McGuireWoods Attorney-Client Privilege/Work Product Case Summary Database

Showing 322 of 322 results

Chapter: 26.1
Case Name: Schaeffler v. United States, Dkt. No. 14-1965-cv, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617 (2nd Cir. Nov. 10, 2015)
("The privilege, and by extension the tax practitioner privilege . . . Protects communications between a client and its attorney that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential. A party that shares otherwise privileged communications with an outsider is deemed to waive the privilege by disabling itself from claiming that the communications were intended to be confidential.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-10 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.7
Case Name: n re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. A. No. 17-2336 (BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186420 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017)
December 27, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Trump-Related Circuit Court Decision Includes Troubling Waiver Analysis"

Because historical facts do not deserve privilege protection, disclosing those facts does not trigger a privilege waiver. Thus, disclosing historical facts to the government should not waive the disclosing client's privilege protection for communications with her lawyer about those facts.

But some decisions take a different, troubling, approach. In In re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. A. No. 17-2336 (BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186420 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017), the court ordered former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort's lawyer to testify before a grand jury. In addition to applying the crime-fraud exception, the court held that the lawyer waived her clients' privilege protection by making representations about historical facts in submissions to the DOJ. The court noted that the lawyer's submissions "made specific factual representations to DOJ that are unlikely to have originated from sources other than [Manafort and a colleague], and, in large part, were explicitly attributed to one or both [of their] recollections." Id. at *32. The court relied on this unsurprising circumstance in holding that the representations "impliedly waived the privilege as to [the clients'] communications with [their lawyer] to the extent that these communications related to the . . . Submissions' contents." Id.

A lawyer's disclosure of historical facts should not strip away privilege protection from the lawyer's communications with her client about those facts.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-02 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.9
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "The Special Master correctly observed that there is a distinction between the results of the investigation and the investigation itself and that reliance on the facts learned in the investigation, when offered from a source other than the investigator, does not put the investigation in issue. . . . When an employer asserts the so-called Faragher/Ellerth defense, the adequacy of its investigation is relevant to the issue of the adequacy of its corrective actions. In this case, however, the adequacy of plaintiff's investigation simply has no relationship to any of the issues in the case.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.9
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "Although Mitre's attaching the products of its investigation to its complaint seems to have been done more for public relations reasons than legal reasons, Mitre's pleading does not put the investigation in issue. The complaint is not evidence, and Mitre cannot offer it as such.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.9
Case Name: Mitre Sports International Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 08 Civ. 9117 (GBD) (HBP), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015)
(holding that the subject matter waiver doctrine did not require plaintiff to disclose additional work product protected documents based on its Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses testimony or its attachment of investigation-related documents to its complaint against HBO; "HBO argues that Mitre waived work-product protection by (1) permitting James Boocock to testify to certain matters concerning Mitre's investigation and designating that testimony as its 30(b)(6) testimony and (2) by attaching the products of its investigation to its complaint."; "Boocock's answering HBO's deposition questions did not put Mitre's investigation in issue for the simple reason that providing such testimony was not an attempt by Mitre to use protected information to influence a decision maker. In many cases, the vast majority of deposition testimony taken in discovery is never put before any decision maker; frequently, only a small fraction of the deposition testimony taken in a case is cited in connection with a summary judgment motion or offered at trial. Thus, the mere fact that a party makes a partial disclosure of privileged or protected information in a deposition does not result in a subject-matter waiver because there is no use of the testimony by the party holding the privilege."; "HBO's second argument concerning Boocock's testimony -- that Mitre has made affirmative use of the testimony by designating portions as Mitre's 30(b)(6) testimony does not alter this result. The authorities cited above teach that the critical inquiry is whether protected information has been partially disclosed to a decision maker in an effort to influence a decision. A party's deposition testimony, whether from an individual witness or a 30(b)(6) witness, does not constitute such a use. Although HBO argues that Mitre is trying to utilize the work-product doctrine as both a sword and a shield, it has not cited any instance in which Mitre affirmatively used Boocock's testimony and has not, therefore, established Mitre's use of the work-product doctrine as a sword."; "'I am aware that subsequent to Boocock's deposition, the parties have submitted voluminous materials in connection with their motions for summary judgment. However, HBO does not cite any instances in which Mitre has made any affirmative use of Boocock's testimony in connection with these motions.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-13 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.302
Case Name: Brownfield v. Hodous and Hodous, L.L.P., 82 Va. Cir. 315, 319 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011)
("Defendants oppose an in camera review, arguing that such a review itself violates the privilege. Disclosure of allegedly privileged materials to a court for purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege, however, does not have the legal effect of terminating the privilege and has been approved by many courts. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568-69, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1989), and cases cited therein.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.302
Case Name: United States v. Myers, 593 F.3d 338, 348 & n.15 (4th Cir. 2010)
("She has argued that her closed case files are privileged but has consistently refused to allow the court to evaluate whether the privilege applies. Myers cannot adjudicate her own Fifth Amendment claim. Rather, the district court must evaluate her claim in the first instance. See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas, Dated Jan. 5, 1988, 847 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the Fifth Amendment does not protect refusal to produce documents for in camera inspection). We will not consider her Fifth Amendment claim until the district court has had the opportunity. Myers does not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege or opportunity for review simply by turning over items for privilege review.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Zen Design Group, Ltd. v. Scholastic, Inc., Case No. 16-12936, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104412 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2018)
(analyzing the scope of an implied waiver in a patent case in which a litigant intends to rely on advice of counsel; "To defend against a claim of willfulness, a party may present evidence that it sought an opinion of counsel as to the merits of the infringement allegations and received exculpatory advice. . . . This is known as the advice-of-counsel defense and it 'aims to establish that due to reasonable reliance on advice from counsel, [the accused infringer's] continued accused activities were done in good faith.'. . . By voluntarily providing the opinion of counsel as part of its defense, the defendant waives its attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality of the related work product. In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006)."; "A little over a year later, the Federal Circuit revisited waiver in the context of the advice-of-counsel defense. See Seagate [In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007)]."; "Both Seagate and Echostar [In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed.Cir.2006)] guide the court's analysis and opinion today. Seagate explicitly discussed Echostar and clarified that Echostar 'did not consider waiver of the advice of counsel defense as it relates to trial counsel.' Id. at 1370. Therefore, Seagate's holding pertains to trial counsel while Echostar governs waiver as to all other counsel, leaving open the question the parties ultimately present to this court: when is an attorney considered trial counsel, thus shielding his communications and work product from discovery even when his client asserts the advice-of-counsel defense?"; "Both parties present thoughtful research and analysis. Upon a review of the pertinent caselaw, the court concludes that a bright-line rule for waiver of trial counsel's pre-suit communications and documents is not appropriate. . . . The moment at which an attorney's role morphs from pre-suit advisory counsel into pre-trial strategy counsel is not easily defined by a distinct point in time and is better suited to a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis. After considering the 'circumstances of the disclosure [sought here], the nature of the legal advice sought[,] and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures[,]' the court concludes that disclosure of Siff's pretrial communications and work product regarding infringement is appropriate."; "Plaintiff accuses Defendant of willfully infringing on its '616 Patent. In response, Defendant submitted an exculpatory opinion as to infringement by outside counsel Stimpson. In doing so, Defendant waived its attorney-client privilege and work product confidentiality as to all other communications and documents given to Defendant on the same subject matter as established by Echostar. The court concludes that this waiver, while not extending to trial counsel's communications and work, extends to Siff's presuit communications and work here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-22 Federal MI

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Leibovic v. United Shore Financial Services, LLC, Case No. 15-12639, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137643 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2017)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation after a software system intrusion; finding that the company created a subject matter waiver by disclosing the third party investigator's conclusions; "The second unresolved issue is raised in XMS's motion to compel against United Shore. . . . "; "In the aftermath of the alleged intrusions to XMS's software system, United Shore's counsel commissioned Navigant -- a third-party -- to conduct an investigation."; "XMS's Interrogatory No. 8 asked United Shore to state with particularity all investigations, notifications and remedial efforts taken in response to any unauthorized use of its accounts -- in relation to the alleged intrusions to XMS's database. In response, United Shore indicated that Navigant conducted an investigation, and it also provided Navigant's conclusions from the investigation. However, United Shore withheld a significant amount of documents related to Navigant's investigation on the basis that they were protected by attorney-client privilege, since its counsel had commissioned the investigation."; "XMS says United Shore is engaging in impermissible selective waiver because it is seeking the benefit of using the results of the investigation, but withholding information about what the investigation considered and how the investigation was conducted. It further says that by including Navigant's conclusions in its response to the Interrogatory, it was using the results of the investigation offensively, which waived the privilege."; "United Shore says it was merely responding to the Interrogatory with factual information related to its retention of Navigant and the existence of Navigant's investigation."; "Although United Shore was responding to XMS's Interrogatory regarding investigations it had commissioned, its response went beyond providing factual information regarding the existence of the investigation and retention of Navigant. United Shore's response also included details regarding Navigant's conclusions. This exceeded the scope of the Interrogatory and -- as XMS contends -- United Shore fails to explain 'why the conclusions of a supposedly privileged investigation commissioned by counsel would not themselves be privileged."; "Because United Shore disclosed the privileged conclusions of Navigant's investigations, and because it appears United Shore intends to use the findings of the investigation to prove the cause of the intrusion of XMS's database, XMS is entitled to see documents related to how the investigation was conducted and what was considered during the investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-28 Federal MI

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Leibovic v. United Shore Financial Services, LLC, Case No. 15-12639, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137643 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2017)
(analyzing protection for an internal investigation after a software system intrusion; finding that the company created a subject matter waiver by disclosing the third party investigator's conclusions; "The second unresolved issue is raised in XMS's motion to compel against United Shore. . . . "; "In the aftermath of the alleged intrusions to XMS's software system, United Shore's counsel commissioned Navigant -- a third-party -- to conduct an investigation."; "XMS's Interrogatory No. 8 asked United Shore to state with particularity all investigations, notifications and remedial efforts taken in response to any unauthorized use of its accounts -- in relation to the alleged intrusions to XMS's database. In response, United Shore indicated that Navigant conducted an investigation, and it also provided Navigant's conclusions from the investigation. However, United Shore withheld a significant amount of documents related to Navigant's investigation on the basis that they were protected by attorney-client privilege, since its counsel had commissioned the investigation."; "XMS says United Shore is engaging in impermissible selective waiver because it is seeking the benefit of using the results of the investigation, but withholding information about what the investigation considered and how the investigation was conducted. It further says that by including Navigant's conclusions in its response to the Interrogatory, it was using the results of the investigation offensively, which waived the privilege."; "United Shore says it was merely responding to the Interrogatory with factual information related to its retention of Navigant and the existence of Navigant's investigation."; "Although United Shore was responding to XMS's Interrogatory regarding investigations it had commissioned, its response went beyond providing factual information regarding the existence of the investigation and retention of Navigant. United Shore's response also included details regarding Navigant's conclusions. This exceeded the scope of the Interrogatory and -- as XMS contends -- United Shore fails to explain 'why the conclusions of a supposedly privileged investigation commissioned by counsel would not themselves be privileged."; "Because United Shore disclosed the privileged conclusions of Navigant's investigations, and because it appears United Shore intends to use the findings of the investigation to prove the cause of the intrusion of XMS's database, XMS is entitled to see documents related to how the investigation was conducted and what was considered during the investigation.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-28 Federal MI

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Doe v. Baylor University, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127509 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017)
(holding that Pepper Hamilton's internal investigation into Baylor's Title IX compliance issues deserved privilege protection, but that the client waived that privilege, and deserved work product protection which Baylor did not waive and which plaintiffs could not overcome; not explaining in detail what communications or documents would be protected only by the privilege and not also by the work product doctrine, and therefore discoverable; in explaining the court's conclusion about Baylor waiving its privilege protection, not identifying the privileged communications Baylor actually disclosed; "In May 2016, a few months after this amendment, Baylor released two documents summarizing the results of the Pepper Hamilton investigation, a thirteen-page summary of the investigation and its conclusions entitle 'Findings of Fact,' and another ten-page list of recommendations titled 'Report of External and Independent Review, Recommendations.' (quoting Baylor's statement that its interim president 'would like to reiterate that the Findings of Fact fully reflect the themes, core findings and failings identified in the investigation'))"; "In other words, the documents summarize the complete course of previously confidential communications between Baylor and Pepper Hamilton. The Findings of Fact document even connects several specific factual findings to Pepper Hamilton. . . . As just one example, the findings explain that Pepper Hamilton found instances of university administrators 'directly discouraging complainants from reporting or participating in student conduct process' and that, in one instance, an administrator's actions 'constituted retaliation against a complainant for reporting sexual assault. . . .' The Shillinglaw answer includes even more specific details, going so far as to quote text messages and conversations by Baylor personnel about reports of sexual assault [these might have been historical non-privileged communications, not privileged communications involving Pepper Hamilton lawyers] and explain that these conversations were uncovered by Pepper Hamilton in the course of its investigation. . . . The Recommendations document then details over ten pages of guidance and advice provided by legal counsel. . . . These disclosures are far from a generic statement that Baylor sought legal advice on Title IX compliance."; "Plaintiffs argue that three disclosures by Baylor constituted waiver of attorney-client privilege. First, Plaintiffs argue that Baylor waived its attorney-client privilege when it released the Findings of Fact and Recommendations in May 2016. Second, Plaintiffs point to disclosures made in a filing by Baylor regents in Shillinglaw v. Baylor University, et al., No. DC-17-01225 (Dallas Cty. Dist. Ct.), where, for example, the regents quoted text message exchanges and paraphrased conversations in which Baylor personnel discussed an alleged rape by a football player and a gang rape reported to athletic staff. . . . The filing explains that all facts and evidence discussed were revealed by Pepper Hamilton's investigation. . . . Third, Plaintiffs argue that former Baylor regents were also briefed by Pepper Hamilton about details of the investigation that have since been kept confidential. . . . "; "These disclosures were intentional and together provide substantial detail about both what Baylor and its employees told Pepper Hamilton and what advice Baylor received in return. After carefully reviewing the documents disclosed, the Court finds that they are much more akin to those made in cases where waiver was found, than those where no waiver was found. Compare Nguyen, 197 F. 3d at 207 & n.17 (finding waiver where deposition questions to executives 'elicit[ed] information about the substance of [attorney-client] communication, touching on the directions given to counsel and the legal materials reviewed in addressing the question presented'); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding waiver where an '85-page report for [a client] summarize[ed] in detail the facts uncovered by the law firm in the course of its investigation'); with YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC, No. A-15-CV-597-RP, 2016 WL 8677303, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2016) (finding no waiver where a single email produced in discovery stated that '[w]e believe and our attorney has confirmed that we are not infringing'); Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. A-09-CA-711 LY, 2010 WL 5174366, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2010) (finding no waiver where 'communications merely note that they have sought advice from their attorneys . . . regarding [a] name change' and 'do not disclose the confidential advice and the opinions of their legal counsel')."; rejecting Baylor's argument that it had disclosed only facts, not privileged communications; inexplicably seeming to equate the disclosure of facts with the disclosure of communications, apparently because the facts must have been disclosed in privileged communications; "Baylor argues that waiver results only from revealing confidential communications, not underlying facts, and asserts that the Findings of Fact and Shillinglaw answer do not reveal the communication themselves. The documents themselves contradict this argument. The Findings of Fact reveal that all findings were the result of Pepper Hamilton's investigation – a 'detailed, thorough and rigorous' investigation based on 'unfettered access to personnel and data.'. . . Contrary to Baylor's assertion, this connection between Pepper Hamilton and the thirteen pages of findings 'reveals' what facts Baylor provided to Pepper Hamilton, not just the underlying facts themselves. In other words, the Findings of Fact are a 'publication of evidence of the communications.'. . . The exact contents of the communications need not be revealed to constitute waiver. See, e.g. In re Kidder, 168 F.R.D. at 468 (finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege where a report made a factual summary and paraphrased interviews conducted by attorneys); Nguyen v, 197 F.3d at 207 (affirming a district court's finding of waiver where executives recounted communications with attorneys in depositions. Similarly, in Shillinglaw, the answer explains that the Pepper Hamilton investigation uncovered the detailed evidence discussed in the answer – again, revealing what was communicated by Baylor and its personnel to Pepper Hamilton."; "Relatedly, Baylor argues that because the Findings of Fact and Recommendations were drafted for the express purpose of public release, they can reveal no confidential communications. This argument is both unconvincing and unsupported by case law. Baylor chose to publicly release a detailed summary of Pepper Hamilton's investigation that disclosed, among other things, attorney-client communications. [the opinion does not identify such privileged communications] While the information contained in these summaries was previously confidential, Baylor's decision to prepare and release a summary of those communications indicates its intentional waiver of that confidentiality. The logical extension of Baylor's argument is that the creation and public release of any document discussing attorney-client communications, no matter how detailed or self-serving, would not constitute waiver. That cannot be the case."; "Next, Baylor argues that generic statements about consulting with an attorney do not constitute waiver. But generic statements are not at issue here. Instead, the thirteen pages of Findings of Fact and ten pages of Recommendations purport to summarize the entire investigation by Pepper Hamilton – both the information provided by Baylor and the factual and legal conclusions that resulted from it.") (emphases added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-11 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017)
("The Court begins by noting that attorney-client privilege 'only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts.'. . . Thus, Banneker could, through a well-written interrogatory, request the disclosure of all facts unearthed during the 51 witness interviews and WMATA would have no legitimate basis to refuse to respond. Banneker need not draft such an interrogatory, however, because the Court finds WMATA has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the interview memoranda."; "As originally commissioned, the Bondi Report was intended to be an internal document for WMATA's purposes and not slated for public disclosure. Upon receipt of the Bondi Report, the WMATA Board decided to release it to the public in its entirety. By disclosing the Bondi Report, WMATA chose to disclose the legal and factual conclusions that were contained in the report and, therefore, waived any claim of attorney-client privilege that existed with respect to the Bondi Report itself. The Court must now consider whether the public disclosure of the Bondi Report also resulted in subject-matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege covering the interview memoranda used to compile the report."; "The Court finds that the waiver of privilege as to the Bondi Report was intentional. . . . the Bondi Report cites extensively to the interview memoranda throughout the entirety of the document. The Court notes multiple references to at least 23 different witness interviews. Additionally, WMATA has not argued that the interview memoranda contain information outside the scope of the investigation or Bondi Report."; "'Ms. Rockwood notes in her declaration that the references to the interview memoranda in the Bondi Report were intended only for use by Cadwalader. . . . However, WMATA failed to remove the references and citations from the version of the Bondi Report that was made available to the public.'"; "WMATA has not zealously protected the information contained in the interview memoranda. Instead, WMATA has permitted direct citation and reference to confidential communications to be disclosed publically in the Bondi Report. WMATA has also used the Bondi Report to its advantage in this litigation. Fairness dictates that if WMATA is able to use the Bondi Report and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and defenses, then Banneker is entitled to the remaining facts and information contained in the interview memoranda that were not included in the Bondi Report. The intent of subject matter waiver is to prevent a party from selectively disclosing information and documents that would otherwise be privileged to gain a tactical advantage. WMATA cannot both benefit from the disclosure of the Bondi Report and prevent further disclosure of the remaining information in the interview memoranda.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-16 Federal DC

