Showing 392 of 392 results

Chapter: 6.8***

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Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked

Chapter: 6.8***

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Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked

Chapter: 6.8***

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Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked

Chapter: 6.14

Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "'The Court does not see an 'agent' theory of the attorney-client privilege present in this case. Here, the documents at issue are emails between and among employees of the various Hertz companies referenced above. The application of privilege to such communications would be more appropriately described as 'intra-' or 'inter-' corporate communications between employees and analyzed under that standard. . . . In contrast, an 'agent' is most commonly a non-lawyer third-party that assists a lawyer in providing legal services, such as an investigator, paralegal, or accountant. . . . Except for very minor exceptions identified herein, the agent theory of the attorney-client privilege is largely inapplicable to this dispute.'")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 7:12-CV-00578, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2013)
("It applies to individuals and corporations, and to in-house and outside counsel.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2913-05-31 Federal VA B 9/14

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Torres v. Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz, PLLC, No. 03-15-00706-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6300 (Tex. App. 3d June 15, 2016)
(finding that a business's co-owner could not pursue a derivative case against a law firm which he alleged represented the company; concluding that the law firm had not represented the company; "The parties concur that the existence of a duty owing by appellees to CRU with respect to either liability theory turns entirely on whether there existed an attorney-client relationship between CRU and appellees. The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature -- an attorney and client mutually agree that the attorney will render professional services for the client. While such an agreement need not necessarily be express and may sometimes be implied from the objective manifestations of the parties' conduct, in either case 'there must be evidence both parties intended to create an attorney-client relationship.' In support of their summary-judgment motion, appellees presented evidence that they had once represented Krueger pursuant to an explicit engagement letter, but had never represented CRU -- and that, in fact, much of their representation of Krueger had been adverse to CRU. In response, in an attempt to raise a fact issue, Torres relied solely on what he viewed as proof of an implied attorney-client relationship between appellees and CRU -- emails and other communications between appellees and Krueger between May 31, 2013, the date of a shareholder meeting at which Krueger purportedly wrested control of CRU from Torres, and early July 2013, when appellees and Krueger parted ways. The gist of Torres's reasoning is that these communications objectively manifested the relationship's evolution from representation of Krueger alone to representation also of the corporation Krueger had come to control. We disagree that this evidence, without more, is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether CRU and appellees agreed to enter into an attorney-client relationship, as opposed to representing conduct merely consistent with appellees' representation of Krueger. Consequently, the district court did not err in granting appellees' summary judgment on their no-duty ground.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-06-15 Federal TX

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Torres v. Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz, PLLC, No. 03-15-00706-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6300 (Tex. App. 3d June 15, 2016)
(finding that a business's co-owner could not pursue a derivative case against a law firm which he alleged represented the company; concluding that the law firm had not represented the company; "The parties concur that the existence of a duty owing by appellees to CRU with respect to either liability theory turns entirely on whether there existed an attorney-client relationship between CRU and appellees. The attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature -- an attorney and client mutually agree that the attorney will render professional services for the client. While such an agreement need not necessarily be express and may sometimes be implied from the objective manifestations of the parties' conduct, in either case 'there must be evidence both parties intended to create an attorney-client relationship.' In support of their summary-judgment motion, appellees presented evidence that they had once represented Krueger pursuant to an explicit engagement letter, but had never represented CRU -- and that, in fact, much of their representation of Krueger had been adverse to CRU. In response, in an attempt to raise a fact issue, Torres relied solely on what he viewed as proof of an implied attorney-client relationship between appellees and CRU -- emails and other communications between appellees and Krueger between May 31, 2013, the date of a shareholder meeting at which Krueger purportedly wrested control of CRU from Torres, and early July 2013, when appellees and Krueger parted ways. The gist of Torres's reasoning is that these communications objectively manifested the relationship's evolution from representation of Krueger alone to representation also of the corporation Krueger had come to control. We disagree that this evidence, without more, is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether CRU and appellees agreed to enter into an attorney-client relationship, as opposed to representing conduct merely consistent with appellees' representation of Krueger. Consequently, the district court did not err in granting appellees' summary judgment on their no-duty ground.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-06-15 State TX

