeled to counsel to aid in the provision of legal services. Defendant provided enough information to conclude that the withheld documents are tied, even if indirectly, to legal advice rendered by counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-20 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Doe v. Baylor University, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127509 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017)
(holding that Pepper Hamilton's internal investigation into Baylor's Title IX compliance issues deserved privilege protection, but that the client waived that privilege, and deserved work product protection which Baylor did not waive and which plaintiffs could not overcome; not explaining in detail what communications or documents would be protected only by the privilege and not also by the work product doctrine, and therefore discoverable; concluding that Baylor retained Pepper Hamilton to receive its legal advice, so the privilege applied; "In this case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Baylor was seeking legal advice when it engaged Pepper Hamilton in September 2015. The initial engagement letter indicated that Pepper Hamilton was hired 'to conduct an independent and external review of Baylor University's institutional responses to Title IX and related compliance issues through the lens of specific cases.'. . . Although the letter does not use the phrases 'legal advice,' 'legal assistance,' or the like, there is no magic phrase that must be included in an engagement letter to invoke the attorney-client privilege. The letter plainly indicates that Baylor hired a law firm to review its compliance with federal law โ€“ in other words, to obtain legal advice."; also pointing to declarations by members of the Baylor's Board of Regents and a Pepper Hamilton lawyer) (emphasis added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-11 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Martinez v. Kleinfeld Bridal Corp., 16-CV-348 (RA) (JLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103261 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017)
(holding that notes prepared by Littler Mendelson about an incident involving plaintiff deserved privilege and work product protection; noting that the court's in camera review of notes showed that Littler was acting in a legal capacity rather than just investigators; "The scant deposition testimony of Kleinfeld CEO Ronnie Rothstein provided by plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that defense counsel had a non-legal purpose in the aftermath of the April 29 incident. The only testimony tying defense counsel to an investigatory role is a portion of Rothstein's deposition where counsel asked, 'So Rosanne [Clerkin], Terry [sic] [Solomon] and Bert [Pogrebin] conducted an investigation?,' and Rothstein answered, 'Yes'. . . . The Court does not consider this testimony, without more, sufficient to establish that Littler's attorneys acted as investigators without a primarily legal purpose.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-30 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Rattner v. Chubb National Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1:17-cv-00136-GBL-MSN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70141 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2017)
("Plaintiff's argument is contrary to law. Information and communications with an attorney retained to conduct an investigation may still be privileged when the investigation is 'related to the rendition of legal services.'"; "Upon in camera review of the ten sample documents, the Court finds that Defendant Chubb properly withheld the documents on the basis of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine because Ms. Bernstiel was retained to conduct an investigation using her legal expertise.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-08 Federal VA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: City of Potomac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Case No. 5:12-cv-5162, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69378, at *4, *11, *8-9, *9-10 (W.D. Ark. May 5, 2017)
(finding that Wal-Mart's investigation into alleged corruption in Mexico did not deserve privilege or work product protection; explaining that "former Wal-Mart in-house investigator [Halter] reviewed business records and interviewed fact witnesses to determine what occurred in Mexico."; holding that securities law plaintiffs alleging that Wal-Mart made misleading filings: (1) could discover factual details underlying documents provided to the New York Times and Congress, even if the disclosure was unauthorized; (2) could depose in-house investigator Halter about his findings, because the privilege did not apply; and (3) could discover documents Halter created during his investigation, because the work product doctrine did not apply; ordering Wal-Mart to "produce Ronald Halter's investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations that Halter drafted in 2005 and 2006. Further, the Court will allow [plaintiff] to depose Ronald Halter a second time."; in supporting conclusion (3), explaining as follows: "According to Defendants, the documents prepared in conjunction with the 2005-2006 internal investigation, including Halter's work plans, interview reports, and December 2005 report, were created in anticipation of litigation or government investigations that could result if FCPA [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] violations had occurred. Defendants argue in general terms that the internal investigation was initiated in direct response to allegations of illegal conduct, which created the prospect of litigation. However, the fact that the subject matter of these documents could conceivably be litigated at some point is not determinative. . . . Defendants have not offered the Court any evidence in the form of an affidavit or declaration setting forth the basis for the claim that the documents are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendants have the burden of proving the applicability of the work product doctrine to the documents prepared in conjunction with the internal investigation, and all that Defendants have offered as evidence are general, conclusory assertions by counsel that litigation was anticipated. If this was sufficient, it would render the burden to establish the protection meaningless."; "The facts before the Court seem to suggest that the investigation was not commenced and the report was not prepared because of any prospect of litigation but instead to gather factual information regarding an alleged bribery scheme orchestrated by Wal-Mart de Mexico. Halter testified that his reports simply recounted facts; and he was not given any special direction as to how to conduct the interviews; that he reported the facts he gathered; that he conducted no legal analysis; and that he did not send his reports to counsel. Thus, the Court finds that the factual materials regarding the 2005-2006 internal investigation that Halter drafted and provided to his superior, Joseph Lewis, including investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations, are not protected by the work product doctrine. Thus, Wal-Mart shall produce these documents to PGERS [plaintiff]." (emphases added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-05 Federal AR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: City of Potomac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Case No. 5:12-cv-5162, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69378, at *4, *11, *7-8 (W.D. Ark. May 5, 2017)
(finding that Wal-Mart's investigation into alleged corruption in Mexico did not deserve privilege or work product protection; explaining that "former Wal-Mart in-house investigator [Halter] reviewed business records and interviewed fact witnesses to determine what occurred in Mexico."; holding that securities law plaintiffs alleging that Wal-Mart made misleading filings: (1) could discover factual details underlying documents provided to the New York Times and Congress, even if the disclosure was unauthorized; (2) could depose in-house investigator Halter about his findings, because the privilege did not apply; and (3) could discover documents Halter created during his investigation, because the work product doctrine did not apply; ordering Wal-Mart to "produce Ronald Halter's investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations that Halter drafted in 2005 and 2006. Further, the Court will allow [plaintiff] to depose Ronald Halter a second time."; in supporting conclusion (2), explaining as follows: "Halter collected facts and conducted interviews pursuant to his duties as an investigator and communicated his findings to his direct superior, Joseph Lewis. Neither Halter nor Lewis is an attorney, and there is no indication that either Halter or Lewis communicated Halter's findings to an attorney. Halter testified that he conducted the investigation without any specific direction. There are no facts in the record to suggest that the purpose of Halter's investigation was to gather facts so that Defendants could obtain legal advice or that Defendants represented to Halter or Lewis that the investigation was commenced for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The Court is not convinced that a communication from one non-attorney gathering facts, without any specific direction, to another non-attorney, without any indication of a purpose of obtaining legal advice, is a privileged communication. Accordingly, Halter's communications regarding the 2005 and 2006 internal investigation are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, and PGERS [plaintiff] is entitled to fully examine Halter regarding the facts he learned and reported to Lewis." (emphasis added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-05 Federal AR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Fairway Methanol LLC and Celanese Ltd., No. 14-16-00884-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 830 (Tex. App. 14d Jan. 31, 2017)
(protecting as privileged documents created by a company's in-house lawyer investigation; noting that Texas did not follow the "primary purpose" test; but finding the work product doctrine applicable after noting that a company affidavit indicated that the departments role in the investigation was not ordinary; "Rowen's affidavit states that he was serving as counsel for Celanese Corporation, not relator Celanese Ltd., and that he requested that an investigative team provide the Celanese Law Department with the information needed to assess liability in potential litigation. Because the investigation was requested by counsel employed by Celanese Corporation, the investigation was for the benefit of not just relator Celanese Ltd., but also for Celanese Corporation which could anticipate litigation and who Plaintiffs have, in fact, sued in this court proceeding.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-31 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Simon v. Northwestern University, Case No. 1:15-CV-1433, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2461 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2017)
("In Illinois, confidential communications made by a client to his attorney are privileged, as are communications made to investigators employed by the attorney.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-06 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Doe v. Phillips Exeter Acad., Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877, at *5, *8-9 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding an implied waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "[D]efendants explain that PEA's outside counsel commissioned Attorney McGintee's reports 'for the purpose of providing legal advice related to the school's handling of this student sexual misconduct matter.' . . . PEA's own statements concerning the purpose of Attorney McGintee's investigation, however, as well as its description of her as an 'independent investigator,' suggest otherwise."; "Finally, PEA's Dean Mischke has consistently described Attorney McGintee as an 'independent investigator' or an 'external investigator' in her communications with the Does and her statements in this court. . . . It seems difficult to reconcile such a description with the argument that Attorney McGintee -- the reports of that 'independent' or 'external' investigator -- acted as an agent of PEA's counsel made for the purposes of obtaining or providing legal advice to PEA. To the contrary, by describing Attorney McGintee as 'independent,' PEA appears to signal that Attorney McGintee was not acting as its outside counsel's agent.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal NH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "The court finds that only the photographs contained in the investigation report should be produced by Letica to the parties. All of the other documents were part of the post-accident investigation which was not in the ordinary course of business, and they were prepared under direction of attorney Michael for possible subsequent litigation closely related to this case, including the OSHA investigation. Attorney Michael had direct involvement with and controlled the fatal accident investigation from its inception. Also, Letica reasonably anticipated litigation immediately after the accident and communications in the investigation report following the accident fell within the work-product doctrine. The court's in camera review further shows that the Exhibits discussed above to which Letica asserts the attorney-client privilege do in fact contain 'information exchanged in order to facilitate the professional relationship between an attorney and his client with regard to ongoing or potential legal proceedings.'. . . As such, these documents are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "These cases certainly support Letica's contention that the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine protect communications made between its in-house attorney Michael and Hunter as well as the communications between Michael and the other employees of Letica. After the accident, attorney Michael conducted interviews of eyewitness employees of Letica and others who had knowledge of or facts relating to the event. Interviews were also performed by supervisory employees of Letica at attorney Michael's direction. Hunter then prepared the investigation report at the direction of attorney Michael.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "The court finds that this report was not complied in the ordinary course of business since it was intended to assist attorney Michael with an OSHA investigation as well as to implement post-accident modifications. It makes no difference that Hunter [Employee] prepared the report since the work-product doctrine also protects 'materials prepared by an attorney's agent.'. . . The report and the referenced communications involving the accident investigation performed at the direction of attorney Michael also are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Every page of the Root Cause Investigation report is marked 'attorney-client privileged.' The second page states that the report is an attorney-client communication that was prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and notifies recipients that they may not disseminate it without permission from Dow Legal or Eddlemon. . . . The report contains no other references to law, legal advice or litigation. It includes factual analyses of the root causes that led to the accident and action items to address the identified causes. None of the action items are assigned to Eddlemon. The final page summarizes what has been learned and makes a few recommendations for what appear to be longer term actions."; "I find that Eddlemon's affidavit and the Root Cause Investigation report contain only conclusory and self-serving allegations about attorney-client privilege. Viewed in light of the overall content of the report, these allegations fail to carry Dow's burden to prove that the report was not prepared in the ordinary course of business of investigating an accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Eddlemon [In-house lawyer] states that she and Dow Legal were involved in all phases of the investigation and that she 'supervised meetings, oversaw the investigative process, approved written documents, and in sum, oversaw preparation of the conclusions set forth in the' Root Cause Investigation report at issue. . . . She avers that the investigation was 'closed to third parties' and that "complete confidentiality was maintained throughout' it. . . . She states that the Root Cause Investigation 'Report and legal conclusions regarding the cause of the September 13, 2012 accident were prepared and ultimately relied upon by Dow and Union Carbide management and Dow Legal to respond to the incident, make recommendations, prepare the matter for trial, and in general, perform the regular functions of legal counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 8, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part Iโ€

Some companies begin internal investigations or audits for business reasons, but later try to cloak related communications and documents with work product privilege protection. Although some companies successfully argue that a business-related investigation "morphed" into a privilege-protected investigation, most attempts fail.

In United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015), NeuroScience retained a regulatory compliance company (CodeMap) to conduct a "full, flat-fee compliance audit" of its billing practices after its billing manager suddenly resigned. About a month later, CodeMap reported that NeuroScience had overbilled Medicare and some insurance companies. In the meantime, NeuroScience's outside Minneapolis law firm learned that the ex-billing manager had accused the company of fraudulent billing practices. About ten days later, NeuroScience and its law firm agreed that the law firm "should supervise the remainder of CodeMap's audit activities." Id. at *7. CodeMap sent a Services Proposal indicating that the law firm would now direct CodeMap's "baseline" compliance audit, and stating that related communications would deserve privilege and work product protection. Id. However, CodeMap later admitted that (1) "counsel really did not provide much internal 'direction' to CodeMap at all" (id. at *8); (2) lawyers were not present when CodeMap auditors met with NeuroScience employees; and (3) lawyers generally did not receive copies of email message traffic between CodeMap and company employees during the audit. CodeMap's chief auditor later acknowledged that "'[b]y the time Counsel was involved, CodeMap already knew the work to be done and how to do it, so the legal oversight, as [he] understood it, was to maintain privilege.'" Id. at *9-10 (internal citation omitted).

Next week's Privilege Point will describe the court's work product and attorney-client privilege analysis.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 15, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part IIโ€

Last week's Privilege Point described an outside regulatory compliance consultant's work for a company which worried about its non-compliant billing practices and about possible litigation, that consultant's later agreement to work under outside lawyers' "direction," and the admitted lack of any such day-to-day direction. United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015).

The court first rejected NeuroScience's work product claim. The court held that the company hired the compliance auditor CodeMap for business purposes, and that lawyers' later involvement "was a tactic designed solely to cloak the audit documents" with some protection. Id. at *17. The court concluded that the outside lawyers "in fact provided no direction at all," and found no evidence that "CodeMap changed the focus of its audit or conducted it any differently after it was agreed that the Services Proposal should be routed through counsel." Id. at *18. Although outside lawyers used the audit's result, the court explained that "the focus is on the circumstances of the communication at the time it was made." Id. The court also rejected NeuroScience's privilege claim. The court noted that the company hired CodeMap "without any direction from counsel," and that CodeMap "conducted and completed [its] coding review and transmitted the results" to NeuroScience before any lawyer's involvement. Id. at *24. And after the lawyers' "post-hoc retention of CodeMap," there was no evidence that "the focus of CodeMap's audits changed." Id. at *25. The court therefore concluded that "there is no question that [the outside law firm's] retention of CodeMap was a subterfuge specifically designed to cloak the audits with privilege." Id. at *26.

This and other similar cases highlight the wisdom of involving lawyers at the first hint of a problem, and assuring their intense hands-on involvement in any consultants' work the company intends to withhold as privileged or as work product.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS) (GWG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8605 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2015)
(in an opinion by Judge Gorenstein, finding that a compliance-initiated investigation into a defendant's possible tie with terrorists did not deserve privilege or work product protection; "'The actual evidence supplied by BOC nowhere refers to an attorney directing that any particular steps be taken by anyone, let alone that particular documents on the privilege log were generated at the direction of counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-21 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS) (GWG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8605 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2015)
(in an opinion by Judge Gorenstein, finding that a compliance-initiated investigation into a defendant's possible tie with terrorists did not deserve privilege or work product protection; "Here, by contrast [with Upjohn [Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584] and In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. [In re Kellogg Brown & Root Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014)]], no communications with any attorneys are being sought and there is no evidence that any of the documents at issue were created at the direction of an attorney.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-21 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews conducted by the Jenner lawyers during the firm's investigation into General Motors ignition switch incidents; "[A]lthough the investigation here was conducted by outside counsel rather than in-house counsel, that difference from Upjohn strengthens rather than weakens New GM's claim to the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *6-7 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "KBR's assertion of the privilege in this case is materially indistinguishable from Upjohn's assertion of the privilege in that case. As in Upjohn, KBR initiated an internal investigation to gather facts and ensure compliance with the law after being informed of potential misconduct. And as in Upjohn, KBR's investigation was conducted under the auspices of KBR's in-house legal department, acting in its legal capacity. The same considerations that led the Court in Upjohn to uphold the corporation's privilege claims apply here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *11-12 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "The District Court erred because it employed the wrong legal test. The but-for test articulated by the District Court is not appropriate for attorney-client privilege analysis. Under the District Court's approach, the attorney-client privilege apparently would not apply unless the sole purpose of the communication was to obtain or provide legal advice. That is not the law.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, *13-14 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "[I]t is clearer, more precise, and more predictable to articulate the test as follows: Was obtaining or providing legal advice a primary purpose of the communication, meaning one of the significant purposes of the communication? . . . Sensibly and properly applied, the test boils down to whether obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the attorney-client communication. In the context of an organization's internal investigation, if one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice, the privilege will apply. That is true regardless of whether an internal investigation was conducted pursuant to a company compliance program required by statute or regulation, or was otherwise conducted pursuant to company policy.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *8-9 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "[T]he District Court pointed out that in Upjohn the interviewed employees were expressly informed that the purpose of the interview was to assist the company in obtaining legal advice, whereas here they were not. The District Court further stated that the confidentiality agreements signed by KBR employees did not mention that the purpose of KBR's investigation was to obtain legal advice. Yet nothing in Upjohn requires a company to use magic words to its employees in order to gain the benefit of the privilege for an internal investigation. And in any event, here as in Upjohn employees knew that the company's legal department was conducting an investigation of a sensitive nature and that the information they disclosed would be protected. . . . KBR employees were also told not to discuss their interviews 'without the specific advance authorization of KBR General Counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *8 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "[T]he investigation here was conducted at the direction of the attorneys in KBR's Law Department. And communications made by and to non-attorneys serving as agents of attorneys in internal investigations are routinely protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *7 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "But Upjohn does not hold or imply that the involvement of outside counsel is a necessary predicate for the privilege to apply.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: McCullough v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, No. 12 C 9359, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014)
(analyzing defendant's investigation of possible sexual harassment; holding that the investigation-related documents deserved privilege protection and work product protection; holding that the defendant could refer to remedial steps and the investigation, but would waive any protection by using investigation-related documents at the trial; "[T]he Court finds that the D'Alba Report (and associated notes and memoranda) is protected by the attorney client and work product privileges. FOP asserts that the report contains 'legal analysis and advice' from D'Alba, which was hired 'in response to a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee' and 'due to the prospect of litigation.' . . . . The firm conducted 'confidential interviews,' prepared the report, marked the report 'privileged and confidential,' and shared the report with only certain FOP management employees and no third parties. . . . "The conduct of the D'Alba attorneys during their investigation is persuasive; the attorneys conducted confidential interviews, marked their report 'privileged and confidential,' and restricted access by third parties to the report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-11 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165210, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013)
(reconsidering an October 24, 2013, opinion, and affirming the court's early conclusions; "I will stress again that neither attorney-client privilege nor work-product protection applies 'to "an internal corporate investigation . . . made by management itself."' To assert privilege over any documents pertaining to the internal investigation into plaintiffs' demand letter, BOC must show that the communications were made as part of an internal investigation that proceeded at the direction of counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-19 Federal NY B 5/14

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., A-13-CV-075-LY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155391, at *11-12, *12-13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013)
(concluding that a company could not claim privilege protection for the first call it received from a whistleblowing employee about possible misconduct within the corporation, but that the privilege could protect later communications between the anonyomous whistleblower and the company's lawyer; "[T]he anonymous whistleblower made three submissions via the EthicsPoint portal used by Maxim. An initial submission was made on December 14, 2011, and two follow-up communications were submitted on December 20, 2011, and February 24, 2012. Maxim's Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel, Ed Medlin, communicated with the anonymous whistleblower twice via EthicsPoint -- once on December 14, 2011, in response to the initial submission and again on February 27, 2012, in response to the whistleblower's submission on February 24, 2012. Upon review of the documents containing these discussions, the Court determines that the initial submission made by the anonymous whistleblower on December 14, 2011, is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and should be produced. The initial submission is distinguishable from the questionnaires at issue in Upjohn [Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)] because it was made prior to the start of any investigation by Maxim into the specific allegations that Freescale's software was being improperly used at Maxim. There is also insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the anonymous whistleblower was seeking legal advice or that this information was somehow solicited by Maxim in order for Maxim's legal counsel to render legal advice to the company. Consequently, the Court concludes that the initial submission by the anonymous whistleblower is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and must be produced."; "However, the subsequent communications between Ed Medlin and the anonymous whistleblower via EthicsPoint are protected by the attorney-client privilege. . . . In the initial communication the whistleblower identifies him or herself as a Maxim employee. The content of the subsequent communications show that more specific information was being solicited from the anonymous whistleblower -- a Maxim employee -- in order for Maxim's General Counsel, Ed Medlin, to investigate the allegations and render legal advice to Maxim. Additionally, the content of the follow-up communications also clarifies that the messages were exchanged after Maxim had started its investigation into the anonymous whistleblower's claims.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-30 Federal TX B 5/14

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51181, at *51-52 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2013)
(finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected an investigation by a company's compliance department into a terrorism bombing; "The evidence cited by both parties consists solely of an excerpt from the deposition of BOC's Chief Compliance Officer John Beauchemin as well as his declaration. These materials do not show that any attorneys were involved in the preparation of the Shurafa Files, nor that the Files contain attorney work-product or attorney-client communications. As plaintiffs suggest, the cited materials indicate that after Beauchemin received plaintiffs' demand letter, he called outside counsel, then set about performing the investigation within the Compliance Department -- without the involvement of any counsel, and not for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-09 Federal NY B 3/14

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Baird v. Dolgencorp, L.L.C., No. 4:11 CV 1589 DDN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17269, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2013)
(finding that a plaintiff could depose the defendant's investigator, who had videotaped plaintiff as part of the investigation; "The privilege also extends to communications between investigators and attorneys.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-02-05 Federal MO B 2/14

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Farzan v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12 Civ. 1217 (RJS) (JLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183623, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2012)
(holding that communications to and from a bank's EEO consultant working under the supervision of the law department deserved privilege protection, because the consultant was working as the lawyer's agent; "[I]t is well-settled that '[f]actual investigations conducted by an agent of the attorney, such as 'gathering statements from employees, clearly fall within the attorney-client rubric.'"; "Although Defendant Bernard [EEO consultant working under supervision of defendant's legal department] is not an attorney, it is undisputed that she conducted the internal investigation on behalf of Wells Fargo's in-house counsel for the purpose of representing Wells Fargo in its proceedings before the EEOC. Thus, her conversations with Wells Fargo employees are plainly protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-28 Federal NY B 5/13

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Services, Inc., Misc. A. No. 12-481 (BAH), 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166088 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2012)
("If a communication would have been made even if legal advice were not explicitly being sought, then it is difficult to say that that communication's primary purpose was to seek legal advice."; "In applying these principles, the Government argues that the Audit Report was not created for the purpose of seeking legal advice. The Government posits that 'nothing about the March 2008 Audit Report indicates that it was part of a request for legal advice,' the Report was 'not directed to any attorney or a person employed by an attorney,' it 'does not contain any legends indicating that it is privileged,' and 'Inchcape's CEO waited nearly two months after it was completed to forward the Audit Report to its outside counsel.'. . . In support of this argument, the Government offers the sworn declaration of Larry Cosgriff, who served as the Senior Vice President of Inchcape Government Services during the relevant time period. As discussed above, Cosgriff states that it was his understanding that Hyldager and Tory 'undertook this internal audit to obtain information to enable Messrs. Hyldager and Tory, the Inchcape audit committee and the Inchcape Board of Directors to make a business decision as to what further action, if any, Inchcape would take to address' the allegations raised by the two Inchcape employees."; "At bottom, the respondent's claim to privilege appears to be premised on a gimmick: exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain them in a watered-down capacity to 'consult' on the investigation in order to cloak the investigation with privilege. Unfortunately for the respondent, this sort of 'consultation lite' does not qualify the Audit Report for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. First and foremost, the fact that Inchcape purposefully eschewed the involvement of outside counsel โ€“ or any attorneys whatsoever โ€“ in the internal investigation and audit militates strongly against applying the attorney-client privilege. When a company fails to involve lawyers directly in an internal investigation, the company faces a higher burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the results of that investigation. The Tory Declaration indicates that, at most, A&P generically 'recommended initiating an internal investigation' and drafted a memorandum that 'framed' the issues relating to 'potential criminal and civil liability implicated by the activities as reported.'. . . The Tory Declaration also states that A&P 'prepared a list of documents necessary to more fully assess the issues identified,'. . . though Tory notably does not specify that A&P would be the ones 'more fully assess[ing] the issues identified.' Although Tory states that he pursued the internal investigation 'in consultation with outside counsel,'. . . the record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that A&P provided any consultation to ISS Marine while the investigation was actually being conducted. A&P's framing of the issues related to potential liability and its guidance about the types of documents that would be helpful all took place before the investigation began. As Cosgriff explains: "A&P did not participate in the interview process or the review of documentary evidence.'. . . Even when Inchcape took steps to verify the information in the Audit Report, Tory indicates that Hyldager performed this 'follow up,' rather than an attorney."; "This sort of arms-length coaching by counsel, as opposed to the direct involvement of an attorney, undercuts the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in the context of an internal investigation."; "Thus, the Audit Report memoralizing the contents of the documents and information gathered from this investigation and audit does not justify the protection of the attorney-client privilege. For the results of an internal investigation to enjoy the attorney-client privilege, the company must clearly structure the investigation as one seeking legal advice and must ensure that attorneys themselves conduct or supervise the inquiries and, at the very least, the company must make clear to the communicating employees that the information they provide will be transmitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-21 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "Although Tory [defendant's officer] states [in his affidavit] that he pursued the internal investigation 'in consultation with outside counsel,' . . . the record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that A&P provided any consultation to ISS Marine while the investigation was actually being conducted. A&P's framing of the issues related to potential liability and its guidance about the types of documents that would be helpful all took place before the investigation began.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "This sort of arms-length coaching by counsel, as opposed to the direct involvement of an attorney, undercuts the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in the context of an internal investigation. Clearly, when an attorney is absent from the information-gathering process, 'the original communicator has no intention that the information be provided a lawyer for the purposes of legal representation.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "[T]he respondent's claim to privilege appears to be premised on a gimmick: exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain them in a watered-down capacity to 'consult' on the investigation in order to cloak the investigation with privilege. Unfortunately for the respondent, this sort of 'consultation lite' does not qualify the Audit Report for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. First and foremost, the fact that Inchcape [affiliate of defendant] purposefully eschewed the involvement of outside counsel -- or any attorneys whatsoever -- in the internal investigation and audit militates strongly against applying the attorney-client privilege. When a company fails to involve lawyers directly in an internal investigation, the company faces a higher burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the results of that investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "For the results of an internal investigation to enjoy the attorney-client privilege, the company must clearly structure the investigation as one seeking legal advice and must ensure that attorneys themselves conduct or supervise the inquiries and, at the very least, the company must make clear to the communicating employees that the information they provide will be transmitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Planicka v. Am. Anesthesiology of Va., P.C., CL 2011 1344, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 135, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2011)
("Upon review of Carey's investigation notes, the Court finds the investigation proceeded with guidance and direction from counsel, and in anticipation of litigation. Such information is privileged under Rule 4:1(b)(3) work product doctrine and under attorney-client privilege, and is not discoverable by Plaintiff Planicka in this matter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-11-22 State VA

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Wierciszewski v. Granite City Ill. Hosp. Co., Case No. 11-cv-120-GPM-SCW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128772, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2011)
("[I]n this case it is clear from the content of the emails that counsel was not directing the investigation. Contrary to the arguments of Defendant, it appears from the emails presented in the privilege log that these emails constituted communications between Ron Payton and his supervisor, Bud Wood, regarding the investigation of and determination to ultimately terminate Plaintiff's employment. The context and content of the emails suggest that Bud Wood was directing the investigation, not attorney Rhea Garrett as argued by Defendant. While Defendant's general counsel was carbon copied (CC'd) on some of the emails, it appears from the context of the emails that Ron Payton and others were merely making attorney Garrett aware of the situation and were not emailing him for the purpose of seeking legal advice from counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-11-07 Federal IL B 7/16

Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 09 CV 4586 (FB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40704 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2011)
(analyzing privilege protection and an investigation into alleged sexual abuse at a college preparatory school; addressing plaintiffs' spoliation claim based on the destruction of documents related to an investigation โ€“ and therefore necessarily addressing possible privilege protection for the documents that had been destroyed; finding that a lawyer had acted as an investigator and not as a legal advisory during the investigation, which meant that privilege did not apply to his documents; "In 2002, after receiving Paggioli's settlement demand, Poly Prep consulted with their outside counsel Menaker & Herrmann LLP, and also hired Peter T. Sheridan, Esq., a sole practitioner, to conduct what they claim was a privileged and confidential investigation regarding Foglietta's alleged conduct, to be performed 'in collaboration with Poly Prep's counsel, Menaker & Herrmann LLP.'. . . Sheridan interviewed faculty and staff, including: Williams, Parker, Ruck, Andersen, Petchesky, Ralph Dupree, a former faculty member and coach, and Joan Wright, a former Dean and Assistant Head of School. . . . Sheridan claims to have determined during his investigation that there was no firsthand or secondhand knowledge of alleged sexual abuse at Poly Prep, other than the accusations made by Hiltbrand and Paggioli. . . . However, Sheridan's notes from his investigation have since been destroyed, resulting in the current motion for spoliation sanctions."; "Sheridan admits that he asked benign questions of each interviewee, 'about his or her background and role(s) at the school, and the nature, extent, and duration of his or her relationship with Mr. Foglietta.' . . . The purpose of Sheridan's retention by Poly Prep was to investigate and learn 'the extent, if any, to which members of the school's faculty or administration knew of sexual misconduct or sexual abuse by Mr. Foglietta,' not to advise Poly Prep on how to proceed. . . . Indeed, although Sheridan was engaged in September 2002 to conduct the investigation, a month later, in October 2002, Poly Prep engaged Greenberg Traurig to advise the school regarding its response to the allegations. . . . Plaintiffs' counsel also notes that 'according to th[e] documentation, [Sheridan] did not tell any of the people he interviewed that he was an attorney. He did not tell them that he was there for the purpose of trying to defend Poly Prep in a potential litigation. He did not tell them anything of that nature. So, the attorney-client privilege, burden, the initial threshold burden is not met.'"; finding in contrast that work product doctrine probably applied to the documents; but not really finding spoliation)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-04-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, No. 08-3344, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28983 (7th Cir. App. Feb. 25, 2009)
(reversing the lower court's denial of privilege protection, and holding that Sidley Austin lawyers were hired as legal advisors to conduct an investigation into possible sexual abuse at the school โ€“ so their investigation-related documents deserved privilege and work product protection; "[T]he School Board retained the law firm of Sidley Austin LLP (then Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP) to conduct an internal investigation. The School Board wanted Sidley to review the criminal charges filed against Sperlik, investigate the actions of school administrators in response to the allegations of sexual abuse, examine whether any district employees had failed to comply with district policies or federal or state law, and analyze the effectiveness the effectiveness of the District's existing compliance procedures. According to the February 4, 2005 engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board, Sidley was to 'investigate the response of the school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and to 'provide legal services in connection with' the investigation. Scott Lassar, a partner at Sidley and a former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, spearheaded the investigation."; "On the same day the engagement letter was issued, the School Board president and superintendent of schools sent a joint letter to parents announcing the District's retention of Lassar to conduct the investigation. Ten days later the superintendent sent another more detailed letter to parents explaining that the investigation had begun and would be completed as soon as possible. As the investigation proceeded, attorneys from Sidley interviewed many school-district employees, including current and former principles, social workers, administrative employees, and members of the School Board. Sidley also interviewed a handful of third parties who had never been employed by the School District. None of the interviews were recorded. Instead, the attorneys took notes of the witnesses' answers and later prepared written memoranda memorializing the interviews for future use in Sidley's legal advice to the Board. These notes and memoranda are the subject of the present discovery dispute."; "Lassar and a Sidley colleague delivered an oral report of the firm's findings at a closed executive session of the Board in April 2005, and later that month delivered a written 'Executive Summary' โ€“ marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product' โ€“ to the Board. This concluded Sidley's engagement; other lawyers have represented the defendants throughout this litigation."; "[T]he judge all but ignored the engagement letter, which should have been the most important piece of evidence. The engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board explained that Sidley had been hired to 'investigate the response of school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and 'provide legal services in connection with the specific representation.' There is no indication that the judge actually considered the engagement letter when it was brought to the court's attention in these later proceedings; rather, the judge simply reiterated his earlier rulings that Sidley had been hired as an investigator and the privilege therefore did not apply."; "This oversight was a mistake; the engagement letter brings this case squarely within the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn."; "Following Upjohn, other circuits have concluded that when an attorney conducts a factual investigation in connection with the provision of legal services, any notes or memoranda documenting client interviews or other client communications in the course of the investigation are fully protected by the attorney-client privilege."; "The same is true here. The engagement letter spells out that the Board retained Sidley to provide legal services in connection with developing the School Board's response to Sperlik's sexual abuse of his students. Sidley's investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding the abuse was an integral part of the package of legal services for which it was hired and a necessary prerequisite to the provision of legal advice about how the District should respond. . . . the conduct of Sidley attorneys during the investigation confirms that they were acting in their capacity as attorneys. During the confidential interviews with school-district employees, the attorneys provided so-called 'Upjohn warnings' emphasizing that Sidley represented the School Board and not the employee and that the School Board had control over whether the conversations remained privileged. No third parties attended the interviews, the School Board received Lassar's report of the firm's findings during an executive session not open to the public, and the written executive summary that Sidley turned over to the Board was marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product.' If more were needed, affidavits submitted into the record by Lassar, his Sidley colleagues, and the School Board president emphasized that Sidley had been hired to provide legal advice in the context of the facts it uncovered during the internal investigation. Because the Sidley lawyers were hired in their capacity as lawyers to provide legal services โ€“ including a factual investigation โ€“ the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications made and documents generated during that investigation." (emphases added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-02-25 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; pointing to E&Y's retainer letter language in concluding that E&Y was within privilege protection because it assisted Household's in-house counsel in giving legal advice; "'We understand that you will be utilizing the Work Product in order to provide legal advice to your client, Household, in your capacity as General Counsel. As such, all Work Product shall be deemed covered by the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, it is our understanding that Household companies are currently involved in various types of litigation for which the Work Product may be used and anticipate such litigation in the future. As such, all Work Product shall be treated by E&Y as privileged under the attorney work product privilege.'"; "According to Defendants, Household's General Counsel needed E&Y's assistance in conducting the compliance study because it required expertise in sophisticated quantitative analyses and in identifying and addressing compliance issues, as well as a substantial commitment of personnel. In Defendants' view, 'it would not have been possible for Household personnel to have performed all of the tasks that E&Y performed.'"; also quoting Household's explanation of E&Y's role in a letter to State Attorney's General who was then pursuing an action against Household: "'The Ernst & Young engagement is designed to monitor the company's compliance with certain company policies and state regulation. In addition, Ernst & Young shall (1) identify the root causes of noncompliance; and (ii) recommend process improvements to enhance controls over compliance.'"; concluding as follows: "It is clear from the Compliance Engagement letter that E&Y was acting as an agent of Household's General Counsel's office. . . . Both Household and E&Y understood that the engagement was to assist in-house counsel in providing legal advice regarding pending or anticipated litigation."; "The mere fact that it took Household's counsel and E&Y a couple of weeks to finalize a retention agreement does not demonstrate that the retention letter is a sham. Nor is the court persuaded that the arrangement was false based on a single internal email stating generically that 'HI' retained E&Y."; "Plaintiffs argue that E&Y's assistance was not necessary for Household's in-house lawyers to understand the Company's business practices or to calculate refunds. . . . The court is satisfied, however, that Defendants have demonstrated the necessity of E&Y's services in this case. Household retained E&Y to conduct complex quantitative analyses and extensive information-gathering that was beyond Household counsel's resources and abilities, but was uniquely within E&Y's qualifications."; "Plaintiffs also object that Household offered to make the E&Y compliance audit available to the Multistate Working Group for their review, and that Household cannot now claim that it intended to keep the documents confidential. . . . This is not entirely accurate. The Settlement Agreement with the Attorneys General provided that Household would retain an 'independent monitor' whose future reports generated in connection with the Settlement Audit would be provided to the Attorneys General upon request. . . . There is nothing to indicate that Household was willing to, or did in fact provide the Working Group with the audit results of the Compliance Engagement. Indeed, Defendants confirm that Household never shared the results with 'the Attorneys General, with the S.E.C., or with any other governmental agency, authority, or entity, and has maintained the results of that engagement in strictest confidence.' Thus, the E&Y documents in question are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.7
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that Baker Bott's investigation deserved privilege protection; "Brady [former director unsuccessfully seeking discovery] alleges that the Phase I Report was prepared in the context of rendering business advice, rather than legal advice."; "In asserting the privilege, i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts claim that i2 hired Baker Botts to deliver legal advice regarding the former officers' allegations of accounting improprieties and threats of litigation. They rely on Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, which quotes Wigmore on Evidence and states that '[i]t is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice. . . . [T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice.' 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence ยง2296 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Additionally, i2 and Baker Botts contend that even though the Phase I Report includes some business considerations, the primary source of the Report was to provide legal advice."; "An in camera review of the Phase I Report revealed that it is laced with underlying facts, legal opinions, and business advice. Additionally, the fact that the Report was the result of many i2 officer and director interviews with Baker Botts leads the court to conclude that the interviews were confidential communications between the corporate client and its counsel. The court also finds that the presentation of the Phase I Report from Baker Botts to the i2 Audit Committee was, in essence, a written communication and the equivalent of a confidential communication between an attorney and his client.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Banc of California Securities Litigation, SA CV 17-00118-AG (DFMx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87477 (C.D.C. May 23, 2018)
(holding that oral communications by Wilmer Hale lawyers to the SEC waived privilege and work product protection; "The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, which can be briefly summarized. On October 18, 2016, a website posted an article by an anonymous writer that alleged that there were financial ties between Banc's then-CEO Sugarman and Jason Galanis, a convicted white-collar criminal. The article set in motion a chain of events that ultimately caused Banc's auditor, KPMG US LLP, to send a Section 10A letter demanding that Banc conduct an investigation. Banc created a Special Committee of its Board of Directors, which in turn hired Wilmer Hale. The investigation conducted by Wilmer Hale included interviews of 15 individuals. Wilmer Hale presented its findings to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Later, at the SEC's request, Wilmer Hale provided the SEC with oral summaries of its 15 interviews.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-05-23 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corp., No. 17 C 1973, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64095 (N.D. Ill. April 17, 2018)
("Thus, the status of the drafter (or the recipient) of the supposedly privileged document is not decisive on the question of whether the document is protected. It is for that reason that progress or status reports, investigation summaries, and general updates are generally not privileged merely because they were written by a lawyer to the client.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-17 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Med. Mut. of Ohio v. AbbVie, Inc. (In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2545, Case No. 14 C 1748, Case No. 14 C 8857, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41412 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with a corporate investigation; holding that a court-approved protective order claw-back agreement trumped the Rule 502 inadvertent production standards; "Rule 502(d), however, allows a federal court to enter an order that the attorney-client or work product privilege 'is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court -- in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.' Fed. R. Evid. 502(d). In this case, the parties' agreed, court-entered protective order provides that the claw-back and non-waiver provisions for inadvertent disclosures are and 'shall be construed as, an Order under Rule 502(d).' D.E. 194 ยถ 18. MMO argues that because the parties obtained a Rule 502(d) order to govern inadvertent production of privileged material, the Court should not apply Rule 502(b) to analyze waiver."; "Defendants argue that the protective order does not override Rule 502(b). They cite a litany of out-of-circuit cases to argue that '[a]lthough Rule 502 recognizes that the default test set forth in subsection (b) may be superseded by court order or agreement of parties, see Fed. R. Evid. 502(d), (e), such an order or agreement must provide concrete directives' that correspond to each element of Rule 502(b)."; "The Seventh Circuit has not addressed this issue. Nor have courts in the Northern District of Illinois taken a uniform approach."; "The Court concludes that the parties' protective order governs inadvertent disclosures; Rule 502(b) does not. Paragraph 18 of the protective order states that it 'is, and shall be construed as, an Order under Rule 502(d).' D.E. 194 ยถ 18. It also reiterates the non-waiver language from Rule 502(d) and quotes from the Rule. Id. Paragraphs Four and Seventeen of the protective order likewise contain non-waiver language, and Paragraph Four states that the purpose of the protective order is to 'facilitat[e] the exchange of information . . . without involving the Court unnecessarily.' Id. ยถ 4. These drafting choices reflect the parties' intent to create their own guidelines to address inadvertent disclosure and to avoid waiver-related litigation under Rule 502(b).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-14 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Hale v. Emporia State Univ., Case No. 16-cv-4182-DDC-TJJ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26562 (D. Kansas Feb. 20, 2018)
(holding that employee-to-employee communications deserved privilege protection; "At the August 28, 2017 scheduling conference with the Court, Plaintiff requested that ESU produce a copy of its internal investigation report referred to as the '350-plus page' investigative report disclosed during a press conference held by ESU. Counsel for ESU agreed to early production of the report, subject to redactions for attorney work product and privilege."; "ESU argues that the email communications from various university personnel seeking direction on how to handle certain issues with the Hales during the investigation constitute requests for legal advice from ESU's general counsel. Some, but not all, of these communications were initially made to high-level university personnel and then forwarded to general counsel Johnson for response. Many of these communications start with an email from Dr. Hale, followed by an inquiry of the sender regarding how to handle the email in light of the investigation and potential for litigation. ESU argues the attorney-client privilege is not defeated simply because some of the emails are not initiated to or from its general counsel; the privilege applies because communications were made to university personnel seeking legal advice in confidence. The email correspondence relating to the Hales during the investigation seeking advice of counsel meets the requirements of the attorney-client privilege and its disclosure should not be compelled."; "As acknowledged by ESU, many of the email strings at issue start with an email exchange between one of the Hales and SLIM Assistant Dean Alexander and are then forwarded to other ESU officials. The Court therefore has conducted an in camera review of these email communications to determine whether any should be produced. For example, ESU lists a three-page email string 'regarding teaching assignment' as Bates number AGO-000362-364 (privilege log 63), but a review of the email string shows that two and a half of the three pages withheld are emails only between Alexander and the Hales. Another example is a two-page email string 'regarding payment resolution of Dr. Hale's practicum.' A review of the emails reveals that all but the last email in the string are between only Alexander and the Hales. ESU cannot claim attorney-client privilege with respect to the emails between its employees and the Hales without some showing those emails contain confidential attorney-client privileged or work-product information that was not disclosed to the Hales. All of the withheld emails at issue between only ESU employees and the Hales must be produced to Plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-02-20 Federal KS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017)
February 21, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Assessing Privilege and Work Product Claims in an Investigation Context Examine Several Factors"

Courts assessing privilege and work product claims for corporate investigations usually focus on (1) the investigation's initiation (analyzing what motivated the investigation), and (2) the investigation's course (usually looking for lawyers' involvement). Less frequently, courts also focus on (3) the corporation's use of the investigation results. That post-investigation factor can shed light on the investigation's initial motivation.

In Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017), the court overruled defendant hospital's privilege and work product claims for documents the hospital created while investigating an allegedly botched surgery. Analyzing one withheld email, the court rejected the hospital Risk Manager's affidavit claiming work product protection โ€“ noting that her statement "indicating that she would let the 'administrative team' know about the conversation . . . as opposed to in-house counsel or outside counsel โ€“ suggests that at the time of the creation of the emails, neither party crafted their emails 'in anticipation of litigation.'" Id. at *13.

Corporations and their lawyers must remember that courts examining privilege and work product protection for investigation-related documents focus on the investigation's initiation, course, and even how the client used investigation-related documents.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-15 Federal KY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Experian Data Breach Litig., SACV 15-01592 AG (DFMx), Slip Op. at 2, 5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2017)
(finding that the work product doctrine protected materials created by a forensic consultant hired by Jones Day to investigate Experian's data breach, making it unnecessary to analyze possible privilege protection; holding that: (1) the work product doctrine protected the documents; (2) plaintiffs could not overcome the work product protection; and (3) Experian did not waive the work product protection by disclosing the forensic consultant's report internally and to fellow common interest participant T-Mobile (Experian's client); explaining that "in this circuit, a 'because-of' test is used to determine whether a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation, which means that a document doesn't need to be prepared exclusively for use in litigation."; in supporting its conclusion (3), explaining as follows: "The final issue to be addressed is whether the protection of the work product doctrine over Mandiant's report was waived by Experian. Parties may disclose documents without waiving work product protection if that disclosure is consistent with maintaining the secrecy against opponents. . . . The disclosure here was very limited and closely controlled by Jones Day and Experian's in-house legal department. The report wasn't given to Experian's Incident Response Team or to the personnel working on remediation of the systems involved in the attack. Further, just before Jones Day retained Mandiant, Experian and T-Mobile, its client, entered into a joint defense agreement ('JDA') because they recognized the risk of litigation arising from the breach. And Experian's counsel gave T-Mobile's counsel the report under the JDA, in redacted form. The disclosure here doesn't amount to a waiver of the work product doctrine." (emphasis added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-18 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017)
("The Court begins by noting that attorney-client privilege 'only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts.'. . . Thus, Banneker could, through a well-written interrogatory, request the disclosure of all facts unearthed during the 51 witness interviews and WMATA would have no legitimate basis to refuse to respond. Banneker need not draft such an interrogatory, however, because the Court finds WMATA has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the interview memoranda."; "As originally commissioned, the Bondi Report was intended to be an internal document for WMATA's purposes and not slated for public disclosure. Upon receipt of the Bondi Report, the WMATA Board decided to release it to the public in its entirety. By disclosing the Bondi Report, WMATA chose to disclose the legal and factual conclusions that were contained in the report and, therefore, waived any claim of attorney-client privilege that existed with respect to the Bondi Report itself. The Court must now consider whether the public disclosure of the Bondi Report also resulted in subject-matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege covering the interview memoranda used to compile the report."; "The Court finds that the waiver of privilege as to the Bondi Report was intentional. . . . the Bondi Report cites extensively to the interview memoranda throughout the entirety of the document. The Court notes multiple references to at least 23 different witness interviews. Additionally, WMATA has not argued that the interview memoranda contain information outside the scope of the investigation or Bondi Report."; "'Ms. Rockwood notes in her declaration that the references to the interview memoranda in the Bondi Report were intended only for use by Cadwalader. . . . However, WMATA failed to remove the references and citations from the version of the Bondi Report that was made available to the public.'"; "WMATA has not zealously protected the information contained in the interview memoranda. Instead, WMATA has permitted direct citation and reference to confidential communications to be disclosed publically in the Bondi Report. WMATA has also used the Bondi Report to its advantage in this litigation. Fairness dictates that if WMATA is able to use the Bondi Report and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and defenses, then Banneker is entitled to the remaining facts and information contained in the interview memoranda that were not included in the Bondi Report. The intent of subject matter waiver is to prevent a party from selectively disclosing information and documents that would otherwise be privileged to gain a tactical advantage. WMATA cannot both benefit from the disclosure of the Bondi Report and prevent further disclosure of the remaining information in the interview memoranda.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-16 Federal DC

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Fairway Methanol LLC and Celanese Ltd., No. 14-16-00884-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 830 (Tex. App. 14d Jan. 31, 2017)
(protecting as privileged documents created by a company's in-house lawyer investigation; noting that Texas did not following the "primary purpose" test; but finding the work product doctrine applicable after noting that a company affidavit indicated that the departments role in the investigation was not ordinary; "According to Rowen [Celanese's corporation's in-house lawyer], the primary purpose for the investigation and creation of documents and communications therefrom was to aid Celanese in preparing to defend itself in anticipated litigation. As a secondary concern, the information communicated from the investigative team to the legal department was necessary for the legal department to provide Celanese with business and legal advice with respect to the potential termination of employees involved in the accident. The team members were immediately informed that the investigation was for the purpose of assisting counsel and that all communications and documents generated during their investigation must be kept confidential and marked as 'Privileged and Confidential' or 'Attorney-Client Privilege -- Attorney Work Product.' The investigative team conducted interviews and site inspections and communicated their findings to the Celanese Law Department. They prepared a root cause analysis which was necessary for the Celanese Law Department to evaluate liability and begin developing a strategy for defending itself in likely civil and regulatory litigation. Rowen states, 'All of the communications withheld by Celanese were communications between Celanese in-house and outside counsel and their representatives made for the purposes of providing and communicating legal advice or otherwise facilitating or providing professional legal services.'"; "Plaintiffs cite no Texas authority for their position that the communication must have been made for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business advice. And the federal decisions supporting Plaintiffs' position are not binding on our court. More important, the language of Rule 503(b) does not require that the primary purpose of the communication be to facilitate the rendition of legal services; it only requires that the communication be made to facilitate the rendition of legal services.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-31 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Hawa v. Coatesville Area School Dist., Civ. A. No. 15-4828, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122912 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2016)
(holding that defendant's release of an investigation report about possible management misconduct did not result in a subject matter waiver; explaining that defendant school district investigated allegedly racist text messages, and ultimately publicized the report; "In an effort to be transparent regarding various allegations of misconduct by CASD, CASD released the Report to the public."; "CASD moves to quash the subpoenas, asserting, inter alia, that they seek privileged information. . . . Plaintiffs argue that CASD has waived any claim of privilege over the responsive documents by publishing the Report. . . . In response, CASD contends that its publication of the Report did not act as a waiver with respect to any attorney-client privileged information related to the Report that was not disclosed."; "There is no question that the work of 'an attorney who investigates complaints and conducts interviews within a company or an organization retains the same entitlement to the attorney-client privilege as if he or she were offering pure legal advice.'. . . Here, Plaintiffs argue that by releasing the Report CASD's attorneys had produced as the result of their investigation, CASD has waived its attorney-client privilege as to all documents that were consulted in the preparation of the Report as well as all related communications."; "It is true, as CASD contends, that a party generally waives the privilege if it voluntarily discloses a privileged communication to a third party. . . . However, it also is well-recognized that a party may make a partial waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to attorney-client communications actually disclosed without waiving its attorney-client privilege in its entirety unless a partial waiver would be unfair to a party's adversary. . . . The 'central element' in determining whether a partial waiver exists is the question of fairness."; "The doctrine of partial waiver is applicable in cases where attorneys conduct investigations on behalf of a client and the client then releases the attorney's report without releasing underlying documents and communications."; "In the present case, the Attorneys prepared the Report as part of a wide-ranging investigation of an array of improper and potentially unlawful activities allegedly carried out by CASD's former leadership that had become the subject of a publicly-reported investigative grand jury report. . . . as a public entity, released the Report to provide transparency to its constituents as to a matter of significant public interest. Plaintiffs have not argued that CASD has made any strategic use of the Report in this litigation, that it relies on the Attorneys' investigation as a form of defense in this action or that it has "'made factual assertions, the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communications.'". . . They have not articulated any basis on which nondisclosure of the communications and materials underlying the Report would impose any unfairness on them. Nor have they argued, or provided any basis for the Court to conclude that any of the non-privileged materials the Attorneys collected in their investigation are not available to them through ordinary discovery addressed to the materials' original sources. Plaintiffs have merely alleged a blanket waiver of the attorney-client privilege for all materials consulted or obtained in the preparation of the Report and all communications relating to it. . . . As the authority discussed above demonstrates, Plaintiffs' blanket-waiver argument is unavailing.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-09-12 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Association v. PHL Variable Insurance Company, Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670 (D. Minn. March 30, 2016)
(finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a risk analysis prepared by Bracewell & Guiliani; including after an in camera review the risk assessment involved business rather than legal concern; "PHL argues generally that portions of the Report that make specific recommendations should be protected as legal advice. However, as discussed above, aside from the additional portions of this Court finds protected, the rest of the recommendations are improvements to PHL's business practices in order to minimize the economic risk of STOLI transactions and not legal recommendations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-07-30 Federal MN

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Thomas v. Kellogg Company, Case No. C13-5136-RBL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66881 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2016)
(finding that work prepared by a consulting firm or Kellogg did not deserve privilege or work product protection; noting that plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) witness did not know who commissioned the report; also noting that the court realized the engagement letter between Kellogg and the consultant and the consultant's report itself; "A review of the report confirms that it was not prepared for Kellogg's attorneys so they could provide legal advice; it was patently prepared to assist Kellogg's in making its workforce more efficient and 'effective in growing sales' -- quintessential business advice."; "The engagement letter (sent by Willard Bishop to a Mr. Martin at 'DSD cost control'), the agreement, and the Report itself all confirm what the 30(b)(6) witness explained: the Report was a study of the efficiencies or 'effectiveness' of the RSRs."; "[N]one of the documents references any legal issue or litigation. And while virtually all business decisions can or do have 'legal implications' that does not mean that every business decision run through an in-house attorney is attorney-client privileged."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-20 Federal WA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Association v. PHL Variable Insurance Company, Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670 (D. Minn. March 30, 2016)
(finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a risk analysis prepared by Bracewell & Guiliani; including after an in camera review the risk assessment involved business rather than legal concern; "PHL argues generally that portions of the Report that make specific recommendations should be protected as legal advice. However, as discussed above, aside from the additional portions of this Court finds protected, the rest of the recommendations are improvements to PHL's business practices in order to minimize the economic risk of STOLI transactions and not legal recommendations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016)
May 25, 2016 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Finds Bracewell & Guiliani Report Unprotected by the Privilege or the Work Product Doctrine"

Many clients assume that the attorney-client privilege will almost always automatically protect any law firm's report to them, and that the work product doctrine will also apply whenever they anticipate litigation. Like other common client assumptions, this overly optimistic view is frequently wrong.

In U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., defendant PHL withheld from production a 39-page report written by three lawyers from the law firm then known as Bracewell & Guiliani โ€” supporting its privilege and work product claim with a declaration that it retained Bracewell & Guiliani "for the purpose of seeking legal consultation, advice and counsel." Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016). But the court rejected both claims. Among other things, the court pointed to non-protected emails, undoubtedly written by the defendant's business folks -- announcing that the company had hired Bracewell & Guiliani "'to review our current procedures,'" because that law firm had provided services to others "'serious about ensuring the quality of business.'" Id. At *6 (internal citations omitted). Other unprotected client documents described the law firm's activities as "'consulting,'" and mentioned the firm's recommendations about the company's "'business plan.'" Id. At *7 (internal citations omitted). The court also reviewed in camera the Bracewell & Guiliani report itself โ€” noting that "the majority of the Report suggests improvements to PHL's business practices." Id. The court again pointed to its in camera review of the report in also rejecting PHL's work product claim โ€” noting that the firm's report "was not 'mapping litigation strategy.'" Id. At *16 (citation omitted).

Corporations hiring law firms should remember that a court might review business executives' description of the law firm's role, and also read the law firm's communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5319, 2015 U.S. App. 14016 (D.C. App. Aug. 11, 2015)
(granting a writ of mandamus and reversing the trial court's holding that KBR waived protections by disclosing documents while preparing its Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, and by inferring in a pleading footnote that its investigation did not uncover any wrongdoing; "If allowed to stand, the District Court's rulings would ring alarm bells in corporate general counsel offices throughout the country about what kinds of descriptions of investigatory and disclosure practices could be used by an adversary to defeat all claims of privilege and protection of an internal investigation."; "These alarm bells would be well founded. If all it took to defeat the privilege and protection attaching to an internal investigation was to notice a deposition regarding the investigations (and the privilege and protection attaching them), we would expect to see such attempts to end-run these barriers to discovery in every lawsuit in which a prior internal investigation was conducted relating to the claims. Accordingly, we think it is essential to act on this Petition in order to protect our privilege waiver jurisprudence.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-08-11 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Dow admitted that Root Cause Investigations 'are standard business practice' for 'run-of-the-mill matters that occur during the day-to-day operation of facilities,' although Dow states that these investigations are not typically managed by counsel. Dow tries to distinguish the subject Root Cause Investigation from 'run-of-the-mill matters,' based on Eddlemon's participation on the investigative team. However, the evidence shows that Root Cause Investigations of serious matters in general and of this particular case, leading to a single -- and the only -- analytical report to determine the root causes of an event and implement appropriate remedial measures, are just as much Dow's standard business practice as investigations of more mundane incidents. Eddlemon's professed anticipation of litigation, her participation on the team and Dow's policy of keeping the investigation confidential cannot convert a factual report prepared in the ordinary course of business into attorney-client privileged material. Dow cannot convert what is standard business practice performed for a variety of non-legal purposes into privileged material through the simple expedient measure of adding a lawyer into the mix. Dow has failed to show that the report refers to legal, rather than business or technical, advice and recommendations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA B 7/15