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Dyson, Inc. v. Sharkninja Operating LLC, Case No. 14-cv-779, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14434 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2017)
("Courts have followed Winbond [Winbond Elecs. Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 262 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir.), opinion corrected, 275 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)] and found waiver of attorney-client privilege when declarations based on attorney advice were submitted to the USPTO to obtain a certificate of correction.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-02 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 08-CV-0706-RJA-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3011 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2017)
(analyzing the waiver implications of defendant's inadvertent production of over 1,000 documents; the Special Master found a waiver because defendant had waited too long to retrieve the documents; also noting that the defendant quoted some of the privileged documents of the subject matter waiver; "Here, the privileged documents themselves were not publically disclosed or filed. However, in the course of appealing the denial of the motion to vacate, Sterling publically filed the Class Determination Award, which contained direct quotations from three of the privileged documents. In doing so, Sterling made no attempt to protect or limit dissemination of that privileged information. Indeed, Sterling has put forth no evidence that it sought leave to file the Class Determination Award under seal or in camera, or that it attempted to redact those portions of the Class Determination Award which quoted directly from the privileged documents. Therefore, even though the initial disclosure of the documents was inadvertent, the subsequent public disclosure of some of the information contained in the documents, during the course of the appeal, was not. That information can no longer be considered confidential. For this reason, and consistent with the case law discussed above, the Court finds that Sterling has waived any privilege with respect to those portions of the July 2006 Compliance Report, the Post-Merit Field Operations EEOC Analysis, and the Merit Payout Alternative Report quoted in the Class Determination Award.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-03 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Father Doe v. Phillips Exeter Academy, Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding an implied waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "Even had PEA not put the reports into issue in this litigation, PEA waived any privilege by disclosing their contents to third parties -- specifically, the Does -- and in filings with this court. . . . Dean Mischke disclosed portions of the reports to John Doe's parents before this litigation began. On March 3, 2016, Dean Mischke emailed Father Doe to set up a phone call 'to review the general findings of Ms. McGintee's investigation . . . .' Not 'want[ing] to be cagey about the conclusion' of Attorney McGintee's report, Dean Mischke disclosed Attorney McGintee's conclusion that 'while she has concerns about [John Doe], his attitude and his lack of reading the situation as well as not obtaining expressed consent early on, concludes no malice and no forcible action.' Id. During the ensuing phone call, plaintiffs allege, Dean Mischke also disclosed certain of Jane's allegations. . . . PEA further described the reports' contents -- including Attorney McGintee's conclusions -- in several filings with this court, including Dean Mischke's declaration and its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in advance of a subsequently-cancelled hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal NH

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. v. The Putnam Advisory Co., LLC, 12 Civ. 7372, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33352 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 2016)
(finding that the plaintiff waived any otherwise available attorney-client privilege and work product protection for documents prepared by a consultant, and which the plaintiff referred to and cited in its complaint and in Second Circuit briefing; noting that referring to the consultant's work in the complaint would not have caused a waiver by itself, but that the waiver came from reliance in court; finding that the scope of the waiver can not extend beyond documents referred to in the complaint; "Lastly, Putnam seeks the production of an economic analysis commissioned by FGIC for this litigation. Although expert reports and other such documents prepared for the purpose of litigation are normally covered by the attorney-client and work product privileges, Putnam contends that FGIC waived any such protection when it cited to and quoted from the analysis in the SAC, and when it used the report in its Second Circuit briefing."; "In Paragraph 122 of the SAC, FGIC declares that it retained a firm of economic analysts to assess the likelihood that a suspicious pattern of referenced securities in Pyxis and other related CDOs could have occurred by chance, rather than by design. That paragraph also includes three bullet-pointed quotations from the analysis, concluding that the pattern 'may indicate that the portfolio selection by independent portfolio managers was influenced by an external factor,' that 'the probability of this happening by chance across independent portfolio managers is less than 1 in a billion,' and that the likelihood was similar to that observed in cases involving fraudulent options backdating. The analysis was referenced in order to show that the selection of financial instruments in Pyxis' portfolio was in fact conducted in conjunction with Magnetar Capital LLC ('Magnetar'), a hedge fund with a short position in Pyxis, with the goal of having Pyxis fail, creating a profit for Magnetar. See id. FGIC also referred to the report in its briefing before the Second Circuit."; "'Although FGIC did not directly cite to Paragraph 122 of the SAC in its Second Circuit briefing, it does repeatedly assert that it had independently confirmed without discovery that Pyxis' collateral was not selected independently, but. Rather for Magnetar's Benefit, a clear reference to the economic analysis.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-15 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Hollis v. O'Driscoll, No. 13 Civ. 01955 (AJN), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83885, at *8, *8-9, *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013)
(holding that a pro se respondent waived the possible privilege protection for an attachment to her answer, which was a timeline created after she spoke with a lawyer she ultimately did not hire; rejecting the pro se respondent's privilege claim after she hired a lawyer; "To the extent that Respondent now realizes that she may have made a mistake in choosing to submit her timeline to the Court, such after-the-fact regrets do not alter the analysis regarding whether she waived the privilege. Respondent cites no authority for the proposition that strategic errors committed by a party while proceeding pro se may be corrected nunc pro tunc after the party has obtained counsel to advise them on what, in retrospect, may have been an unwise course of action."; "Respondent argues that she did not waive the attorney-client privilege because she did not know or fully understand the nature of the privilege or know that she was waiving it. Respondent cites no case law -- and the Court has found none -- to support her argument that a party, whether proceeding pro se or represented by counsel, must thoroughly understand the nature of the attorney-client privilege before it can be waived. Indeed, some authority explicitly holds to the contrary. See generally 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 511App.01[2] (2013) ('[K]knowledge or lack of knowledge of the existence of the privilege appears to be irrelevant'); accord In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Waiver may take place even if the disclosing party does not 'intentionally relinquish[] a known right.'); see also Weinstein's § 511.02."; "Respondent quotes the definition of 'waiver' in Black's Law Dictionary, which speaks of 'voluntary relinquishment' of a legal right of which the party has 'knowledge.'. . . But Judge Weinstein's treatise, as well as related case law, makes clear that this 'traditional doctrine' of waiver does not apply in the confidential privilege context.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-11 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 26.304
Case Name: Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 1:09 cv 1185 WSD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181853, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2012)
("[A]ssuming the communications between Torres, Worms, and Plaintiff's counsel were protected, the Court finds that Plaintiff waived the protections provided by the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege regarding their investigators' knowledge and notes by intentionally and selectively introducing testimony by Torres and Worms in their pleadings during this litigation regarding (i) how the information in the Amended Complaint was collected, (ii) how it was communicated to Plaintiff's counsel, and (iii) what Plaintiff's investigators communicated to Plaintiff's counsel before the Amended Complaint was drafted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-19 Federal GA B 9/13

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: In the Matter of the Estate of Richard L. DeGroat, C.A. No. 12738-MZ, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 762 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2017)
(holding that a litigant who quoted and relied on her lawyer's advice waived the attorney-client privilege protection; "In this estate matter, a child of the decedent's first marriage questions the extent to which the decedent intended to benefit the decedent's second ex-wife. The petitioner alleges that in the decedent's final years, the second ex-wife utilized a power of attorney to name herself beneficiary of several of the decedent's accounts, influenced the decedent to execute a deed to convert co-ownership of real property with the decedent from tenants in common to joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and sold the property and retained all the proceeds while the decedent was still alive."; "In her deposition, Lucinda defended the 2013 deed by asserting she and Decedent were following Mr. Ferry's instructions. Lucinda testified that Mr. Ferry told her and Decedent that their joint ownership of the house 'disappeared' after their divorce, and that upon learning that, she and Decedent agreed to restore joint ownership. Lucinda said Mr. Ferry also explained to her that half the sale proceeds of the house would go to Lucinda and half would go to Decedent's estate. She testified that Mr. Ferry told her that Mr. Ferry could represent both Lucinda and Decedent in the deed preparation so long as Decedent was not otherwise represented by counsel. Lucinda explained, 'Tom Ferry was going to take two people who wanted to do a very simple thing and take care of it. . . . There was nothing nefarious about this.' She stated that Decedent obtained a competency evaluation because Mr. Ferry required it as 'a matter of course for him' for clients 'of a certain age.' Lucinda testified that after Decedent got the competency letter, Lucinda wrote Mr. Ferry and said, 'Richard has it now so we can set an appointment to just correct this issue.'"; "Lucinda's explanation as to how she learned she no longer had an interest in the Property, why Decedent obtained a competency evaluation, and the circumstances under which the January 2013 deed was executed, relies heavily on Mr. Ferry's alleged advice to Lucinda. Lucinda injected Mr. Ferry's representation into the litigation, and the veracity of Lucinda's factual assertions may only be fully understood by examining Mr. Ferry's file. Under the second prong of the 'at issue' exemption, Lucinda may not assert Mr. Ferry's advice and direction as an explanation for her conduct without permitting Michael to inquire into that advice. This is true for any time period preceding execution of the deed. Because Lucinda placed all her communications about the deed with Mr. Ferry at issue, I need not determine the applicability of Delaware Rule of Evidence 502(d)(5) or whether Lucinda waived the privilege by producing some documents. I recommend the Court grant Michael's motion to compel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-02 State DE

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA (JSC), Dkt. No. 1060 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017)
(holding that Uber cannot disclaim privilege protection for an obviously privileged communication, so its disclosure of that communication resulted in a subject matter waiver under Rule 502; "In a case stuffed with surprising scenarios yet another has arisen: the party that would normally assert that a conversation between its in-house litigation counsel and its top executives regarding ongoing litigation is protected by the attorney-client privilege is denying any such protection. The Court is thus in the unusual situation of having to adjudicate whether a conversation is privileged notwithstanding the purported privilege holder's insistence that it is not."; "The question remains whether that conversation, or at least the communications regarding why Mr. Levandowski took Google's information and his decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment, were protected by Uber's attorney-client privilege. Waymo, as the party asserting that the privilege applies, bears the burden of proof. . . . the Court finds that the record overwhelmingly compels the finding that Mr. Kalanick's testimony regarding that conversation was protected by Uber's attorney-client privilege."; "Further, during that conversation Ms. Padilla actually advised Mr. Levandowski (as an Uber executive) and Mr. Kalanick (as Uber's CEO) as to what Uber wanted him to do in this litigation; namely, testify. This, too, supports the Court's finding that the communications during that meeting were for the purpose of enabling Uber to obtain legal advice."; "Ms. Padilla's testimony that she did not believe the conversation to be privileged (although, again, she does not then explain why she was present) does not make the conversation not privileged. If that was all it took to make a communication that has all the hallmarks of a privileged communication not privileged then the rule about not using the privilege as a shield and a sword would be meaningless. Under Uber's theory all a party would have to do is cherry pick the communications they want the opposing party to see and identify those as not privileged, all the while being able to shield other not so favorable communications from disclosure even if they are about the very same topic by claiming those communications privileged. The law of privilege is not that unfair."; "By electing to disclose Uber's communications between Mr. Levandowski, Mr. Kalanick and Ms. Padilla Uber deliberately waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to those communications. . . . The waiver extends to undisclosed communications regarding the subject matter of the disclosed communications. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)."; "Uber nonetheless insists that the Court should not apply a subject matter waiver because its disclosure of privileged communications (if any) was inadvertent as it had a good faith belief that the communications were not privileged. The Court disagrees."; "Even if the Court found that Uber had a good faith belief that Mr. Levandowski's communications with Ms. Padilla and Mr. Kalanick were not privileged (and the Court does not so find), Uber offers no support for its assertion that a lawyer's incorrect advice on whether communications are privileged constitutes inadvertence for purposes of Rule 502(b). Moreover, as Uber did not take any reasonable steps to prevent the disclosure, the second required element of Rule 502(b) is also not met. Finally, at oral argument the Court offered Uber the opportunity to withdraw its waiver and assert the privilege over the communications, in other words, 'to rectify the error.' Uber declined. Thus the third element of Rule 502(b) is not satisfied. Subject matter waiver applies."; "The next step is for the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the scope of Uber's waiver. As Mr. Kalanick's deposition demonstrates, however, it appears that the scope of the waiver may extend to communications made by and to Mr. Levandowski while his personal attorneys were present. He thus may have an individual attorney-client privilege in those communications, although he did not assert such a privilege as to the communications at issue on this motion. The parties must therefore address whether (1) Mr. Levandowski has an individual attorney-client privilege in communications that would be swept within the scope of Uber's subject matter waiver, (2) Uber can waive the privilege with respect to those communications if Mr. Levandowski has an individual attorney-client privilege, and (3) if Uber cannot, whether in fairness Uber should be allowed to waive the privilege with respect to the communications in which Mr. Levandowski does not claim an individual privilege. The parties, including counsel for Mr. Levandowski, shall meet and confer, with the assistance of the Special Master if necessary, and propose a process for addressing these questions.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-14 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
August 16, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point described a New York court's predictable waiver conclusion based on a client's description of his intended future conduct -- explicitly attributed to lawyers' advice. Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017). Another court dealt with a similar situation about two weeks later.

In Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017), Title VII plaintiffs sought to discover an outside lawyer’s report produced after that lawyer investigated an earlier sexual harassment claim against defendant's managing partner. The court found that the report deserved privilege protection, but that the managing partner waived that protection in deposition testimony describing the report's recommendations and his compliance with them. As the court put it, "[b]y discussing [the investigating lawyer's] specific recommendations – that [the managing partner] stay away from [the company] for six months, pay a $10,000 fine, and see a therapist – [he] revealed [the lawyer's] key conclusions and thus disclosed the 'gist' of the report." Id. at *11-12. Based on this waiver, the court ordered the report produced.

Most courts are more forgiving when considering the waiver implications of fast-paced deposition testimony. But the managing partner defendant presumably could have avoided a waiver risk by declining to testify about the report's recommendations – and instead simply describing what he did after the company received the report. Corporations' lawyers should educate their clients' executives and employees about the dispositive distinction between (1) describing the companies' or their own past actions or future intended actions (without attributing them to lawyers' advice), and (2) disclosing privileged communications' content. The former does not waive anything, while the latter waives privilege protection and may trigger a subject matter waiver. Next week's Privilege Point discusses subject matter waiver issues.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE PONT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 16, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point described a New York court's predictable waiver conclusion based on a client's description of his intended future conduct -- explicitly attributed to lawyers' advice. Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017). Another court dealt with a similar situation about two weeks later.

In Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017), Title VII plaintiffs sought to discover an outside lawyer’s report produced after that lawyer investigated an earlier sexual harassment claim against defendant's managing partner. The court found that the report deserved privilege protection, but that the managing partner waived that protection in deposition testimony describing the report's recommendations and his compliance with them. As the court put it, "[b]y discussing [the investigating lawyer's] specific recommendations – that [the managing partner] stay away from [the company] for six months, pay a $10,000 fine, and see a therapist – [he] revealed [the lawyer's] key conclusions and thus disclosed the 'gist' of the report." Id. at *11-12. Based on this waiver, the court ordered the report produced.

Most courts are more forgiving when considering the waiver implications of fast-paced deposition testimony. But the managing partner defendant presumably could have avoided a waiver risk by declining to testify about the report's recommendations – and instead simply describing what he did after the company received the report. Corporations' lawyers should educate their clients' executives and employees about the dispositive distinction between (1) describing the companies' or their own past actions or future intended actions (without attributing them to lawyers' advice), and (2) disclosing privileged communications' content. The former does not waive anything, while the latter waives privilege protection and may trigger a subject matter waiver. Next week's Privilege Point discusses subject matter waiver issues.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: MacFarlane v. Fivespice LLC, No. 3:16-cv-01721-HZ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68184 (D. Ore. May 4, 2017)
(holding that the privilege protected communications between defendant café's lawyer and a former employee, even though the former employee might have been adverse to the former employer café, and even though they met at the café; holding that the former employee waived privilege protection by disclosing the logistics of the meeting; "[T]he Court finds that Virgen's testimony did not constitute a voluntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege. It was unclear whether Virgen was stating that he had a hard time explaining himself to Defendant's attorney present at the deposition or whether he was referring to his prior conversation with Driscoll [Café's lawyer]. This statement is not equivalent to disclosing the substance of what he communicated to Driscoll. Virgen's statements regarding the circumstances of his conversation with Driscoll also do not waive the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-04 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: MacFarlane v. Fivespice LLC, No. 3:16-cv-01721-HZ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68184 (D. Ore. May 4, 2017)
(holding that the privilege protected communications between defendant café's lawyer and a former employee, even though the former employee might have been adverse to the former employer café, and even though they met at the café; also holding that the former employee's testimony that he had not disclosed to his lawyer some fact did not result in a waiver; "the Court agrees with Defendant that its counsel immediately objected to Plaintiff's attorney's question and that Virgen's single word response did not constitute a waiver. Defendant's attorney's timely objection constitutes a reasonable step to prevent and rectify inadvertent disclosure under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b). Accordingly, the Court finds that Virgen's disclosure did not operate as a waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-04 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Case No. 11-2684-JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26271 (D. Kan. Feb. 23, 2017)
("A party waives the attorney-client privilege if it discloses the substance of an otherwise-privileged communication. Comcast makes no serious argument that it did not waive privilege by its January 2017 production or by allowing Finnegan's recent testimony. Comcast does note that the judge in the Pennsylvania case affirmatively determined that he need not -- and did not -- decide the question of waiver, but that fact has no bearing on the waiver question which has now come before this court."; "Sprint also argues Finnegan's recent deposition testimony concerning Comcast's due diligence in acquiring defensive patents revealed attorney-client communications. Comcast (again) does not address this assertion in its response brief. The court agrees with Sprint."; "The court has little trouble concluding Comcast's recent disclosure of information in the Pennsylvania case waived the attorney-client privilege. Perhaps the more significant question, however, is the scope of the waiver. Sprint asserts the disclosures waive privilege for all 'information concerning the same subject matter.' Specifically, Sprint argues Comcast must produce all documents it possesses that (1) mention Sprint and concern 'Comcast's patent acquisition[s],' or (2) reflect 'the timing and nature of any Comcast employee's belief that Comcast was preparing for or otherwise anticipated litigation with Sprint.'"; "Comcast has asserted privilege over information on the same subjects, during both depositions and discovery responses. Fairness requires Comcast to disclose all documents on these two subjects 'in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence' in this case."; "The court therefore concludes Comcast waived privilege over, and must immediately produce, unredacted copies of all documents not previously produced that (1) mention Sprint and also Comcast's patent acquisitions or (2) reflect the timing and nature of any Comcast employee's belief that Comcast was preparing for or otherwise anticipated litigation with Sprint. As earlier indicated, Sprint has asked that such documents be produced to the court for in camera review. But as Comcast notes, caselaw requires the court to 'have some bases or grounds for conducting an in camera review.' Although the decision to review documents in camera is within the court's sound discretion, such review is not 'to be routinely undertaken.' The court finds no basis on which to conduct an in camera review over all the documents affected by Comcast's subject-matter waiver. Thus, at this time (though without foreclosing the future possibility if issues arise as to specific documents), the court declines to review any documents in camera.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-23 Federal KS

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Valenzuela v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. CV-15-01092-PHX-DGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176640 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2016)
("In contrast to these cases, the delay on which Plaintiffs rely with respect to Exhibits A and B was a matter of hours. Objections were made while the deposition was still underway. With respect to Exhibits D and E, a reservation of the privilege objection was immediately lodged and Plaintiffs' counsel stated that a later objection would be fine. Given these facts, the Court cannot conclude that Defendants delayed unreasonably in raising their privilege objections. Other cases have held that objections made during a deposition, even if after some questioning on privileged documents, do not waive the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-12-21 Federal AZ