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., Case No. 14cv1158 BAS (JLB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12420 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016)
("In the case of a corporate client, the attorney-client privilege continues to protect communications between non-attorney employees engaged in discussions to either transmit information to an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice or disseminate information from an attorney to corporate employees. It is well established that the attorney-client privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and it may be necessary for a corporate client to collect information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-management personnel.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2016-02-02 Federal CA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Roberts Technology Group, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-5677, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95779 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2015)
("As the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized, 'this privilege attaches to communications made by corporate as well as individual clients.' Custom Designs [Custom Designs & Mfg. Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 2012 PA Super 33, 39 A.3d 372, 376 (Pa. Super. 2012)], 39 A.3d at 376 (2012). For a corporate employee to satisfy the third prong, he or she must establish communications were 'kept confidential . . . Made at the behest of counsel and with the goal of furthering counsel's provision of legal advice to the client.' Id., at 379. The claiming party can meet its burden by affidavit or counsel's testimony, but cannot simply assert the lack of evidence to the contrary.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2015-07-20 Federal PA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 12-CV-08333 (ALC) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40176 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2015)
("Corporations may be considered clients for the purposes of attorney-client privilege, and the internal communication of corporate legal advice does not necessarily waive the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2015-03-27 Federal NY

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Red Vision Sys., Inc. v. National Real Estate Info. Svcs, L.P., No. 416 WDA 2014, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7 (Pa. Super. Jan. 13, 2015)
("The privilege is available to corporate as well as individual clients.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 State PA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Pia v. Supernova Media, Inc., Case No. 2:09-cv-00840-DN-EJF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175028 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2014)
(holding that a manager/member of an LLC can waive its privilege; "[B]ecause Supernova is a current manager of Shannon's Delaware, it can waive attorney-client privilege on behalf of Shannon's Delaware."; "[T]his case involves an LLC a legally different business organization than a corporation, with a different management structure (manager-managed as opposed to a board of directors). Further, to the extent a corporation and board of directors can be analogized to a manager-managed LLC, Mr. Pia [Lawyer] has not presented any evidence that the majority of the management of Shannon's Delaware wishes to assert the attorney-client privilege, as the majority of the corporation in Milroy [Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646 (D. Neb. 1995)] desired to do. Rather, the only argument Mr. Pia makes is that Supernova is a 'dissident manager' because it seeks to waive the privilege. Milroy referred to the 'dissident director' because he was the only director voting against the majority of the board of directors. No such evidence is presented by Mr. Pia. Thus, Milroy is factually much different than this case and is not persuasive."; "The attorney-client privilege belongs to the entity, and the entity's management holds the power to assert or waive the privilege. Here, a manager (Supernova) of the entity (Shannon's Delaware) has waived the privilege and there is no evidence that by so doing Supernova is taking an action contrary to the will of the majority.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2014-12-18 Federal UT

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014)
June 25, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"How Do Courts Treat LLCs for Privilege Purposes?"

Limited Liability Corporations combine the characteristics of corporations and partnerships. Few courts have dealt with the privilege implications of these hybrid business entities.

In Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family LLC, the court acknowledged that "[t]he application of attorney-client privilege to members of an LLC is a relatively uncharted area of law." No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014). The court ultimately applied the privilege principles applicable to corporations. After reviewing withheld documents in camera, the court concluded that despite the LLC's designation of one person to be the LLC's "sole manager," several other LLC members actually "communicated with each other and with the LLC's attorneys about legal advice relating to the LLC's business." Id. at *10-11. Because these members acted as the LLC's day-to-day "managing members," "disclosure of confidential information received by one managing member of the LLC to another managing member does not, by itself, defeat the attorney-client privilege." Id. at *11-12.

Lawyers representing LLCs should explicitly articulate various individuals' roles in seeking and acting on their legal advice, laying the groundwork for both privilege and non-waiver assertions if the need arises.