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Every page of the Root Cause Investigation report is marked 'attorney-client privileged.' The second page states that the report is an attorney-client communication that was prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and notifies recipients that they may not disseminate it without permission from Dow Legal or Eddlemon. . . . The report contains no other references to law, legal advice or litigation. It includes factual analyses of the root causes that led to the accident and action items to address the identified causes. None of the action items are assigned to Eddlemon. The final page summarizes what has been learned and makes a few recommendations for what appear to be longer term actions."; "I find that Eddlemon's affidavit and the Root Cause Investigation report contain only conclusory and self-serving allegations about attorney-client privilege. Viewed in light of the overall content of the report, these allegations fail to carry Dow's burden to prove that the report was not prepared in the ordinary course of business of investigating an accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA B 7/15
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "The Special Master correctly observed that there is a distinction between the results of the investigation and the investigation itself and that reliance on the facts learned in the investigation, when offered from a source other than the investigator, does not put the investigation in issue. . . . When an employer asserts the so-called Faragher/Ellerth defense, the adequacy of its investigation is relevant to the issue of the adequacy of its corrective actions. In this case, however, the adequacy of plaintiff's investigation simply has no relationship to any of the issues in the case.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "Although Mitre's attaching the products of its investigation to its complaint seems to have been done more for public relations reasons than legal reasons, Mitre's pleading does not put the investigation in issue. The complaint is not evidence, and Mitre cannot offer it as such.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "HBO argues that Mitre waived work-product protection by (1) permitting James Boocock to testify to certain matters concerning Mitre's investigation and designating that testimony as its 30(b)(6) testimony and (2) by attaching the products of its investigation to its complaint."; "Boocock's answering HBO's deposition questions did not put Mitre's investigation in issue for the simple reason that providing such testimony was not an attempt by Mitre to use protected information to influence a decision maker. In many cases, the vast majority of deposition testimony taken in discovery is never put before any decision maker; frequently, only a small fraction of the deposition testimony taken in a case is cited in connection with a summary judgment motion or offered at trial. Thus, the mere fact that a party makes a partial disclosure of privileged or protected information in a deposition does not result in a subject-matter waiver because there is no use of the testimony by the party holding the privilege."; "HBO's second argument concerning Boocock's testimony -- that Mitre has made affirmative use of the testimony by designating portions as Mitre's 30(b)(6) testimony does not alter this result. The authorities cited above teach that the critical inquiry is whether protected information has been partially disclosed to a decision maker in an effort to influence a decision. A party's deposition testimony, whether from an individual witness or a 30(b)(6) witness, does not constitute such a use. Although HBO argues that Mitre is trying to utilize the work-product doctrine as both a sword and a shield, it has not cited any instance in which Mitre affirmatively used Boocock's testimony and has not, therefore, established Mitre's use of the work-product doctrine as a sword."; "'I am aware that subsequent to Boocock's deposition, the parties have submitted voluminous materials in connection with their motions for summary judgment. However, HBO does not cite any instances in which Mitre has made any affirmative use of Boocock's testimony in connection with these motions.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *6-7 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "KBR's assertion of the privilege in this case is materially indistinguishable from Upjohn's assertion of the privilege in that case. As in Upjohn, KBR initiated an internal investigation to gather facts and ensure compliance with the law after being informed of potential misconduct. And as in Upjohn, KBR's investigation was conducted under the auspices of KBR's in-house legal department, acting in its legal capacity. The same considerations that led the Court in Upjohn to uphold the corporation's privilege claims apply here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Telamon Corp. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-00382-RLY-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6583, at *12, *13-14, *14 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2014)
(finding that an internal corporate investigation conducted by Barnes & Thornburg into possible theft of inventory did not deserve privilege or work product protection; addressing these issues in a first party insurance case, in which the defendant insurance company sought documents from the investigation company Chamberlain; finding attorney-client privilege protection inapplicable; "The court's in camera examination reveals that nearly all of Chamberlain's file materials could not be classified as privileged attorney-client communications because they are public records or Telamon's business records. The gathering of public and business records by an investigator, or the funneling of business documents through one's attorney's office (or through one's fraud investigator), does not make those documents privileged."; "[S]ome of the communications obviously were not made to obtain legal advice, were not maintained in confidence, or were not even intended as a confidential communication in the first place. For example, the communications include (a) an email chain sent by the lawyers to Chamberlain lauding its reputation as a fraud investigator; (b) emails to set up meetings; and (c) emails that do not involve counsel at all or any bona fide connection to legal advice. . . . [D]documents within Chamberlain's file reveal that Chamberlain's investigatory work was not inextricable from Barnes & Thornburg's provision of legal advice and that its work was conducted because Telamon had a pressing business reason to uncover what it believed was large-scale inventory fraud by one of its workers. Documents indicate that the use of Barnes & Thornburg as the nominee client to Chamberlain was for the purpose of attempting to shield Chamberlain's work as privileged. It is apparent, however, that Barnes & Thornburg did not in fact direct this investigation, but that Chamberlain designed the investigation and determined the records to gather and review, the persons to interview, the questions to be asked, and the manner of interrogation."; "Moreover, waiver principles would prevent the assertion of the privilege as to the majority of the Chamberlain investigative file. Telamon provided to the insurers a preliminary investigative report prepared by Chamberlain that it otherwise asserts was a privileged communication. That report summarizes 'key' interviews and documents. When the privilege is waived as to an attorney-client communication, the waiver extends to all communications on the same subject matter. . . . The subject matter of the preliminary report is the investigative work conducted by Chamberlain. By producing the preliminary report (apparently for the purpose of proving its insurance claim and the losses suffered), Telamon waived the privilege with respect to the documents in the investigative file that are the 'nuts and bolts' source documents of Chamberlain's work, including the interview summaries, document analyses, and investigative background summaries.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-17 Federal IN B 6/14

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Edwards v. State Casino Control Comm'n, Dkt. No. A-4738-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2737, at *29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 13, 2013)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation into a wrongful termination; ultimately requiring an in camera review; "The attorney-client and work-product privileges do not generally apply to documents created during the course of an internal investigation, especially when a defendant uses that investigation as an affirmative defense; such documents are generally not created in anticipation of litigation but to comply with an employer's internal investigative procedures and policies.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-13 State NJ B 5/14

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09 cv 670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *37 38 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that documents created during a 2006 compliance audit deserved privilege protection; "The distribution lists on the emails are limited to SunCoke's General Counsel and senior HES corporate representatives with knowledge of the facts at issue in the 2006 Audit. The audit findings, comments, and tracking changes constitute the factual predicates underlying the provision of legal advice by SunCoke's Legal Department to assess HNCC's compliance with state and federal HES regulations. . . . The withheld documents reflect the factual information from corporate employee with knowledge of audit findings; their responses to the findings or actions taken in response; and that such information was transmitted to counsel for the purpose of providing legal advice to SunCoke on HNCC's compliance with HES requirements. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence suggests at most that Pack and McCormick were providing technical, business-related advice which is not protected. Even if the information is characterized as 'technical' or 'business-related,' those communications were gathered at the request of counsel for the primary purpose of aiding counsel in providing legal services to SunCoke.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH B 7/13

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill North Coke Co., Case No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
January 23, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Where Do Courts Look When Determining Whether a Litigant has Proven Attorney Client Privilege or Work Product Protection?: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points noted that some courts assess a privilege or work product claim by relying on extrinsic evidence such as affidavits, while other courts look primarily or exclusively at the withheld documents themselves. Most courts examine both the documents and extrinsic evidence.

In Graff v. Haverhill North Coke Co., Case No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012), a litigant claimed work product and privilege protection for documents created during a consultant's audit. In rejecting the work product claim for one audit, the court pointed to the documents themselves. Among other things, the company president's memorandum requesting the audit indicated that "the purpose of the audit was to assess general compliance with regulatory requirements and company policies." Id. At *15. Another company executive described the audit as "generic." Id. At *16. Thus, the documents themselves undercut the work product claim. In contrast, the court found that many of the documents deserved attorney-client privilege protection. Among other things, the court noted that the same executive who described the audit as "generic" had submitted an affidavit which "confirms that the audit was prepared to assist counsel with providing legal advice" to the company. Id. At *28.

Lawyers should always teach their clients to articulate the basis for a protection claim on the face of protected documents. Companies involved in litigation should also determine what a pertinent court will examine in assessing the company's withholding of protected documents. Most courts expect an affidavit or other extrinsic evidence.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Servs., 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2012)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an audit; noting that the company had specifically indicated that it did not need the assistance of Arnold & Porter in connection with the audit; "One would expect that, if the investigation were conducted primarily to allow A&P to counsel the respondent, some kind of legal advice would have resulted from the Audit Report, but the respondent has not even suggested that A&P provided legal advice based on the Audit Report. Furthermore, the fact that Inchcape [affiliate of defendant] waited two months to transmit the finished Audit Report to A&P is very revealing of the company's intentions -- if the Audit Report had truly been prepared at the direction of counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, communication of the completed report to counsel would have been more prompt than a matter of months. This state of affairs collectively suggests that the Audit Report was sent to A&P not for the primary purpose of seeking legal advice, but rather merely to keep A&P informed about the results of the investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 7/13

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Ky. 2012)
("Statements made by a hospital's employees in such circumstances are made as part of a comprehensive program by which the hospital seeks to determine, with the assistance of counsel, the best legal strategy to pursue in regard to the tort that may have happened on the hospital's premises. The policies here were not general business policies, such as those aimed at reducing waste or hiring qualified employees; rather, they were promulgated by the hospital's in-house lawyer for the purpose of assessing the risk of and preparing for possible litigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 State KY B 1/14

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Flynn v. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
("Generally, the privilege covers incident reports prepared for the risk-management department of a hospital."; "[T]he report was not part of the medical records [and] it was not otherwise available 'to persons outside of the attorney-client relationship and/or quality assurance function.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2007-01-01 State OH B 9/13

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; explaining the court's conclusion that Household did not waive its privilege protection by disclosing the subject matter of E&Y's work to adverse states' Attorneys General; "[T]he court will briefly address Plaintiffs' additional argument that Household has waived any applicable privilege by voluntarily revealing the subject matter--though not the specific details -- of the Compliance Engagement to the Attorneys General.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.8
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *100 n.51 &99 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001)
(upholding a privilege claim for materials created during an internal corporate investigation into alleged legal firearm sales; noting that the pertinent documents were circulated only among company executives with a need to know, and were labeled as protected; "The communications related to the corporate review were disseminated only among the employee members of the Doe Corp. Team, the individuals charged with acting upon counsel's advice. . . . A few documents created by the Doe Corp. Team submitted by Doe Corp. as privileged do not copy counsel. Those communications were shared between and among members of the Doe Corp. Team tasked with providing reports and recommendations to counsel. Because I find that those documents 'would not have been created had [the team] not needed the assistance of counsel,'. . . I find these documents to be privileged."; "'Further evidencing the privileged nature of these documents is that a majority of the communications are marked with a privilege legend.'") (emphases added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-10-03 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.8
Case Name:


Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked

Chapter: 22.10
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Kobe avers in its original opposition to Dow's motion, and Dow does not dispute in its supplemental memorandum, that the Root Cause Investigation and report are the only investigation and report that Dow undertook regarding the accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.10
Case Name: Davis v. Hugo Enters., LLC, Case No. 8:11CV221, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22882, at *4 (D. Neb. Feb. 20, 2013)
(finding the a company could waive the privilege for one investigation while maintaining privilege for another investigation that was conducted later by an outside counsel; "Magistrate Judge Gossett acknowledged that voluntary disclosure of privileged communications may waive privileges attached to other communications on the same subject matter, but he recognized that courts have construed 'the same subject matter' narrowly. . . . He noted that the Plaintiffs complained of harassment in August 2009, and the internal investigation of that complaint, conducted by Levitt and Ricketts [defendants], was completed in September 2009. The Plaintiffs' complaint of retaliation followed, with an investigation of that complaint conducted by Turnbull [defendant's lawyer] in November and December 2009. Judge Gossett concluded that the Defendants' waiver of attorney-client privilege with respect to the second investigation did not effect a waiver with respect to attorney-client communications during the first investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-02-20 Federal NE B 2/14

Chapter: 22.10
Case Name: Davis v. Hugo Enters., LLC, No. 8:11CV221, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3357, at *10 (D. Neb. Jan. 9, 2013)
(finding the temporal scope of a company's waiver of its privilege protection by relying on an investigation into sexual harassment charges; "In this case, Davis and Duncan complained of alleged harassment in August, 2009. In response, Opportunity Education conducted an internal investigation that was completed by Levitt and Ricketts in September, 2009. In November, 2009, two months after her initial complaint of harassment, Davis submitted a separate complaint of alleged retaliation. Then, in November, Opportunity Education hired outside counsel, Turnbull, to conduct an investigation. Given the facts here, the Court finds that the subject of Defendants' waiver is Turnbull's November/December 2009 investigation, not the internal investigation conducted earlier. Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the attorney-client privilege was waived as to the other investigatory materials.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-09 Federal NE B 7/13

Chapter: 22.11
Case Name: Freedman v. Weatherford International Ltd., 12 Civ. 2121 (LAK) (JCF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102248 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014)
(denying plaintiffs' effort to obtain documents created during a company's audit committee's investigation; "In accordance with my orders in Dobina, the defendants have produced to the plaintiffs here all documents actually disclosed to the SEC, as well as all factual materials explicitly referenced in those disclosures. The plaintiffs now seek all remaining documents withheld on the basis of attorney client privilege and work product protection, arguing that the defendants waived all privilege and protection over subject matter related to the investigation as a result of Weatherford's 'comprehensive and one-sided disclosure' to the SEC. (Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the Production of Documents Concerning the Audit Committee Investigation. . . . The plaintiffs clarify that they do not seek opinion work product, but rather the all fact-based portions of interview notes, memoranda, attorney e-mails, and other investigative materials, 'regardless of whether they were produced to the SEC.' (Plaintiffs' Omnibus Reply to Defendants' Oppositions to Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel (1) Reports on Electronic Documents Searches, (2) the Production of Documents Concerning the Audit Committee Investigation, and (3) the Production of Documents Concerning the Latham Investigation."; "While the plaintiffs highlight the depth and breadth of the Audit Committee investigation, leading to the 'disclos[ure] [of] minute details and factual conclusions' to the SEC . . . Those very factual conclusions and details have already been produced pursuant to my previous orders in Dobina. This is not a case where Weatherford appears to be 'pick[ing] and choos[ing] among [its] opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or [] invok[ing] the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality [it] has already compromised for [its] own benefit.'"; reaching the same conclusion about an investigation conducted by the Latham law firm)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-07-25 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1:16-CV-373 (lead), Case No. 1:16-CV-497, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11117 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2018)
(analyzing the waiver effect of a school board releasing the results of an investigation into alleged sexual assaults by basketball team members; finding that the disclosure triggered a subject matter waiver that included internal communications between school board representatives and the school board's lawyer; "I find that when the Board released the Bullard Report, it waived the attorney-client privilege as to the entire scope of the investigation performed by Attorney Bullard, and all materials, communications, and information provided to Attorney Bullard as part of her investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-12 Federal TN

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1:16-CV-373 (lead), Case No. 1:16-CV-497, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11117 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2018)
(analyzing the waiver effect of a school board releasing the results of an investigation into alleged sexual assaults by basketball team members; finding that the disclosure triggered a subject matter waiver that included internal communications between school board representatives and the school board's lawyer; "Similarly, when the Board released the Bullard Report to the public, and expressed an intention to rely upon the investigation and report to defend the lawsuits against it, it waived the protection afforded under the work product doctrine as to both fact and opinion work product found in any documents prepared by Attorney Bullard (including draft reports) and in any communications to or from Attorney Bullard which directly relate to her investigation and preparation of the Bullard Report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-12 Federal TN

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: In re United Shore Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 17-2290, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 138 (6th Circuit App. Jan. 3, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in a data breach investigation case; denying defendant's petition for writ of mandamus allowing them to withhold documents relating to its affirmative defense pointing to its lawyer's investigation and conclusion that another defendant caused the breach; "Plaintiff Al Leibovic filed a putative class action against United Shore and Xerox Management Services, Inc. ('XMS') arising from intrusions into an XMS program on which United Shore stored potential borrowers' personal identification information. United Shore asserted several affirmative defenses, including that Leibovic and the class claims were barred based on XMS's acts or failure to act."; "In response to XMS's discovery requests, United Shore stated that the firm it retained through counsel to investigate and prevent future intrusions had concluded that XMS's actions caused the intrusions. United Shore, however, withheld hundreds of documents relevant to the investigation, citing attorney-client privilege. XMS moved to compel United Shore to produce the withheld documents, alleging that it implicitly waived the attorney-client privilege by citing to the investigation's conclusions. The district court granted XMS's motion and denied United Shore's subsequent motion to clarify its order."; "The district court correctly concluded that the attorney-client privilege can be implicitly waived. . . . Here, United Shore cited XMS's action or lack of action as an affirmative defense. And it commissioned an investigation that concluded that XMS was at fault. Thus, it attempted to prove a defense by disclosing or describing the attorney-client communications. See In re G-I-Holdings, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 433 (D.N.J. 2003). Once waived, the privilege is waived with respect to all communications involving the same subject matter. Id. The district court did not clearly err in compelling disclosure of the privileged documents.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-03 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: SEC v. Herrera, Case No. 17-20301-CIV/LENARD/GOODMAN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200142 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2017)
(analyzing the work product waiver impact of Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation and "oral download" to the SEC of the results of its investigation into inventory accounting errors in a client's Brazilian subsidiary; concluding that Morgan Lewis's oral download to the SEC of witness interview content waived work product protection, and triggered a subject matter waiver as to those witnesses; also concluding that Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation to the SEC only disclosed historical facts, and therefore did not deserve work product protection โ€“ so its disclosure to the government did not trigger a waiver; "Defendants contend that ML made other oral disclosures of work-product information to the SEC, above and beyond the oral downloads of the 12 interviews. The Undersigned cannot reach any conclusions about further disclosures unless and until ML provides additional clarification about what was disclosed. Defendants contend that the ML attorneys took notes of the discussions they had with the SEC and perhaps with the Department of Justice. Defendants request that the Undersigned review in camera ML's attorneys' notes of an October 29, 2013 meeting. ML does not oppose this request. . . . But the Undersigned is unsure about whether ML attorneys met with the SEC and/or the Department of Justice on days other that October 29, 2013."; "Therefore, ML shall, within seven days from this Order, file under seal a copy of all attorney notes discussing or reflecting what information was disclosed to the SEC or the Department of Justice during meetings (or otherwise).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-05 Federal FL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: SEC v. Herrera, Case No. 17-20301-CIV/LENARD/GOODMAN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200142 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2017)
(analyzing the work product waiver impact of Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation and "oral download" to the SEC of the results of its investigation into inventory accounting errors in a client's Brazilian subsidiary; concluding that Morgan Lewis's oral download to the SEC of witness interview content waived work product protection, and triggered a subject matter waiver as to those witnesses; also concluding that Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation to the SEC only disclosed historical facts, and therefore did not deserve work product protection โ€“ so its disclosure to the government did not trigger a waiver; "The SEC also asked for the investigative findings, and ML provided the SEC with information about its findings, including a presentation prepared for the SEC and information about specific witness interviews, which were provided orally. An April 15, 2013 PowerPoint presentation that ML made to the SEC contained, among other things, an events timeline, the names of witnesses whom ML had already interviewed, a breakdown of the transactions deemed to be at the heart of the accounting discrepancy, and the results of its investigation. This 28-page PowerPoint presentation is now in the public record of this lawsuit, as Defendants filed it as an exhibit to their motion.";"On October 29, 2013, ML attorneys met with SEC staff and provided oral downloads of 12 witness interviews."; ". . . Although ML provided the SEC with oral downloads of only 12 witness interviews, it provided Deloitte with information about all the interviews notes and memoranda. It appears as though this was accomplished through the reading (by an ML attorney) of memoranda and interview notes to Deloitte and generalized 'access' to review interview notes selected by Deloitte's investigative team."; "There is no dispute here that the notes and memoranda prepared by ML attorneys are in fact work product material. Rather, the dispute is over the waiver of the work-product doctrine protection."; ""ML does not contend that it provided only vague references of the witness notes and memoranda to the SEC, nor does it argue that only detail-free conclusions or general impressions were orally provided. To the contrary, it factually concedes that its attorneys provided oral downloads of the substance of the 12 witness interview notes and memos."; "ML also argues that Defendants' claim -- that they seek to "level the playing field" -- is an argument which "rings hollow" because "the SEC does not have what the Defendants are seeking.". . But that is an incomplete argument. Yes, it is true that the SEC does not have the actual witness notes and memoranda -- but it has the functional equivalent of them by receiving the oral summaries of the interview materials."; "ML waived work-product protection for the witnesses whose interview notes and memoranda its attorneys disclosed to the SEC in the so-called 'oral downloads.' Defendants advise that 'at least twelve' interview memos were orally relayed . . . so the Undersigned is using that number, as well. If it turns out that ML provided information to the SEC about other witness interviews besides the 12 already identified, then it shall disclose to Defendants the additional notes and memoranda. ML shall provide the notes and memoranda within 7 days of this Order."; "Because there is little or no substantive distinction for waiver purposes between the actual physical delivery of the work product notes and memoranda and reading or orally summarizing the same written material's meaningful substance to one's legal adversary, the Undersigned concludes that the Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP law firm ('ML') waived work product protection and must provide to Defendants the interview notes and memoranda that were orally downloaded. To that extent, the Undersigned grants Defendants' motion to compel against ML. . . . The waiver, however, is limited to only the witnesses whose interview notes and memoranda were orally provided, which is far less than all the witnesses ML interviewed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-05 Federal FL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Leibovic v. United Shore Financial Services, LLC, Case No. 15-12639, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137643 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2017)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation after a software system intrusion; finding that the company created a subject matter waiver by disclosing the third party investigator's conclusions; "The second unresolved issue is raised in XMS's motion to compel against United Shore. . . . "; "In the aftermath of the alleged intrusions to XMS's software system, United Shore's counsel commissioned Navigant -- a third-party -- to conduct an investigation."; "XMS's Interrogatory No. 8 asked United Shore to state with particularity all investigations, notifications and remedial efforts taken in response to any unauthorized use of its accounts -- in relation to the alleged intrusions to XMS's database. In response, United Shore indicated that Navigant conducted an investigation, and it also provided Navigant's conclusions from the investigation. However, United Shore withheld a significant amount of documents related to Navigant's investigation on the basis that they were protected by attorney-client privilege, since its counsel had commissioned the investigation."; "XMS says United Shore is engaging in impermissible selective waiver because it is seeking the benefit of using the results of the investigation, but withholding information about what the investigation considered and how the investigation was conducted. It further says that by including Navigant's conclusions in its response to the Interrogatory, it was using the results of the investigation offensively, which waived the privilege."; "United Shore says it was merely responding to the Interrogatory with factual information related to its retention of Navigant and the existence of Navigant's investigation."; "Although United Shore was responding to XMS's Interrogatory regarding investigations it had commissioned, its response went beyond providing factual information regarding the existence of the investigation and retention of Navigant. United Shore's response also included details regarding Navigant's conclusions. This exceeded the scope of the Interrogatory and -- as XMS contends -- United Shore fails to explain 'why the conclusions of a supposedly privileged investigation commissioned by counsel would not themselves be privileged."; "Because United Shore disclosed the privileged conclusions of Navigant's investigations, and because it appears United Shore intends to use the findings of the investigation to prove the cause of the intrusion of XMS's database, XMS is entitled to see documents related to how the investigation was conducted and what was considered during the investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-28 Federal MI

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Leibovic v. United Shore Financial Services, LLC, Case No. 15-12639, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137643 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2017)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation after a software system intrusion; finding that the company created a subject matter waiver by disclosing the third party investigator's conclusions; "The second unresolved issue is raised in XMS's motion to compel against United Shore. . . . "; "In the aftermath of the alleged intrusions to XMS's software system, United Shore's counsel commissioned Navigant -- a third-party -- to conduct an investigation."; "XMS's Interrogatory No. 8 asked United Shore to state with particularity all investigations, notifications and remedial efforts taken in response to any unauthorized use of its accounts -- in relation to the alleged intrusions to XMS's database. In response, United Shore indicated that Navigant conducted an investigation, and it also provided Navigant's conclusions from the investigation. However, United Shore withheld a significant amount of documents related to Navigant's investigation on the basis that they were protected by attorney-client privilege, since its counsel had commissioned the investigation."; "XMS says United Shore is engaging in impermissible selective waiver because it is seeking the benefit of using the results of the investigation, but withholding information about what the investigation considered and how the investigation was conducted. It further says that by including Navigant's conclusions in its response to the Interrogatory, it was using the results of the investigation offensively, which waived the privilege."; "United Shore says it was merely responding to the Interrogatory with factual information related to its retention of Navigant and the existence of Navigant's investigation."; "Although United Shore was responding to XMS's Interrogatory regarding investigations it had commissioned, its response went beyond providing factual information regarding the existence of the investigation and retention of Navigant. United Shore's response also included details regarding Navigant's conclusions. This exceeded the scope of the Interrogatory and -- as XMS contends -- United Shore fails to explain 'why the conclusions of a supposedly privileged investigation commissioned by counsel would not themselves be privileged."; "Because United Shore disclosed the privileged conclusions of Navigant's investigations, and because it appears United Shore intends to use the findings of the investigation to prove the cause of the intrusion of XMS's database, XMS is entitled to see documents related to how the investigation was conducted and what was considered during the investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-28 Federal MI

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Doe v. Baylor University, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127509 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017)
(holding that Pepper Hamilton's internal investigation into Baylor's Title IX compliance issues deserved privilege protection, but that the client waived that privilege, and deserved work product protection which Baylor did not waive and which plaintiffs could not overcome; not explaining in detail what communications or documents would be protected only by the privilege and not also by the work product doctrine, and therefore discoverable; in explaining the court's conclusion about Baylor waiving its privilege protection, not identifying the privileged communications Baylor actually disclosed; "In May 2016, a few months after this amendment, Baylor released two documents summarizing the results of the Pepper Hamilton investigation, a thirteen-page summary of the investigation and its conclusions entitle 'Findings of Fact,' and another ten-page list of recommendations titled 'Report of External and Independent Review, Recommendations.' (quoting Baylor's statement that its interim president 'would like to reiterate that the Findings of Fact fully reflect the themes, core findings and failings identified in the investigation'))"; "In other words, the documents summarize the complete course of previously confidential communications between Baylor and Pepper Hamilton. The Findings of Fact document even connects several specific factual findings to Pepper Hamilton. . . . As just one example, the findings explain that Pepper Hamilton found instances of university administrators 'directly discouraging complainants from reporting or participating in student conduct process' and that, in one instance, an administrator's actions 'constituted retaliation against a complainant for reporting sexual assault. . . .' The Shillinglaw answer includes even more specific details, going so far as to quote text messages and conversations by Baylor personnel about reports of sexual assault [these might have been historical non-privileged communications, not privileged communications involving Pepper Hamilton lawyers] and explain that these conversations were uncovered by Pepper Hamilton in the course of its investigation. . . . The Recommendations document then details over ten pages of guidance and advice provided by legal counsel. . . . These disclosures are far from a generic statement that Baylor sought legal advice on Title IX compliance."; "Plaintiffs argue that three disclosures by Baylor constituted waiver of attorney-client privilege. First, Plaintiffs argue that Baylor waived its attorney-client privilege when it released the Findings of Fact and Recommendations in May 2016. Second, Plaintiffs point to disclosures made in a filing by Baylor regents in Shillinglaw v. Baylor University, et al., No. DC-17-01225 (Dallas Cty. Dist. Ct.), where, for example, the regents quoted text message exchanges and paraphrased conversations in which Baylor personnel discussed an alleged rape by a football player and a gang rape reported to athletic staff. . . . The filing explains that all facts and evidence discussed were revealed by Pepper Hamilton's investigation. . . . Third, Plaintiffs argue that former Baylor regents were also briefed by Pepper Hamilton about details of the investigation that have since been kept confidential. . . . "; "These disclosures were intentional and together provide substantial detail about both what Baylor and its employees told Pepper Hamilton and what advice Baylor received in return. After carefully reviewing the documents disclosed, the Court finds that they are much more akin to those made in cases where waiver was found, than those where no waiver was found. Compare Nguyen, 197 F. 3d at 207 & n.17 (finding waiver where deposition questions to executives 'elicit[ed] information about the substance of [attorney-client] communication, touching on the directions given to counsel and the legal materials reviewed in addressing the question presented'); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding waiver where an '85-page report for [a client] summarize[ed] in detail the facts uncovered by the law firm in the course of its investigation'); with YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC, No. A-15-CV-597-RP, 2016 WL 8677303, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2016) (finding no waiver where a single email produced in discovery stated that '[w]e believe and our attorney has confirmed that we are not infringing'); Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. A-09-CA-711 LY, 2010 WL 5174366, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2010) (finding no waiver where 'communications merely note that they have sought advice from their attorneys . . . regarding [a] name change' and 'do not disclose the confidential advice and the opinions of their legal counsel')."; rejecting Baylor's argument that it had disclosed only facts, not privileged communications; inexplicably seeming to equate the disclosure of facts with the disclosure of communications, apparently because the facts must have been disclosed in privileged communications; "Baylor argues that waiver results only from revealing confidential communications, not underlying facts, and asserts that the Findings of Fact and Shillinglaw answer do not reveal the communication themselves. The documents themselves contradict this argument. The Findings of Fact reveal that all findings were the result of Pepper Hamilton's investigation โ€“ a 'detailed, thorough and rigorous' investigation based on 'unfettered access to personnel and data.'. . . Contrary to Baylor's assertion, this connection between Pepper Hamilton and the thirteen pages of findings 'reveals' what facts Baylor provided to Pepper Hamilton, not just the underlying facts themselves. In other words, the Findings of Fact are a 'publication of evidence of the communications.'. . . The exact contents of the communications need not be revealed to constitute waiver. See, e.g. In re Kidder, 168 F.R.D. at 468 (finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege where a report made a factual summary and paraphrased interviews conducted by attorneys); Nguyen v, 197 F.3d at 207 (affirming a district court's finding of waiver where executives recounted communications with attorneys in depositions. Similarly, in Shillinglaw, the answer explains that the Pepper Hamilton investigation uncovered the detailed evidence discussed in the answer โ€“ again, revealing what was communicated by Baylor and its personnel to Pepper Hamilton."; "Relatedly, Baylor argues that because the Findings of Fact and Recommendations were drafted for the express purpose of public release, they can reveal no confidential communications. This argument is both unconvincing and unsupported by case law. Baylor chose to publicly release a detailed summary of Pepper Hamilton's investigation that disclosed, among other things, attorney-client communications. [the opinion does not identify such privileged communications] While the information contained in these summaries was previously confidential, Baylor's decision to prepare and release a summary of those communications indicates its intentional waiver of that confidentiality. The logical extension of Baylor's argument is that the creation and public release of any document discussing attorney-client communications, no matter how detailed or self-serving, would not constitute waiver. That cannot be the case."; "Next, Baylor argues that generic statements about consulting with an attorney do not constitute waiver. But generic statements are not at issue here. Instead, the thirteen pages of Findings of Fact and ten pages of Recommendations purport to summarize the entire investigation by Pepper Hamilton โ€“ both the information provided by Baylor and the factual and legal conclusions that resulted from it.") (emphases added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-11 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Doe v. Baylor University, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127509 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017)
(holding that Pepper Hamilton's internal investigation into Baylor's Title IX compliance issues deserved privilege protection, but that the client waived that privilege, and deserved work product protection which Baylor did not waive and which plaintiffs could not overcome; not explaining in detail what communications or documents would be protected only by the privilege and not also by the work product doctrine, and therefore discoverable; concluding that Baylor's waiver of the privilege resulted in a broad subject matter waiver; "Because of these representations, and because of the level of detail publicly released about the investigation as a whole, the Court concludes that the waiver encompasses the entire scope of the investigation, and all materials, communications, and information provided to Pepper Hamilton as part of the investigation."; then inexplicably inviting Baylor to log communications it continues to assert as privileged; "To the extent Baylor seeks to withhold any specific communications with Pepper Hamilton or other counsel as responsive to Plaintiffs' requests for production as subject to attorney-client privilege, and not waived pursuant to this order, it must produce an itemized privilege log of these communications.") (emphasis added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-11 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
(analyzing the waiver implications of an executive's deposition testimony about steps he took as a result of a years-earlier lawyer-run investigation into his sexual harassment; finding that the testimony waived the privilege protection because it disclosed the earlier report's recommendations, and finding a subject matter waiver; "In 2009, Ergo received complaints from two other female employees accusing Brownlee of sexual harassment and alleging claims similar to those alleged in this suit. In response, Ergo retained attorney Donald Hartman to conduct an investigation of the company and its management. As part of his investigation, Hartman created a written report of his findings and recommendations. Whether this report is discoverable is now at issue."; "Plaintiffs also contend that Brownlee [Executive] waived the privilege when he testified, without objection, to the report's specific recommendations during his deposition. Unlike Warren, Brownlee, as part-owner and managing partner of Ergo, has the authority to waive attorney-client privilege on behalf of Ergo. . . During Brownlee's deposition, the following exchanges took place: '(Q): Can you describe for the record what the recommendations were [of the investigation]? (A): That I stay away from the building for six months. (A): I went with the recommendations and I followed it. And I had to pay a fine. (Q): Okay. What was the fine? (A): I think it might be $10,000. (A): I've gone to a therapist. But that was -- oh, that was under the recommendation of the internal investigation."; "By discussing Hartman's specific recommendations -- that Brownlee stay away from Ergo for six months, pay a $10,000 fine, and see a therapist -- Brownlee revealed Hartman's key conclusions and thus disclosed the 'gist' of the report. . . . Brownlee, on behalf of himself and Ergo, cannot reveal important conclusions from the report yet continue to maintain that the report itself is privileged. Hence, the Court concludes that Brownlee waived attorney-client privilege for the internal investigation report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017)
July 26, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Cadwalader Loses Work Product and Privilege Claims for 51 Internal Investigation Witness Interview Memoranda: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point explained that Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft's client Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA) lost a work product claim for 51 witness interviews the firm prepared during its internal investigation into self-dealing at WMATA. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017).