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 14-CV-4717 (FB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164204 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2016)
(using Federal Rule of Evidence 502; holding that a Rule 502 order indicating that a litigant would not waive its privilege by producing privileged communications to the adversary did not allow the producing party to claw-back documents about which witness testified without an objection; "In 2015, pursuant to Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ('FRE'), the Court entered a protective order, which provides, among other things, that the parties will not 'waive[] or forfeit[] . . . any claim of privilege or work-product protection' by 'disclos[ing] or mak[ing] available information' that is 'later identified to be subject to [such a claim],' unless the producing party affirmatively uses that information in the litigation by 'motion, pleading or otherwise[.]'; "This Court thereafter construed the non-waiver provision in the protective order to provide that, regardless of the degree of care taken, a party does not waive its privilege merely by producing documents in discovery."; "By their terms, Rules 502(d) and (e) apply only to waiver in connection with disclosures, and say nothing of waiver by other means. Accordingly, while an appropriately worded protective order may prevent waiver due to a producing party's disclosure of privileged information, that party's subsequent failure to timely and specifically object to the use of that information -- during a deposition, for example -- can waive any applicable privilege."; "Amtrak has waived privilege and work-product protection for Exhibits 26 and 44 by failing to seek to preclude their introduction and use at the Noonan deposition. Though Amtrak is arguably correct that the protective order does not provide for waiver based on the mere disclosure of privileged information, nothing in the protective order speaks to the situation at issue here, where Amtrak failed to timely and specifically object to a party's use of privileged material. LMI introduced both exhibits at the Noonan deposition and questioned Noonan about them for several pages of transcript."; "That Amtrak removed Exhibit 26 from its privilege log after a detailed review also counsels in favor of finding waiver. This was no mere inadvertence at work, brought on by the constraints of high-volume document productions; to the contrary, Amtrak's decision to withdraw its claim of privilege for Exhibit 26 was an explicit waiver after considered legal analysis."; "Amtrak seems to argue that the non-waiver provision in the instant case permits the parties to assert and retract claims of privilege at will . . . but this goes too far. Case law and commentary make clear that Rule 502(d) was intended to make discovery issues relating to privilege and waiver more predictable, not insulate parties entirely from the possibility of waiver . . . Amtrak's reading of the non-waiver provision would yield an absurd result, permitting Amtrak to claw back documents, even those used by LMI in depositions and court filings, at any time -- conceivably, even through the close of litigation. The protective order, which was entered by this Court, does not countenance such gamesmanship.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-17 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Regions Bank v. Kaplan, Case No. 8:12-CV-1837-T-17MAP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65650 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2016)
(analyzing the following deposition questions and answers: "(Q) In speaking with Mr. Parrish, were you seeking legal advice? Again, not telling me what was talked about, but in speaking with him, were you seeking legal advice?"; "(A) No."; "(Q) Okay. What did Mr. Parrish tell you?"; "(A) He said -- I was telling him about the deal, and he said it sounded too good to be true."; finding that plaintiff sought protected legal advice; "Defendant Kaplan's brief testimony reveals the mental impression of the attorney Defendant Kaplan was consulting. In light of the overall purpose of the meeting, Defendant Kaplan's knowledge that Mr. Parrish was a lawyer, the fact that Defendant Kaplan was charged a fee for the meeting, what Mr. Parrish said in that meeting arguably constitutes legal advice rather than business advice."; "In the context of an attorney-client privilege issue arising at deposition, it is not unusual for an individual client to have an opinion different from his counsel as to the same communication. Given the context, with Defendant's counsel immediately interposing a privilege objection that overrides an individual's testimony, the Court views the objection as providing appropriate guidance on an arguable issue.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-18 Federal FL

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., Case No. 14cv1158 BAS (JLB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12420 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016)
("[T]he Court's Civil Chambers Rules do not require counsel to call Chambers when a privilege dispute arises during a deposition. The parties may call Chambers, but they are not required to do so.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-02 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., Case No. 14cv1158 BAS (JLB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12420 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016)
(analyzing defendant's instructions to various witnesses not to answer deposition questions; "During Chris Bennett's September 2, 2015 deposition, Plaintiffs asked the witness, "As you sit here today as General Manager of Real Estate Solutions for CoreLogic, does CoreLogic have a position with respect to whether or not metadata for photographs uploaded through its software should be preserved?'. . . 'I want to caution the witness with respect to the disclosure of attorney-client communications, but the witness can answer the question with that in mind.'. . . Mr. Bennett then responded, 'Other than what I've been told by legal counsel, I have no knowledge.'"; "Plaintiffs' Motion is denied on the basis it would be improper for Mr. Bennett, who was noticed for deposition in his individual capacity and not as a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of CoreLogic."; "It may have been proper for Mr. Bennett to answer the questions, 'Do you believe CoreLogic has a position with respect to whether or not metadata for photographs uploaded through its software should be preserved?'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-02 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Terrell v. Central Washington Asphalt, Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv-00142-APG-VCF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94047 (D. Nev. July 20, 2015)
("The CW defendants allowed questioning about the draft answers at the Simon and Davis depositions without any objection based on a privilege, even though the Rule 26(b)(5)(B) letter was mailed the day of the Simon deposition and the day before the Davis deposition. The CW defendants' counsel also questioned Davis on the draft answers. As a result, the CW defendants waived any privilege relating to the draft answers.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-20 Federal NV

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd., Consolidated Civ. A. No. 12-11935-PBS, Civ. A. No. 12-12326-PBS, Civ. A. No. 12-12330-PBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68281 (D. Mass. May 27, 2015)
("Kuo chose to disclose information about Epistar's communications with Finnegan (1) in a deposition (2) in the presence of a Finnegan attorney (3) after speaking to a Finnegan attorney about whether the questions implicated privilege. All of these circumstances indicate that Epistar did not intend to keep these communications private.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-05-27 Federal MA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 13 Civ. 816 (WHP) (GWG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63168 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014)
(holding that disclosing privileged communication in a deposition caused a waiver; "In addition, even if defendants had shown that the communications between Smyres and Mooney were privileged, Smyres waived the privilege by testifying repeatedly and without objection about those conversations."; "The selective disclosure waiver doctrine is reflected in Rule 502(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence."; "Here, the requirements of a Rule 502(a) waiver are satisfied. First, Smyres 'intentional[ly]' disclosed privileged information when he testified at his deposition about the communications that he had with Mooney regarding the Disclosure.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-07 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 13 Civ. 816 (WHP) (GWG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63168 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014)
(holding that disclosing privileged communication in a deposition caused a waiver)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-07 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Gardner v. Major Automobile Co., Inc., 11 Civ. 1664 (FB) (VMS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44877 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2014)
(addressing a general counsel's testimony as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness that he relied on an outside lawyer, but noting the defendant's disclaimer of any reliance on advice of counsel defense in finding that there had not been waiver; "Defendants counter that whatever Defendant Keltz's [General Counsel] deposition testimony, Defendants have no intention of asserting an advice-of-counsel defense or similar claim in this action such that Plaintiffs' allegation of an at-issue waiver is wrong. . . . Instead, Defendants explain that Defendant 'Major's defense here is that they did nothing wrong.'"; "Defendants' representation regarding its approach to this litigation is integral to the resolution of this dispute, and the Court finds no implied privilege waiver here in light of Defendants' representation. . . . Defendants' representation in this case that they will make no reliance defense assures . . . . Plaintiffs will not be disadvantaged before any factfinder by a lack of information relating to this topic.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-31 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168187, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013)
("[T]his is a classic case in which the defendants seek to use privilege both as a sword and a shield and thus implicitly have waived any privilege that might have existed in other circumstances. By producing the Fajardo [member of legal team in underlying suit] email, discussing the January 15 Assembly meeting and vote at the sanctions hearing, by exploring the same subject during the trial testimony of Javier Piaguaje [defendant], by their motion for reconsideration of the sanctions ruling, and by their stated intention to offer testimony of Humberto Piaguaje [witness] and part of the minutes on the same subject, defendants have placed in issue exactly what happened on that occasion.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-21 Federal NY B 5/14

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: United States v. Moazzeni, Case No. 3:12CR45-HEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171240, at *31 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2012)
("[D]uring the 2009 hearing, Moazzeni described Krumbein's advice, complaining that Krumbein 'forced' him to seek a Chapter 13. While Moazzeni characterizes this as mere 'criticism' of Krumbein, that is an overgeneralization. By his description of the events, he has disclosed that Krumbein advised him to seek a Chapter 13 conversion. This is sufficient to waive the privilege as to Krumbein's advice during and leading up to those proceedings.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-03 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: United States v. Moazzeni, Case No. 3:12CR45-HEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171240, at *30-31, *31 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 2012)
(holding that a defendant waived the privilege by blaming his lawyer for alleged bankruptcy fraud; "While Moazzeni did not disclose any particular communication with Krumbein, he has several times disclosed such communications generally. When he asserts that Krumbein 'forced' him to seek conversion to Chapter 13, he is describing Krumbein's advice."; "[D]uring the 2009 hearing, Moazzeni described Krumbein's advice, complaining that Krumbein 'forced' him to seek a Chapter 13. While Moazzeni characterizes this as mere 'criticism' of Krumbein, that is an overgeneralization. By his description of the events, he has disclosed that Krumbein advised him to seek a Chapter 13 conversion. This is sufficient to waive the privilege as to Krumbein's advice during and leading up to those proceedings.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-03 Federal VA B 5/13

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 1:09 cv 1185 WSD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181853, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2012)
("[A]ssuming the communications between Torres, Worms, and Plaintiff's counsel were protected, the Court finds that Plaintiff waived the protections provided by the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege regarding their investigators' knowledge and notes by intentionally and selectively introducing testimony by Torres and Worms in their pleadings during this litigation regarding (i) how the information in the Amended Complaint was collected, (ii) how it was communicated to Plaintiff's counsel, and (iii) what Plaintiff's investigators communicated to Plaintiff's counsel before the Amended Complaint was drafted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-19 Federal GA B 9/13

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 247 (E.D. Va. 2012)
("Lawson waived its privilege during the depositions of Mr. Christopherson, Mr. Hager, and Mr. Lohkamp."; "The record thus establishes that Lawson has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the communications from Lawson's attorneys to Lawson concerning the development of RQC because it has allowed extensive, detailed questions on that subject." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: Chase v. City of Portsmouth, 236 F.R.D. 263, 268-69 (E.D. Va. 2006)
("Whitehurst informed the other Council Members and the City Attorney as well as some persons who were not among the original recipients of the letter that he was going to reveal some of the contents of the letter more than twenty-four hours in advance. In the email, Whitehurst included passages from the letter, indicated what he was going to say at the meeting, and disputed the conclusions made by the City Attorney in the letter. At the public meeting, Whitehurst read statements from the letter and not one Council Member nor the City Attorney attempted to stop hi, cut him off, or otherwise note that the information was supposed to be privileged and confidential. '[I]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege . . ., he must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality . . . . Taking or failing to take precautions may be considered as bearing on intent.' FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991). Despite the City's arguments that Whitehurst cannot alone waive the privilege for the City, the Council Members and the City Attorney should have acted to at least try and prevent the disclosure of the contents of the letter. Whether Whitehurst quoted from only two footnotes or not, the failure to object to his statements either before or at the meeting is highly prejudicial to the City's position on the existence of privilege. . . . An objection would have been a reasonable step to ensure confidentiality. Absent any such attempt, the Court cannot allow the defendants to shield this letter under the doctrine of attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.305
Case Name: In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.307
Case Name: International Cards Co., Ltd. v. MasterCard International Inc., 13-CV-02576 (LGS) (SN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125370 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014)
("The next two sentences describe the substance of the two letters drafted by the Legal Department. While these sentences may constitute legal advice and thus may be privileged, the Court finds that MasterCard has waived any potential privilege. In the redacted version of Document 645 that MasterCard produced to ICC, MasterCard did not redact any text from the 'Actions Planned and Timeline' section of the October 26, 2012 entry on page M0102062. The first action point contains identical information regarding the substance of the two letters drafted by the Legal Department that MasterCard seeks to redact in Document 246. Thus, while the attorney-client privilege may apply here, it has been waived by MasterCard's disclosure of the communication to ICC.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-27 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.307
Case Name: Heglet v. City of Hays, Case No. 13-2228-KHV/KGG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35738, at *4, *7 8 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2014)
(holding that the defendant city waived its attorney-client privilege by producing notes regarding a discussion with a lawyer, because the notes reflected the substance of the conversation, not just the fact of the conversation; "The referenced document that had been placed in Plaintiff's personnel file and voluntarily produced in discovery was titled 'Time Line With Firma' and included an entry for May 10, 2012, written by Defendant Scheibler, which stated in part: 'I was contacted . . . by Peter Maharry and was questioned about an affidavit that Firma had signed in the Dryden lawsuit. . . . . I spoke with [attorney] John Bird and he agreed with concerns about confidentiality. John Bird spoke with Peter and then called me back and he stated that the City would be justified in moving forward.'. . . . The time line also indicates that Scheibler met with John Bird the next day and confirmed that Bird was 'ok' with Defendant City terminating Plaintiff's employment."; "The Court finds that the disclosure in this case included the substance of the attorney's conclusions. Although the time line entry is brief, there is a substantive recitation of the legal advice given to Defendants. . . . The entry indicates that Scheibler spoke with counsel regarding 'concerns about confidentiality,' and counsel agreed. . . . Counsel also told Scheibler that 'the City would be justified in moving forward.'. . . This is not a simple disclosure that a consultation was obtained, but reveals the legal advice rendered. Thus, Defendants voluntary waived the privilege as a result of producing this document in this case, and the Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED on that basis.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-19 Federal KS B 8/14

Chapter: 26.307
Case Name: Samaritan Alliance, LLC v. Ken. (In re Samaritan Alliance), Case No. 07-50735, Adv. No. 12-5009, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 671, at *10 (E.D. Ken. Feb. 20, 2013)
("A party's failure to object to the use of a disclosed document as a deposition exhibit supports a finding of waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-02-20 Federal KY B 2/14

Chapter: 26.307
Case Name: Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Case No. 1:10cv00037, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89403, at *12-13 (W.D. Va. June 28, 2012)
("Even assuming for the purpose of this Motion that these documents contained privileged information, any privilege was waived by their production to a third party. See Front Royal Ins. Co. v. Gold Players, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 252, 257-58 (W.D.Va. 1999); see also In re Grand Jury 83-2, 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-06-28 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.308
Case Name: Young v. Chapman, Civ. A. No. 3:14-CV-666-JHM-CHL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56409 (W.D. Ky. April 28, 2016)
("In this case, Chapman voluntarily disclosed the contents of the so-called arbitration documents when, in response to discovery requests, he produced some of the documents, including a summary of the privileged matter, the recorded statement. Any argument by Chapman that this disclosure was inadvertent is unavailing, as Chapman did not notify Young of any purportedly erroneous disclosure or take steps to rectify an error. The Court finds that Chapman impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege attached to the recorded statement and that it would be manifestly unfair to Young were the Court not to require Chapman to produce the statement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-04-28 Federal KY

Chapter: 26.310
Case Name: Monco v. Zoltek Corp., No. 17 C 6882, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117940 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2018)
(analyzing the common interest doctrine application and work product issues in a law firm's lawsuit to collect its fees from a former client; focusing on communications between defendant's founder and another company with whom the founder negotiated a transfer of the patent to the founder; "Like most contract negotiations, the negotiation between Mr. Rumy [Defendant's founder] and Toray Industries [Other company] for the transfer of the patent is are not privileged. They are akin to a game of Texas Hold 'Em, insofar as there are flop, turn, and river cards -- face up -- and hole cards -- face down. The face up cards here are the questions and comments from Toray Industries and the attach draft agreement from Mr. Rumy. Ordinarily, even if those items revealed legal advice, any privilege that might attach to them would be waived as, obviously, they weren't kept confidential. The 'common interest doctrine,' which Zoltek Corporation insists is applicable here, is not.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-16 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: Fifth Third Bancorp v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, Case No. 1:14-cv-869, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70639 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2017)
("[T]he Underwriters are not entitled to any information relating to Suspicious Activity Reports ('SARs') that Fifth Third may have filed concerning Ross, because Fifth Third is prohibited from disclosing that type of information under the Annuzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (the 'Act'). Under the Act and corresponding regulations, banks "are prohibited from disclosing either that [a] SAR has been filed or the information contained therein.'"; "There is no exception for disclosure of an SAR 'in the context of discovery in a civil lawsuit.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-09 Federal OH

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 14-CV-7126 (JMF), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158455 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016)
(analyzing but not reaching any conclusions about whether disclosure to the CFTC waived work product protection; acknowledging the effect of specific statutes covering some disclosure to bank regulators; "[T]here is no dispute that many of the materials sought by Defendants' lawyers in connection with the government investigations – constitute work product. Nor is there any contention that Defendants waived the protections of the doctrine by disclosing materials to the FRB, OCC, or DFS, their 'prudential' regulators, as the Financial Services and Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 explicitly provides, in relevant part, that submission 'of any information to . . . any Federal banking agency, State bank supervisor, or foreign banking authority for any purpose in the course of any supervisory or regulatory process of such . . . agency, supervisor, or authority shall not be construed as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege such person may claim with respect to such information under Federal or State law as to any person or entity other than such . . . agency, supervisor, or authority.' 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x)(1). (See Docket No. 290, at 9).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-16 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 14-CV-7126 (JMF), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158455 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016)
(analyzing but not reaching any conclusions about whether disclosure to the CFTC waived work product protection; acknowledging the effect of specific statutes covering some disclosure to bank regulators; "[T]here is no dispute that many of the materials sought by Defendants' lawyers in connection with the government investigations – constitute work product. Nor is there any contention that Defendants waived the protections of the doctrine by disclosing materials to the FRB, OCC, or DFS, their 'prudential' regulators, as the Financial Services and Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 explicitly provides, in relevant part, that submission 'of any information to . . . any Federal banking agency, State bank supervisor, or foreign banking authority for any purpose in the course of any supervisory or regulatory process of such . . . agency, supervisor, or authority shall not be construed as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege such person may claim with respect to such information under Federal or State law as to any person or entity other than such . . . agency, supervisor, or authority.' 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x)(1). (See Docket No. 290, at 9).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-16 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: United States v. Heine, Case No. 3:15-cr-00238-SI-2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44397, at *33 34 (D. Ore. Mar. 31, 2016)
("The Bank responds that any disclosures made to the FDIC do not waive the attorney-client privilege because such disclosures are statutorily protected. The Court agrees based on 12 U.S.C. § 1828. . . . In addition, the FDIC may share otherwise privileged information with other federal government agencies without waiving any applicable privilege. . . . Thus, any statements made by the Bank to the FDIC or any documents provided by the Bank to the FDIC cannot constitute a waiver of the Bank's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-31 Federal OR B 8/16