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2014-04-18 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family, LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335 (N.D. Cal. April 18, 2014)
(treating an LLC the same way as a corporation for privilege purposes; "The application of attorney-client privilege to members of an LLC is a relatively uncharted area of law.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2014-04-18 Federal CA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 7:12-CV-00578, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2013)
("It is well settled that a corporation may be a 'client' with standing to assert the privilege. [Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981)]. Thus, communications from K-C's legal counsel to its employees may fall within the privilege. However, the confidential communication 'must be for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business, advice.' Henson By and Through Mawyer v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987) (citing N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power, 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C. 1986)).")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2013-05-31 Federal VA B 9/13

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Va. 2012)
("While the attorney-client privilege is available to corporations, see Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 413 S.E.2d 630, 638, 8 Va. Law Rep. 1829 (Va. 1992) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981)), the determination of whether the attorney-client privilege applies to protect a document from production becomes more difficult when the sender or recipient of that document is in-house counsel for a corporate entity. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); ABB Kent-Taylor, Inc. v. Stallings & Co., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 53, 55 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Rush v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., No. CL-07-11322, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 12, at *5-6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 2008)
(addressing the privilege implications of a company's former CFO's request for a protected document from his former employer, against which he had filed a breach of contract and defamation action; "The attorney client privilege is available to corporations. . . . The policy for extending the privilege to corporate clients is conceptually the same as for individual clients: 'to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.'" (citation omitted)) [Woolridge, J.]

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2008-02-12 State VA B 5/09 & 6/09

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Gordon v. Newspaper Assoc. of Am., 51 Va. Cir. 183, 186 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
("'[T]he privilege exists between a corporation and its in-house attorney.' . . . The communications protected are those between employees and in-house counsel which aid counsel in providing legal services to the corporation.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2000-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: X Corp. v. Doe, Civ. No. 92-338-A, 1992 Dist. LEXIS 13612 (E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 1992)
(enjoining a former in-house lawyer and his lawyer from disclosing privileged documents in-house lawyer retained when he was terminated for allegedly complaining about corporate misconduct; refusing to order the former in-house lawyer to return the documents to the company; "It is well-settled that the privilege protects corporate as well as individual clients . . . And that it attaches to in-house as well as outside counsel.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
1992-08-25 Federal VA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1305-06 (E.D. Va. 1992)
("[i]t is well-settled that the privilege protects corporate as well as individual clients . . . and that it attaches to in-house as well as outside counsel"; holding that an in-house lawyer did not have to return privileged communications that the lawyer took when the lawyer left employment), aff'd sub nom. Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994)

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
1992-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696 (E.D. Va. 1987)
("It is well-settled that the attorney-client privilege does attach to corporations as well as individuals.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 6.102

Case Name: Henson v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987)
("it is well settled that a corporation may be a 'client' with standing to assert the privilege")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 6.103

Case Name: Maplewood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 295 F.R.D. 550, 590 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
(in a first party insurance setting, finding that an insurance company and its insured had a common interest that acted much like a joint representation, so there was no privilege when they later litigated against each other about coverage; "In a particularly significant decision announced after Upjohn [Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)], the Supreme Court of Florida applied a heightened level of scrutiny to claims of corporate privilege in order 'to minimize the threat of corporations cloaking information with the attorney-client privilege in order to avoid discovery.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal FL B 4/14