Unlike the court's focus on the investigation's primary business motivation in rejecting the work product claim, the court's privilege analysis found that WMATA waived its privilege protection. The court noted that WMATA publicly released the final Cadwalader report -- which "disclosed counsel's legal and factual conclusions," and "cite[d] extensively to the interview memoranda throughout the entirety of the document." Id. at *18-19. The court acknowledged a Cadwalader lawyer's declaration that the interview memoranda references "were intended only for use by Cadwalader" -- but noted that "WMATA failed to remove the references . . . from the version of the [Cadwalader] Report that was made available to the public." Id. at *19 n.1. The court also noted that WMATA "has also used the [Cadwalader] Report to its advantage in this litigation" โ€“ by "us[ing] the [Cadwalader] Report and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and defenses." Id. at *19. The court therefore found a subject matter waiver, and ordered WMATA to produce all of Cadwalader's 51 witness interview memoranda except the portions which (1) "contain subjects not covered by the [Cadwalader] Report," and (2) "material and other comments, if any, as to a lawyer's mental impressions." Id. at *20.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-16 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017)
("The Court begins by noting that attorney-client privilege 'only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts.'. . . Thus, Banneker could, through a well-written interrogatory, request the disclosure of all facts unearthed during the 51 witness interviews and WMATA would have no legitimate basis to refuse to respond. Banneker need not draft such an interrogatory, however, because the Court finds WMATA has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the interview memoranda."; "As originally commissioned, the Bondi Report was intended to be an internal document for WMATA's purposes and not slated for public disclosure. Upon receipt of the Bondi Report, the WMATA Board decided to release it to the public in its entirety. By disclosing the Bondi Report, WMATA chose to disclose the legal and factual conclusions that were contained in the report and, therefore, waived any claim of attorney-client privilege that existed with respect to the Bondi Report itself. The Court must now consider whether the public disclosure of the Bondi Report also resulted in subject-matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege covering the interview memoranda used to compile the report."; "The Court finds that the waiver of privilege as to the Bondi Report was intentional. . . . the Bondi Report cites extensively to the interview memoranda throughout the entirety of the document. The Court notes multiple references to at least 23 different witness interviews. Additionally, WMATA has not argued that the interview memoranda contain information outside the scope of the investigation or Bondi Report."; "'Ms. Rockwood notes in her declaration that the references to the interview memoranda in the Bondi Report were intended only for use by Cadwalader. . . . However, WMATA failed to remove the references and citations from the version of the Bondi Report that was made available to the public.'"; "WMATA has not zealously protected the information contained in the interview memoranda. Instead, WMATA has permitted direct citation and reference to confidential communications to be disclosed publically in the Bondi Report. WMATA has also used the Bondi Report to its advantage in this litigation. Fairness dictates that if WMATA is able to use the Bondi Report and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and defenses, then Banneker is entitled to the remaining facts and information contained in the interview memoranda that were not included in the Bondi Report. The intent of subject matter waiver is to prevent a party from selectively disclosing information and documents that would otherwise be privileged to gain a tactical advantage. WMATA cannot both benefit from the disclosure of the Bondi Report and prevent further disclosure of the remaining information in the interview memoranda.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-16 Federal DC

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Edwards v. State Casino Control Comm'n, Dkt. No. A-4738-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2737, at *29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 13, 2013)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation into a wrongful termination; ultimately requiring an in camera review; "The attorney-client and work-product privileges do not generally apply to documents created during the course of an internal investigation, especially when a defendant uses that investigation as an affirmative defense; such documents are generally not created in anticipation of litigation but to comply with an employer's internal investigative procedures and policies.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-13 State NJ B 5/14

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Gruss v. Zwirn, 276 F.R.D. 115, 138, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(analyzing privilege implication of an internal corporate investigation by Gibson Dunn and Schulte Roth involving alleged financial irregularities at several hedge funds; finding the defendants' assertion of a counterclaim did not trigger an "at issue" waiver; "Plaintiff also asserts that defendants' reliance on the findings of the internal investigations in their asserted counterclaims constitutes a waiver of the privilege. Again, were this argument directed towards the talking points, internal reports, or investor memorandum that have already been disclosed to plaintiff, we would be inclined to agree that there could be a waiver. We are more skeptical, however, of this assertion as directed towards the interview notes and summaries created by the law firms in the course of their investigation."; "Defendants make extensive allegations as to specific instances of Gruss's misconduct, none of which rely solely on the findings of the internal investigations. . . . In any event, while it is true that the Zwirn Entities may have originally learned of some of these alleged facts through the internal investigations, their later reference to those facts does not waive the privilege in the communications whereby they gained that knowledge, any more than an assertion of privilege in a particular attorney client communication protects against disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-01-01 Federal NY B 10/12

Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; explaining the court's conclusion that Household did not waive its privilege protection by disclosing the subject matter of E&Y's work to adverse states' Attorneys General; "[T]he court will briefly address Plaintiffs' additional argument that Household has waived any applicable privilege by voluntarily revealing the subject matter--though not the specific details -- of the Compliance Engagement to the Attorneys General.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; explaining that the court's conclusion that WilmerHale did not waive Household's work product protection by disclosing work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; "Plaintiffs finally seek waiver of the privilege based on Household's production to the SEC of 'documents summarizing the Restructuring Report.'. . . Defendants also emphasize that Household expressly withheld any privileged materials pursuant to a privilege log and agreed to the SEC's request for access to the Restructuring Report only on condition that the SEC enter into a written confidentiality agreement. . . . That July 16, 2003 confidentiality agreement specifically stated that 'neither the Committee nor Household intend to waive the protections of the attorney work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, or any other privilege applicable as to third parties.'"; "[T]he circuit courts are split as to the viability and application to this theory. Some have found that selective waiver is always permissible; some have found that selective waiver is never permissible; and others have found that selective waiver is permissible when the government has signed a confidentiality agreement. The court finds this last approach most persuasive in this case."; "Household insisted on a confidentiality agreement to protect the information. The court agrees with those cases finding that selective waiver may be appropriate where the disclosing party took steps to preserve its privilege. The agreement in this case expressly stated that 'neither the Committee nor Household intend to waive the protections of the attorney work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, or any other privilege applicable as to third parties.'. . . Plaintiffs make such of the fact that the agreement also allows the SEC to disclose the confidential information 'to the extent that the Staff determines that disclosure is otherwise required by law or would be in furtherance of the Commission's discharge of its duties and responsibilities.'. . . Plaintiffs note that the Qwest Communications [In re Qwest Communs. Int'l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006)] court found that identical confidentiality language did not preclude waiver because it 'gave the [SEC and DOJ] broad discretion to use the Waiver Documents as they saw fit.' 450 F.3d at 1181, 1194. The language in the DOJ's confidentiality agreement, however, was much broader than the language at issue here. In addition, unlike in Qwest, there is no evidence that 'any restrictions on [the documents'] use were loose in practice.' Id. at 1194. Thus, the court finds the agreement sufficient for purposes of applying selective waiver of the WilmerHale documents in this case. Household has not waived the work-product privilege by its voluntary production to the SEC of otherwise privileged documents, and Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.12
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that the company and its lawyer Baker Botts waived privilege protection by disclosing their investigation results to company's new auditor; "[I]t appears that i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts made significant disclosures of privileged information to third parties who lacked a common legal interest. First, the October 17, 2002 Deloitte and Touche [new auditor] memorandum provides evidence that on October 14, 2002, two of their partners met with Baker Botts attorneys to discuss the investigation and review the Phase I Report. Additionally the KPMG [accountant which assisted Baker Botts in its investigation] portion of the Phase I Report was disclosed to Deloitte and Touche for review the previous week. Further, the meeting concluded with a conference call with i2 management to discuss the additional allegations and the need to update the Phase I Report. Federal case law makes it clear that disclosure of confidential communications or documents to auditors for purposes other than seeking legal advice destroys confidentiality and with it, the right to claim the attorney-client privilege. . . . For this reason, the Court concludes that due to the disclosure of the privileged Phase I Report to Deloitte and Touche, and confidential communications between i2 and Baker Botts while Deloitte and Touche partners were present, attorney-client privilege over the Phase I Report, the subject of Category 3, has been waived."; finding a subject matter waiver; "Brady argues that i2 and Baker Botts' waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the Phase I Report and the Phase II investigation extends to the entire subject matter related to the disclosures."; "The 'disclosure of any significant portion of a confidential communication waives the privilege as to the whole.'. . . Moreover, waiver of an attorney-client communication waives the privilege as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter. . . . Here, Brady disclosed the Phase I Report, which summed up Baker Botts' entire Phase I investigation, to Deloitte and Touche. Additionally, they disclosed to the SEC the same oral report and power point presentation given to the Audit Committee concerning the ultimate findings of Phase II, interview observations and summaries, and exhibits used during witness interviews. Based on that evidence, the court finds that these disclosures amount to a significant portion of attorney-client privileged information, and thus, the waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to all responsive documents relating to the Phase I and Phase II subject matter. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege has been waived as to all documents responsive to Categories 3, 4, 5, and 6.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.14
Case Name: Doehne v. EmpRes Healthcare Management, LLC, No. 46467-5-II, 2015 Wash. App. LEXIS 1909 (Wash. App. Aug. 11, 2015)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected a post-accident investigation following a slip and fall accident at a health facility; noting that the facility's in-house lawyers directed the investigation; "The purpose of EmpRes' risk management position 'is to act as a conduit between the legal department and insurers regarding liability issues, including workers' compensation and third-party liability, with the goal of avoiding litigation and minimizing liability.'. . . The record shows that Clarno's report was prepared to assist in-house counsel in addressing issues of liability and potential litigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-08-11 Federal WA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Pitkin v. Corizon Health, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-02235-AA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208058 (D. Ore. Dec. 18, 2017)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege protected an investigation undertaken by a jail health services contractor into the death of an inmate; adopting the one "primary purpose" privilege standard from the D.C. circuit court case in Kellogg Brown & Root; "I am persuaded by the Kellogg [In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 2014)] court's reasoning, and I adopt it here. Because the Ninth Circuit has not adopted a characterization of the 'primary purpose' test that aids in categorizing the kinds of mixed-motive investigations specifically at issue here, I will apply the gloss provided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Kellogg."; "Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege protects the results of the Sentinel Event investigation undertaken by Corizon in the aftermath of Ms. Pitkin's untimely and unfortunate death. Corizon has satisfied each element of the attorney-client privilege standard, showing that it sought factfinding and advice at the direction of Corizon's in-house legal team. Moreover, it showed that at least one primary purpose of the investigation was to 'assess the situation from a legal perspective, provide legal guidance, and prepare for possible litigation and/or administrative proceedings.'. . . That Corizon was fulfilling its obligations under its own corporate policies or its contract with Washington County -- or both -- is of no moment. As the Kellogg court explained, '[i]t is often not useful or even feasible to try to determine whether the purpose was A or B when the purpose was A and B.'. . . Common sense suggests that the death of an inmate would trigger numerous obligations for the organization charged with her care, not the least of which would be an assessment of liability. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege applies to the Sentinel Event investigation, and Corizon is not required to produce it.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-18 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hosp., Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017)
(analyzing a hospital's investigation after an allegedly botched surgery; "Although the Hospital has not provided an affidavit as to Mr. Seraphine's [former hospital CEO] intent in drafting the 9:26 a.m. email, it is in direct response to at least one of Mr. Parker's [current hospital CEO] emails, and also directly includes in-house counsel Ms. Hendry [hospital's lawyer] as a recipient. For these reasons, the 9:26 a.m. email is also protected by attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-15 Federal KY

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Doe v. Baylor University, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127509 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017)
(holding that Pepper Hamilton's internal investigation into Baylor's Title IX compliance issues deserved privilege protection, but that the client waived that privilege, and deserved work product protection which Baylor did not waive and which plaintiffs could not overcome; not explaining in detail what communications or documents would be protected only by the privilege and not also by the work product doctrine, and therefore discoverable; concluding that Baylor retained Pepper Hamilton to receive its legal advice, so the privilege applied; "In this case, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Baylor was seeking legal advice when it engaged Pepper Hamilton in September 2015. The initial engagement letter indicated that Pepper Hamilton was hired 'to conduct an independent and external review of Baylor University's institutional responses to Title IX and related compliance issues through the lens of specific cases.'. . . Although the letter does not use the phrases 'legal advice,' 'legal assistance,' or the like, there is no magic phrase that must be included in an engagement letter to invoke the attorney-client privilege. The letter plainly indicates that Baylor hired a law firm to review its compliance with federal law โ€“ in other words, to obtain legal advice."; also pointing to declarations by members of the Baylor's Board of Regents and a Pepper Hamilton lawyer) (emphasis added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-11 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S. A., LLC, 16 Civ. 1805 (JPO) (JCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126185 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017)
(in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Francis, holding that drafts of and communications relating to an investigation conducted by the Proskauer Rose law firm into client's alleged Title VII violation deserved both privilege and work product protection; also noting that the defendant had abandoned a Faragher-Ellerth defense, but that the court would have to review the withheld documents in camera to determine if defendant waived either protection by using the report for "context" in connection with its "good faith" defense; "In this case, the Corporate Defendants raised a Faragher/Ellerth defense in their Answer. . . . However, they have since disavowed use of the Proskauer Report in connection with any Farragher/Ellerth defense. They first made this clear at a court conference. . . and they state unequivocally in their reply memorandum that 'Defendants will not be using the legal conclusions in the Proskauer Report . . . to support their position that there has been no violation of the law . . . . ' (Reply Memorandum of Law in further Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)."; "This does not, however, end the inquiry. The Corporate Defendants have indicated that they do not intend to rely on the Proskauer Report 'to provide context for the actions they took as a result of the business recommendations in the Report.'. . . Reliance by the Corporate Defendants on the conclusions of the report does not open up to discovery the details of the investigation that led to the report. . . . Therefore, there is no waiver with respect to the categories of the Proskauer Documents that could be relevant, if at all, only to the accuracy of the findings in the report, specifically, notes of interviews of JWT employees, drafts of the report, and invoices."; "However, when a party asserts a good faith defense, as the Corporate Defendants appear to do here, it may not selectively proffer the information upon which it relied. . . . Here, the extent to which the Corporate Defendants acted in good faith on the basis of the Proskauer Report is dependent upon the totality of the legal advice they received. Thus, the communications related to Proskauer's conclusions, but not the reliabililty of the investigation lending to those conclusions, are discoverable. Accordingly, if they intend to introduce the Proskauer Report in evidence, the Corporate Defendants shall produce for my in camera review any documents withheld on grounds of privilege that reflect communications between themselves and Proskauer or between Proskauer and David & Gilbert concerning the subject matter of the Proskauer Report. In that way, I can determine whether fairness necessitates the disclosure of these documents to the plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-09 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S. A., LLC, 16 Civ. 1805 (JPO) (JCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126185 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017)
(in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Francis, holding that drafts of and communications relating to an investigation conducted by the Proskauer Rose law firm into client's alleged Title VII violation deserved both privilege and work product protection; also noting that the defendant had abandoned a Faragher-Ellerth defense, but that the court would have to review the withheld documents in camera to determine if defendant waived either protection by using the report for "context" in connection with its "good faith" defense; "Proskauer has declined to disclose (1) electronic and handwritten notes taken by Proskauer attorneys during the investigation interviews; (2) earlier drafts of the Proskauer Report containing attorney comments; (3) invoices submitted to the Corporate Defendants; (4) documents provided to Proskauer by JWT and the interviewees in the course of the investigation; and (5) emails among Proskauer attorneys and between Proskauer attorneys and JWT witnesses or outside counsel regarding the investigation and the lawsuit (collectively, the 'Proskauer Documents')."; "[I]t is not the Report itself that is at issue, but rather the documents generated during the investigation."; "With respect to many of the Proskauer Documents, I disagree. 'Rare is the case that a troubled corporation will initiate an internal investigation solely for legal, rather than business, purposes; indeed, the very prospect of legal action against a company necessarily implicates larger concerns about a company's internal procedures and controls, not to mention its bottom line.'. . . Yet the purpose of a communication need not be exclusively legal in order for the privilege to attach. . . . Rather, the legal purpose need only be predominant, and identification of such a purpose 'may [] be informed by the overall needs and objectives that animate the client's request for advice.'. . . Here, there were no doubt multiple motivations for commencing an internal investigation and engaging in the subject communications: to gather information to defend this lawsuit; to determine whether systemic changes were necessary; to decide on a course of action specifically with respect to Mr. Martinez; and to ameliorate a public relations problem. Yet all of these purposes were suffused with the need for legal advice triggered by a lawsuit that had already been filed. This is confirmed by the fact that the Proskauer report contains multiple references to the allegations contained in the lawsuit . . . as well as the fact that its recommendations reflect the application of legal expertise . . . . The plaintiff complains that any claim that the Proskauer investigation had a primarily legal purpose is undermined by the fact that the Corporate Defendants' outside counsel, Davis & Gilbert, had already conducted one . . . . But, surely, the fact that a client chooses to seek legal advice from multiple attorneys does not cast doubt on the privileged nature of communications with any one of them."; "This is true even where the document in its final form is intended to be disseminated publicly. . . . As discussed above, the Proskauer Report reflects the provision of legal advice so the drafts of that report are similarly privileged. Moreover, even if the drafts are not privileged in their entirety, they are also subject to work product protection, as will be discussed below."; "In this case, the Corporate Defendants raised a Faragher/Ellerth defense in their Answer. . . . However, they have since disavowed use of the Proskauer Report in connection with any Farragher/Ellerth defense. They first made this clear at a court conference. . . and they state unequivocally in their reply memorandum that 'Defendants will not be using the legal conclusions in the Proskauer Report . . . to support their position that there has been no violation of the law . . . . ' (Reply Memorandum of Law in further Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)."; "This does not, however, end the inquiry. The Corporate Defendants have indicated that they do not intend to rely on the Proskauer Report 'to provide context for the actions they took as a result of the business recommendations in the Report.'. . . Reliance by the Corporate Defendants on the conclusions of the report does not open up to discovery the details of the investigation that led to the report. . . . Therefore, there is no waiver with respect to the categories of the Proskauer Documents that could be relevant, if at all, only to the accuracy of the findings in the report, specifically, notes of interviews of JWT employees, drafts of the report, and invoices."; "However, when a party asserts a good faith defense, as the Corporate Defendants appear to do here, it may not selectively proffer the information upon which it relied. . . . Here, the extent to which the Corporate Defendants acted in good faith on the basis of the Proskauer Report is dependent upon the totality of the legal advice they received. Thus, the communications related to Proskauer's conclusions, but not the reliabililty of the investigation lending to those conclusions, are discoverable. Accordingly, if they intend to introduce the Proskauer Report in evidence, the Corporate Defendants shall produce for my in camera review any documents withheld on grounds of privilege that reflect communications between themselves and Proskauer or between Proskauer and David & Gilbert concerning the subject matter of the Proskauer Report. In that way, I can determine whether fairness necessitates the disclosure of these documents to the plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-09 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Martinez v. Kleinfeld Bridal Corp., 16-CV-348 (RA) (JLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103261 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2017)
(holding that notes prepared by Littler Mendelson about an incident involving plaintiff deserved privilege and work product protection; noting that the court's in camera review of notes showed that Littler was acting in a legal capacity rather than just investigators; "The scant deposition testimony of Kleinfeld CEO Ronnie Rothstein provided by plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that defense counsel had a non-legal purpose in the aftermath of the April 29 incident. The only testimony tying defense counsel to an investigatory role is a portion of Rothstein's deposition where counsel asked, 'So Rosanne [Clerkin], Terry [sic] [Solomon] and Bert [Pogrebin] conducted an investigation?,' and Rothstein answered, 'Yes'. . . . The Court does not consider this testimony, without more, sufficient to establish that Littler's attorneys acted as investigators without a primarily legal purpose.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-30 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
(analyzing the waiver implications of an executive's deposition testimony about steps he took as a result of a years-earlier lawyer-run investigation into his sexual harassment; finding that the testimony waived the privilege protection because it disclosed the earlier report's recommendations, and finding a subject matter waiver; "In 2009, Ergo received complaints from two other female employees accusing Brownlee of sexual harassment and alleging claims similar to those alleged in this suit. In response, Ergo retained attorney Donald Hartman to conduct an investigation of the company and its management. As part of his investigation, Hartman created a written report of his findings and recommendations. Whether this report is discoverable is now at issue."; finding that the report deserved privilege protection; "Attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between attorneys and clients, including internal investigation reports supplied by attorneys to their clients, when one of the significant purposes of communication is legal advice, rather than only business advice. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 2014)."; "After reviewing the report in camera, the Court concludes that the report was confidential legal advice from an attorney to a client, and therefore is protected by attorney-client privilege. The Court presumes that outside counsel is retained for legal purposes. . . . Here, the presumption is borne out by the document itself. It includes legal conclusions as to the company's exposure to liability, legal recommendations for avoiding liability from these allegations and protecting against future misconduct that could lead to new allegations, and litigation strategies relating to the sexual harassment allegations at issue at the time of the report. Thus, a 'significant purpose' of the report was to provide legal advice. . . . There are also several indications that the document was intended to be a confidential communication between an attorney and his clients. The report is labeled 'Attorney-Client Privilege' and states that it is '[n]ot to be disseminated beyond ownership group,' with Ergo's owners listed by name underneath. Thus, because the report contains primarily legal advice and was a confidential communication between an attorney and his clients, the report is privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Fairway Methanol LLC and Celanese Ltd., No. 14-16-00884-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 830 (Tex. App. 14d Jan. 31, 2017)
(protecting as privileged documents created by a company's in-house lawyer investigation; noting that Texas did not follow the "primary purpose" test; but finding the work product doctrine applicable after noting that a company affidavit indicated that the departments role in the investigation was not ordinary; "Rowen's affidavit states that he was serving as counsel for Celanese Corporation, not relator Celanese Ltd., and that he requested that an investigative team provide the Celanese Law Department with the information needed to assess liability in potential litigation. Because the investigation was requested by counsel employed by Celanese Corporation, the investigation was for the benefit of not just relator Celanese Ltd., but also for Celanese Corporation which could anticipate litigation and who Plaintiffs have, in fact, sued in this court proceeding.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-31 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Fairway Methanol LLC and Celanese Ltd., No. 14-16-00884-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 830 (Tex. App. 14d Jan. 31, 2017)
(protecting as privileged documents created by a company's in-house lawyer investigation; noting that Texas did not following the "primary purpose" test; but finding the work product doctrine applicable after noting that a company affidavit indicated that the departments role in the investigation was not ordinary; "According to Rowen [Celanese's corporation's in-house lawyer], the primary purpose for the investigation and creation of documents and communications therefrom was to aid Celanese in preparing to defend itself in anticipated litigation. As a secondary concern, the information communicated from the investigative team to the legal department was necessary for the legal department to provide Celanese with business and legal advice with respect to the potential termination of employees involved in the accident. The team members were immediately informed that the investigation was for the purpose of assisting counsel and that all communications and documents generated during their investigation must be kept confidential and marked as 'Privileged and Confidential' or 'Attorney-Client Privilege -- Attorney Work Product.' The investigative team conducted interviews and site inspections and communicated their findings to the Celanese Law Department. They prepared a root cause analysis which was necessary for the Celanese Law Department to evaluate liability and begin developing a strategy for defending itself in likely civil and regulatory litigation. Rowen states, 'All of the communications withheld by Celanese were communications between Celanese in-house and outside counsel and their representatives made for the purposes of providing and communicating legal advice or otherwise facilitating or providing professional legal services.'"; "Plaintiffs cite no Texas authority for their position that the communication must have been made for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business advice. And the federal decisions supporting Plaintiffs' position are not binding on our court. More important, the language of Rule 503(b) does not require that the primary purpose of the communication be to facilitate the rendition of legal services; it only requires that the communication be made to facilitate the rendition of legal services.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-31 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 3:13-cv-06529, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44267, at *82 84 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2016)
("Under both West Virginia law and federal law, the withheld ASO documents are protected from disclosure under attorney-client privilege. First, Ford's OGC, specifically Mr. Logel, and Ford's ASO contemplated that an attorney-client relationship existed at the time that the OGC engaged the ASO to analyze the VOQs and TREAD Act data. Mr. Logel's affidavit, Mr. Love's affidavit, and Mr. Nevi's deposition testimony all support this conclusion. Second, as explained above, the ASO prepared and submitted the logged documents at the request of the OGC for the purpose of rendering legal advice to Ford. Although Ford's OGC may have been the initiating party by requesting that the ASO conduct an analysis of the pertinent data, that fact alone does not render the attorney-client privilege inapplicable. As explained above, communications during fact-finding investigations conducted by an attorney in his or her legal capacity are protected. . . . Indeed, even with the understanding that the privilege should be construed narrowly . . . it would be an unreasonable interpretation of the privilege to hold that a proactive, fastidious in-house attorney who seeks information from his client for the purpose of rendering legal advice cannot claim privilege over the information that he receives in response to his request simply because he was the first to act. . . . Third, and finally, the communication of the information (i.e. the sending of the documents) from Ford's ASO to the OGC was intended to be confidential. As Mr. Logel's affidavit explains, '[t]he documents identified on Ford's ASO Privilege Log have not been disseminated beyond those Ford employees and consultants working directly with Ford's counsel in this regard.' . . . There is no evidence that Mr. Logel's assertion is false or that it was 'the intention or understanding of [Ford] that the communication [was] to be made known to others.'" (citation and footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-28 Federal WV B 8/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "The court finds that only the photographs contained in the investigation report should be produced by Letica to the parties. All of the other documents were part of the post-accident investigation which was not in the ordinary course of business, and they were prepared under direction of attorney Michael for possible subsequent litigation closely related to this case, including the OSHA investigation. Attorney Michael had direct involvement with and controlled the fatal accident investigation from its inception. Also, Letica reasonably anticipated litigation immediately after the accident and communications in the investigation report following the accident fell within the work-product doctrine. The court's in camera review further shows that the Exhibits discussed above to which Letica asserts the attorney-client privilege do in fact contain 'information exchanged in order to facilitate the professional relationship between an attorney and his client with regard to ongoing or potential legal proceedings.'. . . As such, these documents are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "The court finds that this report was not complied in the ordinary course of business since it was intended to assist attorney Michael with an OSHA investigation as well as to implement post-accident modifications. It makes no difference that Hunter [Employee] prepared the report since the work-product doctrine also protects 'materials prepared by an attorney's agent.'. . . The report and the referenced communications involving the accident investigation performed at the direction of attorney Michael also are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., 14-cv-748-wmc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166438 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2015)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues in connection with internal corporate investigations conducted by Loeb & Loeb; finding the privilege inapplicable and concluding that the plaintiff could overcome any possible work product protection; finding that the privilege did not apply because (among other things) "the report contains no legal advice."; inexplicably concluding that the investigation's focus might have deserve privilege protection; "The court found Muthuswami's [Defendant's president] reliance on summary documents to be routine, and did not constitute a waiver of the underlying attorney-client privilege, although counsel rightly disclosed the summary documents as an aid to Muthuswami's testimony. To the extent that the information in the summary documents came from Loeb & Loeb's earlier investigations, perhaps the production of those documents coupled with Muthuswami's testimony would have constituted waiver, but TCS's counsel at the hearing represented that she had independently prepared those summary documents and the court has no basis to find otherwise. While the court continues to find fault with the designation of Muthuswami as the sole 30(b)(6) designee given his limited knowledge on a variety of designated subjects, this, too, is no basis for stripping away at the attorney-client privilege between defendants and their trial counsel.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-10 Federal WI