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: In Re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-8015, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14721 (1st Cir App. Aug. 21, 2015)
(finding that the protection for SARS documents did not apply, because the documents were already in the public domain, and only listed transactions; "Against this backdrop, a body of district court caselaw has emerged, examining the scope of the protections emanating from the Act and related regulations. District courts have extrapolated from the statute and regulations 'an unqualified discovery and evidentiary privilege that . . . cannot be waived.'. . . The trickier task for the district courts has been to define the universe of documents encompassed by this 'privilege.'"; explaining that "[o]ther categories of documents are not shielded, including 'documents produced in the ordinary course of business pertaining to the defendants' banking activities, transactions, and accounts' that do not suggest the existence of a SAR."; "That position is consistent with the regulation quoted above, and other courts have drawn similar distinctions between SARs and supporting documentation."; "[I]t would appear that neither the Act nor the regulations restrict third parties -- that is, parties on neither the financial-institution side nor the government side of a SAR exchange -- from disclosing the existence or non-existence of a particular SAR."; "It is undisputed among the parties that, through a series of events we need not limn, the SAR to which the relevant documents relate was placed into the public record via court filings in prior litigation and that electronic versions of the SAR reside on the internet. As such, even assuming applicability of the Act and regulations, it is doubtful that the name plaintiffs are even capable of exposing the SAR to view or making it known or public because, right or wrong, the SAR already has been exposed to view and has been made public by other actors."; "[B]oth relevant agencies and some courts have suggested that the 'privilege' extends, not just to the SAR itself and documents expressly stating the existence of a SAR, but also to documents that indirectly suggest the existence or non-existence of a SAR. For current purposes, the court will assume the correctness of that position. Even so, Chase's claim of privilege would fail. First, the vast majority of the allegedly privileged documents in this case feature only lists and descriptions of transactions. . . . That leaves the narrow sliver of the fifty-five pages featuring non-transactional information. Under the existing law and guidance previously described, the key query is whether any of those documents suggest, directly or indirectly, that a SAR was or was not filed. . . . Careful de novo in camera review of the documents reveals that none of them do. For example, none of the documents at issue constitute a draft SAR, and none of the documents reflect the decision-making process as to whether a SAR should be filed, the process of preparing a SAR, or an attempt to explain the content of a SAR post-filing.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-04-21 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: Lesti v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 297 F.R.D. 665, 668 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
("The Court will require Wells Fargo to produce all business records made in the ordinary course of business, in its possession, custody or control relating to Fuchs' [third party] accounts including, but not limited to, correspondence, e-mails, facsimiles, account statements, wire transfer records, cancelled checks, deposit slips, and other documents of these types related to Fuchs' accounts only. Wells Fargo shall not produce documents representing drafts of SARs [suspicious activity reports] or other work product or privileged communications that relate to the SAR itself or internal memorandum prepared as part of a financial institution's process for complying with federal reporting requirements. If the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine applies, then Wells Fargo must produce a privilege log.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal FL B 8/14

Chapter: 26.402
Case Name: Lesti v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 297 F.R.D. 665, 667 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
("'[S]upporting documentation' giving rise to a SAR [suspicious activity report] that is generated or received in the ordinary course of business is discoverable." (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-01 Federal FL B 8/14

Chapter: 26.403
Case Name: Gordon v. Newspaper Assoc. of Am., 51 Va. Cir. 183, 187, 188 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
("Next, the court considers plaintiff's argument that Media General waived the attorney-client privilege by disclosures made in both a letter authored by Media General's representative from the National Employer's Council and written to the VEC and in McDonald's testimony at the VEC hearing. Defendant maintains that the court should not ponder at all the information included in that material as the VEC received the information during a proceeding before that agency."; "The statute unambiguously precludes the use of the letter written to the VEC and the admission of McDonald's testimony in this proceeding for the purpose of considering a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the court rejects plaintiff's arguments with regard to any waiver effected by that material.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.502
Case Name: RMS of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Shea-Kiewit Joint Venture, Case No. 13-CV-1071, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74425, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2015)
July 29, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Does Sharing Work Product with the Government Always Waive that Protection?"

For decades, companies trying to cooperate with the government have hoped for a change in the general rule that disclosing privileged communications and/or work product to the government waives those protections. In nearly every case, disclosing attorney-client privileged communications to the government waives that fragile protection. But in the work product context, courts sometimes take a more forgiving view.

In RMS of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Shea-Kiewit Joint Venture, Case No. 13-CV-1071, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74425, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2015), plaintiff RMS disclosed work product to the FBI, "in cooperation with the FBI's investigation of the defendants." The court contrasted this situation with settings where such a disclosure generally waives work product protection: when the disclosing company and the government "are adversaries," and when the company "voluntarily submitted the information to a government agency to incite it to attack the [company's] adversary." Id. The court found that RMS did not waive its work product protection — because the company's "interests were aligned" with the FBI, which was "pursuing an investigation of the defendants on the same issue that RMS is now litigating in this suit." Id. At *4.

In most situations, corporations dealing with the government must treat it as an adversary. But in certain very limited circumstances, corporations and the government share a sufficiently common interest that the former can disclose work product to the latter without waiving that robust protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-09 Federal WI
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: Hunton & Williams LLP v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Civ. A. No. 15-1203 (RC), Civ. A. No. 15-1207 (RC), Civ. A. No. 15-1208 (RC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48907 (D.D.C. March 31, 2017)
("[C]ourts in this district have recognized that the attorney-client privilege may apply between counsel for different agencies.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-03-31 Federal DC

Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: United States v. Heine, Case No. 3:15-cr-00238-SI-2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Ore. March 31, 2016)
(rejecting a former Bank executive's effort to obtain privileged Bank documents in his criminal proceeding; holding that the Bank had not waived its privilege by providing facts to the FBI, or by disclosing protected documents to bank regulators; "The Bank also asserts that several of Yates's requests seek large amounts to documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, which the Bank does not waive."; "Unlike the voluntary disclosure of the Report and Back-up Materials in Bergonzi [United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003)], the Bank produced to the FBI, or in response to grand jury subpoenas, only non-privileged information. Because the information provided to the FBI or the grand jury did not contain the Bank's confidential attorney-client communications, the Bank has not waived its attorney-client privilege."; "The Bank responds that any disclosures made to the FDIC do not waive the attorney-client privilege because such disclosures are statutorily protected. The Court agrees based on 12 U.S.C. § 1828."; "In addition, the FDIC may share otherwise privileged information with other federal government agencies without waiving any applicable privilege. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(t). Thus, any statements made by the Bank to the FDIC or any documents provided by the Bank to the FDIC cannot constitute a waiver of the Bank's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-31 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: United States v. Heine, Case No. 3:15-cr-00238-SI-2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Ore. March 31, 2016)
(rejecting a former Bank executive's effort to obtain privileged Bank documents in his criminal proceeding; holding that the Bank had not waived its privilege by providing facts to the FBI, or by disclosing protected documents to bank regulators; "The Bank also asserts that several of Yates's requests seek large amounts to documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, which the Bank does not waive."; "Unlike the voluntary disclosure of the Report and Back-up Materials in Bergonzi [United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003)], the Bank produced to the FBI, or in response to grand jury subpoenas, only non-privileged information. Because the information provided to the FBI or the grand jury did not contain the Bank's confidential attorney-client communications, the Bank has not waived its attorney-client privilege."; "The Bank responds that any disclosures made to the FDIC do not waive the attorney-client privilege because such disclosures are statutorily protected. The Court agrees based on 12 U.S.C. § 1828."; "In addition, the FDIC may share otherwise privileged information with other federal government agencies without waiving any applicable privilege. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(t). Thus, any statements made by the Bank to the FDIC or any documents provided by the Bank to the FDIC cannot constitute a waiver of the Bank's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-31 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: Hoffman v. City & Cnty. of S.F., Case No. 4:11-cv-4016 CW (KAW), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77076, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2013)
(finding that sending privileged communications to other government employees did not waive the privilege; "[T]he fact that members of the Civil Service Commission and the City's Human Resources department were also recipients of the documents sent to the City Attorney's office does not render the documents unprivileged, because these individuals were the employees of the City that could have been seeking legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-05-31 Federal CA B 4/14

Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: Rein v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2009)
("Nor is there any support for R&HW's assertion that attorney-client privilege was waived through disclosure to a third party. . . . The DOJ attorney's e-mail was then forwarded to several employees within the USPTO, who appear to offer their view and opinion on what the USPTO's position should be. Nothing in the e-mail discussion support R&HW's assertion that the redacted information in the e-mails was ever communicated to anyone outside the USPTO.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.503
Case Name: Rein v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2009)
("Nor is there any support for R&HW's assertion that attorney-client privilege was waived through disclosure to a third party. . . . [T]he DOJ attorney is seeking the USPTO's opinion on what the DOJ's position on a particular issue should be. The DOJ attorney's e-mail was then forwarded to several employees within the USPTO, who appear to offer their view and opinion on what the USPTO's position should be. Nothing in the e-mail discussion support R&HW's assertion that the redacted information in the e-mails was ever communicated to anyone outside the USPTO.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), No. 17-4183, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17613 (4th Cir. App. June 27, 2018)
("The Fraud Section and EDVa each agree that it will not assert that the disclosure of any Protected Information by [Doe] provides the Fraud Section or EDVa with additional grounds to subpoena other privileged materials from [X Corp. and its directors] or [Doe] although any grounds that exist apart from such disclosure shall remain unaffected by this agreement."; "The Government concedes that the Agreement precludes it from seeking additional information not disclosed in the interview."; "Applying these principles, we conclude that the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges as to the Government. Holding otherwise would require us to discount the plain language of the Agreement's First Clause, which expressly reserves those privileges. The Government argues that, because the Agreement's Second Clause permits the Government to share the information it received from Doe with third parties in carrying out its responsibilities, the First Clause cannot mean what it says. Instead, the Government contends, the First Clause provides a basis for X Corp. to assert privilege only against third parties. We find nothing in the Agreement or the law to support such a construction."; "[H]ere, the First Clause prevents that result; it preserves X Corp.'s privileges, at least as to the Government, even if Doe disclosed the information in the interview and even if the Government in turn disclosed it to a third party."; "In essence, the Agreement maintains the status quo regarding X Corp.'s privileges. It nullifies the effect of both Doe's initial disclosure of privileged information and the Government's later disclosure of the same information on X Corp.'s ability to assert privilege against the Government. As a result, X Corp. may assert privilege here as if Doe had never disclosed the information in the first instance."; "Construing the Agreement to preserve X Corp.'s privileges also serves important policy considerations. Cooperation between private entities and the Government furthers the truth-finding process. Such negotiations 'give potential defendants an opportunity to explain away suspicious circumstances, give the government an opportunity to avoid embarrassing and wasteful mistakes, and give the public a greater likelihood of a just result.'. . . Declining to hold the Government to the terms of an agreement it struck would discourage private entities from cooperating with the Government in the future."; explaining that the court need not decide whether a third party could claim there had been a waiver; "We do not decide whether the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges vis-à-vis a third party to whom the Government disclosed information from Doe's interview, as that is not the question before us. For the same reason, we find inapposite the cases the Government cites involving attempts by third parties to access information a company shared with the government under a confidentiality agreement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: Peterson v. Porter, No. 3:16-cv-01955-PK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101935 (D. Ore. June 19, 2018)
(finding that disclosure of privileged documents to the state bar waived privilege protection; "I agree with the parties that Plaintiff has waived his attorney-client privilege as to the 80-plus pages of documents he submitted to the OSB, which include documents related to Sarre's and McIntosh's criminal defense of Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff waived his attorney-client privilege as to these documents, I grant Defendants' request for documents related to Plaintiff's alleged original invoices and receipts for the Teed remodeling project, and to Sarre's alleged loss of those original records.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-19 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Banc of California Securities Litigation, SA CV 17-00118-AG (DFMx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87477 (C.D.C. May 23, 2018)
(holding that oral communications by Wilmer Hale lawyers to the SEC waived privilege and work product protection; "The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, which can be briefly summarized. On October 18, 2016, a website posted an article by an anonymous writer that alleged that there were financial ties between Banc's then-CEO Sugarman and Jason Galanis, a convicted white-collar criminal. The article set in motion a chain of events that ultimately caused Banc's auditor, KPMG US LLP, to send a Section 10A letter demanding that Banc conduct an investigation. Banc created a Special Committee of its Board of Directors, which in turn hired Wilmer Hale. The investigation conducted by Wilmer Hale included interviews of 15 individuals. Wilmer Hale presented its findings to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Later, at the SEC's request, Wilmer Hale provided the SEC with oral summaries of its 15 interviews.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-05-23 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: SEC v. Herrera, Case No. 17-20301-CIV/LENARD/GOODMAN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200142 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2017)
(analyzing the work product waiver impact of Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation and "oral download" to the SEC of the results of its investigation into inventory accounting errors in a client's Brazilian subsidiary; concluding that Morgan Lewis's oral download to the SEC of witness interview content waived work product protection, and triggered a subject matter waiver as to those witnesses; also concluding that Morgan Lewis's PowerPoint presentation to the SEC only disclosed historical facts, and therefore did not deserve work product protection – so its disclosure to the government did not trigger a waiver; "The SEC also asked for the investigative findings, and ML provided the SEC with information about its findings, including a presentation prepared for the SEC and information about specific witness interviews, which were provided orally. An April 15, 2013 PowerPoint presentation that ML made to the SEC contained, among other things, an events timeline, the names of witnesses whom ML had already interviewed, a breakdown of the transactions deemed to be at the heart of the accounting discrepancy, and the results of its investigation. This 28-page PowerPoint presentation is now in the public record of this lawsuit, as Defendants filed it as an exhibit to their motion.";"On October 29, 2013, ML attorneys met with SEC staff and provided oral downloads of 12 witness interviews."; ". . . Although ML provided the SEC with oral downloads of only 12 witness interviews, it provided Deloitte with information about all the interviews notes and memoranda. It appears as though this was accomplished through the reading (by an ML attorney) of memoranda and interview notes to Deloitte and generalized 'access' to review interview notes selected by Deloitte's investigative team."; "There is no dispute here that the notes and memoranda prepared by ML attorneys are in fact work product material. Rather, the dispute is over the waiver of the work-product doctrine protection."; ""ML does not contend that it provided only vague references of the witness notes and memoranda to the SEC, nor does it argue that only detail-free conclusions or general impressions were orally provided. To the contrary, it factually concedes that its attorneys provided oral downloads of the substance of the 12 witness interview notes and memos."; "ML also argues that Defendants' claim -- that they seek to "level the playing field" -- is an argument which "rings hollow" because "the SEC does not have what the Defendants are seeking.". . But that is an incomplete argument. Yes, it is true that the SEC does not have the actual witness notes and memoranda -- but it has the functional equivalent of them by receiving the oral summaries of the interview materials."; "ML waived work-product protection for the witnesses whose interview notes and memoranda its attorneys disclosed to the SEC in the so-called 'oral downloads.' Defendants advise that 'at least twelve' interview memos were orally relayed . . . so the Undersigned is using that number, as well. If it turns out that ML provided information to the SEC about other witness interviews besides the 12 already identified, then it shall disclose to Defendants the additional notes and memoranda. ML shall provide the notes and memoranda within 7 days of this Order."; "Because there is little or no substantive distinction for waiver purposes between the actual physical delivery of the work product notes and memoranda and reading or orally summarizing the same written material's meaningful substance to one's legal adversary, the Undersigned concludes that the Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP law firm ('ML') waived work product protection and must provide to Defendants the interview notes and memoranda that were orally downloaded. To that extent, the Undersigned grants Defendants' motion to compel against ML. . . . The waiver, however, is limited to only the witnesses whose interview notes and memoranda were orally provided, which is far less than all the witnesses ML interviewed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-05 Federal FL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. A. No. 17-2336 (BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186420 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017)
December 27, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Trump-Related Circuit Court Decision Includes Troubling Waiver Analysis"

Because historical facts do not deserve privilege protection, disclosing those facts does not trigger a privilege waiver. Thus, disclosing historical facts to the government should not waive the disclosing client's privilege protection for communications with her lawyer about those facts.

But some decisions take a different, troubling, approach. In In re Grand Jury Investigation, Misc. A. No. 17-2336 (BAH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186420 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2017), the court ordered former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort's lawyer to testify before a grand jury. In addition to applying the crime-fraud exception, the court held that the lawyer waived her clients' privilege protection by making representations about historical facts in submissions to the DOJ. The court noted that the lawyer's submissions "made specific factual representations to DOJ that are unlikely to have originated from sources other than [Manafort and a colleague], and, in large part, were explicitly attributed to one or both [of their] recollections." Id. at *32. The court relied on this unsurprising circumstance in holding that the representations "impliedly waived the privilege as to [the clients'] communications with [their lawyer] to the extent that these communications related to the . . . Submissions' contents." Id.

A lawyer's disclosure of historical facts should not strip away privilege protection from the lawyer's communications with her client about those facts.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-02 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: SEC v. Roberts, No. C 07-04580 MHP, 254 F.R.D. 371, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64615 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017)
(analyzing Howrey's disclosures to its corporate client's board of directors and to the government about the results of its internal corporate investigation; explaining that Howrey carefully limited its disclosure in some circumstances to historical facts, but in other circumstances answered questions about privileged communications Howrey had with witnesses; "The court now turns to whether the information orally provided effectuated a waiver, and if so, the scope of the waiver."; "Howrey vehemently maintains that other than the documentary disclosures made during the presentations, Howrey's oral disclosures were limited to confirming specific factual information contained in the PowerPoint presentation or underlying source documents, as well as responding to specific questions about what certain witnesses said about those non-privileged documents. It contends the answers regarding the witnesses were limited to facts and did not reveal the attorneys' thoughts or mental impressions. Specifically, it contends the presentation described the scope and methodology of the investigation while highlighting key unprivileged documents and emails to set forth the underlying facts regarding problematic stock option grants."; "Indeed, other than the Board meeting minutes outlined above there is no evidence of Howrey conclusions and analysis being revealed. Further, the fact that Howrey took meticulous precautions to create a presentation based only on non-privileged documents lends credibility to Howrey's assertion."; "Nevertheless, Howrey did answer the Board's and the government's questions during the presentations as to what certain witnesses said during their interview. Howrey claims to have done so without referring to the notes, reviewing them prior to the presentation or bringing the notes to the presentation. There is evidence, however, that Howrey attorneys referred to their interview notes prior to some other communications with the government. There is evidence of this with respect to at least four witnesses. . . . Howrey attorneys referred to the interview notes when answering the government's questions. Specifically, they verified certain factual information regarding what the witnesses Radke, Snook and Koopman had told the Howrey attorneys. . . . The information disclosed in the e-mails regarding Radke, Snook and Koopman, however, only disclose the witness' factual assertions, not the attorneys' mental impressions or conclusions. Indeed, there is no evidence that Howrey volunteered the substance of its impressions and opinions regarding the witness interviews. It simply answered factual questions posed by the government regarding the witnesses."; "Here, factors weighing in favor of disclosure are: (1) reference to the interview notes before releasing factual information to the government; (2) an 'admission' that the substance of the interviews was disclosed; and (3) alleged disclosure, without evidentiary support, of the attorneys' conclusions and analysis during the multiple presentations made by Howrey's attorneys where they discussed improprieties and erroneous option grants. On the other hand, factors weighing against disclosure are: (1) when questioned, Howrey attorneys only revealed specific facts from the interviews, not their mental impressions and opinions nor did they reveal the questions asked of the witnesses and answers given; (2) reference to the interview notes were made only to confirm or deny facts; (3) the vagueness of the purposed admission; (4) the attenuated nature of the attorneys' conclusion from their interview notes; (5) the availability of the witnesses to Mr. Roberts to interview for himself; and (6) disclosure, if any, was indirect. Weighing the circumstances, the court does not find a waiver of the privileges with respect to meeting notes pertaining to individuals for whom there is no evidence of disclosure.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-22 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: Roberts v. Clark County School District, Case No. 2:15-cv-00388-JAD-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60995 (D. Nev. May 9, 2016)
(holding that disclosing privileged documents to the EEOC waived the attorney-client privilege, but not the work product doctrine; "Applying these principles the court finds that many of the documents CCSD has withheld on the grounds of attorney-client privilege are not privileged or that CCSD has waived any potential privilege by voluntarily disclosing the advice of its counsel relied upon to support its good-faith defense in this case. It is undisputed that CCSD disclosed some of the documents withheld in its privileged document logs to the EEOC in its response to Plaintiff's administrative claims. CCSD relied upon legal advice of in-house counsel and conveyed that legal advice to the EEOC to explain and justify its decision to deny Roberts' use of the men's restroom associated with his gender identity. Although counsel for CCSD argues that CCSD is not relying on the advice of counsel as a defense to this action, CCSD disclosed the advice of counsel to the EEOC to support its claim that its actions with respect to Bradley were justified and complied with existing law. CCSD has also asserted an affirmative good-faith defense in its answer which claims its actions were justified and complied with existing law.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-09 Federal NV