Chapter: 6.201

Case Name: In re Oxbow Carbon LLC, Unitholder Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 12447-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 425 (Del. Ch. March 7, 2017)
(holding that its point two members of a company's board of directors (appointed by investors) may be so adverse to the company that they can be denied access to privileged communications; "The extent to which the Company can invoke privilege against the Crestview Directors turns on the point at which sufficient adversary existed between them such that the Crestview Directors could no longer have a reasonable expectation that they were clients of Company counsel."; "I conclude that for purposes of discovery, Robert Popeo's email to Michael Carlinsky dated October 23, 2015, was the point at which adversary was established sufficiently to enable the Company to begin asserting privilege. Arguments can be made and evidence cited in support of a finding of adversity before or after that point. Clearly, tensions were rising before then. Equally clearly, there are arguments as to why the Crestview Directors should be able to continue to access privileged material after that date. In my view, it is important for purposes of discovery to have as clear a line of demarcation as possible, and I have selected the date that appears most justified on the facts of the case."; "Consequently, the Company cannot withhold discovery material dated before October 23, 2015, from the Crestview Directors on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The Company shall produce the Crestview Directors all items on its privilege log that pre-date October 23, 2015. Thereafter, the Company can invoke the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, subject to the additional rulings made in this order."; "Because of the nature of the relationship between Crestview and the Crestview Directors, Crestview is entitled to the same information as Crestview Directors and vice versa. . . ."; "Crestview cannot obtain access to otherwise privileged materials separately under Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Once sufficient adversity existed for the Crestview Directors not to have access to privileged information, there was insufficient mutuality of interest between Crestview and the Company for Garner to apply."; "The Company has alleged that Crestview sought to undermine the Company 'from the inside' by secretly enlisting McAuliffe and Eric Johnson 'to undercut the advice the Company was receiving from its outside counsel,' which had been retained specifically to analyze to Put Right. . . . The complaint posits that Crestview already was knowledgeable about the two firms' advice. The complaint further alleges that when one of the two firms produced a memo partially supporting Oxbow's position. McAuliffe had the offending passage removed before sharing the memo with Koch. . . . Given these allegations, the Company has placed at issue its communications with its original counsel and the two additional law firms about ThoughtWorks and the legal advice it received from them."; "The Company similarly has put at issue the advice it received from Mintz Levin regarding a potential payment to the Small Holders by asserting in its answer that Popeo only suggested this to Crestview to broker a compromise and not because it represented his belief or the Company's belief. By taking the additional step of drawing a distinction between what was said that what they believed, the Company placed at issue advice showing what Popeo and the Company actually believed on this point. . . ."; "The Company shall produce the items on its privilege log for which no attorney is identified.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2017-03-07 State DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 6.202

Case Name: In re Oxbow Carbon LLC, Unitholder Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 12447-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 425 (Del. Ch. March 7, 2017)
(holding that its point two members of a company's board of directors (appointed by investors) may be so adverse to the company that they can be denied access to privileged communications; "The extent to which the Company can invoke privilege against the Crestview Directors turns on the point at which sufficient adversary existed between them such that the Crestview Directors could no longer have a reasonable expectation that they were clients of Company counsel."; "I conclude that for purposes of discovery, Robert Popeo's email to Michael Carlinsky dated October 23, 2015, was the point at which adversary was established sufficiently to enable the Company to begin asserting privilege. Arguments can be made and evidence cited in support of a finding of adversity before or after that point. Clearly, tensions were rising before then. Equally clearly, there are arguments as to why the Crestview Directors should be able to continue to access privileged material after that date. In my view, it is important for purposes of discovery to have as clear a line of demarcation as possible, and I have selected the date that appears most justified on the facts of the case."; "Consequently, the Company cannot withhold discovery material dated before October 23, 2015, from the Crestview Directors on the basis of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. The Company shall produce the Crestview Directors all items on its privilege log that pre-date October 23, 2015. Thereafter, the Company can invoke the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, subject to the additional rulings made in this order."; "Because of the nature of the relationship between Crestview and the Crestview Directors, Crestview is entitled to the same information as Crestview Directors and vice versa. . . ."; "Crestview cannot obtain access to otherwise privileged materials separately under Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Once sufficient adversity existed for the Crestview Directors not to have access to privileged information, there was insufficient mutuality of interest between Crestview and the Company for Garner to apply."; "The Company has alleged that Crestview sought to undermine the Company 'from the inside' by secretly enlisting McAuliffe and Eric Johnson 'to undercut the advice the Company was receiving from its outside counsel,' which had been retained specifically to analyze to Put Right. . . . The complaint posits that Crestview already was knowledgeable about the two firms' advice. The complaint further alleges that when one of the two firms produced a memo partially supporting Oxbow's position. McAuliffe had the offending passage removed before sharing the memo with Koch. . . . Given these allegations, the Company has placed at issue its communications with its original counsel and the two additional law firms about ThoughtWorks and the legal advice it received from them."; "The Company similarly has put at issue the advice it received from Mintz Levin regarding a potential payment to the Small Holders by asserting in its answer that Popeo only suggested this to Crestview to broker a compromise and not because it represented his belief or the Company's belief. By taking the additional step of drawing a distinction between what was said that what they believed, the Company placed at issue advice showing what Popeo and the Company actually believed on this point. . . ."; "The Company shall produce the items on its privilege log for which no attorney is identified.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2017-03-07 State DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 6.202

