Showing 422 of 422 results

Chapter: 6.14

Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "'The Court does not see an 'agent' theory of the attorney-client privilege present in this case. Here, the documents at issue are emails between and among employees of the various Hertz companies referenced above. The application of privilege to such communications would be more appropriately described as 'intra-' or 'inter-' corporate communications between employees and analyzed under that standard. . . . In contrast, an 'agent' is most commonly a non-lawyer third-party that assists a lawyer in providing legal services, such as an investigator, paralegal, or accountant. . . . Except for very minor exceptions identified herein, the agent theory of the attorney-client privilege is largely inapplicable to this dispute.'")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 7:12-CV-00578, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2013)
("It applies to individuals and corporations, and to in-house and outside counsel.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2913-05-31 Federal VA B 9/14

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Torres v. Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz, PLLC, No. 03-15-00706-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6300 (Tex. App. 3d June 15, 2016)
(finding that a business's co-owner could not pursue a derivative case against a law firm which he alleged represented the company; concluding that the law firm had not represented the company; "The parties concur that the existence of a duty owing by appellees to CRU with respect to either liability theory turns entirely on whether there existed an attorney-client relationship between CRU and appellees. The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature -- an attorney and client mutually agree that the attorney will render professional services for the client. While such an agreement need not necessarily be express and may sometimes be implied from the objective manifestations of the parties' conduct, in either case 'there must be evidence both parties intended to create an attorney-client relationship.' In support of their summary-judgment motion, appellees presented evidence that they had once represented Krueger pursuant to an explicit engagement letter, but had never represented CRU -- and that, in fact, much of their representation of Krueger had been adverse to CRU. In response, in an attempt to raise a fact issue, Torres relied solely on what he viewed as proof of an implied attorney-client relationship between appellees and CRU -- emails and other communications between appellees and Krueger between May 31, 2013, the date of a shareholder meeting at which Krueger purportedly wrested control of CRU from Torres, and early July 2013, when appellees and Krueger parted ways. The gist of Torres's reasoning is that these communications objectively manifested the relationship's evolution from representation of Krueger alone to representation also of the corporation Krueger had come to control. We disagree that this evidence, without more, is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether CRU and appellees agreed to enter into an attorney-client relationship, as opposed to representing conduct merely consistent with appellees' representation of Krueger. Consequently, the district court did not err in granting appellees' summary judgment on their no-duty ground.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-06-15 Federal TX

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Torres v. Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz, PLLC, No. 03-15-00706-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6300 (Tex. App. 3d June 15, 2016)
(finding that a business's co-owner could not pursue a derivative case against a law firm which he alleged represented the company; concluding that the law firm had not represented the company; "The parties concur that the existence of a duty owing by appellees to CRU with respect to either liability theory turns entirely on whether there existed an attorney-client relationship between CRU and appellees. The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature -- an attorney and client mutually agree that the attorney will render professional services for the client. While such an agreement need not necessarily be express and may sometimes be implied from the objective manifestations of the parties' conduct, in either case 'there must be evidence both parties intended to create an attorney-client relationship.' In support of their summary-judgment motion, appellees presented evidence that they had once represented Krueger pursuant to an explicit engagement letter, but had never represented CRU -- and that, in fact, much of their representation of Krueger had been adverse to CRU. In response, in an attempt to raise a fact issue, Torres relied solely on what he viewed as proof of an implied attorney-client relationship between appellees and CRU -- emails and other communications between appellees and Krueger between May 31, 2013, the date of a shareholder meeting at which Krueger purportedly wrested control of CRU from Torres, and early July 2013, when appellees and Krueger parted ways. The gist of Torres's reasoning is that these communications objectively manifested the relationship's evolution from representation of Krueger alone to representation also of the corporation Krueger had come to control. We disagree that this evidence, without more, is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether CRU and appellees agreed to enter into an attorney-client relationship, as opposed to representing conduct merely consistent with appellees' representation of Krueger. Consequently, the district court did not err in granting appellees' summary judgment on their no-duty ground.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-06-15 State TX

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., Case No. 14cv1158 BAS (JLB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12420 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016)
("In the case of a corporate client, the attorney-client privilege continues to protect communications between non-attorney employees engaged in discussions to either transmit information to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice or disseminate information from an attorney to corporate employees. It is well established that the attorney-client privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and it may be necessary for a corporate client to collect information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-management personnel.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-02-02 Federal CA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Roberts Technology Group, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-5677, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95779 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2015)
("As the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized, 'this privilege attaches to communications made by corporate as well as individual clients.' Custom Designs [Custom Designs & Mfg. Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 2012 PA Super 33, 39 A.3d 372, 376 (Pa. Super. 2012)], 39 A.3d at 376 (2012). For a corporate employee to satisfy the third prong, he or she must establish communications were 'kept confidential . . . Made at the behest of counsel and with the goal of furthering counsel's provision of legal advice to the client.' Id., at 379. The claiming party can meet its burden by affidavit or counsel's testimony, but cannot simply assert the lack of evidence to the contrary.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2015-07-20 Federal PA