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1566, Base Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61371 (D. Nev. May 5, 2016)
(finding that Dynegy waived its privilege protection by giving the federal government documents about a gas price fixing investigation, but did not waive its work product protection; "The Ninth Circuit has plainly held that a party may not selectively waive the attorney-client privilege. It has held that voluntary disclosure to one waives the attorney-client privilege as to the world at large. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012). There, the court noted that only the Eighth Circuit had adopted the selective waiver doctrine in its decision in Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Id. at 1127. Every other circuit to have addressed the issue had rejected the doctrine of selective waiver. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the selective waiver theory finding that, if it was 'to unmoor a privilege from its underlying justification' it would be failing to construe the privilege narrowly.' Id. at 1128. It observed that since the Eighth Circuit decided Diversified, there had been multiple legislative attempts to adopt the theory of selective waiver which had failed. Id. It cited the report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and portions of the Congressional Record in which Congress declined to adopt a new privilege to protect disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government. Id. As Congress had declined to broadly adopt a new privilege protecting disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government, the Ninth Circuit also declined to do so. Id.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-05 Federal NV

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1566, Base Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61371 (D. Nev. May 5, 2016)
(finding that Dynegy waived its privilege protection by giving the federal government documents about a gas price fixing investigation, but did not waive its work product protection; "Here, the declaration of counsel supporting the opposition indicates that the DOJ, CFTC and FERC served formal and informal demands for documents and information. The DOJ served a subpoena on Dynegy in May 2002, to testify before a grand jury. As a result, Dynegy hired two outside firms to conduct internal investigations to assist Dynegy in complying with the government demand for information and documents. Dynegy's counsel interviewed employees, summarized the interviews of these employees, analyzed the information gathered to provide legal advice to Dynegy. The federal agencies demanded the interview summaries, as well as Dynegy's counsel's analyses of Dynegy's natural gas trading activities. The documents summarizing or analyzing the data and information reflected Dynegy's counsel's evaluation of the relevant facts and law pertaining to the allegations of misreporting and loss trading. The federal agencies investigating Dynegy demanded these materials, and Dynegy produced them because withholding them would jeopardize its cooperative status under the Holder & Thompson memoranda."; "The court finds Dynegy waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to the disclosure of attorney-client privileged documents to the federal agencies investigating Dynegy.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-05 Federal NV

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: United States v. Kmart Corp., Case No. 3:12-cv-00881-MJR-PMF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73261 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2014)
(holding that Kmart waived attorney-client privilege protection by disclosing documents to the government, and ordering Kmart to produce the same documents to their relator; "[A]pplication the selective waiver doctrine is not appropriate in this case. It is clear that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals does not look favorably upon the selective waiver doctrine."; "K-Mart made a calculated decision to intentionally relinquish work product protection in order to obtain a strategic advantage in the 2009 OIG investigation. This disclosure occurred in California, which is part of the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit did not have a firm position on selective waiver in 2009 but has since rejected it. . . . The D.C. Circuit, where the OIG of HHS is headquartered, has long rejected selective waiver . . . as has almost every other circuit.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-29 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: United States v. K-Mart, Case No. 3:12-cv-00881-MJR-PMF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73261 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2014)
(holding that Kmart waived its privilege by providing documents to government agency, and rejecting a selective waiver argument; "The policy reasons for disallowing selective waiver in this case outweigh the reasons for allowing it. In the May 15 discovery dispute conference, K-Mart went to great lengths to emphasize that not allowing selective waiver under these circumstances would discourage corporate cooperation with government investigations. While increased cooperation with the government is most certainly a laudable end, this policy ground for permitting selective waiver has been repeatedly rejected. . . . Most pointedly, the attorney client privilege and work product doctrines do not exist to foster full and frank conversation with the government. . . . Rather, the chief purpose of attorney work product protection is to permit an attorney to prepare a client's case in confidence. . . . Disclosure of protected attorney work product is a strategic litigation decision.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-29 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: Gruss v. Zwirn, No. 09 Civ. 6441 (PGG) (MHD), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100012, at *23-24, *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013)
(rejecting the possibility of a selective waiver upon disclosing work product to the government; "There is no question here that the relationship between Defendants and the SEC was adversarial, regardless of the fact that the disclosures were voluntary. Defendants do not contend otherwise. It is clear that they self-reported the financial irregularities to the SEC in order to escape or limit liability."; "Under Steinhardt [In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993)] and its progeny, when a party provides documents to a government adversary under such circumstances, it ordinarily waives both attorney-client privilege and work product protection as to those documents.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-07-10 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: Rivera v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 10 C 1733, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83761, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2013)
(holding that Allstate waived both privilege and work product protection by disclosing documents to the SEC and the Department of Labor; "We adopt the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Columbia/HCA Healthcare [In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002)] here and reject the application of selective waiver. Allstate waived any privilege or protection associated with the documents at issue by producing them to the SEC and DOL; therefore, they must be produced to plaintiffs.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-14 Federal IL B 4/14

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, No. 05-2367 (SRC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144850 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2012)
(rejecting the possibility of a selective waiver, under which a company can share documents with the government but continue to maintain privilege protection if a third party seeks the same documents; upheld by the District of New Jersey District Court, Dec. 12, 2012)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-10-05 Federal NJ B 6/13

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Derivative & "Erisa" Litig., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), Civ. A. Nos. 05 1151 & 2367 (SRC), slip op at 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2012)
(not for publication) (holding that Merck's disclosure of privileged communications to the federal government caused a waiver, which entitled securities plaintiff access to the privileged communication in their case against Merck relating to Vioxx; "Merck provided the subject documents to the DOJ pursuant to an agreement that provided that the government would maintain the confidentiality of the privileged materials it received from Merck and that Merck's 'limited waiver' of any protection offered by the attorney client privilege and/or work doctrine would not extend to any third party or private entity. Merck argues that the magistrate judge incorrectly applied Third Circuit law concerning the doctrine of selective waiver, which 'permits the client who has disclosed privileged communication to one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties.' Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991). Judge Waldor concluded that, because the Third Circuit had rejected selective waivers in Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, Merck had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the subject documents were entitled to protection under the attorney client privilege and/or work product doctrine. She accordingly ordered Merck to turn the documents over the Plaintiffs."; "A district court may reverse a magistrate judge's determination of a non dispositive issue only if it is 'clearly erroneous or contrary to law.'. . . A finding is clearly erroneous 'when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'. . . A ruling is contrary to law if the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied applicable law. . . . 'The phrase 'contrary to law' indicates plenary review as to matters of law.'. . . ('[T]his Court will conduct a de novo review of a Magistrate Judge's legal conclusions.') . . . The burden is on the party filing the notice of appeal to demonstrate that the magistrate judge's decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law."; "The controlling law in this jurisdiction on the issue selective waiver is the Third Circuit's opinion in Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines. There, the Third Circuit considered whether a party's disclosure of privileged documents for the purpose of cooperating with a government investigation waives the applicable privilege only as against the government or waives it completely, 'thereby exposing the documents to civil discovery in litigation between the discloser and a third party.'" (citation omitted); "Merck points to language in the Westinghouse opinion, in which the Third Circuit observed that the 'agreement between Westinghouse and the DOJ preserved Westinghouse's right to invoke the attorney client privilege only as to the DOJ -- and does not appear in any way to have purported to preserve Westinghouse's right to invoke the privilege against a different entity in an unrelated civil proceeding such as the instant case.' . . . Merck interprets this dicta as a signal from the Third Circuit that had the agreement expressly preserved both the confidentiality of the produced material and the producing party's continuing right to assert the privilege against third parties -- as the agreement between Merck and the DOJ did -- it would have been effective to avoid waiver."; "[T]o the extent Merck's argument that the privilege remains intact may be understood to be predicated on its reliance on an agreement which purported to preserve both confidentiality and the right to assert the privilege as to third parties, such reliance would not be reasonable in light of Westinghouse and the many decisions following its clear holding that selective waiver of the attorney client privilege cannot be endorsed because it goes beyond the scope of the privilege."; "This Court concludes that Judge Waldor correctly applied Third Circuit precedent in concluding that Merck must produce the documents it had previously disclosed to the DOJ, given its waiver of any applicable protection from disclosure.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-10-05 Federal NJ B 1/13

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: Rein v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 376 (4th Cir. 2009)
("[T]he attorney client privilege can be waived if the document is published, or disclosed to private individuals or to nonfederal agencies. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 566 F.2d at 253.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that the company and Baker Botts waived privilege protection by disclosing the investigation results to the SEC, and therefore could not withhold them from the former officer; "Brady [former officer] asserts that materials related to the Phase II investigation were provided to the SEC, thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege as to Categories 5 and 6. . . . With regard to the Phase II materials, i2 and Baker Botts concede that they disclosed to the SEC the same oral report and power point presentation given to the Audit Committee concerning Phase II, in addition to interview observations and summaries, exhibits used during witness interviews, and other documents uncovered during its Phase II investigation. Indeed, they state that pursuant to a confidentiality agreement with Brady, he will receive all of the materials presented to the SEC. . . . i2 and Baker Botts contend that despite the disclosure of Phase II materials to the SEC, they did not waive the attorney-client privilege; however, to the extent they have waived attorney-client privilege, they urge the court to adopt the Eighth Circuit's selective waiver doctrine."; "As noted, the Fifth Circuit has yet to adopt the selective waiver doctrine. Moreover, this court is persuaded by the reasoning of the great weight of authority which has declined to adopt the selective waiver doctrine. Therefore, the court finds that i2 and Baker Botts waived the attorney-client privilege as to Categories 5 and 6 by disclosing Phase II privileged information to a third-party."; finding a subject matter waiver; "Brady argues that i2 and Baker Botts' waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the Phase I Report and the Phase II investigation extends to the entire subject matter related to the disclosures."; "The disclosure of any significant portion of a confidential communication waives the privilege as to the whole.'. . . Moreover, waiver of an attorney-client communication waives the privilege as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter. . . . Here, Brady disclosed the Phase I Report, which summed up Baker Botts' entire Phase I investigation, to Deloitte and Touche. Additionally, they disclosed to the SEC the same oral report and power point presentation given to the Audit Committee concerning the ultimate findings of Phase II, interview observations and summaries, and exhibits used during witness interviews. Based on that evidence, the court finds that these disclosures amount to a significant portion of attorney-client privileged information, and thus, the waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to all responsive documents relating to the Phase I and Phase II subject matter. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege has been waived as to all documents responsive to Categories 3, 4, 5, and 6.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.505
Case Name: In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that Martin Marietta's submission to a United States Attorney of "a Position Paper describing why the company should not face indictment" means that "the Position Paper as well as the underlying details are no longer within the attorney-client privilege."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1988-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.506
Case Name: In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 14-MD-2543 (JMF), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5199 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015)
(finding that the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protected notes and memoranda relating to the witness interviews conducted by the Jenner lawyers during the firm's investigation into General Motors ignition switch incidents; finding that GM did not waive the privilege protection for the underlying material by disclosing facts to the government; "'Based on the interviews, and in order to cooperate with the DOJ investigation, Jenner attorneys 'made oral hypothetical proffers' of 'what certain witnesses might say if the DOJ were to speak with them,' a tactic New GM represents is 'in accord with typical practice in DOJ investigations conducted in the Southern District of New York.'. . . Plaintiff makes no argument that those oral proffers -- which 'were not complete or verbatim recitations of what the witnesses said or of the [Interview Materials]' . . . -- or the intention to make those oral proffers, vitiated the attorney-client privilege.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-15 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.602
Case Name: Enea v. Bloomberg, L.P., 12cv4656-GBD-FM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111901 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015)
(initially concluding that there had been no implied waiver, but revisiting the issue and ordering an in camera review of documents that support defendant's good faith defense in an FLSA case; "During a telephone conference on July 30, 2014, I denied the Plaintiffs' motion, relying, in part, on Brackett v. St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, 12-CV-898-JAR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95899, 2014 WL 3451197, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 15, 2014). As in that case, I found that the distinction 'between a good faith defense and a potential advice of counsel defense creates a thin line that the party seeking to put forward the privilege through testimony may cross,' but that Bloomberg had yet to cross that line.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-08-20 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.602
Case Name: Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., Case No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162013, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012)
(holding that defendant company could not withhold draft versions of and communications related to an environmental audit having disclosed the final version; "The undersigned finds that it would be unfair to permit defendants to produce the final version of the ERM audit which concludes that HNCC was compliant with regulatory requirements, yet withhold the draft versions of the audit and other communications that may undermine or help explain the factual basis for this conclusion. While defendants disclaim any tactical advantage by voluntarily disclosing the final ERM audit because they 'have not pout [sic] the audit at issue' in this case, the absence of such a tactical use does not essentially mandate a finding of no waiver. . . . Although the 'audit' itself may not be 'at issue,' whether HNCC has been compliant with state and federal regulations during the relevant time frame in this lawsuit is at issue – an issue the final version of the ERM audit specifically addresses. Additionally, defendants' affirmative defenses assert that HNCC has been in substantial compliance with federal, state, and local statutes and regulations, and by making the subject matter of the final ERM audit (compliance with regulatory requirements) a defense in this action, defendants have placed the subject matter of the audit at issue.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-13 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.603
Case Name: Winfield v. City of New York, 15-cv-05236 (LTS) (KHP), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2018)
(declining to order a "quick peek" of protected documents, and appointing a Special Master to review withheld documents; "Controlling precedent, along with the structure and commentary on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence discussed above, make clear that the court may not run roughshod over a party's assertion of privileges merely to expedite discovery or relieve itself from determining a party's substantive or common law rights. What would be expedient here is simply not right in terms of the resolution of the parties' dispute. Moreover, given that a large number of the documents are being withheld by the City pursuant to the deliberative process privilege, a Rule 502(d) order is of no help. Once these documents are turned over, the privilege will be subject to waiver arguments in other proceedings.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-05-10 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.603
Case Name: Winfield v. City of New York, 15-cv-05236 (LTS) (KHP), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79281 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2018)
(declining to order a "quick peek" of protected documents, and appointing a Special Master to review withheld documents; "At the case management conference on May 7, 2018, Plaintiffs' counsel indicated that, absent this Court granting a compelled 'quick peek' procedure, they would request in camera review of all of the documents being withheld by the City as privileged. The task of reviewing 3,300 documents is enormous and one that this Court cannot complete before the end of fact discovery on July 31, 2018 given other demands in this and other cases. Appointment of a Special Master to conduct the privilege review pursuant to Rule 53 is therefore warranted. The scope of the appointment will be to prepare a report the recommends to the Court (1) documents, identified by privilege log number, that the City has improperly withheld and must produce, and (2) documents, identified by privilege log number, that are partially privileged and that the City must produce in redacted form."; "This Court proposes the appointment of the Honorable Frank Maas (Ret.) of JAMS, who recently retired as a Magistrate Judge in this District and is available to conduct a review. In accordance with Rule 53(b)(1), the parties may file a letter regarding their position on the appointment of a Special Master, whether they have identified any conflict-of-interest issues that would preclude appointment of Judge Maas, and suggest other candidates for appointment if they so desire. The parties shall file their letters by no later than May 16, 2018."; "Given the costs of a Special Master, Plaintiffs are directed to evaluate whether they can narrow the documents for review so as to reduce the time and thus the costs of the review.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-05-10 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.603
Case Name: Med. Mut. of Ohio v. AbbVie, Inc. (In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2545, Case No. 14 C 1748, Case No. 14 C 8857, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41412 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 2018)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with a corporate investigation; holding that a court-approved protective order claw-back agreement trumped the Rule 502 inadvertent production standards; "Rule 502(d), however, allows a federal court to enter an order that the attorney-client or work product privilege 'is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court -- in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.' Fed. R. Evid. 502(d). In this case, the parties' agreed, court-entered protective order provides that the claw-back and non-waiver provisions for inadvertent disclosures are and 'shall be construed as, an Order under Rule 502(d).' D.E. 194 ¶ 18. MMO argues that because the parties obtained a Rule 502(d) order to govern inadvertent production of privileged material, the Court should not apply Rule 502(b) to analyze waiver."; "Defendants argue that the protective order does not override Rule 502(b). They cite a litany of out-of-circuit cases to argue that '[a]lthough Rule 502 recognizes that the default test set forth in subsection (b) may be superseded by court order or agreement of parties, see Fed. R. Evid. 502(d), (e), such an order or agreement must provide concrete directives' that correspond to each element of Rule 502(b)."; "The Seventh Circuit has not addressed this issue. Nor have courts in the Northern District of Illinois taken a uniform approach."; "The Court concludes that the parties' protective order governs inadvertent disclosures; Rule 502(b) does not. Paragraph 18 of the protective order states that it 'is, and shall be construed as, an Order under Rule 502(d).' D.E. 194 ¶ 18. It also reiterates the non-waiver language from Rule 502(d) and quotes from the Rule. Id. Paragraphs Four and Seventeen of the protective order likewise contain non-waiver language, and Paragraph Four states that the purpose of the protective order is to 'facilitat[e] the exchange of information . . . without involving the Court unnecessarily.' Id. ¶ 4. These drafting choices reflect the parties' intent to create their own guidelines to address inadvertent disclosure and to avoid waiver-related litigation under Rule 502(b).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-03-14 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.603
Case Name: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 14-CV-4717 (FB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164204 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2016)
(using Federal Rule of Evidence 502; holding that a Rule 502 order indicating that a litigant would not waive its privilege by producing privileged communications to the adversary did not allow the producing party to claw-back documents about which witness testified without an objection; "In 2015, pursuant to Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ('FRE'), the Court entered a protective order, which provides, among other things, that the parties will not 'waive[] or forfeit[] . . . any claim of privilege or work-product protection' by 'disclos[ing] or mak[ing] available information' that is 'later identified to be subject to [such a claim],' unless the producing party affirmatively uses that information in the litigation by 'motion, pleading or otherwise[.]'; "This Court thereafter construed the non-waiver provision in the protective order to provide that, regardless of the degree of care taken, a party does not waive its privilege merely by producing documents in discovery."; "By their terms, Rules 502(d) and (e) apply only to waiver in connection with disclosures, and say nothing of waiver by other means. Accordingly, while an appropriately worded protective order may prevent waiver due to a producing party's disclosure of privileged information, that party's subsequent failure to timely and specifically object to the use of that information -- during a deposition, for example -- can waive any applicable privilege."; "Amtrak has waived privilege and work-product protection for Exhibits 26 and 44 by failing to seek to preclude their introduction and use at the Noonan deposition. Though Amtrak is arguably correct that the protective order does not provide for waiver based on the mere disclosure of privileged information, nothing in the protective order speaks to the situation at issue here, where Amtrak failed to timely and specifically object to a party's use of privileged material. LMI introduced both exhibits at the Noonan deposition and questioned Noonan about them for several pages of transcript."; "That Amtrak removed Exhibit 26 from its privilege log after a detailed review also counsels in favor of finding waiver. This was no mere inadvertence at work, brought on by the constraints of high-volume document productions; to the contrary, Amtrak's decision to withdraw its claim of privilege for Exhibit 26 was an explicit waiver after considered legal analysis."; "Amtrak seems to argue that the non-waiver provision in the instant case permits the parties to assert and retract claims of privilege at will . . . but this goes too far. Case law and commentary make clear that Rule 502(d) was intended to make discovery issues relating to privilege and waiver more predictable, not insulate parties entirely from the possibility of waiver . . . Amtrak's reading of the non-waiver provision would yield an absurd result, permitting Amtrak to claw back documents, even those used by LMI in depositions and court filings, at any time -- conceivably, even through the close of litigation. The protective order, which was entered by this Court, does not countenance such gamesmanship.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-17 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.603
Case Name: Botkin v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 5:10cv00077, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63871, at *13, *14, *18-19, *20 (W.D. Va. June 15, 2011)
(analyzing privilege and work product issues in a first party insurance case; after citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994); analyzing the "at issue" doctrine under the Hearn standard; "The court in Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975), set forth a framework for determining whether the party asserting a privilege has impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct. Courts must determine whether: a) the assertion of privilege was the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; b) through this act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and c) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense. Id. at 581. Although the Hearn framework has not been met with universal acceptance, it remains the most widely accepted approach."; "Plaintiffs . . . contend that Stacey Callahan's deposition testimony, in which she acknowledged that Donegal relied on the advice of counsel in denying the Botkins' claim, is enough to constitute waiver. Stacey Callahan testified as follows: '(Q) Did Mr. Roswell [of Niles Barton], anything that Mr. Roswell or his opinion or anything else -- I'm not asking what it was. I'm just asking you, did that have anything to do with Donegal's decision to deny coverage?' (A) The Niles Barton firm had given us the coverage analysis, and based on their analysis -- partially based on their analysis, we denied coverage.'" (internal citation omitted); "Plaintiffs have offered no evidence other than Stacey Callahan's deposition testimony to suggest that Donegal interjected the advice of counsel into this litigation. And Callaghan's response to a question about whether Niles Barton's advice factored into Donegal's decision to deny coverage is not enough to show that Donegal put its communications with counsel at issue. . . . The mere fact that Donegal relied on the opinion of coverage counsel in denying plaintiffs' claim does not waive the attorney-client privilege. Certainly, when Donegal enlisted the assistance of Niles Barton in this matter, it intended to rely on counsel's advice. There would be little point in retaining coverage counsel to issue an opinion if a party did not intend to rely on it. Likewise, if reliance always gave rise to waiver in this circumstance, no one would seek coverage counsel's advice."; "Donegal has not used the attorney-client privilege as a sword in this litigation. . . . Donegal's reliance on coverage counsel's opinion, without more, is not sufficient enough to show it put the advice of counsel 'at issue.' Thus, the first Hearn factor has not been met.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-06-15 Federal VA B 7/16