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Armouth International, Inc. v. Dollar General Corp., No. 3:14-0567, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148784 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege protected communications to and from a company's in-house lawyer also serving as its compliance director; "According to Dollar General, the communications at issue involve emails that are: (1) from Mr. Stephenson [Dollar General's "Assistant General Counsel," who also served as "head of the Compliance Department" and "supervisor to the Senior Director of Global Sourcing"] providing legal advice to Dollar General employees regarding the tested merchandise; (2) from employees to Mr. Stephenson requesting legal advice; (3) from employees to Mr. Stephenson providing information necessary for Mr. Stephenson to provide adequate legal advice regarding the tested merchandise; or (4) between employees relaying Mr. Stephenson's legal advice as it pertains to the ongoing situation with Armouth [supplier of products to Dollar General, suing the company for not paying its invoices]. . . . Dollar General contends that all such communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege."; "In Zolin [U.S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570-71, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989)], the Supreme Court delineated the standard for determining whether an assertion of attorney-client privilege warrants an in camera review by the presiding judge. While the Supreme Court applied this standard specifically to the crime-fraud exception, this Court finds that the standard is appropriate in this matter to evaluate whether the documents requested for in camera review may reveal evidence of business advice that is not shielded from discovery by the attorney-client privilege."; "[A]s Dollar General states in its response, the decision to release the hold was made by Mr. Stephenson precisely because it required the legal opinion of an attorney. . . . Furthermore, even if Mr. Stephenson had considered some aspects of business in making his decision, such consideration does not necessarily remove the coverage afforded by the attorney-client privilege. Dollar General correctly notes that district courts have held that the 'mere fact that business considerations are weighed in the rendering of legal advice does not vitiate the attorney-client privilege."; "The privilege log indicates that this email consisted of Mr. Vasos 'relaying Rob Stephenson's legal advice related to the non-conforming scrubs' to Mr. Gatta. . . . This appears to match the substance of the email's content prior to the redacted portion, which concludes with, 'now for the bad news. Their label does not match the product.'. . . It is logical that the remainder of the email would pertain to Mr. Stephenson's legal advice regarding the nonconforming goods."; agreeing with Dollar General that the company's decision to put a hold on the invoices primarily involved a legal rather than a business issue; "Here, Dollar General's claims of privilege are narrow and specific. Dollar General has reasonably rebutted the speculation by Armouth that Mr. Stephenson was giving business advice (or predominately giving business advice) rather than legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-02 Federal TN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Doehne v. EmpRes Healthcare Management, LLC, No. 46467-5-II, 2015 Wash. App. LEXIS 1909 (Wash. App. Aug. 11, 2015)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected a post-accident investigation following a slip and fall accident at a health facility; noting that the facility's in-house lawyers directed the investigation; "The purpose of EmpRes' risk management position 'is to act as a conduit between the legal department and insurers regarding liability issues, including workers' compensation and third-party liability, with the goal of avoiding litigation and minimizing liability.'. . . The record shows that Clarno's report was prepared to assist in-house counsel in addressing issues of liability and potential litigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-08-11 Federal WA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Perino v. Edible Arrangements Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 3:13CV1411 (JBA), 2015 U.S. Dist. 39131 (D. Conn. March 27, 2015)
(finding that the privilege protected a forensic audit of plaintiff's alleged misconduct prepared by an outside accounting firm retained by a lawyer; also finding that the defendant did not waive the privilege by mentioning the report in press releases, because it did not intend to rely on the report at trial; "[D]efendant represents in its brief, and reiterated at the March 2 conference, that its in-house counsel Catherine Gilroy initiated an investigation to determine the scope of plaintiff's offline accounting activities so that Ms. Gilroy could provide legal advice to defendants about the consequences of these actions and whether any further legal action was necessary.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-27 Federal CT

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews conducted by the Jenner lawyers during the firm's investigation into General Motors ignition switch incidents; explaining the background; "Jenner was retained 'to represent New GM's interests and to provide legal advice to new GM in a variety of matters relating to the recalls, including the DOJ investigation and other anticipated government investigations and civil litigation.'"; "No transcript or recording was made of the interviews. . . . Instead, the Jenner lawyers produced three types of writings during and after the interviews: attorney notes taken during the interviews; summaries created after each interview; and formal attorney memoranda created after the interviews (collectively, the 'Interview Materials').")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews conducted by the Jenner lawyers during the firm's investigation into General Motors ignition switch incidents; rejecting plaintiff's argument that GM's "primary purpose" in conducting the investigation was not to obtain legal advice; adopting the "one of the significant purposes" standard; "The primary purpose test, however, does not require a showing that obtaining or providing legal advice was the sole purpose of an internal investigation or that the communications at issue 'would not have been made 'but for' the fact that legal advice was sought.' In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Instead, as the D.C. Circuit has expressly held, 'the primary purpose test, sensibly and properly applied, cannot and does not draw a rigid distinction between a legal purpose on the one hand and a business purpose on the other.' Id. At 759. 'So long as obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes of the internal investigation, the attorney-client privilege applies, even if there were also other purposes for the investigation . . . .' Id. At 758-59."; "[T]he D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with -- if not compelled by -- the Supreme Court's logic in Upjohn. Rare is the case that a troubled corporation will initiate an internal investigation solely for legal, rather than business, purposes; indeed, the very prospect of legal action against a company necessarily implicates larger concerns about the company's internal procedures and controls, not to mention its bottom line. Accordingly, an attorney-client privilege that fails to account for the multiple and often-overlapping purposes of internal investigations would 'threaten[] to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law.' Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393."; "[R]egardless of whether New GM had other purposes in retaining Jenner, and regardless of whether the Valukas Report itself contained legal as opposed to business advice -- a question this Court need not, and does not, reach -- the underlying investigation, and the interviews conducted as part of it, had a 'primary purpose' of enabling Valukas and Jenner to provide New GM with legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014).
July 16, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point described the legal standard and some of the factual bases for the District of Columbia District Court's denial of privilege protection for Kellogg Brown & Root's (KBR) internal corporate investigation. This weekโ€™s privilege point tells the good news -- when about three months later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a writ of mandamus reversing the District Court's holding. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014).

The District of Columbia federal appellate court first rejected the district court's legal standard, holding that the privilege could protect a company's investigation if its need for legal advice was one of the "primary" or "significant" motivating purposes โ€“ even if not the only purpose, or the primary purpose. Id. at *13-14. The appeals court also explicitly addressed several factual indicia the district court relied on, holding that (1) KBR's requirement under government regulations to investigate alleged fraud did not preclude KBR's argument that another "significant purpose[]" was seeking legal advice; (2) nonlawyers could conduct privileged employee interviews while "serving as agents of attorneys"; (3) the absence of Upjohn warnings did not prevent privilege protection, because "nothing in Upjohn requires a company to use magic words"; and (4) although the employees' confidentiality agreements did not "expressly" mention KBR's need for legal advice, employees knew the law department was conducting a "sensitive" investigation and were warned not to discuss their interviews without KBR's General Counsel's authorization. Id. at *8-10.

The appeals court's legal standard represents a much more privilege-friendly approach than most courts apply. The standard permits companies to claim privilege protection even for investigations they must undertake pursuant to external requirements -- rather than having to initiate parallel or successive investigations to gain the protection. And the court's analysis of the factual issues provides a much more lenient standard for claiming privilege than most courts would apply. Next week's Privilege Point will discuss what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' decision did not address.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 14-5055, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115, at *6-7 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014)
(granting a petition for writ of mandamus and vacating a lower court's holding that the privilege did not protect documents created during an internal corporate investigation of possible foreign wrongdoing; holding among other things that a privilege applied to an investigation if one "significant purpose" was the collection of facts lawyers required to give legal advice; "KBR's assertion of the privilege in this case is materially indistinguishable from Upjohn's assertion of the privilege in that case. As in Upjohn, KBR initiated an internal investigation to gather facts and ensure compliance with the law after being informed of potential misconduct. And as in Upjohn, KBR's investigation was conducted under the auspices of KBR's in-house legal department, acting in its legal capacity. The same considerations that led the Court in Upjohn to uphold the corporation's privilege claims apply here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: McCullough v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, No. 12 C 9359, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014)
(analyzing defendant's investigation of possible sexual harassment; holding that the investigation-related documents deserved privilege protection and work product protection; holding that the defendant could refer to remedial steps and the investigation, but would waive any protection by using investigation-related documents at the trial; "[T]he Court finds that the D'Alba Report (and associated notes and memoranda) is protected by the attorney client and work product privileges. FOP asserts that the report contains 'legal analysis and advice' from D'Alba, which was hired 'in response to a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee' and 'due to the prospect of litigation.' . . . . The firm conducted 'confidential interviews,' prepared the report, marked the report 'privileged and confidential,' and shared the report with only certain FOP management employees and no third parties. . . . "The conduct of the D'Alba attorneys during their investigation is persuasive; the attorneys conducted confidential interviews, marked their report 'privileged and confidential,' and restricted access by third parties to the report.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-11 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014)
July 9, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part I"

After a decade or more of generally bad news for corporations seeking privilege protection for their internal corporate investigations, the District of Columbia Circuit has issued an opinion containing good news on all fronts.

In March 2014, the District of Columbia District Court denied attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection for documents Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) (and affiliates) created during an internal corporate investigation. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). Five days later, the court denied a stay. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014). The District Court used a narrow version of the "primary purpose" test for privilege protection -- holding that "[t]he party invoking the privilege must show the 'communication would not have been made "but for" the fact that the legal advice was sought.'" Halliburton, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490, at *7-8 (citation omitted). In applying this standard, the District Court pointed to a number of facts, including (1) the investigation "resulted from the Defendants [sic] need to comply with government regulations"; (2) nonlawyers conducted the interviews; (3) those nonlawyers did not give Upjohn warnings informing the interviewed employees "that the purpose of the interview was to assist KBR in obtaining legal advice"; and (4) the interviewed employees signed confidentiality agreements that did not mention the investigation's legal purpose. Id. at *9-10. In most courts, these factors would probably have doomed KBR's privilege claim even under a more favorable "primary purpose" test.

The next two Privilege Points will describe the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reversal of this ruling.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-11 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014)
July 9, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"District of Columbia Circuit Court Dramatically Expands Privilege Protection for Internal Corporate Investigations: Part I"

After a decade or more of generally bad news for corporations seeking privilege protection for their internal corporate investigations, the District of Columbia Circuit has issued an opinion containing good news on all fronts.

In March 2014, the District of Columbia District Court denied attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection for documents Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) (and affiliates) created during an internal corporate investigation. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). Five days later, the court denied a stay. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co, Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30866 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014). The District Court used a narrow version of the "primary purpose" test for privilege protection -- holding that "[t]he party invoking the privilege must show the 'communication would not have been made "but for" the fact that the legal advice was sought.'" Halliburton, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36490, at *7-8 (citation omitted). In applying this standard, the District Court pointed to a number of facts, including (1) the investigation "resulted from the Defendants [sic] need to comply with government regulations"; (2) nonlawyers conducted the interviews; (3) those nonlawyers did not give Upjohn warnings informing the interviewed employees "that the purpose of the interview was to assist KBR in obtaining legal advice"; and (4) the interviewed employees signed confidentiality agreements that did not mention the investigation's legal purpose. Id. at *9-10. In most courts, these factors would probably have doomed KBR's privilege claim even under a more favorable "primary purpose" test.

The next two Privilege Points will describe the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reversal of this ruling.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-06 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Nelson v. Intercontinental Hotels Group Operating Corp., Case No. 12 CV 8485, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157262 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2013)
(holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a post-accident investigation following an accident at a hotel; "Aside from asserting that these incident reports are submitted to Defendants' 'Risk Management Team in Rhode Island,' Defendants failed to submit any information to satisfy the requisite elements for Defendant corporations to assert that the incident reports are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-01 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., A-13-CV-075-LY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155391, at *11-12, *12-13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013)
(concluding that a company could not claim privilege protection for the first call it received from a whistleblowing employee about possible misconduct within the corporation, but that the privilege could protect later communications between the anonyomous whistleblower and the company's lawyer; "[T]he anonymous whistleblower made three submissions via the EthicsPoint portal used by Maxim. An initial submission was made on December 14, 2011, and two follow-up communications were submitted on December 20, 2011, and February 24, 2012. Maxim's Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel, Ed Medlin, communicated with the anonymous whistleblower twice via EthicsPoint -- once on December 14, 2011, in response to the initial submission and again on February 27, 2012, in response to the whistleblower's submission on February 24, 2012. Upon review of the documents containing these discussions, the Court determines that the initial submission made by the anonymous whistleblower on December 14, 2011, is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and should be produced. The initial submission is distinguishable from the questionnaires at issue in Upjohn [Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)] because it was made prior to the start of any investigation by Maxim into the specific allegations that Freescale's software was being improperly used at Maxim. There is also insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the anonymous whistleblower was seeking legal advice or that this information was somehow solicited by Maxim in order for Maxim's legal counsel to render legal advice to the company. Consequently, the Court concludes that the initial submission by the anonymous whistleblower is not protected by the attorney-client privilege and must be produced."; "However, the subsequent communications between Ed Medlin and the anonymous whistleblower via EthicsPoint are protected by the attorney-client privilege. . . . In the initial communication the whistleblower identifies him or herself as a Maxim employee. The content of the subsequent communications show that more specific information was being solicited from the anonymous whistleblower -- a Maxim employee -- in order for Maxim's General Counsel, Ed Medlin, to investigate the allegations and render legal advice to Maxim. Additionally, the content of the follow-up communications also clarifies that the messages were exchanged after Maxim had started its investigation into the anonymous whistleblower's claims.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-30 Federal TX B 5/14

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09 cv 670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *37 38 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that documents created during a 2006 compliance audit deserved privilege protection; "The distribution lists on the emails are limited to SunCoke's General Counsel and senior HES corporate representatives with knowledge of the facts at issue in the 2006 Audit. The audit findings, comments, and tracking changes constitute the factual predicates underlying the provision of legal advice by SunCoke's Legal Department to assess HNCC's compliance with state and federal HES regulations. . . . The withheld documents reflect the factual information from corporate employee with knowledge of audit findings; their responses to the findings or actions taken in response; and that such information was transmitted to counsel for the purpose of providing legal advice to SunCoke on HNCC's compliance with HES requirements. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence suggests at most that Pack and McCormick were providing technical, business-related advice which is not protected. Even if the information is characterized as 'technical' or 'business-related,' those communications were gathered at the request of counsel for the primary purpose of aiding counsel in providing legal services to SunCoke.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH B 7/13

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill North Coke Co., Case No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
January 23, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Where Do Courts Look When Determining Whether a Litigant has Proven Attorney Client Privilege or Work Product Protection?: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points noted that some courts assess a privilege or work product claim by relying on extrinsic evidence such as affidavits, while other courts look primarily or exclusively at the withheld documents themselves. Most courts examine both the documents and extrinsic evidence.

In Graff v. Haverhill North Coke Co., Case No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012), a litigant claimed work product and privilege protection for documents created during a consultant's audit. In rejecting the work product claim for one audit, the court pointed to the documents themselves. Among other things, the company president's memorandum requesting the audit indicated that "the purpose of the audit was to assess general compliance with regulatory requirements and company policies." Id. At *15. Another company executive described the audit as "generic." Id. At *16. Thus, the documents themselves undercut the work product claim. In contrast, the court found that many of the documents deserved attorney-client privilege protection. Among other things, the court noted that the same executive who described the audit as "generic" had submitted an affidavit which "confirms that the audit was prepared to assist counsel with providing legal advice" to the company. Id. At *28.

Lawyers should always teach their clients to articulate the basis for a protection claim on the face of protected documents. Companies involved in litigation should also determine what a pertinent court will examine in assessing the company's withholding of protected documents. Most courts expect an affidavit or other extrinsic evidence.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Schlicksup v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 09 CV 1208, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75299, at *5, *9 (C.D. Ill. July 13, 2011)
(analyzing an internal corporate investigation; finding that both the attorney client privilege and the work product doctrine applied to documents created during an investigation by Howrey into possible illegal activity and retaliation, harassment and other "improper and illegal conduct by Caterpillar employees"; "Even if Howrey's investigation could have been conducted by in house counsel, that does not, by itself render unavailable the protections of the attorney client privilege. . . . The focus is on the purpose and confidentiality of the communications, not on whether the attorney was in house or out. Here, the purpose of the communications was to obtain legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-07-13 Federal IL B 1/13

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, No. 08-3344, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28983 (7th Cir. App. Feb. 25, 2009)
(reversing the lower court's denial of privilege protection, and holding that Sidley Austin lawyers were hired as legal advisors to conduct an investigation into possible sexual abuse at the school โ€“ so their investigation-related documents deserved privilege and work product protection; "[T]he School Board retained the law firm of Sidley Austin LLP (then Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP) to conduct an internal investigation. The School Board wanted Sidley to review the criminal charges filed against Sperlik, investigate the actions of school administrators in response to the allegations of sexual abuse, examine whether any district employees had failed to comply with district policies or federal or state law, and analyze the effectiveness the effectiveness of the District's existing compliance procedures. According to the February 4, 2005 engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board, Sidley was to 'investigate the response of the school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and to 'provide legal services in connection with' the investigation. Scott Lassar, a partner at Sidley and a former U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, spearheaded the investigation."; "On the same day the engagement letter was issued, the School Board president and superintendent of schools sent a joint letter to parents announcing the District's retention of Lassar to conduct the investigation. Ten days later the superintendent sent another more detailed letter to parents explaining that the investigation had begun and would be completed as soon as possible. As the investigation proceeded, attorneys from Sidley interviewed many school-district employees, including current and former principles, social workers, administrative employees, and members of the School Board. Sidley also interviewed a handful of third parties who had never been employed by the School District. None of the interviews were recorded. Instead, the attorneys took notes of the witnesses' answers and later prepared written memoranda memorializing the interviews for future use in Sidley's legal advice to the Board. These notes and memoranda are the subject of the present discovery dispute."; "Lassar and a Sidley colleague delivered an oral report of the firm's findings at a closed executive session of the Board in April 2005, and later that month delivered a written 'Executive Summary' โ€“ marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product' โ€“ to the Board. This concluded Sidley's engagement; other lawyers have represented the defendants throughout this litigation."; "[T]he judge all but ignored the engagement letter, which should have been the most important piece of evidence. The engagement letter between Sidley and the School Board explained that Sidley had been hired to 'investigate the response of school administration to allegations of sexual abuse of students' and 'provide legal services in connection with the specific representation.' There is no indication that the judge actually considered the engagement letter when it was brought to the court's attention in these later proceedings; rather, the judge simply reiterated his earlier rulings that Sidley had been hired as an investigator and the privilege therefore did not apply."; "This oversight was a mistake; the engagement letter brings this case squarely within the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn."; "Following Upjohn, other circuits have concluded that when an attorney conducts a factual investigation in connection with the provision of legal services, any notes or memoranda documenting client interviews or other client communications in the course of the investigation are fully protected by the attorney-client privilege."; "The same is true here. The engagement letter spells out that the Board retained Sidley to provide legal services in connection with developing the School Board's response to Sperlik's sexual abuse of his students. Sidley's investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding the abuse was an integral part of the package of legal services for which it was hired and a necessary prerequisite to the provision of legal advice about how the District should respond. . . . the conduct of Sidley attorneys during the investigation confirms that they were acting in their capacity as attorneys. During the confidential interviews with school-district employees, the attorneys provided so-called 'Upjohn warnings' emphasizing that Sidley represented the School Board and not the employee and that the School Board had control over whether the conversations remained privileged. No third parties attended the interviews, the School Board received Lassar's report of the firm's findings during an executive session not open to the public, and the written executive summary that Sidley turned over to the Board was marked 'Privileged and Confidential,' 'Attorney-Client Communication,' and 'Attorney Work Product.' If more were needed, affidavits submitted into the record by Lassar, his Sidley colleagues, and the School Board president emphasized that Sidley had been hired to provide legal advice in the context of the facts it uncovered during the internal investigation. Because the Sidley lawyers were hired in their capacity as lawyers to provide legal services โ€“ including a factual investigation โ€“ the attorney-client privilege applies to the communications made and documents generated during that investigation." (emphases added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-02-25 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; "Even accepting that the attorney-client privilege applies, Plaintiffs argue, 'there is a well-recognized exception . . . that allows shareholders access to communications between the corporation and its attorneys.'"; "Defendants argue that the Garner doctrine does not apply outside the context of derivative actions."; "The Seventh Circuit has not decided whether this fiduciary exception applies where shareholders are suing a corporation in a non-derivative action. The Third and Fifth Circuits have held that it does, as have several district courts."; "In this case, Plaintiffs have not filed a derivative action and their interests are clearly personal in that they seek to recover financially for Household's alleged fraud. In addition, Plaintiffs are seeking to recover for, and have charged Household with, injuries sustained by the investing public, not the corporation."; "Nevertheless, unlike the plaintiffs in In re Omnicom Group [In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 400, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)], Plaintiffs have presented evidence -- and Defendants do not dispute -- that the Class represents a substantial majority of shareholders who owned stock at the time of the communications in question. . . . Thus, it appears that Household did owe a majority of Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty. . . . On the limited facts of this case, the court finds that the fiduciary exception applies to the communications between E&Y and Household."; "This does not end the inquiry, however. Courts have declined to extend Garner [Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970)] to the work product doctrine, so the court must still determine whether the documents in question here are covered by that privilege as well.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. 02 C 5893 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues related to documents created by and communications with Ernst & Young ("E&Y") and Wilmer Hale during their internal investigation into defendant Household's alleged customer overcharges; concluding that: (1) E&Y's documents deserve privilege protection because it assisted Household's general counsel in providing legal advice, but that the Garner doctrine allowed access by the securities fraud plaintiff class shareholders; and deserved fact work product protection, but that plaintiffs could overcome that protection; (2) Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection because the firm represented Household although it was retained by an Audit Committee; and also deserved work product protection which plaintiffs could not overcome, and (3) Wilmer Hale did not waive the work product protection by disclosing facts, by disclosing its work product to Household's auditor KPMG, or by disclosing its work product to the SEC under a confidentiality agreement; explaining the court's conclusion that Wilmer Hale's documents deserved privilege protection; "Plaintiffs argue that the Restructuring Report, similarly, was designed to address only factual questions, such as (1) How did HMS actually restructure delinquent loans during 2002?; (2) What did public disclosures and company policies say about HMS's restructuring of delinquent loans during the same period?; and (3) What were the differences, if any, between HMS's practices and either its policies or the Company's public disclosures? . . . Nowhere in that Report, Plaintiffs argue, did WilmerHale provide any legal analysis or recommendations that could be subject to the attorney-client privilege."; "The mere fact that WilmerHale's report included some factual findings does not establish that the entire report falls outside the scope of the attorney client privilege. As Defendants note, 'fact-gathering is an essential element in an attorney's formation of legal conclusions.'. . . The court has reviewed the Restructuring Report and finds that WilmerHale was retained to provide legal analysis and advice. Within the Restructuring Report . . . WilmerHale considered both the quantitative and qualitative materiality of variances from disclosed restructuring policies, and provided legal advice as to whether Household should take corrective action."; "Plaintiffs make much of the fact that a Report to the Board of Directors on 2003 Audit Committee Activities stated that the Committee retained WilmerHale to investigate 'the allegations made by Ms. Markell, in order to comply with the requirements of Section 10A of the Securities Act of 1934.'. . . See also 15 U.S.C. ยง 78-j1. Section 10A requires that '[i]f, in the course of conducting an audit . . . [auditors] become[] aware of information indicating that an illegal act . . . may have occurred, the firm shall . . . determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred.' 15 U.S.C. ยง 78j-1(b)(1). This provision 'expanded independent accountants' watchdog duties,' such that KPMG was required to ascertain whether Household had engaged in any illegal acts that would directly and materially affect the Company's financial statements. . . . Nothing prohibited KPMG, however, from requesting legal assistance in meeting its obligations under 15 U.S.C. ยง 78j-1(b).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-06 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that the company and its lawyer Baker Botts waived privilege protection by disclosing their investigation results to company's new auditor; "[I]t appears that i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts made significant disclosures of privileged information to third parties who lacked a common legal interest. First, the October 17, 2002 Deloitte and Touche [new auditor] memorandum provides evidence that on October 14, 2002, two of their partners met with Baker Botts attorneys to discuss the investigation and review the Phase I Report. Additionally the KPMG [accountant which assisted Baker Botts in its investigation] portion of the Phase I Report was disclosed to Deloitte and Touche for review the previous week. Further, the meeting concluded with a conference call with i2 management to discuss the additional allegations and the need to update the Phase I Report. Federal case law makes it clear that disclosure of confidential communications or documents to auditors for purposes other than seeking legal advice destroys confidentiality and with it, the right to claim the attorney-client privilege. . . . For this reason, the Court concludes that due to the disclosure of the privileged Phase I Report to Deloitte and Touche, and confidential communications between i2 and Baker Botts while Deloitte and Touche partners were present, attorney-client privilege over the Phase I Report, the subject of Category 3, has been waived."; finding a subject matter waiver; "Brady argues that i2 and Baker Botts' waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the Phase I Report and the Phase II investigation extends to the entire subject matter related to the disclosures."; "The 'disclosure of any significant portion of a confidential communication waives the privilege as to the whole.'. . . Moreover, waiver of an attorney-client communication waives the privilege as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter. . . . Here, Brady disclosed the Phase I Report, which summed up Baker Botts' entire Phase I investigation, to Deloitte and Touche. Additionally, they disclosed to the SEC the same oral report and power point presentation given to the Audit Committee concerning the ultimate findings of Phase II, interview observations and summaries, and exhibits used during witness interviews. Based on that evidence, the court finds that these disclosures amount to a significant portion of attorney-client privileged information, and thus, the waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to all responsive documents relating to the Phase I and Phase II subject matter. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege has been waived as to all documents responsive to Categories 3, 4, 5, and 6.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that Baker Bott's investigation deserved privilege protection; "Brady [former director unsuccessfully seeking discovery] alleges that the Phase I Report was prepared in the context of rendering business advice, rather than legal advice."; "In asserting the privilege, i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts claim that i2 hired Baker Botts to deliver legal advice regarding the former officers' allegations of accounting improprieties and threats of litigation. They rely on Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, which quotes Wigmore on Evidence and states that '[i]t is not easy to frame a definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice. . . . [T]he most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice.' 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence ยง2296 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Additionally, i2 and Baker Botts contend that even though the Phase I Report includes some business considerations, the primary source of the Report was to provide legal advice."; "An in camera review of the Phase I Report revealed that it is laced with underlying facts, legal opinions, and business advice. Additionally, the fact that the Report was the result of many i2 officer and director interviews with Baker Botts leads the court to conclude that the interviews were confidential communications between the corporate client and its counsel. The court also finds that the presentation of the Phase I Report from Baker Botts to the i2 Audit Committee was, in essence, a written communication and the equivalent of a confidential communication between an attorney and his client.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *100 n.51 &99 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001)
(upholding a privilege claim for materials created during an internal corporate investigation into alleged legal firearm sales; noting that the pertinent documents were circulated only among company executives with a need to know, and were labeled as protected; "The communications related to the corporate review were disseminated only among the employee members of the Doe Corp. Team, the individuals charged with acting upon counsel's advice. . . . A few documents created by the Doe Corp. Team submitted by Doe Corp. as privileged do not copy counsel. Those communications were shared between and among members of the Doe Corp. Team tasked with providing reports and recommendations to counsel. Because I find that those documents 'would not have been created had [the team] not needed the assistance of counsel,'. . . I find these documents to be privileged."; "'Further evidencing the privileged nature of these documents is that a majority of the communications are marked with a privilege legend.'") (emphases added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-10-03 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Gruss v. Zwirn, 276 F.R.D. 115, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(upholding privilege and work product claims for documents created during an internal corporate investigation undertaken by Gibson Dunn into accounting irregularities; finding that the primary purpose of the investigation was the need for legal advice; "[I]t is irrelevant that both firms' reports 'were prepared in part, for the business purpose of gaining advice on what to communicate to investors and other interested business parties, rather than legal purposes.'. . . There can be little question that both firms were engaged to investigate the accounting irregularities at the Zwirn Entities and advise management how to resolve those irregularities. . . . Their advice included instructions not only how to communicate with investors, but also on the legal ramifications of the accounting irregularities within the heavily-regulated world of investment contracts, the decision as to which employees should be held responsible and how those employees should be disciplined โ€“ advice with clear legal implications when the employee in question was party to a partnership agreement, as was Gruss . . . and both the possibility of, and strategies for future litigation. . . . Based on our review of the portions of the law firms' findings that have already been produced, it is clear that their communications with the Zwirn Entities were predominantly made with the purpose of giving legal advice. The fact that some of this advice resides in the gray area where legal advice shades into business advice does not change that conclusion.") (emphasis added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-01-01 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.1102
Case Name: Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)
February 4, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œGame Changer? The S.D.N.Y. Endorses a Company-Friendly Privilege Standardโ€

In In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *220 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015), Judge Furman upheld General Motors' claim of privilege and work product protection for "notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews" Jenner & Block conducted while investigating GM's ignition switch issue. The opinion naturally has received extensive media coverage, given the high profile. But many reports do not focus on the court's ground-breaking adoption of a company-friendly privilege standard.

Most courts provide privilege protection only to communications whose "primary purpose" relates to legal rather than business advice. Last year, the D.C. Circuit rejected that rule, and extended privilege protection to investigation-related documents if "legal advice was one of the significant purposes." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (also known as the Barko decision). Although acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's decision did not bind it, the General Motors court adopted that standard. This appears to represent the first time another court has adopted the D.C. Circuit's favorable privilege standard. Most significantly, the court held that "the D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with - if not compelled by - the Supreme Court's logic" in the seminal Upjohn decision. Gen. Motors, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199, at *240 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)).