Case Name: Krys v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, & Garrison LLP (In re China Med. Techs., Inc.), 539 B.R. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(holding that a bankruptcy liquidator could waive the attorney-client privilege that belonged to a company's Audit Committee, but could not waive the Audit Committee's work product protection, which belonged solely or jointly to the Audit Committee's lawyer's at Paul Weiss; "The issue now before the Court is whether the capacity of the Audit Committee to retain independent counsel and to conduct unfettered internal investigations that implicate corporate management should thwart the statutory obligation of a trustee in bankruptcy to maximize the value of the estate by conducting investigations into a corporation's prebankruptcy affairs."; "Weintraub did not squarely address the circumstances here. Its analysis was limited to whether privileges asserted by a corporation's counsel were waivable by that corporation's trustee in bankruptcy. The asserted privileges here relate to an investigation by Appellees on behalf of a corporation's audit committee, and the precise relationship between that committee and the corporation is disputed. Despite these factual distinctions, however, the same considerations that weighed in favor of the trustee in Weintraub weigh in favor of Appellant here."; "It is true that the Audit Committee was 'independent' in some sense. It could retain counsel, and it legitimately expected that its communications with counsel would be protected against intrusion by management. But the Audit Committee is not an individual, nor is its status analogous to that of an individual. Instead, it was a committee constituted by CMED's Board of Directors, and thus a critical component of CMED's management infrastructure."; "[T]he justifications for protected attorney-client communications dissipate in bankruptcy. Prebankruptcy, audit committees 'play a critical role in monitoring corporate management and a corporation's auditor.'. . . Without the prebankruptcy protection of attorney-client privilege, audit committees could not provide 'independent review and oversight of a company's financial reporting processes, internal controls and independent auditors,' nor could they offer a 'forum separate from management in which auditors and other interested parties [could] candidly discuss concerns.' SEC Release No. 8220, 'Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees,' File No. 87-02-03, 79 SEC Docket 2876, 2003 WL 1833875, at *19 (Apr. 9, 2003). But as the Bankruptcy Court noted in its Opinion, 'any miscreants have left the company' in bankruptcy, Op. 17; corporate management is deposed in favor of the trustee, and there is no longer a need to insulate committee-counsel communications from managerial intrusion. Without a legitimate fear of managerial intrusion or retaliation in bankruptcy, Appellees' assertions as to a potential chilling effect ring hollow."; "Although the Court recognizes that this is a difficult issue in a largely ill-defined area of the law, it nevertheless respectfully disagrees with the legal determination of the Bankruptcy Court below. The Court finds that Appellant, as CMED's Liquidator, now owns and can thus waive the Audit Committee's attorney-client privilege, regardless of the Committee's prebankruptcy independence. The Bankruptcy Court's ruling to the contrary is hereby reversed."; "The Court's ruling as to attorney-client privilege does not extend, however, to Appellees' assertion of work product protections, which the Bankruptcy Court Opinion only peripherally addressed. . . . Importantly, because 'work product protection belongs to the Audit Committee's counsel and cannot be waived by the client' . . . It does not fall within the ambit of Weintraub. . . . Thus, even assuming that the Liquidator owns those documents for which Appellees have asserted work-product protection, he cannot waive this protection unilaterally. Appellant, at the very least, has not cited any cases suggesting otherwise.")

Case Date Jurisidction State Cite Checked
2015-09-30 Federal NY

Chapter: 6.202

Case Name: TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, No. 46S03-1405-MI-337, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 715, at *22-23 (Ind. Sept. 3, 2014)