Chapter: 26.802
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, 66 N.Y.S. 3d 135, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 85 (N.Y. App. 1d Jan. 4, 2018)
(holding that a businessman waived privilege protection by sending an email to an investor that attributed his lawyer the actions that he intended to take in the future; inexplicably finding a subject matter waiver, although the disclosure occurred in a non-judicial setting; "Siras proffers an email dated March 24, 2016 from Dai to a third-party investor, Lou Ceruzzi, concerning the UBS loan: 'I was about to write, to you this email last Friday but I decided to 'wait until we all sit down with attorneys this morning. It is concluded by legal counsels that we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise. Otherwise, all the equity we invested is at risk to be wiped out.'"; "I find that Dai waived the attorney-client privilege as to any communications and documents dealing with his counsel's advice that 'we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise. Otherwise, all the equity we invested is at risk to be wiped out.'. . . Contrary to the cases defendants' 'rely upon, Dai's communication to Ceruzzi goes beyond a client conveying to a third-party the decision to settle an action or withdraw a claim based on advice of counsel. . . . Dai's communication provided a detailed description of specific legal advice and the course of action given to him by his attorneys, which he voluntarily divulged to a third party. Accordingly, defendants are directed to produce any communications and documents 'pertaining to the subject matter of the email.'").; AFFIRMED: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, 650868/2015, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017) (affirming the lower court's subject matter waiver holding; "By disclosing to a third party by email certain advice given to them by counsel, defendants waived the attorney-client privilege as to other documents pertaining to that advice (see Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 NY3d 616, 624, 36 N.Y.S. 3d 838, 57 N.E. 3d 30 [2016]; Arkin Kaplan Rice LLP v. Kaplan, 118 AD-3d 492, 988 N.Y.S.2d 22 [1st Dept 2014]).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-04 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.802
Case Name: One World Foods, Inc. v. Stubb's Austin Restaurant Company LC, Case No. A-15-CA-1071-SS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167125 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2016)
(holding that plaintiff had waived privilege protection for a legal opinion by turning it over to McCormick, which insisted on receiving the opinion before purchasing the plaintiff; rejecting plaintiff's argument that it and McCormick shared a common interest, because the court found there was no palpable threat of litigation; "In the spring of 2015, McCormick offered to buy Plaintiff for approximately $100 million. . . . As a prerequisite to finalizing the deal, McCormick required a written license agreement with SARC."; "McCormick nevertheless proceeded with the purchase of Plaintiff, and a Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) between Plaintiff and McCormick memorialized the transaction. . . . 'McCormick agreed to close instead with the condition that Plaintiff share with it the opinions Plaintiff's counsel had previously prepared regarding the ownership and validity of the STUBB'S trademark.'. . . Those opinions were attached to the SPA as Exhibit B-1 and Exhibit B-2 (the Opinion Exhibits)."; "The SPA describes the conditions governing the purchase and sale of Plaintiff as well as the representations and warranties made by both McCormick and Plaintiff. The only threat of litigation Plaintiff identified at the time of the SPA was a demand for payment related to a terminated software subscription. . . . In fact, the only litigation currently pending to the knowledge of the undersigned was initiated by the Plaintiff."; "[I]n camera review confirms the Opinion Exhibits contain legal memoranda created for the express purpose of providing legal opinions on Plaintiff's intellectual property rights. But Plaintiff notes its attorney had previously prepared these legal memoranda and later Plaintiff shared the memoranda with McCormick as a condition of McCormick's purchase of Plaintiff's stock. . . . Thus, while the legal memoranda were originally communications between Plaintiff and its attorney made for the purpose of securing legal advice, the legal memoranda were disclosed to McCormick as the Opinion Exhibits to support the sale of Plaintiff's stock, a business decision."; "As the party asserting attorney-client privilege, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the privilege applies and that burden extends to proof of preliminary facts showing the matter is eligible for protection. . . . Plaintiff meets this burden with regard to the initial legal memoranda."; "Consequently, while Plaintiff demonstrates attorney-client privilege applied to the initial version of the legal memoranda, attorney-client privilege does not apply to the disclosure of the legal memoranda to McCormick via the Opinion Exhibits. The remaining inquiry thus focuses on whether the CLI privilege exception applies.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-12-02 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.802
Case Name: Swortwood v. Tenedora De Empresas, S.A. DE C.V., Case No. 13cv362-BTM (BLM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29247, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014)
(analyzing a claim by plaintiffs, who sold their stock in the Neology to Smarttrac, after which the defendant eliminated plaintiffs' liquidation preferences; "Here, Neology, not Defendant[,] is the client. Defendant is not Neology's guardian or representative and, therefore, cannot claim the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Neology. In addition, the fact that Defendant is in possession of Neology's allegedly attorney-client privileged communications indicates that the communications are not privileged as the communications have been shared with individuals or entities not covered by the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-06 Federal CA B 8/14

Chapter: 26.802
Case Name: Swortwood v. Tenedora De Empresas, S.A. DE C.V., Case No. 13cv362-BTM (BLM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29247, at *9 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014)
(analyzing a claim by plaintiffs, who sold their stock in the Neology to Smarttrac, after which the defendant eliminated plaintiffs' liquidation preferences; "If a communication between Neology's counsel and Mr. Diez Barroso regarding Mr. Diez Barroso's duties as a Neology director was found in the possession of Mr. Diez Barroso and the communication was not shared with other employees of Defendant, the communication would retain its privilege. If, however, the communication was shared with other employees of Defendant and/or was found in the possession of another employee of Defendant, including Mr. Elias-Calles, then the confidentiality of the privilege has not been maintained and the document must be produced.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-06 Federal CA B 8/14

Chapter: 26.802
Case Name: In re Alexandria Priftis West, Case No. 11-15594-BFK, Ch. 7, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1673 (E.D. Va. April 17, 2012)
(holding that a client waived her attorney-client privilege protection by disclosing a communication from her lawyer, but concluding that the waiver did not cause a subject matter waiver; "On the same day, July 29, 2011, in response to an e-mail from Ms. West, Ms. Holme advised Ms. West that 'I'm doing everything I can -- see e-mail from our Attorney,' and she forwarded to Ms. West an e-mail from C. Thomas Ebel (hereinafter, 'Ebel e-mail'), of the law firm of Sands Anderson, dated July 28, 2011.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-04-17 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.803
Case Name: RKF Retail Holdings, LLC v. Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc., Case Nos. 2:14-cv-01232-APG-GWF, 2:15-cv-01446-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80436 (D. Nev. May 25, 2017)
(holding that defendant Tropicana waived its privilege protection but not its work product protection by sharing due diligence material in an ongoing litigation to its ultimate acquirer; noting that plaintiff RKF sued Tropicana in 2014, and that Penn Gaming acquired Tropicana in 2015; creating a privilege waiver; "Courts are somewhat divided on whether the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications to a prospective purchaser or investor is protected from a finding of waiver by the common interest doctrine. A majority of courts have rejected application of the doctrine where the disclosure was made for business purposes rather than for the purpose of pursuing a common legal effort. . . . Nidec [Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575 (N.D. Cal. 2007)] notes that even if the parties to the disclosure have a common legal interest, the communication at issue must be designed to further that common legal effort. It must be made in the course of formulating a common legal strategy."; "A majority of federal courts have not adopted Hewlett-Packard's [Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308 (N.D.Cal. 1987)] expansive application of the common interest doctrine to protect disclosures made primarily for business purposes. There is no indication that the Nevada Supreme Court would interpret NRS § 49.095.3 to protect from waiver disclosures made primarily for business purposes. This Court therefore declines to interpret NRS § 49.095.3 in a manner that is not called for by the statutory language itself, and which is contrary to the majority view regarding the scope of the common interest doctrine."; "Tropicana has shown only that representatives and lawyers for Tropicana and Penn Gaming discussed this litigation. This, however, indicates nothing more than that Tropicana provided information about the lawsuit so that Penn Gaming could make a business decision whether to proceed with the acquisition. Tropicana has failed to show that its pre-merger communications with Penn Gaming are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. RKF's motion to compel will therefore be granted as to those pre-merger documents to which only the attorney-client privilege and common interest doctrine are asserted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-25 Federal NV
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.803
Case Name: RKF Retail Holdings, LLC v. Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc., Case Nos. 2:14-cv-01232- & 2:15-cv-01446-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80436 (D. Nev. May 25, 2017)
August 2, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Addresses Waiver Implications of a Target's Due Diligence Disclosures to its Ultimate Acquirer"

Acquiring companies predictably seek information from their acquisition targets, such as descriptions of the targets' ongoing litigation. During their due diligence, the acquirer may demand the target's documents or communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or both.

In RKF Retail Holdings, LLC v. Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc., Case Nos. 2:14-cv-01232- & 2:15-cv-01446-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80436 (D. Nev. May 25, 2017), plaintiff RKF sued Tropicana in 2014, alleging that Tropicana wrongfully terminated an exclusive agency contract. In 2015, Penn Gambling acquired Tropicana. RKF then sought discovery of "information about [its] lawsuits" that Tropicana disclosed to Penn Gaming before the acquisition. Id. at *5. The court found that Tropicana's due diligence disclosures waived privilege protection but not work product protection. In finding a privilege waiver, the court rejected Tropicana's argument that it shared a "common interest" with acquirer Penn Gaming -- noting that the "majority of courts have rejected application of the [common interest] doctrine where the disclosure was made for business purposes rather than for the purpose of pursuing a common legal effort." Id. at *10. The court concluded that "Tropicana provided information about the lawsuit so that Penn Gaming could make a business decision whether to proceed with the acquisition." Id. at *14. In contrast, the court found that Tropicana did not waive its work product protection by disclosing work product to Penn Gaming during the due diligence process. The court correctly noted that unlike the fragile privilege protection, work product protection "is not waived if the disclosing party has a reasonable basis to believe that the recipient will keep the disclosed materials confidential and not reveal them to the disclosing party's adversary." Id. at *17. The court concluded that Penn Gaming had a vital interest in preserving as confidential Tropicana's disclosure about RKF's suit because Penn Gaming "would, directly or indirectly, assume Tropicana's potential liability if the merger went through." Id. at *18.

Other courts have reached the identical two-part conclusion in addressing pre-acquisition due diligence disclosures – which dramatically highlights the contrast between the fragile privilege protection and the robust work product protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-25 Federal NV
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: Cooper v. Meritor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-052 DMB-JMV Consolidated with Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-053 DMB-JMV, Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-054 DMB-JMV, CIV. A. No. 4:16-cv-055-DMB-JMV, CIV. A. No. 4:16-cv-056-DMB-JMV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727 (N.D. Miss. 1/12/17)
(analyzing the waiver impact of fifteen documents Textron created when it owned a Mississippi facility from 1989 to 1996; explaining that Textron sold assets of the company in 1999; disagreeing with Textron's assertion that the asset purchase agreement excluded the privileged environmental documents; noting that Textron left the documents at the facility without any restrictions on access, and did not object when the asset purchaser went bankrupt in 2004 and all of its assets were sold to another company out of bankruptcy; finding that Textron waived privilege protection for the fifteen documents, even though Textron claims to have forgotten that the documents were left at the facility; "In the instant case, Textron asserts a privilege over fifteen (15) documents created from 1989 to 1996 during a period of time it owned and operated a wheel cover manufacturing facility in Grenada, Mississippi. In 1999, Textron entered and subsequently consummated an asset sale agreement with Grenada Manufacturing, LLC (hereinafter sometimes 'the APA'). According to Textron, it did not transfer ownership of documents related to environmental matters, including the subject 15 documents, to Grenada Manufacturing, LLC as part of that sale. It is Textron's positon that it retains ownership of all such documents and any affiliated privilege with respect thereto."; "According to an affidavit supplied by Textron, boxes of these environmental documents, together with other business records of Textron's operations prior to the 1999 sale, were left by Textron at the Grenada facility after the sale. Indeed, Textron contracted for a right to access the documents for a period of time following the sale. APA 14.1. In the court's view, Textron's claim of retained ownership of the documents, even if it were convincing, does not satisfactorily answer whether its treatment of those assets waived any privilege that might be claimed with regard to any of them."; "Textron is faced with the fact that it intentionally left documents that it must acknowledge (because it is material to its claim of retained ownership of the documents in the first instance) it knew concerned environmental matters related to releases from the business prior to 1999. These documents were intentionally left unattended and unrestricted in the hands of yet another party -- this time, Ice Industries, Inc. Though Textron was given notice of the asset transfer to Ice Industries, Inc., it made no effort to retrieve the environmental documents or to even review them for privilege."; "In other words, Textron plainly waived any privilege that would have otherwise been retained if the documents had, in fact, been excluded from the purchase and asset sale."; "Textron argues that unless it realized that the documents concerning environmental matters that it freely gave possession of to others for decades did in fact contain privileged documents, that disclosure could not waive any privilege attendant to the document(s)."; "The court is unpersuaded."; "[T]here is nothing about the 'practical consequences doctrine' that dictates a different outcome. The practical outcome of leaving -- for decades -- documents a company contends it owns in possession of another, with no provision for protection of any privileged communications therein, not to mention permitting the subsequent transfer of possession to others on additional occasions, all without any effort to retrieve them prior to the instant litigation, or to otherwise review them to remove privileged materials has the obvious practical and legal consequence of waiver of any associated privileges.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-12 Federal MS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: Chemeon Surface Technology, LLC v. Metalast International, Inc., Case No. 3:15-CV-0294-MMD (VPC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125610 (D. Nev. Sept. 15, 2016)
(holding that the purchaser of an LLC from a receiver purchased all privileged documents in LLC's position; inexplicably seeming to hold that the waiver occurred when the plaintiff purchased the LLC; "When plaintiff acquired the LLC's assets, it acquired all of the LLC and INC legal files, which were intermingled and contained in the LLC's database . . . . There were voluminous legal files, including attorney correspondence, draft and final legal documents, and there was no segregation of the documents on the basis of the LLC or the INC. . . . The documents ranged from hard copy documents to electronic files, and the legal files in electronic format were all stored in LLC's document database, which the LLC created, paid for and maintained. . . . The legal files include numerous communications to and from Mr. Burns, and, as a result, many communications to and from Mr. Burns were included in the legal documents which are in plaintiff's possession."; "It is undisputed that at no time has INC, or any of its former or current principals, stated that plaintiff should not be in possession of the legal documents that plaintiff obtained in connection with LLC acquisition, nor has INC or it its current or former principals requested that any legal documents be returned. . . . During discovery, plaintiff produced responsive legal documents in its possession, which included many attorney-client communications involving Mr. Burns . . . . Neither INC nor its former or current principals objected to this production, sought to claw back the materials on the basis of attorney-client privilege or attorney work product, or made any other complaints about this production."; "The analysis in In-Store [In re In-Store Advertising Sec. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)] is persuasive in this case. Here, when plaintiff purchased the Metalast assets out of receivership, the co-mingled legal files of the LLC and the INC were included. Plaintiff admits that it has many LLC and INC legal documents in its possession, yet defendants never sought return of the documents, nor did they attempt to claw back materials based on attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-09-15 Federal NV
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: Newspring Mezzanine Capital II, L.P. v. Hayes, Jr., Civ. A. No. 14-1706, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169900 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014)
(holding that a company owned the privilege when it sold the stock of a company, because the law firm assisting the company did not represent the individual selling shareholders as personal clients; "The Baxter Parties insist that they retain the right to assert attorney-client privilege over communications with Wishart Norris pre-merger because they were the sellers of a controlling interest in Old Utilipath. In support of this position, they analogize the current situation to Tekni-Plex v. Meyner and Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 674 N.E.2d 663, 651 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Ct. Ap. N.Y. 1996)."; "The most useful point of departure is the contract of representation whereby Wishart Norris was retained. The retention letter stated that it related to 'this Firm's representation of Utilipath, LLC ('the Company').' The letter also cautioned, 'The advice and communications which we render on the Company's behalf are not intended to be disseminated to or relied upon by any other parties without our written consent' (emphasis added). The signature line identified Utilipath LLC and identified Jarrod Hayes as a 'manager.' Jarrod Hayes did not separately sign as an individual, and neither did his father, Baxter Hayes, Jr., or brother, Baxter Hayes, III."; "I also find nothing in Wishart Norris' actions that indicate it was representing any of the Baxter Parties as individuals in addition to representing the corporations. Further supporting my conclusion is the fact that Baxter, Jarrod, and Lindon Hayes had retained their own personal counsel."; "In contrast, in the situation before me, Wishart Norris was explicitly retained by Old Utilipath to carry out the Utilipath transaction, and other lawyers were retained to personally represent the parties in the transaction. Under Bevill [In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corporation, 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)], the individuals asserting the privilege have a specific burden, which they have failed to meet."; "Because Wishart Norris represented the corporation, the corporation's post-merger owners took control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-12-09 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: Newspring Mezzanine Capital II, L.P. v. Hayes, Jr., Civ. A. No. 14-1706, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169900 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014)
("In reaching this conclusion, I do not decide whether the Baxter Parties waived their attorney client privilege with respect to documents left on Utilipath servers after the Sale of Control.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-12-09 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 734 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(a parent corporation waives any attorney-client privilege applicable to documents by leaving those documents with the spun subsidiary), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1990-01-01 Federal VA B 3/16