The General Motors court's rejection of the "primary purpose" test and powerful endorsement of a "one of the significant purposes" standard could extend privilege protection in other contexts, such as with compliance-related communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1981-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Rubie's Costume Co. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc., CV 16-6517 (SJF) (AKT), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168220 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018)
(analyzing work product and common interest issues in connection with an investigation into possible trademark infringement; "The Court has reviewed the transcript of Aziz's testimony and finds that in many instances, Plaintiffs' counsel improperly instructed Aziz not to answer certain questions on the grounds of attorney-client and work product privileges, as well as the common interest doctrine. Likewise, in some instances, the privilege assertion was far too broad. The relevant questions to which an instruction not to answer was given can be characterized as either (1) questions concerning the people at Amazon with whom Aziz communicated during the course of his 'test purchases' and the subject matter of those communications . . . or (2) questions concerning internal communications between Aziz and other Rubie's employees regarding his investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-28 Federal NY
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "As for the second point -- that SoftwareONE's counsel provided legal advice and direction so as to ensure that the QTI investigation moved forward in an adequate way -- if SoftwareONE is attempting to suggest that its in-house counsel entered into an attorney-client relationship with QTI, it falls far short of establishing that."; "Only if QTI's investigators were 'professional legal adviser[s],' SoftwareONE sought their legal advice, and made confidential communications for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, would the communications plausibly be privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "All SoftwareONE can muster in support of its argument is that 'QTI's investigation was done at the direction of SWO's in-house and outside counsel,' and 'SWO's counsel provided legal advice and direction so to ensure that the QTI investigation moved forward in an adequate way.'"; "The first argument -- that QTI's investigation was done at the direction of SoftwareONE's counsel -- is not enough to suggest the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. . . . Even if initiated by a business's attorney, investigations undertaken for the purpose of making business decisions, as opposed to obtaining legal advice, are not privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Anderson v. SoftwareONE, Inc., Case No. 16-CV-1181, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126812 (E.D. Wis. July 30, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product protection for an internal investigation into alleged sexual harassment and discrimination; finding both the attorney-client privilege and the work product inapplicable, because the investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns or litigation; "Businesses routinely investigate matters for their own purposes independent of the prospect of litigation."; "The party seeking the protection of the work-product doctrine has the burden to show the doctrine applies."; "The court concludes that SoftwareONE has failed in its burden to show that the documents sought by Anderson were created in anticipation of litigation rather than for SoftwareONE's own business purposes. Although SoftwareONE could reasonably recognize based on some of the allegations in Anderson's October 1, 2015 email (ECF No. 25-1) that there was a possibility that she might sue it, Anderson's allegations were expansive, including many matters for which she could not personally seek legal redress but which any prudent business would investigate."; "The fact that SoftwareONE's in-house attorney initiated the investigation, coupled with the fact that SoftwareONE learned soon after the email complaint that Anderson had retained counsel, are insufficient without significantly more to sustain SoftwareONE's burden on this issue. Significantly, as Anderson points out, SoftwareONE does not support its motion with an affidavit or declaration from its in-house counsel, or anyone else for that matter, stating that QTI was hired in anticipation of litigation. Moreover, SoftwareONE has failed to support its claim of work-product with the sorts of relevant details the court would expect -- such as the nature and scope of QTI's engagement; details as to the actual investigation; a detailed description of the documents that were allegedly created in anticipation of litigation; details as to SoftwareONE's policies and procedures for conducting internal investigations of complaints of discrimination, etc. Without the identification and discussion of specific documents, the court is unable to analyze whether any particular document was created in anticipation of litigation."; "Essentially all SoftwareONE has offered are the assertions of its current attorney contained in its brief, where she asserts, unsupported by any evidentiary support, that SoftwareONE retained QTI in anticipation of litigation. . . . But that falls far short of showing the requisite causation between the prospect of litigation and the investigation. It is entirely foreseeable that, even if SoftwareONE were somehow assured that Anderson would not be pursuing litigation, it nonetheless would investigate her allegations. Therefore, the court will deny SoftwareONE's motion to quash the subpoena issued to QTI.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-30 Federal WI

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
(holding that an employment discrimination investigation was not primarily motivated by legal concerns; "When information is collected to serve a dual purpose, one for transmittal to an attorney and one not related to that purpose, the question is which purpose 'predominates.'. . . These standards would apply to the transmittal and discussion of Ryan's interview notes if defendants were correct that her investigation is presumptively privileged. . . . Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Ryan's purpose in interviewing plaintiffs was to identify any discriminatory practices within WealthCounsel and develop an internal corporate remedial plan if necessary. Nadeau Declaration at ยถ 6; Coffin Declaration at ยถ 7; Magelssen Declaration at ยถ 7. Plaintiff's evidence demonstrates that the internal corporate purposes for the investigation was, if not the sole purpose, at least on par with the intended (and undisclosed to plaintiffs) submission of Ryan's findings to counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The court cannot conclude on this record that the dominant purpose was to defend Titus's legal claims. Accordingly, the privilege would be defeated here even if defendant had made a prima facie showing of its applicability.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
("Defendants contend, in the privilege log as in the joint statement and at hearing, that all the identified documents are privileged because they involve an investigation that was conducted by Ryan, a non-attorney employee in Insperity's EEO division, at the direction of counsel and for the purpose of seeking legal advice. . . . The court is unconvinced by this theory, for several reasons. First, defendants provide no evidentiary support for their factual assertion that Ryan conducted the investigation pursuant to instructions from counsel, and that her investigation was solely or primarily motivated by the need to defend Titus's legal claims. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have provided evidence to dispute defendants' claim that the investigation was for the purpose of defending claims or obtaining legal advice. All three plaintiffs have submitted declarations in which they attest that Ryan told them her interviews were intended to determine whether a pattern of discriminatory practices existed within WealthCounsel and, if so, recommend appropriate remedial measures. . . . Such an internal human resources investigation is independent of the defense of Titus's claims before the EEOC or in a court of law. Accordingly, the court cannot accept defendants' unsupported allegation that Ryan's investigation was conducted 'for the purpose of obtaining advice from counsel regarding next steps and defenses.'. . . Rather, the court finds that defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the facts necessary to support the claim of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Nadeau v. Wealth Counsel LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00561-MCE-AC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100125 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2018)
("Defendants essentially contend that if an attorney provided any direction to Ryan about her investigation into Titus's complaint, then any subsequent communication having to do with the investigation is privileged. Defendants have not identified authority establishing such a broad proposition.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-14 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017)
February 21, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Assessing Privilege and Work Product Claims in an Investigation Context Examine Several Factors"

Courts assessing privilege and work product claims for corporate investigations usually focus on (1) the investigation's initiation (analyzing what motivated the investigation), and (2) the investigation's course (usually looking for lawyers' involvement). Less frequently, courts also focus on (3) the corporation's use of the investigation results. That post-investigation factor can shed light on the investigation's initial motivation.

In Carr v. Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, Civ. A. No. 15-138-DLB-HAI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188865 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017), the court overruled defendant hospital's privilege and work product claims for documents the hospital created while investigating an allegedly botched surgery. Analyzing one withheld email, the court rejected the hospital Risk Manager's affidavit claiming work product protection โ€“ noting that her statement "indicating that she would let the 'administrative team' know about the conversation . . . as opposed to in-house counsel or outside counsel โ€“ suggests that at the time of the creation of the emails, neither party crafted their emails 'in anticipation of litigation.'" Id. at *13.

Corporations and their lawyers must remember that courts examining privilege and work product protection for investigation-related documents focus on the investigation's initiation, course, and even how the client used investigation-related documents.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-15 Federal KY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017)
January 24, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Putting Lawyers in Charge of Investigations Does Not Assure Privilege Protection"

Corporations' investigations generally deserve (1) privilege protection only if the corporations are primarily motivated by their need for legal advice; and (2) work product protection only if they are motivated by anticipated litigation, and the company would not have created the investigation-related documents in the same form but for that anticipated litigation.

In In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017), Premera claimed privilege and work product protection for its data breach investigation. The court rejected both claims. Among many other things, the court assessed Premera's work product claim for documents created by its consultant Mandiant. Premera had hired Mandiant to review its claims data management system in October 2014. On January 29, 2015, Mandiant discovered malware on the system. Premera quickly hired an outside lawyer, and on February 21, 2015, "Premera and Mandiant entered into an amended statement of work that shifted supervision of Mandiant's [later] work to outside counsel." Id. at *22. Premera predictably argued that Mandiant's later work was protected, because Mandiant was then working "on behalf of an attorney." Id. at *23. But the court rebuffed the argument -- bluntly explaining that the "flaw in Premera's argument . . . is that . . . [Mandiant's] scope of work did not change [from the October 2014 agreement] after outside counsel was retained." Id. As the court noted, the "only thing that appears to have changed involving Mandiant was the identity of its direct supervisor." Id.

Companies seeking to maximize privilege and work product protection for internal corporate investigations should carefully document the primary motivations, showing that the corporation did something different or special because of its need for legal advice or because of anticipated litigation. The documentation of course should start with law firms' and consultants' retainer letters โ€“ but all documents created before, during, and after investigations should help evidence the necessary motivational elements under the privilege and (if appropriate) the work product doctrine.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-27 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: City of Potomac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Case No. 5:12-cv-5162, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69378, at *4, *11, *8-9, *9-10 (W.D. Ark. May 5, 2017)
(finding that Wal-Mart's investigation into alleged corruption in Mexico did not deserve privilege or work product protection; explaining that "former Wal-Mart in-house investigator [Halter] reviewed business records and interviewed fact witnesses to determine what occurred in Mexico."; holding that securities law plaintiffs alleging that Wal-Mart made misleading filings: (1) could discover factual details underlying documents provided to the New York Times and Congress, even if the disclosure was unauthorized; (2) could depose in-house investigator Halter about his findings, because the privilege did not apply; and (3) could discover documents Halter created during his investigation, because the work product doctrine did not apply; ordering Wal-Mart to "produce Ronald Halter's investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations that Halter drafted in 2005 and 2006. Further, the Court will allow [plaintiff] to depose Ronald Halter a second time."; in supporting conclusion (3), explaining as follows: "According to Defendants, the documents prepared in conjunction with the 2005-2006 internal investigation, including Halter's work plans, interview reports, and December 2005 report, were created in anticipation of litigation or government investigations that could result if FCPA [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] violations had occurred. Defendants argue in general terms that the internal investigation was initiated in direct response to allegations of illegal conduct, which created the prospect of litigation. However, the fact that the subject matter of these documents could conceivably be litigated at some point is not determinative. . . . Defendants have not offered the Court any evidence in the form of an affidavit or declaration setting forth the basis for the claim that the documents are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendants have the burden of proving the applicability of the work product doctrine to the documents prepared in conjunction with the internal investigation, and all that Defendants have offered as evidence are general, conclusory assertions by counsel that litigation was anticipated. If this was sufficient, it would render the burden to establish the protection meaningless."; "The facts before the Court seem to suggest that the investigation was not commenced and the report was not prepared because of any prospect of litigation but instead to gather factual information regarding an alleged bribery scheme orchestrated by Wal-Mart de Mexico. Halter testified that his reports simply recounted facts; and he was not given any special direction as to how to conduct the interviews; that he reported the facts he gathered; that he conducted no legal analysis; and that he did not send his reports to counsel. Thus, the Court finds that the factual materials regarding the 2005-2006 internal investigation that Halter drafted and provided to his superior, Joseph Lewis, including investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations, are not protected by the work product doctrine. Thus, Wal-Mart shall produce these documents to PGERS [plaintiff]." (emphases added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-05 Federal AR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: City of Potomac Gen. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Case No. 5:12-cv-5162, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69378, at *4, *11, *7-8 (W.D. Ark. May 5, 2017)
(finding that Wal-Mart's investigation into alleged corruption in Mexico did not deserve privilege or work product protection; explaining that "former Wal-Mart in-house investigator [Halter] reviewed business records and interviewed fact witnesses to determine what occurred in Mexico."; holding that securities law plaintiffs alleging that Wal-Mart made misleading filings: (1) could discover factual details underlying documents provided to the New York Times and Congress, even if the disclosure was unauthorized; (2) could depose in-house investigator Halter about his findings, because the privilege did not apply; and (3) could discover documents Halter created during his investigation, because the work product doctrine did not apply; ordering Wal-Mart to "produce Ronald Halter's investigative reports, action plan, interview reports, and other factual compilations that Halter drafted in 2005 and 2006. Further, the Court will allow [plaintiff] to depose Ronald Halter a second time."; in supporting conclusion (2), explaining as follows: "Halter collected facts and conducted interviews pursuant to his duties as an investigator and communicated his findings to his direct superior, Joseph Lewis. Neither Halter nor Lewis is an attorney, and there is no indication that either Halter or Lewis communicated Halter's findings to an attorney. Halter testified that he conducted the investigation without any specific direction. There are no facts in the record to suggest that the purpose of Halter's investigation was to gather facts so that Defendants could obtain legal advice or that Defendants represented to Halter or Lewis that the investigation was commenced for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The Court is not convinced that a communication from one non-attorney gathering facts, without any specific direction, to another non-attorney, without any indication of a purpose of obtaining legal advice, is a privileged communication. Accordingly, Halter's communications regarding the 2005 and 2006 internal investigation are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, and PGERS [plaintiff] is entitled to fully examine Halter regarding the facts he learned and reported to Lewis." (emphasis added))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-05 Federal AR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Doe v. Phillips Exeter Acad., Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877, at *5, *8-9 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding an implied waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "[D]efendants explain that PEA's outside counsel commissioned Attorney McGintee's reports 'for the purpose of providing legal advice related to the school's handling of this student sexual misconduct matter.' . . . PEA's own statements concerning the purpose of Attorney McGintee's investigation, however, as well as its description of her as an 'independent investigator,' suggest otherwise."; "Finally, PEA's Dean Mischke has consistently described Attorney McGintee as an 'independent investigator' or an 'external investigator' in her communications with the Does and her statements in this court. . . . It seems difficult to reconcile such a description with the argument that Attorney McGintee -- the reports of that 'independent' or 'external' investigator -- acted as an agent of PEA's counsel made for the purposes of obtaining or providing legal advice to PEA. To the contrary, by describing Attorney McGintee as 'independent,' PEA appears to signal that Attorney McGintee was not acting as its outside counsel's agent.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal NH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Father Doe v. Phillips Exeter Academy, Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding a waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "As PEA has described the reports, they consist of Attorney McGintee's 'factual findings,' as to what occurred between John and Jane, 'including credibility determinations in instances where there were disputes of fact.'. . . This suggests that the reports consist largely of facts acquired from the three minor witnesses. Facts and statements by third parties do not enjoy the protection of the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal NH

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Thomas v. Kellogg Company, Case No. C13-5136-RBL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66881 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2016)
(finding that work prepared by a consulting firm or Kellogg did not deserve privilege or work product protection; noting that plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) witness did not know who commissioned the report; also noting that the court realized the engagement letter between Kellogg and the consultant and the consultant's report itself; "A review of the report confirms that it was not prepared for Kellogg's attorneys so they could provide legal advice; it was patently prepared to assist Kellogg's in making its workforce more efficient and 'effective in growing sales' -- quintessential business advice."; "The engagement letter (sent by Willard Bishop to a Mr. Martin at 'DSD cost control'), the agreement, and the Report itself all confirm what the 30(b)(6) witness explained: the Report was a study of the efficiencies or 'effectiveness' of the RSRs."; "[N]one of the documents references any legal issue or litigation. And while virtually all business decisions can or do have 'legal implications' that does not mean that every business decision run through an in-house attorney is attorney-client privileged."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-20 Federal WA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Association v. PHL Variable Insurance Company, Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670 (D. Minn. March 30, 2016)
(finding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a risk analysis prepared by Bracewell & Guiliani; including after an in camera review the risk assessment involved business rather than legal concern; "PHL has not convinced the Court that they retained Bracewell & Guiliani primarily for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Rather, the majority of the Report suggests improvements to PHL's business practices aimed at resolving what the first page of the Report refers to as the 'clear economic risk' presented by STOLI policies. Thus, to the extent that there is a presumption that communications between an attorney and client are in pursuit to legal advice, U.S. Bank has shown evidence rebutting that presumption. Accordingly, the Court will not find the Report as a whole protected by attorney-client privilege."; "For example, a November 7, 2007, email states that PHL retained 'an outside firm 'Bracewell and Giuliani' to review our current procedures and provide recommendations to us on how to improve the detection and prevention of life insurance sales intended to be investor owned. They have provided this type of service to others serious about ensuring the quality of business and bring to [PHL] expertise in this field.'. . . Another email referred to the firm's activities with PHL as 'consulting.' (Id., Ex. P) A presentation given at a risk management meeting stated, 'Bracewell and Guiliani recommendations -- majority implemented from business plan.' Finally, another presentation stated that PHL '[e]ngaged Bracewell & Guiliani law firm to assess and recommend STOLI prevention tactics.'. . .")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016)
May 25, 2016 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Finds Bracewell & Guiliani Report Unprotected by the Privilege or the Work Product Doctrine"

Many clients assume that the attorney-client privilege will almost always automatically protect any law firm's report to them, and that the work product doctrine will also apply whenever they anticipate litigation. Like other common client assumptions, this overly optimistic view is frequently wrong.

In U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. PHL Variable Insurance Co., defendant PHL withheld from production a 39-page report written by three lawyers from the law firm then known as Bracewell & Guiliani โ€” supporting its privilege and work product claim with a declaration that it retained Bracewell & Guiliani "for the purpose of seeking legal consultation, advice and counsel." Civ. No. 12-877 (JRT/TNL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42670, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2016). But the court rejected both claims. Among other things, the court pointed to non-protected emails, undoubtedly written by the defendant's business folks -- announcing that the company had hired Bracewell & Guiliani "'to review our current procedures,'" because that law firm had provided services to others "'serious about ensuring the quality of business.'" Id. At *6 (internal citations omitted). Other unprotected client documents described the law firm's activities as "'consulting,'" and mentioned the firm's recommendations about the company's "'business plan.'" Id. At *7 (internal citations omitted). The court also reviewed in camera the Bracewell & Guiliani report itself โ€” noting that "the majority of the Report suggests improvements to PHL's business practices." Id. The court again pointed to its in camera review of the report in also rejecting PHL's work product claim โ€” noting that the firm's report "was not 'mapping litigation strategy.'" Id. At *16 (citation omitted).

Corporations hiring law firms should remember that a court might review business executives' description of the law firm's role, and also read the law firm's communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-30 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: McSparran v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Civ. No. 1:13-CV-1932, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19993 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2016)
(allowing the plaintiff to ask the government agency's investigator about the logistics of her investigation into sexual discrimination allegations, and also ask her about the facts she uncovered; dealing first with attorney-client privilege issues; "[T]he information at issue is not a communication. Plaintiff wants disclosure of the steps Moseley took during her investigation -- what she did, who she talked to, where she looked -- not disclosure of what agency counsel told her. Thus, Plaintiff seeks disclosure of underlying facts, and those facts do not become shielded under attorney-client privilege simply because they may have been included in a communication between Moseley and counsel. Id."; "Accordingly, we will deny Defendants' motion for protective order. Plaintiff may inquire into the steps Moseley took during the course of her investigation. She may also inquire into the facts Moseley learned during that investigation. Plaintiff may not, however, discover the contents of conversations Moseley had with agency counsel or the contents of conversations Moseley had with other DEP employees while acting at the direction of agency counsel. Such conversations, whether written or oral, are privileged attorney-client communications."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-18 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., 14-cv-748-wmc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166438 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 2015)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues in connection with internal corporate investigations conducted by Loeb & Loeb; finding the privilege inapplicable and concluding that the plaintiff could overcome any possible work product protection; finding that the privilege did not apply because (among other things) "the report contains no legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-10 Federal WI

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Sun v. Ikea US West, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-01146-MEJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150544 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2015)
(denying privilege and work product protection for an investigation of a injury in which a plaintiff was struck by a cart in a store; "Defendant's Incident Reporting System indicates the report was prepared in the normal course of business, within the scope of the employee's responsibilities to the company. Thus, Defendant's purpose in creating these incident reports determines whether the privilege applies."; "Defendant offers no such evidence, such as a redacted copy of the report showing it is labeled 'confidential,' or a declaration from someone with personal knowledge that the report was intended to be confidential, or a declaration from the employee stating that he knew the report was confidential at the time it was made. . . . Without more evidentiary support, the Court finds Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing the incident report was a confidential communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship."; also denying work product protection)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-04 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Gillespie v. Charter Communications, Case No. 4:14CV00207 AGF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128185 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2015)
(finding that an investigation into alleged racial discrimination did not deserve privilege or work product protection; "Charter argues that the incident report is privileged because it was created by Charter's Director of Human Resources at the direction of, and following a process instituted by, Charter's compliance team, which includes three in-house attorneys. Charter provides no facts as to the overall size of the compliance team, nor to the composition of its remaining members."; "In this case, unlike Geller [2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129751, 2011 WL 5507572], the incident report was not prepared in response to any pending litigation, and the Director of Human Resources who prepared the report did so as an agent of Charter's entire corporate compliance team, rather than a single defense attorney as was the case in Geller. Therefore, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to either the EthicsPoint complaint or the incident report."; also finding the work product doctrine inapplicable).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-09-24 Federal MO

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Every page of the Root Cause Investigation report is marked 'attorney-client privileged.' The second page states that the report is an attorney-client communication that was prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and notifies recipients that they may not disseminate it without permission from Dow Legal or Eddlemon. . . . The report contains no other references to law, legal advice or litigation. It includes factual analyses of the root causes that led to the accident and action items to address the identified causes. None of the action items are assigned to Eddlemon. The final page summarizes what has been learned and makes a few recommendations for what appear to be longer term actions."; "I find that Eddlemon's affidavit and the Root Cause Investigation report contain only conclusory and self-serving allegations about attorney-client privilege. Viewed in light of the overall content of the report, these allegations fail to carry Dow's burden to prove that the report was not prepared in the ordinary course of business of investigating an accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Eddlemon [In-house lawyer] states that she and Dow Legal were involved in all phases of the investigation and that she 'supervised meetings, oversaw the investigative process, approved written documents, and in sum, oversaw preparation of the conclusions set forth in the' Root Cause Investigation report at issue. . . . She avers that the investigation was 'closed to third parties' and that "complete confidentiality was maintained throughout' it. . . . She states that the Root Cause Investigation 'Report and legal conclusions regarding the cause of the September 13, 2012 accident were prepared and ultimately relied upon by Dow and Union Carbide management and Dow Legal to respond to the incident, make recommendations, prepare the matter for trial, and in general, perform the regular functions of legal counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Dow admitted that Root Cause Investigations 'are standard business practice' for 'run-of-the-mill matters that occur during the day-to-day operation of facilities,' although Dow states that these investigations are not typically managed by counsel. Dow tries to distinguish the subject Root Cause Investigation from 'run-of-the-mill matters,' based on Eddlemon's participation on the investigative team. However, the evidence shows that Root Cause Investigations of serious matters in general and of this particular case, leading to a single -- and the only -- analytical report to determine the root causes of an event and implement appropriate remedial measures, are just as much Dow's standard business practice as investigations of more mundane incidents. Eddlemon's professed anticipation of litigation, her participation on the team and Dow's policy of keeping the investigation confidential cannot convert a factual report prepared in the ordinary course of business into attorney-client privileged material. Dow cannot convert what is standard business practice performed for a variety of non-legal purposes into privileged material through the simple expedient measure of adding a lawyer into the mix. Dow has failed to show that the report refers to legal, rather than business or technical, advice and recommendations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA B 7/15

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Frickey v. Kobelco Stewart Bolling, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-2 Sec. "I" (2), 2015 U.S. Dist. 27264 (E.D. La. March 5, 2015)
(finding that Dow's post-accident root cause analysis did not deserve privilege protection; noting Dow had already produced all witness statements and factual documents collected during the investigation, despite an in-house lawyer's involvement in the investigation; "Every page of the Root Cause Investigation report is marked 'attorney-client privileged.' The second page states that the report is an attorney-client communication that was prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and notifies recipients that they may not disseminate it without permission from Dow Legal or Eddlemon. . . . The report contains no other references to law, legal advice or litigation. It includes factual analyses of the root causes that led to the accident and action items to address the identified causes. None of the action items are assigned to Eddlemon. The final page summarizes what has been learned and makes a few recommendations for what appear to be longer term actions."; "I find that Eddlemon's affidavit and the Root Cause Investigation report contain only conclusory and self-serving allegations about attorney-client privilege. Viewed in light of the overall content of the report, these allegations fail to carry Dow's burden to prove that the report was not prepared in the ordinary course of business of investigating an accident.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege protection for materials created by a billing auditor; ultimately rejecting the privilege claim; "In this case, it is plain that CodeMap was 'operating under its own steam' when it conducted the two compliance audits. As noted above, Pharmasan/NeuroScience initially engaged CodeMap for the 2012 audit completely on its own, without any direction from counsel. Nobody gave CodeMap any special instructions about what to do or how to do it; to the contrary, Codemap was hired to perform its standard, baseline audit to determine whether the company's billing and coding practices were in compliance with those recommended by the Office of the Inspector General. Charles Root conducted and completed his coding review and transmitted the results to Bublitz before anyone got the notion to restructure the relationship so that CodeMap's bills would be paid by Pharmasan/NeuroScience's lawyers. Root's communications with NeuroScience and Pharmasan regarding coding, billing and payment issues clearly are not protected by the attorney-client privilege."; "Even after counsel's post-hoc retention of CodeMap, there is nothing in the record that establishes that the focus of CodeMap's audits changed or that communications with CodeMap were made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, as opposed to medical coding and billing advice."; "Here, . . . There is no question that AHDN's retention of CodeMap was a subterfuge specifically designed to cloak the audits with privilege. Accordingly, the court rejects respondents' assertion of the attorney-client privilege based on an agency or theory.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 15, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part IIโ€

Last week's Privilege Point described an outside regulatory compliance consultant's work for a company which worried about its non-compliant billing practices and about possible litigation, that consultant's later agreement to work under outside lawyers' "direction," and the admitted lack of any such day-to-day direction. United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015).

The court first rejected NeuroScience's work product claim. The court held that the company hired the compliance auditor CodeMap for business purposes, and that lawyers' later involvement "was a tactic designed solely to cloak the audit documents" with some protection. Id. at *17. The court concluded that the outside lawyers "in fact provided no direction at all," and found no evidence that "CodeMap changed the focus of its audit or conducted it any differently after it was agreed that the Services Proposal should be routed through counsel." Id. at *18. Although outside lawyers used the audit's result, the court explained that "the focus is on the circumstances of the communication at the time it was made." Id. The court also rejected NeuroScience's privilege claim. The court noted that the company hired CodeMap "without any direction from counsel," and that CodeMap "conducted and completed [its] coding review and transmitted the results" to NeuroScience before any lawyer's involvement. Id. at *24. And after the lawyers' "post-hoc retention of CodeMap," there was no evidence that "the focus of CodeMap's audits changed." Id. at *25. The court therefore concluded that "there is no question that [the outside law firm's] retention of CodeMap was a subterfuge specifically designed to cloak the audits with privilege." Id. at *26.

This and other similar cases highlight the wisdom of involving lawyers at the first hint of a problem, and assuring their intense hands-on involvement in any consultants' work the company intends to withhold as privileged or as work product.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015)
April 8, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

โ€œCourt Condemns Law Firm's Privilege Claim as "Subterfuge": Part Iโ€

Some companies begin internal investigations or audits for business reasons, but later try to cloak related communications and documents with work product privilege protection. Although some companies successfully argue that a business-related investigation "morphed" into a privilege-protected investigation, most attempts fail.

In United States v. NeuroScience, Inc., No. 14-mc-003-slc, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2015), NeuroScience retained a regulatory compliance company (CodeMap) to conduct a "full, flat-fee compliance audit" of its billing practices after its billing manager suddenly resigned. About a month later, CodeMap reported that NeuroScience had overbilled Medicare and some insurance companies. In the meantime, NeuroScience's outside Minneapolis law firm learned that the ex-billing manager had accused the company of fraudulent billing practices. About ten days later, NeuroScience and its law firm agreed that the law firm "should supervise the remainder of CodeMap's audit activities." Id. at *7. CodeMap sent a Services Proposal indicating that the law firm would now direct CodeMap's "baseline" compliance audit, and stating that related communications would deserve privilege and work product protection. Id. However, CodeMap later admitted that (1) "counsel really did not provide much internal 'direction' to CodeMap at all" (id. at *8); (2) lawyers were not present when CodeMap auditors met with NeuroScience employees; and (3) lawyers generally did not receive copies of email message traffic between CodeMap and company employees during the audit. CodeMap's chief auditor later acknowledged that "'[b]y the time Counsel was involved, CodeMap already knew the work to be done and how to do it, so the legal oversight, as [he] understood it, was to maintain privilege.'" Id. at *9-10 (internal citation omitted).

Next week's Privilege Point will describe the court's work product and attorney-client privilege analysis.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-10 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS) (GWG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8605 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2015)
(in an opinion by Judge Gorenstein, finding that a compliance-initiated investigation into a defendant's possible tie with terrorists did not deserve privilege or work product protection; "'The actual evidence supplied by BOC nowhere refers to an attorney directing that any particular steps be taken by anyone, let alone that particular documents on the privilege log were generated at the direction of counsel.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-21 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Chevron Midstream Pipelines LLC v. Settoon Towing LLC, Civ. A. No. 13-2809c/w13-3197, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179284 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2015)
(holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected Chevron's "legally chartered" "root cause analysis" of a fatal pipeline accident, although in-house lawyer's affidavit explained that Chevron anticipated litigation, and as such "legally chartered root cause investigations are not routine"; "On the basis of the Legal Charter and Youngblood's Declaration describing its genesis and his handling of the RCA Team's work product upon the completion of its work, Chevron seeks to protect the RCA and all documentation related to its creation under both the attorney-client and work product privileges. Importantly, Chevron, through Youngblood, claims the following: 'Within Chevron, legally chartered root cause investigations are not routine. While root cause procedures are utilized by Chevron's Health, Environmental, and Safety (HES) group to analyze incidents and near miss events, often in conjunction with outside contractors, in order to identify improvements to procedures or equipment, HES incident reviews are separate and distinct from root cause analyses conducted at the request of the Law Department pursuant to a Legal Charter.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Mega Manufacturing, Inc. v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of the State of Nevada, No. 62396, 2014 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 844 (Nev. May 30, 2014)
(holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected a post-accident investigation into an injury caused by a manufacturing machine)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-30 Federal NV

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Telamon Corp. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-00382-RLY-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6583, at *12, *13-14, *14 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2014)
(finding that an internal corporate investigation conducted by Barnes & Thornburg into possible theft of inventory did not deserve privilege or work product protection; addressing these issues in a first party insurance case, in which the defendant insurance company sought documents from the investigation company Chamberlain; finding attorney-client privilege protection inapplicable; "The court's in camera examination reveals that nearly all of Chamberlain's file materials could not be classified as privileged attorney-client communications because they are public records or Telamon's business records. The gathering of public and business records by an investigator, or the funneling of business documents through one's attorney's office (or through one's fraud investigator), does not make those documents privileged."; "[S]ome of the communications obviously were not made to obtain legal advice, were not maintained in confidence, or were not even intended as a confidential communication in the first place. For example, the communications include (a) an email chain sent by the lawyers to Chamberlain lauding its reputation as a fraud investigator; (b) emails to set up meetings; and (c) emails that do not involve counsel at all or any bona fide connection to legal advice. . . . [D]documents within Chamberlain's file reveal that Chamberlain's investigatory work was not inextricable from Barnes & Thornburg's provision of legal advice and that its work was conducted because Telamon had a pressing business reason to uncover what it believed was large-scale inventory fraud by one of its workers. Documents indicate that the use of Barnes & Thornburg as the nominee client to Chamberlain was for the purpose of attempting to shield Chamberlain's work as privileged. It is apparent, however, that Barnes & Thornburg did not in fact direct this investigation, but that Chamberlain designed the investigation and determined the records to gather and review, the persons to interview, the questions to be asked, and the manner of interrogation."; "Moreover, waiver principles would prevent the assertion of the privilege as to the majority of the Chamberlain investigative file. Telamon provided to the insurers a preliminary investigative report prepared by Chamberlain that it otherwise asserts was a privileged communication. That report summarizes 'key' interviews and documents. When the privilege is waived as to an attorney-client communication, the waiver extends to all communications on the same subject matter. . . . The subject matter of the preliminary report is the investigative work conducted by Chamberlain. By producing the preliminary report (apparently for the purpose of proving its insurance claim and the losses suffered), Telamon waived the privilege with respect to the documents in the investigative file that are the 'nuts and bolts' source documents of Chamberlain's work, including the interview summaries, document analyses, and investigative background summaries.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-17 Federal IN B 6/14

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165210, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013)
(reconsidering an October 24, 2013, opinion, and affirming the court's early conclusions; "I will stress again that neither attorney-client privilege nor work-product protection applies 'to "an internal corporate investigation . . . made by management itself."' To assert privilege over any documents pertaining to the internal investigation into plaintiffs' demand letter, BOC must show that the communications were made as part of an internal investigation that proceeded at the direction of counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-19 Federal NY B 5/14

Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013)
December 18, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Deny Privilege Protection for Compliance-Related Documents"

Many corporate clients erroneously assume that the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine will protect their compliance-related communications. However, such communications face the same impediments to either protection as other internal corporate communications.

For instance, the attorney-client privilege only protects communication primarily motivated by clients' request for legal advice. In United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., the court found that the privilege did not protect "Compliance Committee meetings and the documents drafted by [the company's CCO]," โ€“ because the company's previous agreement with the government required such meetings. Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013). The court concluded that "[t]he meetings and documents sought to comply with its contract with the United States, not to obtain legal advice." Id. The privilege also normally depends on lawyers' involvement. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013), Judge Scheindlin held that the privilege did not protect documents created during the Bank of China Chief Compliance Officer's investigation into the bank's possible dealings with terrorists. Judge Scheindlin noted that after the Bank's CCO received Plaintiff's demand letter, "'he called outside counsel, then set about performing the investigation within the Compliance Department โ€“ without the involvement of any counsel.'" Id. At *35 (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin cited an earlier case's blunt conclusion that "[p]rivilege does not apply to 'an internal corporate investigation . . . Made by management itself.'" Id. At *36 (citation omitted).

Companies and their lawyers should not assume that the compliance function automatically, or even usually, deserves privilege protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-24 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013)
December 18, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Deny Privilege Protection for Compliance-Related Documents"

Many corporate clients erroneously assume that the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine will protect their compliance-related communications. However, such communications face the same impediments to either protection as other internal corporate communications.

For instance, the attorney-client privilege only protects communication primarily motivated by clients' request for legal advice. In United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., the court found that the privilege did not protect "Compliance Committee meetings and the documents drafted by [the company's CCO]," โ€“ because the company's previous agreement with the government required such meetings. Case No. 1:10-CV-00127, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143831, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2013). The court concluded that "[t]he meetings and documents sought to comply with its contract with the United States, not to obtain legal advice." Id. The privilege also normally depends on lawyers' involvement. In Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 1266 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154343 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013), Judge Scheindlin held that the privilege did not protect documents created during the Bank of China Chief Compliance Officer's investigation into the bank's possible dealings with terrorists. Judge Scheindlin noted that after the Bank's CCO received Plaintiff's demand letter, "'he called outside counsel, then set about performing the investigation within the Compliance Department โ€“ without the involvement of any counsel.'" Id. At *35 (citation omitted). Judge Scheindlin cited an earlier case's blunt conclusion that "[p]rivilege does not apply to 'an internal corporate investigation . . . Made by management itself.'" Id. At *36 (citation omitted).

Companies and their lawyers should not assume that the compliance function automatically, or even usually, deserves privilege protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-04 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: United States v. ISS Marine Services, Inc., Misc. A. No. 12-481 (BAH), 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166088 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2012)
("If a communication would have been made even if legal advice were not explicitly being sought, then it is difficult to say that that communication's primary purpose was to seek legal advice."; "In applying these principles, the Government argues that the Audit Report was not created for the purpose of seeking legal advice. The Government posits that 'nothing about the March 2008 Audit Report indicates that it was part of a request for legal advice,' the Report was 'not directed to any attorney or a person employed by an attorney,' it 'does not contain any legends indicating that it is privileged,' and 'Inchcape's CEO waited nearly two months after it was completed to forward the Audit Report to its outside counsel.'. . . In support of this argument, the Government offers the sworn declaration of Larry Cosgriff, who served as the Senior Vice President of Inchcape Government Services during the relevant time period. As discussed above, Cosgriff states that it was his understanding that Hyldager and Tory 'undertook this internal audit to obtain information to enable Messrs. Hyldager and Tory, the Inchcape audit committee and the Inchcape Board of Directors to make a business decision as to what further action, if any, Inchcape would take to address' the allegations raised by the two Inchcape employees."; "At bottom, the respondent's claim to privilege appears to be premised on a gimmick: exclude counsel from conducting the internal investigation but retain them in a watered-down capacity to 'consult' on the investigation in order to cloak the investigation with privilege. Unfortunately for the respondent, this sort of 'consultation lite' does not qualify the Audit Report for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. First and foremost, the fact that Inchcape purposefully eschewed the involvement of outside counsel โ€“ or any attorneys whatsoever โ€“ in the internal investigation and audit militates strongly against applying the attorney-client privilege. When a company fails to involve lawyers directly in an internal investigation, the company faces a higher burden to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege applies to the results of that investigation. The Tory Declaration indicates that, at most, A&P generically 'recommended initiating an internal investigation' and drafted a memorandum that 'framed' the issues relating to 'potential criminal and civil liability implicated by the activities as reported.'. . . The Tory Declaration also states that A&P 'prepared a list of documents necessary to more fully assess the issues identified,'. . . though Tory notably does not specify that A&P would be the ones 'more fully assess[ing] the issues identified.' Although Tory states that he pursued the internal investigation 'in consultation with outside counsel,'. . . the record is devoid of any evidence to suggest that A&P provided any consultation to ISS Marine while the investigation was actually being conducted. A&P's framing of the issues related to potential liability and its guidance about the types of documents that would be helpful all took place before the investigation began. As Cosgriff explains: "A&P did not participate in the interview process or the review of documentary evidence.'. . . Even when Inchcape took steps to verify the information in the Audit Report, Tory indicates that Hyldager performed this 'follow up,' rather than an attorney."; "This sort of arms-length coaching by counsel, as opposed to the direct involvement of an attorney, undercuts the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in the context of an internal investigation."; "Thus, the Audit Report memoralizing the contents of the documents and information gathered from this investigation and audit does not justify the protection of the attorney-client privilege. For the results of an internal investigation to enjoy the attorney-client privilege, the company must clearly structure the investigation as one seeking legal advice and must ensure that attorneys themselves conduct or supervise the inquiries and, at the very least, the company must make clear to the communicating employees that the information they provide will be transmitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-21 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1103
Case Name: Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 09 CV 4586 (FB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40704 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2011)
(analyzing privilege protection and an investigation into alleged sexual abuse at a college preparatory school; addressing plaintiffs' spoliation claim based on the destruction of documents related to an investigation โ€“ and therefore necessarily addressing possible privilege protection for the documents that had been destroyed; finding that a lawyer had acted as an investigator and not as a legal advisory during the investigation, which meant that privilege did not apply to his documents; "In 2002, after receiving Paggioli's settlement demand, Poly Prep consulted with their outside counsel Menaker & Herrmann LLP, and also hired Peter T. Sheridan, Esq., a sole practitioner, to conduct what they claim was a privileged and confidential investigation regarding Foglietta's alleged conduct, to be performed 'in collaboration with Poly Prep's counsel, Menaker & Herrmann LLP.'. . . Sheridan interviewed faculty and staff, including: Williams, Parker, Ruck, Andersen, Petchesky, Ralph Dupree, a former faculty member and coach, and Joan Wright, a former Dean and Assistant Head of School. . . . Sheridan claims to have determined during his investigation that there was no firsthand or secondhand knowledge of alleged sexual abuse at Poly Prep, other than the accusations made by Hiltbrand and Paggioli. . . . However, Sheridan's notes from his investigation have since been destroyed, resulting in the current motion for spoliation sanctions."; "Sheridan admits that he asked benign questions of each interviewee, 'about his or her background and role(s) at the school, and the nature, extent, and duration of his or her relationship with Mr. Foglietta.' . . . The purpose of Sheridan's retention by Poly Prep was to investigate and learn 'the extent, if any, to which members of the school's faculty or administration knew of sexual misconduct or sexual abuse by Mr. Foglietta,' not to advise Poly Prep on how to proceed. . . . Indeed, although Sheridan was engaged in September 2002 to conduct the investigation, a month later, in October 2002, Poly Prep engaged Greenberg Traurig to advise the school regarding its response to the allegations. . . . Plaintiffs' counsel also notes that 'according to th[e] documentation, [Sheridan] did not tell any of the people he interviewed that he was an attorney. He did not tell them that he was there for the purpose of trying to defend Poly Prep in a potential litigation. He did not tell them anything of that nature. So, the attorney-client privilege, burden, the initial threshold burden is not met.'"; finding in contrast that work product doctrine probably applied to the documents; but not really finding spoliation)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-04-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., Civ. Case No. C17-1212RSL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157335 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2018)
(analyzing work product protection in a third party insurance setting; "It is Sedgwick LLP's communications with Mr. Aus that were withheld as attorney-client privileged communications. While it is possible that these communications contain legal advice regarding whether or not coverage exists under Washington law or how Arrowood could defend a declaratory judgment action, some or all of the communications may also reflect counsel's participation in and guidance of the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigation and adjustment. Because the documents appear to be located within the insurer's claim file, they are subject to the presumption that the attorney-client privilege does not apply as between the insured and its insurer in the claims adjusting process. The Court will, nevertheless, review the withheld and redacted documents in camera to forestall an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-14 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., Civ. Case No. C17-1212RSL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157335 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2018)
(analyzing work product protection in a third party insurance setting; "It is Sedgwick LLP's communications with Mr. Aus that were withheld as attorney-client privileged communications. While it is possible that these communications contain legal advice regarding whether or not coverage exists under Washington law or how Arrowood could defend a declaratory judgment action, some or all of the communications may also reflect counsel's participation in and guidance of the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigation and adjustment. Because the documents appear to be located within the insurer's claim file, they are subject to the presumption that the attorney-client privilege does not apply as between the insured and its insurer in the claims adjusting process. The Court will, nevertheless, review the withheld and redacted documents in camera to forestall an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-14 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Barge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Case No. C16-0249JLR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155066 (W.D.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2016)
("But even if an insurer demonstrates that an attorney was not serving in a quasi-fiduciary role, an insured may still be able to pierce the insurer's assertion of attorney-client privilege. . . . If the insured asserts that the insurer has engaged 'in an act of bad faith tantamount to civil fraud' and makes 'a showing that a reasonable person would have a reasonable belief that an act of bad faith has occurred' or that an insurer has engaged in a 'bad faith attempt to defeat a meritorious claim,' then the insurer waives the privilege. . . . Something more than an honest disagreement between the insurer and the insured about coverage under the policy must be at play."; "In federal court, opinion work product 'is virtually undiscoverable.'. . . This court has previously agreed that 'reserve information that was created in anticipation of litigation is protected by the work product doctrine.'"; "Therefore, given State Farm's representations that the reserve amounts are based on the opinions and evaluation of State Farm personnel after State Farm reasonably contemplated litigation in this case, State Farm has properly withheld these documents under the work product doctrine.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-08 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Collazo v. Balboa Ins. Co., Case No. C13-892 JCC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109336 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2014)
("Where an attorney is engaged in the tasks of 'investigating and evaluating or processing the claim' during the claims adjustment process . . . The presumption against the attorney-client privilege applies and the insurer may not raise the shield of privilege. However, where an attorney instead engages in core attorney-client communications with the insurer, such as 'providing the insurer with counsel as to its own potential liability,' there is no presumption against the attorney-client privilege. . . . Here, upon review of the unredacted documents in camera, the Court finds that the relevant entries did not relate to the investigation, evaluation, or processing of the claim. Instead, they consist solely of statements that are an attorney's work-product, or are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-07 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Meighan v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 298 F.R.D. 436, 444 (N.D. Iowa 2014)
(finding that an insurance company's reserve information deserved both privilege and work product protection; "Many courts have found an insurer's reserve information is privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal IA B 8/14

Chapter: 22.1401
Case Name: Ten Talents Inv. 1, LLC v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., Case No. C12-5849RBL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53741, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2013)
("In the insurance context, the question of whether a communication falls within the attorney-client privilege can often be a difficult one because of the investigatory nature of the insurance business. The line between what constitutes claim handling and the rendition of legal advice is often more cloudy than crystalline.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-15 Federal WA B 3/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Westridge Townhomes Owners Ass'n v. Great American Ins. Co., Case No. C16-1011RSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27960 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2018)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues in what appears to be a first party insurance context; "The Association moves to compel Defendants Great American Assurance Company ('Great American') and Greenwich to produce documents withheld under attorney-client and work product privileges, but which were created as part of Defendants' coverage investigation. . . . The Association relies heavily on Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013). Under Cedell, the Court begins with the 'presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting process,' and that the attorney-client privilege is 'generally not relevant.' Cedell, 295 P.3d at 246. The insurer may overcome the presumption of discoverability by demonstrating that its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary functions of investigating and evaluating or processing the claim.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-02-21 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Friday Investments, LLC v. Valley Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 248PA16, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 895 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017)
(finding that defendant's agreement to indemnify another company for any liability created a joint representation (which the court called a "tripartite" representation; citing with approval Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 617 S.E. 2d 40, 46 (2005), aff'd per curiam 360 N.C. 356, 625 S.E. 2d 779 (2006); "In all significant ways, the question of the formation of an attorney-client relationship here is indistinguishable from that resolved by our decision in Raymond. Blast contractually agreed to indemnify and defend defendants against any losses incurred relating to their real property lease. After this litigation commenced, defendants notified Blast of the litigation, and Blast engaged counsel to defend the case under the indemnification agreement. Like the common interest found in the insurance context, Blast's interest in defendants' legal well-being as indemnitees creates the common interest in this litigation: The indemnification provision subjects Blast to any damages that result from an adverse judgment against defendants. Accordingly, a tripartite attorney-client relationship exists between defendants, Blast, and their defense counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-03 State NC

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Friday Investments, LLC v. Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 248PA16, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 895 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017)
(finding that defendant's agreement to indemnify another company for any liability created a joint representation (which the court called a "tripartite" representation; citing with approval Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 617 S.E. 2d 40, 46 (2005), aff'd per curiam 360 N.C. 356, 625 S.E. 2d 779 (2006); "In sum, we hold that Blast's contractual duty to defend and indemnify defendants created a tripartite attorney-client relationship. Nonetheless, the record before us fails to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the post-litigation communications between defendants and Blast were not privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-03 Federal NC

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Friday Investments, LLC v. Valley Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 248PA16, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 895 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017)
(finding that defendant's agreement to indemnify another company for any liability created a joint representation (which the court called a "tripartite" representation; citing with approval Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 617 S.E. 2d 40, 46 (2005), aff'd per curiam 360 N.C. 356, 625 S.E. 2d 779 (2006); "In sum, we hold that Blast's contractual duty to defend and indemnify defendants created a tripartite attorney-client relationship. Nonetheless, the record before us fails to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the post-litigation communications between defendants and Blast were not privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-03 State NC

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Friday Investments, LLC v. Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 248PA16, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 895 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017)
(finding that defendant's agreement to indemnify another company for any liability created a joint representation (which the court called a "tripartite" representation; citing with approval Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 617 S.E. 2d 40, 46 (2005), aff'd per curiam 360 N.C. 356, 625 S.E. 2d 779 (2006); "Our decision in Raymond [Raymond v. North Carolina Police Benevolent Ass'n, 365 N.C. 94, 98, 721 S.E.2d 923, 926 (2011)] analogized the relationship between the officer, the SSPBA and an attorney for the association, and outside defense counsel to those relationships common in the insurance context. See id. at 98, 721 S.E.2d at 926 ('In the insurance context, courts find that the attorney defending the insured and receiving payment from the insurance company represents both the insured and the insurer . . . .' (citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 172 N.C. App. 595, 602-03, 617 S.E.2d 40, 46 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 356, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (mem.))).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-03 State NC

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Flanagan v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 2:17-cv-33-KS-MTP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123204 (S.D. Ms. Aug. 4, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with an insured's bad faith claim against an insurance company; "An insured cannot force an insurer to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege merely by bringing a bad faith claim. Nationwide's prior production, however, has put at issue Nationwide's confidential communications with McDonough. Nationwide has voluntarily injected its counsel's advice into this case by purposely disclosing, inter alia, its counsel's opinion that Nationwide has not 'unnecessarily delayed payment of [Flanagan's] claim . . . .' To allow Nationwide to use the attorney-client privilege to withhold additional information related to counsel's advice 'would be manifestly unfair' to Plaintiffs."; "The Court finds that Nationwide has waived the attorney-client privilege for all communications between it and McDonough regarding insurance coverage advice or opinions related to Flanagan's claim for insurance proceeds or regarding the accident at issue.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-04 Federal MS

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Smiley Body Shop, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00062-JMS-MJD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148649 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 27, 2016)
(in a first party insurance case; finding that the normal attorney-client privilege protection applicable in third party insurance cases did not apply; "The Indiana Supreme Court recognized the insurer-insured privilege in Richey v. Chappell, 594 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 1992)."; "Unlike Richey [], however, this matter is a 'first-party' case brought by an insurer to determine its rights and liabilities vis-ร -vis its insured. The Court finds that the Richey insurer-insured privilege does not extend to this first-party case and that the underlying tort plaintiff's status as party-defendant in this action does not change this conclusion."; "Second, other jurisdictions recognizing the insurer-insured privilege also make the distinction between third-party and first-party actions.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-27 Federal IN

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Wachob Leasing Co., Inc. v. Gulfport Aviation Partners, LLC, Civ. A. No. 1:15CV237-HSO-RHW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78660 (S.D. Miss. June 16, 2016)
("Wachob and USAIG, had an insurer-insured relationship. There is no blanket privilege for communications between insurer and insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-06-16 Federal MS

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. v. PMSLIC Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 14-1420-RGA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152178 (D. Del. Nov. 10, 2015)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues in an insurance bad faith case, in which an insured doctor assigned his claim against his insurance company to the hospital; holding that the insurance company cannot claim privilege to avoid discovery; "If an insurer retains counsel to represent the common interest of the insurer and its insured in defending a lawsuit against the insured, the insurer cannot claim attorney-client privilege or work product protection for its communications with counsel related to that representation. . . . Attorney-client privilege and work product protection likewise may not be asserted against the insured's assignee.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-10 Federal DE

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Smith v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, No. 15-1002, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13290 (4th Cir. App. July 30, 2015)
("This privilege also applies to communications between an attorney and a client that are shared with the client's insurance company.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-30 Federal

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Germantown Cab Co. v. Pinelands Insurance Company Risk Retention Group, Inc., No. 1787, 2015 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 184 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 23, 2015)
("Under Pennsylvania law, when an insurer retains an attorney to represent an insured pursuant to the insurer's duty to defend, that attorney's client is the insured. The insurer may be, but is not always, a co-client of the insured. Here, Pinelands retained Meltzer to represent Germantown for a period of eight years. When Meltzer communicated with Pinelands regarding defenses of Germantown, Meltzer acted as the attorney for Germantown and Pinelands. In these communications, Pinelands may not claim attorney-client privilege. When an attorney represents both parties to a transaction, 'no communications in relation to the common business are privileged in favor or against either, but only against a common adversary.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-23 State PA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Germantown Cab Co. v. Pinelands Insurance Company Risk Retention Group, Inc., No. 1787, 2015 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 184 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 23, 2015)
("Under Pennsylvania law, when an insurer retains an attorney to represent an insured pursuant to the insurer's duty to defend, that attorney's client is the insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-23 State PA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Gebremedhin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Civ. A. No. 1:13-cv-02813-CMA-NYW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91948 (D. Colo. July 15, 2015)
("Colorado law provides that 'an attorney retained by the insurance carrier owes a duty to the insured only; there is no attorney-client relationship between an insurance carrier and the attorney it hires to represent the insured.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-15 Federal CO

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company v. Funk, C.A. No. N14C-04-199 PRW, 2015 Del. Super. LEXIS 301 (Del. Super. June 17, 2015)
(analyzing a title company's request for indemnity from a closing attorney who made a priority error in the mortgage documents; holding that an insurance's lawyer could have a privileged communication with the insurance company, that the insured cannot waive the insurance company's privilege, and that the insurance company's request for attorney's fees did not trigger an "at issue" waiver; "Commonwealth [Insurance company] represents in its brief that Commonwealth retained Mr. Harker [Lawyer for insured] to 'represent the common legal interests of the Baffones and Commonwealth in the underlying litigation' Although the Funk Defendants claim there is insufficient evidence of an attorney-client relationship between Cohen Seglias [Harker's law firm] and Commonwealth, both parties agreed to the Court reviewing the communications at issue in camera. Having done so, it is clear that there was an attorney-client relationship between Cohen Seglias and Commonwealth, as Commonwealth represents. It is further clear that the communications were intended to be confidential, and that they were made for the purpose of seeking legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-17 State DE

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Roach v. Hughes, Civ. A. No. 4:13-CV-00136-JHM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67669 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2015)
(holding that the privilege protected a communications between an insurer and insured and a representative of the insurance company; "Warner Chilcott directed Hughes to call Wheels following a motor vehicle accident. One of the functions Wheels, a named insured, served was to communicate this Loss Notice to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer. The insurance policy insuring Hughes, Wheels, and Warner Chilcott required the insureds to cooperate with the insurer and obligated the insurer to provide counsel for the insureds. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege applies to the Loss Notice document and the document is not discoverable.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-05-26 Federal KY

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Valley Forge Insurance Company v. Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc., Cause No. 1:14-CV-6-RLM-SLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61143 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 2015)
(holding that under Ohio law the insured's lawyer also represented the insurance company; "Valley Forge cites Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1999), and argues that under Indiana law, when an insurance company employs and pays for its insured's defense counsel, such counsel has an attorney-client relationship with both the insured and the insurance company. The court agrees, although the Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Wills holding isn't that simple. . . . The court needn't decide whether an attorney-client relationship existed to determine whether the privilege applied to the communications at issue because Valley Forge didn't establish that the communications were confidential.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-05-11 Federal IN

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Nester v. Textron, Inc., Cause No. A-13-CA-920-LY, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28182 (W.D. Tex. March 9, 2015)
("[T]here is nothing in the privilege log or the document itself that would show whether the insurance carrier was a joint client along with Textron, and Texas law does not recognize a general insurer-insured privilege. . . . The communication, if protected, must fall under federal work product privilege, discussed further below.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-09 Federal TX

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Dietz & Watson, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 14-4082, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9815 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015)
(in a bad faith insurance case, holding that the insurance company lawyer had jointly represented the insurance company and its insured, so it could not withhold documents from its insured -- although some of the law firm's communication related to coverage issues, on which there was no joint representation; "Under Pennsylvania law, when an insurer retains an attorney to represent an insured pursuant to the insurer's duty to defend, that attorney's client is the insured and 'the insurer may be, but is not always, a co-client of the insured.'. . . Here, Liberty retained two attorneys to represent D&W in the Underlying Action, Mr. Baginski and Mr. White. Clearly, when these attorneys communicated with Liberty regarding the defense of the Underlying Action, they acted as the attorneys for D&W, as well as Liberty. In these communications, Liberty cannot claim the attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure to D&W of these communications. When an attorney represents both parties to a transaction, 'no communications in relation to the common business are privileged in favor or against either, but only against a common adversary.'"; "Liberty claims, however, that there exists other distinct communications that in-house Liberty counsel (other than Mr. Baginski and Mr White) had with the insurer's employees that relate solely to insurance coverage issues and to a reservation of rights letter issued in March of 2013 . . . And to D&W's threat of a bad faith claim against Liberty. . . . In these communications, counsel would have been acting solely as counsel for Liberty since D&W and Liberty's positions on these issues were adverse to one another.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-28 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Ellis v. Arrowood Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 2:14-mc-00146, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121913, at *12, *13, *13 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2014)
("The question in the third-party bad faith context is whether the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between the insurer, insured, and the attorney retained by the insurer. This is an undeveloped area of law in Kentucky. However, the Eastern District of Kentucky recently answered this question in the affirmative. . . . Because the insurer and the insured are joint clients of the attorney, the rules of joint representation apply. . . . I will hold that with respect to third parties, the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between the insurer, counsel retained by the insurer, and the insured. Other courts have also found that the insured and insurer are joint clients of the attorney retained by the insurer, and thus the attorney-client privilege applies to that tripartite relationship.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-02 Federal WV

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: AU Electronics, Inc. v. Harleysville Group, Inc., Case No. 13 C 5947, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72862 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2014)
(analyzing whose in a third party insurance coverage dispute; "Lawyers may play a number of roles in the decision to deny a claim, which, for an insurance company, is a business decision. As a general proposition, the fact that a lawyer is part of a business decision does not, by itself, cloak the communications relating to that decision with privilege. That does not mean, however, that there can be never be any privilege for a communication with a lawyer during the course of the decision. It depends on the facts, including the nature of the communication and the role of the lawyer. In Illinois, communications between an insurer and its coverage counsel generally are privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-28 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. The North River Ins. Co., 2:09cv348, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42771 (W.D. Pa. March 31, 2014)
(analyzing work product issues in a first party bad faith case based on a defendant insurance company's failure to pay for asbestos liability; "Some federal courts have interpreted Pennsylvania law to encompass an absolute rule whereby the insured and insurer are always considered to be co-clients when the carrier pays for the defense."; "The appellate courts of Pennsylvania have opined that 'a co-client relationship does not exist simply by virtue of the insurer-insured relationship.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-31 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Warns, Civ. No. CCB-11-1846, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44507, at *6-7 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014)
("The sole remaining question, then, is Allstate's standing to assert the privilege. Ms. Warns contends that the attorney-client privilege cannot be invoked by Allstate because the privilege can only be asserted by the client. . . . The insurance company therefore serves as the 'client' for purposes of invoking the privilege regarding communications between counsel and the insurance company relating to the litigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-28 Federal MD B 3/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: McAdam v. State Nat'l Ins. Co., Case No. 12-cv-1333 BTM-MDD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37808, at *9-10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014)
(analyzing documents in a first party insurance context; "It follows that, when an insurer hires an attorney both to provide a legal opinion and to serve as a claims adjuster, 'the court must make a determination of which purpose was primary.' . . . The objectors argue that the predominant purpose test must be applied on a document-by-document basis. . . . The Court disagrees. '[I]t is not the dominant purpose of a particular communication that dictates whether the attorney-client privilege is applicable; rather the issue is what was the dominant purpose of the relationship.' . . . If the dominant purpose of the relationship was attorney-client at the time of the communications, they are privileged. If not, they are generally discoverable, though the producing party may request an in camera inspection of a particular communication to support a claim that it should be protected nonetheless.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-21 Federal CA B 8/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Meighan v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 298 F.R.D. 436, 447-48 (N.D. Iowa 2014)
("I find that TransGuard and Sutton [lawyer arguably providing both legal advice and claims adjustment advice] established an attorney client relationship on March 12, 2012, when Sutton accepted TransGuard's request for legal assistance. I recognize that many of the communications between Sutton and TransGuard related to the investigation of Meighan's claim. Sutton and Sobus [claims adjuster] discussed medical reports, arranged for treatment paid by TransGuard and discussed the policy provisions and settlement. . . . However, in light of Armstrong's [plaintiff's lawyer] early involvement and bad faith accusations, I find that Sutton's communications with TransGuard employees and legal counsel involved more than just business advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal IA B 8/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Nat'l Union Fire v. TransCanada Energy USA, Inc., Index No. 650515/10, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 31967(U), at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2013)
("Similarly, documents prepared in the ordinary course of business are not privileged, even if drafted by an attorney. Rather, for the privilege to attach, the communication must be made primarily for the purpose of furnishing legal advice, although the privilege does not disappear merely because the communication includes non-legal matters. . . . Insurance companies investigate claims and decide whether to accept or deny coverage as part of their regular business activities, and consequently, courts have consistently held that the use of attorneys to perform such work does not cloak the documents in privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-08-15 State NY B 7/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Larson v. One Beacon Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 12-cv-03150-MSK-KLM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81181, at *15, *16 (D. Colo. June 10, 2013)
("In Colorado insurance cases, 'an attorney retained by the insurance carrier owes a duty to the insured only; there is no attorney-client relationship between an insurance carrier and the attorney it hires to represent the insured.'" (citation omitted); "[T]he communications between Ms. Tester [Insured] and Mr. Thomas [Lawyer hired by the insurance carrier to represent the insured] are generally protected, but not when those communications are between Ms. Tester and/or Mr. Thomas on the one hand and Defendant and/or Defendant's legal counsel on the other.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-10 Federal CO B 4/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Larson v. One Beacon Insurance Co., Civ. A. No. 12-cv-03150-MSK-KLM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81181, at *15 (D. Colo. June 10, 2013)
August 14, 2013 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"States' Differing Approaches to Attorney-Client Relationships in the Insurance Context Complicate Privilege Issues"

The attorney-client privilege necessarily depends on an attorney-client relationship. Some states recognize what is called a "tripartite" relationship among a liability insurance carrier, its insured, and the lawyer it hires to represent the insured. Such a relationship can create conflicts issues, but generally assures privilege protection when the insured's lawyer communicates with the insurance carrier.