Chapter: 26.804
Case Name: United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4, John Doe 89-129), 902 F.2d 244, 247, 247-48, 248, 249, 250 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a parent and subsidiary corporation could enter into a valid common interest agreement although the subsidiary was not a named party -- because the subsidiary was the "real party in interest"; concluding that the valid common interest agreement prevented the subsidiary from unilaterally waiving the attorney-client privilege and protected documents relating to the common interest participants' prosecution of a claim against the Army and defense of the Army's counterclaim; agreeing with the district court that the subsidiary could unilaterally control its own privilege once it had been sold to another company, and that the parent had no control over documents created by the subsidiary after it was sold; assessing a situation described more fully in the district court's opinion (In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3, 89-4 & 89-129, 734 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Va. 1990)) in which a government grand jury subpoenaed documents relating to possible fraud in connection with a government contract; explaining a company ["Movant"] objected to the grand jury subpoena on attorney-client privilege and work product grounds; explaining that the district court had divided the subpoenaed documents into three categories: (1) documents created by one of Movant's divisions while it was undertaking the contractual work; (2) documents created by the division after it had become a Subsidiary of Movant; and (3) documents created by Subsidiary after Movant had sold controlling interest in Subsidiary to independent investors; noting that the Subsidiary had advised Movant and the government that it wished to cooperate with the grand jury and to produce the responsive documents; [Although not described fully in the Fourth Circuit opinion, the district court found that: (1) as to the Category 1 documents, generated by the division that was then part of Movant, it was "unclear" whether the Subsidiary gained ownership of any privilege covering those documents when the division became a subsidiary, but that it was unnecessary to resolve "this somewhat metaphysical issue" because Movant "permitted at least some of these documents to remain in the Subsidiary's custody and control" after selling the Subsidiary, and therefore "effectively waived its privilege with respect to these documents" meaning that the now-independent Subsidiary could waive the privilege and work product protections as to those documents (734 F. Supp. at 1213); (2) as to the Category 2 documents, generated by Subsidiary when it was owned by Movant, Movant could not block Subsidiary's waiver of those documents in its possession because the "joint defense privilege" did not give both Movant and Subsidiary veto power over the other's waiver the joint defense doctrine did not cover documents created while Movant and Subsidiary were merely "cooperating to assert [Movant's] claim" against the Army in seeking to recover under the underlying government contract; acknowledging that Subsidiary would have received a portion of whatever amount was ultimately recovered from the Army in connection with that claim, but that "[t]o extend the joint defense privilege to non-parties simply because they are financially interested in the litigation stretches the rationale for the privilege beyond its reach" (734 F. Supp. at 1212); and (3) as to the Group 3 documents, created by the newly-independent Subsidiary, finding that Movant had no control over those documents, and Subsidiary could produce them to the government.]; affirming the district court's analysis as to any document not related to what the Fourth Circuit described as "prosecution of the claim against the Army for an equitable adjustment and those prepared for the defense of the counter-claim" which involved "joint efforts on the part of Movant and Subsidiary"; agreeing with Movant that such "claim-related documents are subject to a joint defense privilege that Subsidiary cannot waive without Movant's consent"; acknowledging that Subsidiary "was not named as party in either the civil claim against the Army or in the Army's counter-claim," but finding that "persons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims," and thus the common interest doctrine applied to Movant's and Subsidiary's "joint prosecution of a claim against the Army, as well as in the joint defense of the Army's counterclaim. Although Subsidiary was not a named party, it was the real party in interest. Recovery would inure to it."; holding that the district court's ruling was in error because it was "apparently based on the notion that the joint defense privilege is limited to codefendants" [although the district court's opinion instead was based on the fact that Subsidiary was not a party to any litigation, not on the fact that the Subsidiary was not a co-defendant]; in analyzing the Category 1 documents, rejecting the government's argument that the joint defense privilege could not apply because the creating entity was then a division of Movant rather than a separate entity; holding that "[t]he rationale underlying the joint defense privilege focuses not on when documents were generated, but on the circumstances surrounding the disclosure of privileged documents to a jointly interested third party"; explaining that here the disclosure "occurred on the day Movant incorporated Subsidiary as a separate entity," and was made to allow Subsidiary "to continue to participate in the ongoing litigation"; ultimately holding that "all documents that relate to the prosecution of the claim against the Army or to the defense of the Army's counterclaim, and which are subject to the attorney-client or work-product privilege, are subject to a joint defense privilege that Subsidiary may not waive unilaterally"; reversing the district court's opinion to that extent)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1990-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.805
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, 66 N.Y.S. 3d 135, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 85 (N.Y. App. 1d Jan. 4, 2018)
(holding that a businessman waived privilege protection by sending an email to an investor that attributed his lawyer the actions that he intended to take in the future; inexplicably finding a subject matter waiver, although the disclosure occurred in a non-judicial setting; "Siras proffers an email dated March 24, 2016 from Dai to a third-party investor, Lou Ceruzzi, concerning the UBS loan: 'I was about to write, to you this email last Friday but I decided to 'wait until we all sit down with attorneys this morning. It is concluded by legal counsels that we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise. Otherwise, all the equity we invested is at risk to be wiped out.'"; "I find that Dai waived the attorney-client privilege as to any communications and documents dealing with his counsel's advice that 'we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise. Otherwise, all the equity we invested is at risk to be wiped out.'. . . Contrary to the cases defendants' 'rely upon, Dai's communication to Ceruzzi goes beyond a client conveying to a third-party the decision to settle an action or withdraw a claim based on advice of counsel. . . . Dai's communication provided a detailed description of specific legal advice and the course of action given to him by his attorneys, which he voluntarily divulged to a third party. Accordingly, defendants are directed to produce any communications and documents 'pertaining to the subject matter of the email.'").; AFFIRMED: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, 650868/2015, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017) (affirming the lower court's subject matter waiver holding; "By disclosing to a third party by email certain advice given to them by counsel, defendants waived the attorney-client privilege as to other documents pertaining to that advice (see Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 NY3d 616, 624, 36 N.Y.S. 3d 838, 57 N.E. 3d 30 [2016]; Arkin Kaplan Rice LLP v. Kaplan, 118 AD-3d 492, 988 N.Y.S.2d 22 [1st Dept 2014]).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-04 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.805
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.805
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.805
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216 (U) at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 9, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part I"

Clients describing their past or intended future actions obviously do not waive their privilege protection – even if the clients are following their lawyers' advice. But clients voluntarily disclosing privileged communications nearly always waive their privilege protection, and can trigger a subject matter waiver. It can be easy to cross that tenuous line.

In Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, defendant business executive sent an email to a third party investor with the following sentence: "I was about to write, to you this email last Friday but I decided to []wait until we all sit down with attorneys this morning. It is concluded by legal counsels that we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise." No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216 (U) at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017) (emphasis added). The court concluded that defendant's email "provided a detailed description of specific legal advice and the course of action given to him by his attorneys." Id. at 4. Contrary to most case law, the court found a subject matter waiver – and "directed [defendants] to produce any communications and documents 'pertaining to the subject matter of the email.'" Id. (citation omitted).

Defendant presumably would not have waived privilege protection or risked a subject matter waiver if his email had not included the three words "by legal counsels." The fact that defendant met with his lawyers did not deserve privilege protection, and his intended course of action following the meeting likewise did not deserve privilege protection. Clients can describe their intended actions, but should never attribute those to lawyers' advice. Next week's Privilege Point will discuss a similar decision from another court about two weeks later. The Privilege Point after that will discuss the subject matter waiver implications of the decisions described here and in the next Privilege Point.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.805
Case Name: In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.806
Case Name: Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-20 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.806
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216 (U) at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 9, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part I"

Clients describing their past or intended future actions obviously do not waive their privilege protection – even if the clients are following their lawyers' advice. But clients voluntarily disclosing privileged communications nearly always waive their privilege protection, and can trigger a subject matter waiver. It can be easy to cross that tenuous line.

In Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, defendant business executive sent an email to a third party investor with the following sentence: "I was about to write, to you this email last Friday but I decided to []wait until we all sit down with attorneys this morning. It is concluded by legal counsels that we have no choice but buying the note from UBS immediately to clean up the mess at Hudson Rise." No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216 (U) at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017) (emphasis added). The court concluded that defendant's email "provided a detailed description of specific legal advice and the course of action given to him by his attorneys." Id. at 4. Contrary to most case law, the court found a subject matter waiver – and "directed [defendants] to produce any communications and documents 'pertaining to the subject matter of the email.'" Id. (citation omitted).

Defendant presumably would not have waived privilege protection or risked a subject matter waiver if his email had not included the three words "by legal counsels." The fact that defendant met with his lawyers did not deserve privilege protection, and his intended course of action following the meeting likewise did not deserve privilege protection. Clients can describe their intended actions, but should never attribute those to lawyers' advice. Next week's Privilege Point will discuss a similar decision from another court about two weeks later. The Privilege Point after that will discuss the subject matter waiver implications of the decisions described here and in the next Privilege Point.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.806
Case Name: Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.806
Case Name: Cooper v. Meritor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-052 DMB-JMV Consolidated with Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-053 DMB-JMV, Civ. A. No. 4:16-cv-054 DMB-JMV, CIV. A. No. 4:16-cv-055-DMB-JMV, CIV. A. No. 4:16-cv-056-DMB-JMV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727 (N.D. Miss. 1/12/17)
(analyzing the waiver impact of fifteen documents Textron created when it owned a Mississippi facility from 1989 to 1996; explaining that Textron sold assets of the company in 1999; disagreeing with Textron's assertion that the asset purchase agreement excluded the privileged environmental documents; noting that Textron left the documents at the facility without any restrictions on access, and did not object when the asset purchaser went bankrupt in 2004 and all of its assets were sold to another company out of bankruptcy; finding that Textron waived privilege protection for the fifteen documents, even though Textron claims to have forgotten that the documents were left at the facility; "In the instant case, Textron asserts a privilege over fifteen (15) documents created from 1989 to 1996 during a period of time it owned and operated a wheel cover manufacturing facility in Grenada, Mississippi. In 1999, Textron entered and subsequently consummated an asset sale agreement with Grenada Manufacturing, LLC (hereinafter sometimes 'the APA'). According to Textron, it did not transfer ownership of documents related to environmental matters, including the subject 15 documents, to Grenada Manufacturing, LLC as part of that sale. It is Textron's positon that it retains ownership of all such documents and any affiliated privilege with respect thereto."; "According to an affidavit supplied by Textron, boxes of these environmental documents, together with other business records of Textron's operations prior to the 1999 sale, were left by Textron at the Grenada facility after the sale. Indeed, Textron contracted for a right to access the documents for a period of time following the sale. APA 14.1. In the court's view, Textron's claim of retained ownership of the documents, even if it were convincing, does not satisfactorily answer whether its treatment of those assets waived any privilege that might be claimed with regard to any of them."; "Textron is faced with the fact that it intentionally left documents that it must acknowledge (because it is material to its claim of retained ownership of the documents in the first instance) it knew concerned environmental matters related to releases from the business prior to 1999. These documents were intentionally left unattended and unrestricted in the hands of yet another party -- this time, Ice Industries, Inc. Though Textron was given notice of the asset transfer to Ice Industries, Inc., it made no effort to retrieve the environmental documents or to even review them for privilege."; "In other words, Textron plainly waived any privilege that would have otherwise been retained if the documents had, in fact, been excluded from the purchase and asset sale."; "Textron argues that unless it realized that the documents concerning environmental matters that it freely gave possession of to others for decades did in fact contain privileged documents, that disclosure could not waive any privilege attendant to the document(s)."; "The court is unpersuaded."; "[T]here is nothing about the 'practical consequences doctrine' that dictates a different outcome. The practical outcome of leaving -- for decades -- documents a company contends it owns in possession of another, with no provision for protection of any privileged communications therein, not to mention permitting the subsequent transfer of possession to others on additional occasions, all without any effort to retrieve them prior to the instant litigation, or to otherwise review them to remove privileged materials has the obvious practical and legal consequence of waiver of any associated privileges.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-12 Federal MS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.806
Case Name: In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987)
August 23, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Drawing the Line Between Waiver and Non-Waiver: Part III"

The last two Privilege Points described decisions in which courts found a subject matter waiver when (1) a business executive described his future intended conduct, explicitly attributing it to his lawyers' advice (Siras Partners LLC v. Activity Kuafu Hudson Yards LLC, No. 650868/2015, 2017 NY Slip Op. 31216(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2017)); and (2) a business executive described his past conduct, explicitly attributing it to a lawyer's earlier sexual harassment investigation and report (Smith v. Ergo Solutions, LLC, Civ. A. No. 14-382 (JDB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94337 (D.D.C. June 20, 2017)). Both courts' subject matter waiver conclusions seem out of the mainstream.

In Siras Partners, the executive's disclosure was in a non-judicial setting. Most courts hold that non-judicial disclosures do not trigger subject matter waivers. In re von Bulow, 828 F. 2d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the extrajudicial disclosure of an attorney-client communication – one not subsequently used by the client in a judicial proceeding to his adversary's prejudice – does not waive the privilege as to the undisclosed portions of the communication"). Federal Rule of Evidence 502 adopts the same narrow approach. In Smith, the executive testified in a deposition about his lawyer's advice. Many if not most courts hold that such deposition testimony does not trigger a subject matter waiver, as long as the deponent disclaims any intent to later rely on the testimony to gain some litigation advantage. The legislative history of Rule 502 explains that subject matter waivers are "limited to situations in which a party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, misleading and unfair manner" to "mislead the fact finder to the disadvantage of the other party." Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note, subdiv. (a); 154 Cong. Rec. H7817, H7819 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).

Corporations and their executives should not count on courts properly applying the subject matter waiver doctrine. Instead, they should seek to avoid ever waiving privilege protection, thus eliminating the risk that courts will stretch the waiver too far.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland Cnty. v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, Civ. A. No. 2:16-CV-422, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209659 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2017)
("MAWC avers that the emails are not privileged because Fink was acting on behalf of CONE Gathering when he participated in the communications and there was no 'joint client' relationship between Fink and the CONSOL attorneys. . . . The court recognizes that the presence of a third-party generally destroys the attorney-client privilege . . . but Fink was not a third-party. The emails reveal that Fink drafted and received all the communications at issue to and from his CONSOL address. The record is also clear that Fink worked for both CONE Gathering and CONSOL at the time of the emails. . . . The court's in camera review further reveals that all parties to the emails have CONSOL or CNX email addresses, with the exception of attorney Cole DeLancey from Steptoe & Johnson LLC who is copied on three email chains. . . . The court finds that the mere email exposure to outside counsel or individuals with CNX email addresses did not destroy the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-21 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: United States v. Owensboro Dermatology Assoc., P.S.C., Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00003-JHM, Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00004-JHM, Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00005-JHM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105099 (D. Ky. July 7, 2017)
(holding that related corporations could safely share privileged communications without waiving the privilege; "[T]he undersigned notes and relies on the affidavit-based roster of relevant persons filed in the record. . . . All relevant persons are either within the law firm or an agent or employee of Respondents. Drs. Crowe and Truett were the joint owners of Beveled Edge and are co-owners of the Insured Entities. Each used the same integrated staff, Sara Elder (Sara Burden) and Angie Grant, to make confidential communications to assist the lawyers in performing legal counseling to Respondents. Brenda Clayton provided accounting and advisory services to Beveled Edge and the Insured Entities. The undersigned finds that she acted as an agent or representative of Beveled Edge and the Insured Entities because it is clear from the emails that Drs. Crowe and Truett had authorized her to make and receive confidential communications for the purpose of assisting the lawyers in performing legal counseling to Beveled Edge and the Insured Entities. Thus, the only issue remaining is whether there has been a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the emails."; "The evolution and structure of all three Respondent entities shows an integrated path from the lone captive entity, Beveled Edge, to the Insured Entities. This involved direct and thorough participation of both owners, at logical points, and much of the management and decisional information over time funneled through a common administrative source for Drs. Crowe and Truett. The owners, Drs. Crowe and Truett, jointly retained the law firm MIJS for the purposes of captive management and compliance. The undersigned sees clear commonality of interest, counsel, ownership history, management, insured operation/ownership, and personnel that, in this context, prevents waiver and keeps the privilege intact despite the separate ownership of the later captives, Micro Cap and Cavallo Nero. In assessing the privileged status of the emails at issue, the undersigned has considered the real-world structure of the relationships, including the joint retention of the law firm and the need for legal advice on identical issues and concerns. The undersigned concludes that the common-interest privilege is applicable to the email communications generated in these circumstances.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-07 Federal KY

Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Au New Haven, LLC v. YKK Corp., No. 15-CV-03411 (GHW)(SN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160602, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016)
January 18, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Southern District of New York Issues a Troublesome Corporate Privilege Case"

Most courts applying privilege principles automatically treat wholly-owned subsidiaries' employees as if they were the parent's employees. However, occasionally courts take a narrower view.

In Au New Haven, LLC v. YKK Corp., Judge Netburn rejected defendants' argument that "entities under common ownership sharing privileged information are always considered to be a single entity for the purpose of attorney-client privilege" protection. No. 15-CV-03411 (GHW)(SN), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160602, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016). Instead, the court surprisingly held that "[e]ntities that are under common ownership must still demonstrate that [the common interest doctrine] applies, such as by making a showing that a common attorney was representing both corporate entities or that they otherwise shared a common legal interest." Id. at *10. The court ultimately found the privilege applicable.