Other states take a different approach. In Larson v. One Beacon Insurance Co., the court noted that under Colorado law "'there is no attorney-client relationship between an insurance carrier and the attorney it hires to represent the insured.'" Civ. A. No. 12-cv-03150-MSK-KLM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81181, at *15 (D. Colo. June 10, 2013) (citation omitted). This meant that the attorney-client privilege did not protect communications between the insurance carrier (or its lawyer) and the insured (or his lawyer). On the other hand, because the insurance carrier and the insured were cooperating in opposing the plaintiff's claim, they could freely share work product without waiving that separate protection.

Even states adopting Colorado's view of attorney-client relationships in the insurance context sometimes stretch to find the attorney-client privilege applicable in this setting. And perhaps most importantly, the ability to freely share work product usually covers all or nearly all of the communications between a liability insurance carrier and its insured.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-10 Federal CO
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Brown v. Fryer, Civ. A. No. 12-cv-01740-CMA-KMT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34686, at *5 n.3 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2013)
("'Under certain circumstances, an insured's communications with its insurance company's investigator may fall within the attorney-client privilege.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-03-13 Federal CO B 3/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Camico Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, LLP, Civ. A. No. 11 4753, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10832, at *6-7, *9-10, *11, *12, *15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2013)
(holding that the lawyer hired by an insurance company to represent the insured does not automatically have a joint representation between the two of them; "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed whether an insurance carrier is always a co client with its insured when the carrier funds the defense of the insured. Indeed, this question continues to be the subject of debate among scholars and courts."; "The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers . . . rejects an absolute rule. The Restatement discusses representations in the insurer insured context, noting that, '[t]he insurer is not, simply by the fact that it designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer. Whether a client-lawyer relationship also exists between the lawyer and the insurer is determined under ยง 14.' Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ยง 134 cmt. f."; "Teleglobe [Teleglobe Communications Corp, 493 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2007)] provides additional support for the position that insured and insurer are not considered co-clients whenever the insurer pays for the defense of the insured."; "The Court concludes, . . . that where an insurer funds the defense of its insured, the insurer may be, but is not always, a co-client of the insured."; "[N]o evidence was offered in support of this alleged participation by CAMICO in a joint representation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-28 Federal PA B 6/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Zuniga v. Sw. Airlines, No. 11 CV 939, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8524, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2013)
("Illinois also extends the attorney-client privilege to communications between an insured and insurer where the insurer owes an obligation to defend the insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-22 Federal IL B 7/13

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Med. Assurance Co. v. Weinberger, 295 F.R.D. 176, 184-85 (N.D. Ind. 2013)
("PCF readily admits that tripartite attorney-relationship between Medical Assurance, Hough [lawyer], and the Weinberger defendants extends the attorney-client privilege among the three parties and that waiver of the privilege by one does not constitute a waiver by the other party.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal IN B 2/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Med. Assurance Co. v. Weinberger, 295 F.R.D. 176, 188 (N.D. Ind. 2013)
("Indiana broadly construes the attorney-client privilege when applying it to communications between an insurance company and its attorney. The privilege applies to communications between an insurance company and legal counsel concerning the investigation and validity of the insured's claim, whether an insured's loss fits within the terms of the contract, and discussions of coverage protection. The relevant inquiry is whether the attorney is acting in his capacity as an attorney or as either a provider of simple business advice or outside claims adjuster. . . . However, a plethora of cases have held that no attorney-client privilege can be asserted against an insured or an assignee of an insured in its action against an insurance company with respect to materials prepared as part of the insured's defense in the underlying action.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal IN B 2/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Woodruff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 291 F.R.D. 239, 243 (S.D. Ind. 2013)
(analyzing a first party bad faith claim pursued by the trustee of a bankrupt insured; "Jurisdictions are divided on whether the attorney retained by an insurance company to defend the insured have [sic] an attorney-client relationship with both the insured and the insurance company.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal IN B 3/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Bank of Am. N.A. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal, Rptr. 3d 526, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
(recognizing a tripartite relationship between an insurance carrier, an insured and the lawyer hired by the former to represent the latter; "When an insurer retains counsel to defend its insured, a tripartite attorney-client relationship arises among the insurer, insured, and counsel. As a consequence, confidential communications between either the insurer or the insured and counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and both the insurer and insured are holders of the privilege. In addition, counsel's work product does not lose its protection when it is transmitted to the insurer."; "In this case, we hold the same tripartite attorney-client relationship arises when a title insurer retains counsel to prosecute an action on behalf of the insured pursuant to the title policy.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State CA B 6/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Draggin' Y Cattle Co. v. Addink, 312 P.3d 451, 460 (Mont. 2013)
(holding that the privilege protects communications between an insurance company and its insured, despite the absence of a formal attorney-client relationship; "In In re Rules of Professional Conduct, 2000 MT 110, 299 Mont. 321, 2 P.3d 806, we were asked to decide whether an insurer and an insured are co-clients of an insurer-appointed attorney under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. Though we concluded that the Rules prohibited an insurer being accorded client status, In re Rules, ยถ 38, we recognized 'a privileged community or magic circle within which confidential information may be shared without waiver of attorney-client or work product privilege.' . . . We also discussed Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 303 U.S. App. D.C. 316 (D.C. Cir. 1993), regarding how far the 'magic circle' extends. In re Rules, ยถ 64. The court in Linde Thomson noted that '[f]ederal courts have never recognized an insured-insurer privilege as such.' 5 F.3d at 1514 (citations omitted). While rejecting a blanket extension of attorney-client privilege to communications between an insurer and its insured, the court recognized that due to the essential purpose of the privilege -- obtaining legal advice from a lawyer -- 'where the insured communicates with the insurer for the express purpose of seeking legal advice with respect to a concrete claim, or for the purpose of aiding an insurer-provided attorney in preparing a specific legal case' application of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate as an extension to those employed to assist the attorney. Linde Thomson, 5 F.3d at 1514-15 (citations omitted).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State MT B 5/14

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Gates v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co., Case No. 3:12 cv 349 J 32TEM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176649, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2012)
("Under Florida law, the attorney-client privilege ordinarily cannot be asserted in a third party bad faith action relating to documentation in the insurer's file created before the date of judgment.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-12 Federal FL B 9/13

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: EMC Ins. Co. v. Mid Continent Cas. Co., Civ. A. No. 10 cv 03005 LTB KLM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142977, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 3, 2012)
("In Colorado insurance cases, 'an attorney retained by the insurance carrier owes a duty to the insured only; there is no attorney-client relationship between an insurance carrier and the attorney it hires to represent the insured.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-10-03 Federal CO B 12/13

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 287 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(analyzing a bad faith claim against an insurance company by the insured's assignee; ultimately holding the plaintiff assignee could obtain communications with the insured's outside lawyer but not the insurance company's in-house lawyer, and could overcome any work product protection other than opinion work product protection; "The Court finds that the joint defense/common interest doctrine applies here, and Nationwide cannot claim the protection of the attorney-client privilege over its communications with Hawkins & Parnell regarding the defense of its insured in the underlying action unrelated to the issue of coverage. Such communications are therefore discoverable in this third-party bad faith action, and Nationwide's objection to the production of documents as being protected by the attorney-client privileged is overruled. However, the Court cannot reach the same conclusion regarding Nationwide's communications with its in-house claims counsel involving the rendering of legal services as there is no presumption that in-house counsel is employed to represent the interests of the insured as opposed to the insurer.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal GA B 9/13

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Sayre Enters., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. No. 5:06cv00036, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89097, at *10-11 (W.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2006)
("In the case now before the court, Allstate was unquestionably a client of its coverage counsel. Each of the withheld communications was either to or from a licenced [sic] attorney. Each pertained to information being provided by Allstate, and each of the communications was for the purpose of securing legal services or a legal opinion.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-12-08 Federal VA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Petter, Ex'r v. Acevedo, 31 Va. Cir. 7, 8 (Alexandria 1993)
("[T]he weight of authority supports such an extension [of the attorney-client privilege to cover communications between an insurance carrier and the insured and insured's counsel], and the policy reasons for the privilege support its extension to communications made by an insured to his carrier, if the carrier is required to contract to defend him and the information conveyed is intended to assist counsel in defending the insured.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1993-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 22.1402
Case Name: Norman v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 727, 239 S.E.2d 902, 907 (Va. 1978)
(โ€œ[A]n insurerโ€™s attorney, employed to represent an insured, is bound by the same high standards which govern all attorneys, and owes the insured the same duty as if he were privately retained by the insured.โ€)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1978-01-01 State VA B 3/16

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., Civ. Case No. C17-1212RSL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157335 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2018)
(analyzing work product protection in a third party insurance setting; "It is Sedgwick LLP's communications with Mr. Aus that were withheld as attorney-client privileged communications. While it is possible that these communications contain legal advice regarding whether or not coverage exists under Washington law or how Arrowood could defend a declaratory judgment action, some or all of the communications may also reflect counsel's participation in and guidance of the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigation and adjustment. Because the documents appear to be located within the insurer's claim file, they are subject to the presumption that the attorney-client privilege does not apply as between the insured and its insurer in the claims adjusting process. The Court will, nevertheless, review the withheld and redacted documents in camera to forestall an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-14 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this case, the Court must determine whether communications between BTC [the service provider] and its insurance carrier and insurance broker are protected by the attorney-client privilege notwithstanding the fact that an attorney neither authored nor received the communications. This issue requires a discussion of the relationship between an insurance carrier and broker, an insured, and an attorney for an insured who is paid by the insurer."; "In Serrano [Serrano v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 271 (W.D. Pa. 2014)], the court did not rely on a theory of joint representation, but instead concluded that Pennsylvania law extends the attorney-client privilege to agents who assist in facilitating the relationship between the attorney and the client. . . . Accordingly, that court concluded that '[c]ommunications between an insured and its carrier. . . . are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications . . . [made] for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.'. . . With respect to communications involving the insurance carrier and broker, the Serrano court stated that the relevant question is whether the communications were made for the purpose of obtaining legal representation or advice. This Court agrees with the Serrano court that communications between an insured, an insurance carrier, and its broker, are privileged if the communications 'are necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel.' Id.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this context then, an attorney's ability to give sound and informed advice will depend on the assessment of the claim and other information conveyed to the client by the insurance carrier and by the client to the insurance carrier. Because the communications addressed above were 'necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel in that setting fall within the attorney-client privilege,' the Court concludes that they are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "Disclosures made to a third-party consultant do not constitute a waiver when the disclosure is 'necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice' or if the disclosure is made 'to an 'agent' assisting the attorney in giving legal advice to the client.'. . . Pennsylvania law recognizes that '[t]he protection of the attorney-client privilege involving communications regarding the availability of insurance can extend to those agents who are necessary to effectuating the representation [which] can include communications between an insured and an insurance carrier and their respective agents where the disclosures to the agents are in furtherance of the purpose of the privilege.'"; "Accordingly, '[s]uch communications are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications from the client to the carrier or the carrier to the client for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Huntington Chase Condominium Assoc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 16 C 4877, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14082 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2017)
("The attorney-client privilege is inapplicable because the emails do not provide legal advice with respect to, or discuss the legal consequences of the factual material within the emails. The transfer of insurance claim information between plaintiff and its insurer through an attorney does not transform otherwise purely factual data into legal analysis warranting privilege protections.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-01 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: 866 East 164th Street, LLC v. Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 16-CV-03678 (SN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162703 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016)
(analyzing protections in a first party insurance setting; "Where an attorney acts as an attorney and provides legal advice and recommendations, even if such advice may ultimately assist the insurer in deciding whether to pay or deny a claim, such communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-23 Federal NY

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Insurance Corp., Case No. 5:16-cv-00407 (HRL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113309 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016)
("[T]he undersigned notes for the benefit of the parties' future discovery efforts: (1) particular documents may be protected under attorney-client privilege if they are communications sent between an insurer or an insured and their shared attorney.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-08-24 Federal CA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Young v. Chapman, Civ. A. No. 3:14-CV-666-JHM-CHL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56409 (W.D. Ky. April 28, 2016)
("In Asbury [Asbury v. Beerbower, 589 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979)], the Supreme Court 'extended the scope of the attorney-client privilege . . . to include communications between an insured and a representative of his insurer.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-04-28 Federal KY

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Vaughn v. Amerigas Propane, L.P., No. 5-15-0205, 2016 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 704, at *18 19 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 6, 2016)
("A statement given by an insured to its insurer, when that insurer is responsible for selecting an attorney and defending the insured in conjunction with the defense of any civil litigation, is protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-04-06 Federal IL B 8/16

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Cedar Grove Composting Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. C14-1443RAJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171576 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2015)
("Under Washington law, 'in first-party bad faith insurance suits, Cedell creates a 'presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting process, and that the attorney-client and work product privileges are generally not relevant.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-23 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Turubchuk v. E.T. Simonds Construction Co., Case No. 3:12-cv-594-SMY-DGW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133512 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2015)
("As a part of the attorney-client privilege, the State of Illinois recognizes the privileged nature of communications between an insured and in insurer because, in part, of defense clauses contained in insurance agreements.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-09-30 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Tate & Lyle Americas, LLC v. Gatt Air Techniques, Inc., Case No. 13-2037, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104265 (C.D. Ill. July 31, 2015)
("While Illinois recognizes the insured-insurer privilege, the federal courts do not recognize the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-31 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Slaven v. Great American Ins. Co., No. 13 C 1370, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33591 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 2015)
("In Illinois, as elsewhere, the general rule is that communications between an insurer and its outside coverage counsel are privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-18 Federal IL

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad, Cause No. 2:13-CV-285-RL-PRC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13090 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2015)
("In Richey v. Chappell, 594 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 1992), the Indiana Supreme Court 'held that an insured's statement about the underlying event given to the insurer (which has a duty to defend its insured) and that is in the nature of a communication the insured would make for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, can be protected from discovery by the person suing the insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-02-04 Federal IN

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Chevalier-Seawell v. Mangum, Case No. CL14-2789, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 146 (Va. 2015)
(in an insurance case, holding that a plaintiff pursuing a bad faith claim against a UIM carrier can overcome defendant's work product claim; "The Court has located only one Virginia case addressing the availability of the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege to an insurance company defending a bad faith claim by its insured. . . . Luthman v. GEICO, 40 Va. Cir. 404 (Fairfax 1996) . . . ."; "Given the scarcity of Virginia case authority on these issues, the Court has examined decisions from other states regarding the applicability of the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege in a bad faith action."; "The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has a substantial need for Allstate's underlying claim file showing how her claim was adjusted and that she is unable to obtain by other means the substantial equivalent of those documents. Accordingly, all such materials other than those protected by the attorney-client privilege must be produced.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Ellis v. Arrowood Indem. Co., Civil Action No. 2:14-mc-00146, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121913, at *12, *13, *13 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2014)
("The question in the third-party bad faith context is whether the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between the insurer, insured, and the attorney retained by the insurer. This is an undeveloped area of law in Kentucky. However, the Eastern District of Kentucky recently answered this question in the affirmative. . . . Because the insurer and the insured are joint clients of the attorney, the rules of joint representation apply. . . . I will hold that with respect to third parties, the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between the insurer, counsel retained by the insurer, and the insured. Other courts have also found that the insured and insurer are joint clients of the attorney retained by the insurer, and thus the attorney-client privilege applies to that tripartite relationship.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-02 Federal WV

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Anderson v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., Case No. C14-0048JLR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112360 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2014)
("In Washington, the attorney-client privilege applies differently in certain insurance cases. In a first-party insurance bad faith action, the attorney-client privilege is presumptively inapplicable.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-13 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Collazo v. Balboa Ins. Co., Case No. C13-892 JCC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109336 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2014)
("In Washington, 'in first party insurance claims by insured's [sic] claiming bad faith in the handling and processing of claims . . . There is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege' in the claims adjustment process.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-07 Federal WA

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: West Virginia v. Honorable Louis H. Bloom, No. 13-1172, 2014 W. Va. LEXIS 345 (W. Va. App. April 10, 2014)
(holding that privilege protected outside counsel's coverage opinions given to an insurance company, and that insurance company did not waive the privilege by communicating the substance of the letter to its insured; "In this situation, a coverage opinion letter written by outside counsel to the insurer containing legal advice 'is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it involved confidential communications.'"; "In the instant case, the Respondents content that, because the Petitioners disclosed the recommendation of the coverage opinion letters to the insureds, the attorney-client privilege was lost as to the actual coverage opinion letters. . . . Application of the third-party disclosure exception to the attorney-client privilege, in the context of the Respondents' argument, appears to be novel. The Respondents have not cited to, nor have we found, any case in the country that has held that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to a coverage opinion letter when an insurer communicates the gist of the recommendation contained in the letter to the insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-10 State WV

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Hawker v. Bancinsurance, Inc., Case No. 1:12-cv-01261-SAB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180831, at *22-23, *23 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2013)
("Under California law, 'where reinsurance documents include attorney-client or protected work product communications they would be entitled to the same privilege protection as would similar communications between the ceding insurer and its attorneys handling the insured's claim.' . . . California law requires that '[w]here an insurer obtains reinsurance, he must communicate all the representations of the original insured, and also all the knowledge and information he possesses, whether previously or subsequently acquired, which are material to the risk.' Cal. Ins. Code ยง 622."; "To the extent that communication with the reinsurance company includes attorney-client information, the documents are not discoverable and Defendant has not waived its privilege by the communication with the reinsurers.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-12-27 Federal CA B 5/14

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Draggin' Y Cattle Co. v. Addink, 313 P.3d 451, 460 (Mont. 2013)
(holding that an insurance company was not an insurance defense lawyer's client, but that the privilege protected communications between the lawyer and the company; "In In re Rules of Professional Conduct, 2000 MT 110, 299 Mont. 321, 2 P.3d 806 [(2000)], we were asked to decide whether an insurer and an insured are co-clients of an insurer-appointed attorney under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. Though we concluded that the Rules prohibited an insurer being accorded client status . . ., we recognized 'a privileged community or magic circle within which confidential information may be shared without waiver of attorney-client or work product privilege.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State MT B 5/14

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Maplewood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 596 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
(in a first party insurance setting, finding that an insurance company and its insured had a common interest that acted much like a joint representation, so there was no privilege when they later litigated against each other about coverage; "The principle animating the rule that an insurer and its insured, because they are aligned as to the defense of claims brought against the insured, share an attorney-client privilege has been the law in Florida for more than one hundred years.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal FL B 4/14

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 246-47 (Wash. 2013)
(analyzing privilege protection in a first-party bad faith claim; "To summarize, in first party insurance claims by insured's claiming bad faith in the handling and processing of claims, other than UIM claims, there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege. However, the insurer may assert an attorney-client privilege upon a showing in camera that the attorney was providing counsel to the insurer and not engaged in a quasi-fiduciary function. Upon such a showing, the insured may be entitled to pierce the attorney-client privilege. If the civil fraud exception is asserted, the court must engage in a two-step process. First, upon a showing that a reasonable person would have a reasonable belief that an act of bad faith has occurred, the trial court will perform an in camera review of the claimed privileged materials. Second, after in camera review and upon a finding there is a foundation to permit a claim of bad faith to proceed, the attorney-client privilege shall be deemed to be waived. However, in first party UIM claims, there is no presumption of waiver by the insurer of the attorney-client privilege but . . . that privilege may be pierced, among other ways, by the two step procedure described above for showing the bad faith civil fraud exception is applicable.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State WA B 6/13

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 246 (Wash. 2013)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with an insurance bad faith claim; "[W]e adopt the same basic approach as the Court of Appeals did in Barry [Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172 (1999)]. We start from the presumption that there is no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting process, and that the attorney-client and work product privileges are generally not relevant. . . . However, the insurer may overcome the presumption of discoverability by showing its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating or processing the claim, but instead in providing the insurer with counsel as to its own potential liability; for example, whether or not coverage exists under the law. Upon such a showing, the insurance company is entitled to an in camera review of the claims file, and to the redaction of communications from counsel that reflected the mental impressions of the attorney to the insurance company, unless those mental impressions are directly at issue in its quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to its insured. . . . If the trial judge finds the attorney-client privilege applies, then the court should next address any claims the insured may have to pierce the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State WA B 3/14

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Holland v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 992 N.E.2d 43, 84, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)
(holding that a worker's comp claim file did not deserve attorney-client privilege protection, although normally Illinois protects communications between an insured and an insurance company; holding that the privilege did not apply because the communications were not designed to help the insured by relaying information to a lawyer; "The privilege extends to communications between an insured and its insurer. . . . The basis for extending the privilege to an insurer is that the insured may properly assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the insured."; "To extend the attorney-client privilege to an insurer, the party asserting the privilege must prove: (1) the identity of the insured, (2) the identity of the insurance carrier, (3) the duty to defend a lawsuit, and (4) that a communication was made between the insured and an agent of the insurer. . . . In addition, the court in Chicago Trust Co. [v. Cook County Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 1998)] also noted that the insurer-insured privilege, as an offshoot of the attorney-client privilege, applies only when 'the insured may properly assume that the communication is made to the insurer for the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the insured.'" (citation omitted); "Under the facts of the present case, the attorney-client privilege does not apply to exclude Hartford's [defendant's insurer] claim file. There is no evidence in the record that supports the conclusion that the Hartford claim file contains communications that were made 'for the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the insured.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 State IL B 4/14

Chapter: 22.1403
Case Name: Petter v. Acevedo, 31 Va. Cir. 7, 8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993)
("[T]he weight of authority supports such an extension [of the attorney-client privilege to cover communications between an insurance carrier and the insured and insured's counsel], and the policy reasons for the privilege support its extension to communications made by an insured to his carrier, if the carrier is required by contract to defend him and the information conveyed is intended to assist counsel in defending the insured." (citing State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1993-01-01 State VA B 5/16

Chapter: 22.1404
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this case, the Court must determine whether communications between BTC [the service provider] and its insurance carrier and insurance broker are protected by the attorney-client privilege notwithstanding the fact that an attorney neither authored nor received the communications. This issue requires a discussion of the relationship between an insurance carrier and broker, an insured, and an attorney for an insured who is paid by the insurer."; "In Serrano [Serrano v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 271 (W.D. Pa. 2014)], the court did not rely on a theory of joint representation, but instead concluded that Pennsylvania law extends the attorney-client privilege to agents who assist in facilitating the relationship between the attorney and the client. . . . Accordingly, that court concluded that '[c]ommunications between an insured and its carrier. . . . are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications . . . [made] for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.'. . . With respect to communications involving the insurance carrier and broker, the Serrano court stated that the relevant question is whether the communications were made for the purpose of obtaining legal representation or advice. This Court agrees with the Serrano court that communications between an insured, an insurance carrier, and its broker, are privileged if the communications 'are necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel.' Id.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-22 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1404
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this context then, an attorney's ability to give sound and informed advice will depend on the assessment of the claim and other information conveyed to the client by the insurance carrier and by the client to the insurance carrier. Because the communications addressed above were 'necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel in that setting fall within the attorney-client privilege,' the Court concludes that they are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1404
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "Disclosures made to a third-party consultant do not constitute a waiver when the disclosure is 'necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice' or if the disclosure is made 'to an 'agent' assisting the attorney in giving legal advice to the client.'. . . Pennsylvania law recognizes that '[t]he protection of the attorney-client privilege involving communications regarding the availability of insurance can extend to those agents who are necessary to effectuating the representation [which] can include communications between an insured and an insurance carrier and their respective agents where the disclosures to the agents are in furtherance of the purpose of the privilege.'"; "Accordingly, '[s]uch communications are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications from the client to the carrier or the carrier to the client for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 22.1404
Case Name: Patel v. Kensol-Franklin, Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:14-1439, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36684 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2016)
(in a bad faith insurance case, analyzing privilege and work product protection for a post-accident investigation; finding that both protections applied; "No doubt, courts, including this one, have held in bad faith insurance claims that communications between in-house counsel and claims adjustor and, related notes in claims file are generally privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-22 Federal PA

Chapter: 22.1404
Case Name: Serrano v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 271, 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
(analyzing documents created during a post-accident investigation, and application of the common interest doctrine; "Plaintiff's contention that Patterson's [employer of a worker who died at an oil rig] communications with its carrier and insurance agents in an effort to obtain and administer insurance coverage waived the privileges equally is misplaced. As previously noted, a client can waive the attorney-client privilege by disclosing a protected communication to a third party. . . . An exception to this rule is recognized where the disclosure to the third party is necessary to receive informed legal advice."; "The protection of the attorney-client privilege involving communications regarding the availability of insurance can extend to those agents who are necessary to effectuating the representation. . . . These can include communications between an insured and an insurance carrier and their respective agents where the disclosures to the agents are in furtherance of the purpose of the privilege."; "Communications between an insured and its carrier which include communications with the insured's insurance administrator and broker fall within the permissible use of agents. Such communications are within the privilege to the extent they involve communications from the client to the carrier or the carrier to the client for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal PA B 8/14

Chapter: 22.1405
Case Name: Popina v. Rice-Steward, 86 Va. Cir. 402, 403 n.4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2013)
(holding that a statement from the defendant obtained by the defendant's insurance company's agent did not deserve work product protection, because there was no attorney-client relationship, and because the statement was obtained in the ordinary course of the insurance company's business; "In the present case, the Defendant's statement was taken by an insurance adjuster for the Defendant's insurance company prior to the engagement of counsel. If the statement had been taken by her attorney, or by an agent of her attorney, the statement would be protected by the principle of attorney-client privilege and would not be subject to discovery under Rule 4:1(b)(1) or the exception of Rule 4:1(b)(3).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-05 State VA

Chapter: 22.1405
Case Name: In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 602 (4th Cir. 1997)
("Of course, not all communications between an attorney and client during attorney-conducted investigations constitute legal work entitled to attorney-client privilege. For example, no privilege attaches when an attorney performs investigative work in the capacity of an insurance claims adjuster, rather than as a lawyer."), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047 (1998)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1997-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 22.1406
Case Name: Fox Paine & Co., LLC v. Houston Cas. Co., No. 52607/2014, 2016 NY Slip Op 50635(U), at 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2016)
("This Court, however, notes that HCC further failed to offer sufficient support for its proposition that an insurer and insured share the requisite common interest in the context of an indemnity-only policy, as opposed to a liability policy which imposes a duty to defend upon the insurer. Additionally, at least one court has held that letters of defense counsel written for the purpose of apprising the insurer of the status of the case, not for the purpose of seeking or imparting legal advice, are not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-04-21 Federal NY B 8/16

Chapter: 22.1406
Case Name: Schaeffler v. United States, Dkt. No. 14-1965-cv, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617 (2nd Cir. Nov. 10, 2015)
("[S]everal courts have held that an insurer shares a common legal interest with the insured in the outcome of litigation, even when their potential defenses are not perfectly aligned.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-10 Federal NY
Comment:

key case