Although almost by definition a wholly-owned subsidiary's legal interest must align with its parent's legal interest, it is unsettling that a prestigious court would apply the common interest doctrine in such a setting.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-18 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Airport Fast Park-Austin, L.P. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Case No. 1:15-cv-245, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125931, at *4, *8-9, *9-10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2016)
(holding that affiliate corporations with common ownership could communicate within privilege protection; "In the corporate context, it is well-settled that the 'attorney-client privilege is not waived merely because the communications involved extend across corporate structures to encompass parent corporations, subsidiary corporations, and affiliated corporations.' Crabb v. KFC Nat. Management Co., No. 91-5474, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38268, 1992 WL 1321, at *3 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C. 1979)."; "The communications AFP seeks to protect from disclosure are privileged communications AFP sent to PCA, which is an affiliated entity by virtue of the entities' common ownership and the overlap in their operations, or that the affiliates' joint counsel exchanged with PCA employees. Cf. Ohio Valley Coal Co. v. Pleasant Ridge Synfuels, LLC, 54 F. App'x 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding a finding that companies were affiliates where one individual served as the CEO of one company and owned and controlled another company)."; "'Chavez Properties' is the name 'loosely use[d] to describe a family of affiliated entities,' including AFP and PCA. . . . The vast majority of Chavez Properties are single-asset entities that are limited liability companies which own parking real estate assets. . . . PCA is a management company which manages the vast majority of the affiliates of Chavez Properties. . . . Manuel Chavez, Robert Chavez and Martin Chavez are the common owners of both Austin Airport Fast Park, LLC, which is the managing partner of AFP, and of PCA, the entity which manages AFP's business. . . . AFP and PCA, though separate entities, share a common attorney and common legal interests. There is nothing in the documentation before the Court or about the parties' relationship that suggests AFP waived the confidentiality of its privileged communications when outside counsel for AFP communicated with employees of PCA on the JHLIC loan transaction or when AFP copied employees of PCA on emails it sent to the parties' joint counsel. Accordingly, the same result reached in Crabb [Crabb v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., No. 91-5474, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38268 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1992)] and Roberts [Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ind. 1985)] is warranted under the facts of this case.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-09-15 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Total Recall Technologies v. Luckey, Case No. 15-cv-02281-WHA (SK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65673 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2016)
(holding that two general partners who were in a dispute did not waive any privilege by talking to the general partnership's lawyer; "Whether Seidl and Igra have a dispute between them and whether Seidl actually consents to the lawsuit brought by TRT is an issue to be resolved between them either informally or through the pending Hawaii action. However, Seidl and Igra are still the two general partners of TRT, and thus any communications between them, as agents of TRT, regarding TRT's counsel's advice do not waive the privilege."; "Here, Igra and Seidl communicated about the merits of this litigation and the advice from TRT's counsel regarding this litigation, and thus the common interest doctrine encompasses their communications. Accordingly, the Court finds that communications between Igra and Seidl that discuss TRT's counsel's advice did not waive TRT's privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-17 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: IFG Port Holdings, LLC v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District, Dkt. No. 16-cv-00146, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42223 (W.D. La. March 29, 2016)
(inexplicably finding that a direct subsidiary did not have a common interest with its parent, and that the common interest therefore did not apply to communications between them; also finding plaintiff's disclaimer of any intent to sue the subsidiary meant the subsidiary could not be a common interest participant; "The February 2, 2016, email was written by Mike Dees, in house counsel for the Port and Port Rail, Inc., on the advice of outside counsel and was distributed to various Port employees and an employee of the non-party Port Rail, Inc. The Port argues that since Port Rail, Inc. is a direct subsidiary of the Port, it shares a common legal interest with the Port. We disagree. At the time the email was written the Port and Port Rail, Inc. were not co-clients being jointly represented in the ongoing litigation. Further, Port Rail, Inc. was not a potential client facing 'a palpable threat of litigation at the time of the communication.' Id. At 711. The privilege applies when the parties share a common legal interest, not a commercial or financial interest and it does not extend to communications about joint business strategy. FSP Stallion 1, LLC v. Luce, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110617, 2010 WL 3895914 *18 (U.S.D.C Nev. Sept. 30, 2010). IFG candidly admits that it has no intention of ever making Port Rail, Inc. a party to this litigation. Doc. 44, p. 5. Thus, if the email was in fact protected by the attorney-client privilege, we find that the privilege was waived by disclosing the communication to an employee of a non-party.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-29 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: IFG Port Holdings, LLC v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District, No. 16-cv-00146, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42223, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2016)
May 18, 2016 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Issues a Surprising Common Interest Doctrine Decision"

The common interest doctrine can sometimes allow separately represented clients to avoid the normal waiver implications of disclosing privileged communications to each other. However, courts take widely varying views of the doctrine's reach, and reject its applicability in about half of the reported cases — after the participants have already shared privileged communications, and therefore waived their respective privileges.

In IFG Port Holdings, LLC v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District, plaintiff claimed that defendant's in-house lawyer (who jointly represented the defendant and its "direct subsidiary") waived privilege protection by sending an email to several of defendants employees — and one subsidiary employee. No. 16-cv-00146, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42223, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2016). Defendant argued that such disclosure did not waive defendant's privilege, because the defendant shared a common interest with its own subsidiary. The court found the common interest doctrine inapplicable — because the subsidiary did not face any litigation threat. The court quoted plaintiff, which indicated that "it has no intention of ever making [the subsidiary] a party to this litigation." Id. At *5. Thus, the court held that defendant waived its privilege by disclosing the communication "to an employee of a non-party" — its own subsidiary. Id. Fortunately for defendant, the court also found the work product doctrine applicable, and held that disclosing the email to the subsidiary did not waive that separate protection.

This is a remarkable decision. The common interest doctrine should never have become an issue, because the in-house lawyer jointly represented the parent and its subsidiary. And the court's apparent insistence that every common interest participant must itself anticipate litigation could reward some obvious mischief — plaintiffs could threaten a number of possible defendants, but later disclaim any intent to sue one of them. All in all, cases like this highlight the risk of relying on the common interest doctrine.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-29 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Cohen v. Trump, Civ. No. 13-CV-2519-GPC (WVG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2015)
August 5, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Court Confirms that Corporations do not Waive Their Privilege by Communicating with Their Affiliates"

The attorney-client privilege provides such a fragile protection that disclosure to nearly any third party waives the protection. Does that general rule apply to communications among corporate affiliates? Surprisingly few decisions have addressed this issue.

In Cohen v. Trump, Civ. No. 13-CV-2519-GPC (WVG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2015), the plaintiff claimed that a Trump entity waived its privilege by including in its communication an employee of another Trump entity. The court rejected plaintiff's waiver argument — confirming that "if a corporation with a legal interest in an attorney-client communication relays it to another related corporation, the attorney-client privilege is not thereby waived." Id. At *39. Interestingly, the court primarily relied on a 41-year-old District of South Carolina case. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1184-85 (D.S.C. 1974). The most recent case cited by the court was nearly 20 years old. Id. At *39-40. One might have expected the court to rely on more recent case law.

Corporations should take comfort in this latest articulation of a principle that many lawyers think goes without saying.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-09 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Cohen v. Trump, Civ. No. 13-CV-2519-GPC (WVG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2015)
(holding that an executive of a corporate affiliate was within the privilege, so his presence did not destroy the privilege protection, and disclosing privileged communications that did not waive the privilege; "Corporations can claim an attorney-client privilege over their own communications with attorneys, and courts have extended the privilege to communications between a parent corporation and its attorneys which are also communicated to a subsidiary."; "Thus, if a corporation with a legal interest in an attorney-client communication relays it to another related corporation, the attorney-client privilege is not thereby waived."; "The Ninth Circuit has observed in dicta that 'communications between employees of a subsidiary corporation and counsel for the parent corporation, like communications between former employees and corporate counsel, would be privileged if the employee possesses information critical to the representation of the parent company and the communications concern matters within the scope of employment.'. . . Moreover, the clear implication of this dictum -- that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary should be treated as a single entity for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege doctrine -- has found support in a number of district court decisions applying federal common law privilege rules.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-09 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Environnement N.A. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154717 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2014)
("The Court finds that the privilege attaching to these documents has not been waived. The presence of a third party does not waive the attorney-client privilege if that presence is 'essential to and in furtherance of the communication.'. . . To the extent that these documents were shared within the corporate family, such as those sent to or from VE [parent corporation], such involvement was essential to and in furtherance of the communications with the attorneys involved.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-31 Federal DE

Chapter: 26.902
Case Name: Crabb v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., No 91-5474, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38268, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1992)
("It is well settled that attorney-client privilege is not waived merely because the communications involved extend across corporate structures to encompass parent corporations, subsidiary corporations, and affiliated corporations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1992-01-06 Federal B 8/13

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Huntington Chase Condominium Assoc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 16 C 4877, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14082 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2017)
("However, if a control group member communicates with someone outside of the control group, the privilege is lost.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-01 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Thomas v. Kellogg Company, Case No. C13-5136-RBL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66881 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2016)
("Documents disseminated beyond those with a 'need to know' for legal advice purposes are not privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-20 Federal WA

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: EEOC v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11-cv-11732-DJC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161929 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2015)
("Communications retain their privileged status if relayed to other employees or officers of the corporation who need to know the information. When the communications are repeated to employees who do not need the information to carry out their work or make decisions, the privilege is lost.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-02 Federal MA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Whitney v. Tallgrass Beef Company LLC, Case No. 13 C 7322, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78956 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015)
(finding that a company president fell within the Illinois control group, but that the company's controller did not; "Illinois applies the control group test to determine if communications between a corporation and its counsel are protected. . . . The Court is satisfied that Bloom meets this test by virtue of his position as the Agency's President."; "Corporate employees qualify as the 'client' for purposes of the attorney-client privilege under Illinois law only when they satisfy the control group test. . . . Plaintiffs must show that Ms. Whitney [Company's controller] is part of the Agency's 'top management who have the ability to make a final decision' rather than only advisory decisions."; "Plaintiffs do not rely on her position as the Agency's controller to support their claim. They appear to assume that Whitney's employee status confers a common legal interest per se. If that were the case, corporations could routinely disseminate privileged communications with all of their employees and hide beneath the broad cloak of the common interest doctrine. Clearly, that is not the case. Thus Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that emails that included her did not waive the attorney-client privilege. Assertions of the work product doctrine are waived for the same reasons.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-18 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Whitney v. Tallgrass Beef Company LLC, Case No. 13 C 7322, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78956 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015)
(inexplicably holding that intra-corporate disclosure of work product to an employee outside the control group waived the work product protection; "Plaintiffs do not rely on her position as the Agency's controller to support their claim. They appear to assume that Whitney's employee status confers a common legal interest per se. If that were the case, corporations could routinely disseminate privileged communications with all of their employees and hide beneath the broad cloak of the common interest doctrine. Clearly, that is not the case. Thus Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that emails that included her did not waive the attorney-client privilege. Assertions of the work product doctrine are waived for the same reasons.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-18 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: AU Electronics, Inc. v. Harleysville Group, Inc., Case No. 13 C 5947, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72862 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2014)
(explaining that disclosing privileged communications under the control group standard to those outside the control group waived attorney-client privilege protection; "Under Illinois law, privileged communications lose their privileged status if disseminated to person not in the control group.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-28 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: AU Electronics, Inc. v. Harleysville Group, Inc., Case No. 13 C 5947, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72862 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2014)
(explaining that disclosing privileged communications under the control group standard to those outside the control group waived attorney-client privilege protection; "Under Illinois law, privileged communications lose their privileged status if disseminated to person not in the control group.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-28 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Sullivan v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., Case No. 12 C 7528, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82407 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2013)
(analyzing the control group standard in connection with a former lawyer's lawsuit for a contingent fee; carefully analyzing several employees' status in connection with plaintiff's argument that disclosing privileged communications to the employees waived the privilege; finding that some employees were inside the control group and some were outside the control group; citing an affidavit that established the control group membership to an employee; holding that the defendant's Asset Manager in the defendant's real estate organization was inside the control group; "Colin Cameron is a former Asset Manager in Defendant's Real Estate organization. In his affidavit, Mr. Cameron states '[i]t was [his] job' during the 2010 tax appeal to provide his opinion and advise both Patrick Morrison and Lewis Lefkowitz. . . . Mr. Mendoza, who attests that he is 'personally familiar with the key employees involved with the decision-making process' regarding the tax appeal states that Mr. Cameron was the 'primary contact/client for the 2010 tax appeal' and that 'his analysis and recommendation were part of ALU's decision to settle the appeal. . . . Plaintiffs do not contest the factual allegations underlying these contentions. Thus, Defendant has sufficiently shown that Mr. Cameron was an employee for the period in question 'whose advisory role on top management in particular area is such that a decision would not normally be made without [his] advice or opinion' and thus was a member of Defendant's control group."; also finding that the head of the defendant's real estate was within the control group; "Mr. Morrison states that he is the head of the ALU Real Estate organization for the Americas, and according to Mr. Mendoza was Mr. Cameron's former manager. . . . Mr. Morrison further states that he 'had the authority to make the final decisions with respect to the 2010 tax appeal and settlement thereof' and made such decisions. . . . Mr. Mendoza corroborates this information in his affidavit. . . . In addition, in their Supplemental Memorandum in support of the Motion, Plaintiffs have noted their willingness to consider that Mr. Morrison qualifies as a control group member. . . . Thus, Defendant has made a sufficient showing that Mr. Morrison qualifies as a 'top management person[] who ha[s] the responsibility of making final decisions' such that he falls within Defendant's control group."; finding that two other employees were outside the control group; "Defendant did not submit affidavits from Mr. Hullings or Mr. Viollt, but contends that they too are members of the control group. With respect to Mr. Hullings, Mr. Cameron described Mr. Hullings as an "Economic Analysis Manager' who along with Mr. Cameron, 'created various correspondence and documents' in order 'to seek legal advice from Mr. Lefkowitz and to illustrate [his] opinions and advice for Mr. Morrison.'. . . Specifically, Mr. Mendoza identifies Mr. Hullings as an individual who 'Mr. Cameron relied in part' upon for 'information and input . . . In order to make a recommendation on the settlement of the 2010 tax appeal.'. . . Similarly, with respect to Mr. Viollt, Mr. Cameron avers that Mr. Viollt is an 'Area Master Planner/Manager in ALU's real estate organization' who reported directly to Mr. Cameron and created documents in order to seek legal advice from Mr. Lefkowitz."; "Defendant has not satisfied its burden of showing that Mr. Viollt and Mr. Hullings are control group members. Specifically, Defendant has not made a sufficient factual showing that Mr. Viollt and Mr. Hullings are individual whom 'top management would normally consult in making decisions' as opposed to those who merely supply information to top management. Although Mr. Morrison states in his affidavit that he 'would not have made a decision with respect to the 2010 tax appeal . . . Without seeking the advice and opinions of Mr. Cameron and his team,' which presumably includes Mr. Viollt and Mr. Hullings, Defendant fails to provide sufficient factual detail in its affidavits to bear out this determination with respect to Mr. Viollt and Mr. Hullings. Trustmark Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18917, 2000 WL 1898518, at *6 (focus of the control group inquiry is 'on individual people who substantially influenced decisions, not on facts that substantially influenced decisions'). As such, any distribution of documents to Mr. Hullings and Mr. Viollt as non-control group members destroys the privilege. See Sterling Fin. Mgmt., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 448; see also Trustmark Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18917, 2000 WL 1898518, at *4. Consequently, the attorney-client privilege does not protect the following documents listed in Defendant's Second Revised Privilege Log that members of the control group distributed to non-control group members . . . .").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-12 Federal IL

Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: Sterling Finance Mgmt., L.P. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., No. 1-02-0575, 2002 Ill. App. LEXIS 1249 (Ill. App. 1d 6th Div. Dec. 20, 20002)
(finding that intra-corporate disclosure of a privileged communication to someone outside a corporation's control group waived the privilege; "As the trial court additionally noted, with respect to the Mendelson [defendant's outside council] report, its distribution to Goulard [defendant's employee] destroyed any privilege that existed. Distribution of otherwise privileged materials to individuals outside the corporation's control group destroys the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-20 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.903
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15646, at *100 n.51 &99 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001)
(upholding a privilege claim for materials created during an internal corporate investigation into alleged legal firearm sales; noting that the pertinent documents were circulated only among company executives with a need to know, and were labeled as protected; "The communications related to the corporate review were disseminated only among the employee members of the Doe Corp. Team, the individuals charged with acting upon counsel's advice. . . . A few documents created by the Doe Corp. Team submitted by Doe Corp. as privileged do not copy counsel. Those communications were shared between and among members of the Doe Corp. Team tasked with providing reports and recommendations to counsel. Because I find that those documents 'would not have been created had [the team] not needed the assistance of counsel,'. . . I find these documents to be privileged."; "'Further evidencing the privileged nature of these documents is that a majority of the communications are marked with a privilege legend.'") (emphases added)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-10-03 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Valassis Communications, Inc. v. News Corporation, 17-cv-7378 (PKC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160234 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2018)
(after reviewing documents in camera; "Courts in this district focus on whether the legal advice was disclosed 'to employees of the corporation who are not in a position to act or rely on the legal advice.'. . . If the legal advice is disclosed in this fashion, the attorney-client privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-09-19 Federal NY
Comment:

Key Case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: United States v. Halliburton Co., Case No. 1:05-CV-1276, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162680 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2014)
("The cornerstone requirement of the attorney-client privilege is intent to keep the communication confidential. That is, '[t]he circumstances must indicate that the communicating persons reasonably believed that the communication would be confidential.' In the corporate context, this requires that internal corporate communications be shared no more widely than necessary to implement the lawyer's advice. Typically, this means that the attorney-client privilege only covers a lawyer's communications with officers and employees with the responsibility for acting on the lawyer's advice. Sharing of otherwise confidential information within a corporation even if the sharing is only with employees can result in loss of the privilege if the sharing goes beyond this 'need-to-know limitation.'"; "Crucially, the litigation hold notices at issue here were sent to large groups such as 'all KBR employees.' Furthermore, follow-up emails encouraged employees to share some of the litigation hold notices with other employees who may not have received or read the first notice. No warning was given that these notices should be disseminated no more widely than necessary. No directive was issued telling employees not to discuss the litigation hold notices outside the company. KBR has thus failed to demonstrate its intent to keep these communications confidential, and the attorneyclient privilege does not apply."; "'The notices did contain a header describing them as 'Privileged & Confidential.' This designation is not, however, controlling. This type of boilerplate labeling, without any more detailed instruction about the scope of the confidentiality, is not a concrete direction to employees to avoid disclosing the substance of the document. Moreover, follow-up emails encouraging employees to share the notice amongst themselves would destroy whatever confidentiality may have existed.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-20 Federal DC

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Nalco Co., Inc. v. Baker Hughes Inc., Civ. A. No. 4:09-CV-1885, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111127 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2017)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege can protect employee-to-employee communications under certain circumstances; examining the withheld emails in deciding privilege protection; "Communications that reflect counsel's advice to the corporation do not lose their privileged status when shared among corporate employees who share responsibility for the subject matter of the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-18 Federal TX

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: United States v. Owensboro Dermatology Assoc., P.S.C., Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00003-JHM, Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00004-JHM, Civ. A. No. 4:16-mc-00005-JHM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105099 (D. Ky. July 7, 2017)
("[T]he undersigned finds that each document predominantly involves legal advice within the retention of the counsel involved and is properly restricted to persons within the privilege sphere.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-07 Federal KY

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., MDL No. 2591, Case No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44192 (D. Kansas March 24, 2017)
(in an opinion by Special Master, finding that a former Monsanto lawyer and business person did not resist discovery after being designated by defendant as a testifying expert; "[W]ith very few exceptions, Monsanto's privilege log lists the recipients of the various documents as simply 'Monsanto Company,' without delineating the individual recipients (or their corresponding professional titles or job positions). By this description, Monsanto has chosen to leave the undersigned in the dark as to whether the documents were shared only with key Monsanto managers needing legal advice, or whether they also were shared widely with lower-level employees. In other words, the undersigned have no way of determining whether the multitudes of persons who were sent particular documents were attorneys or business persons, and with respect to the latter category, whether they had a need to know the contents of those documents.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-03-24 Federal KS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "This document is not privileged."; "Although the email is written to counsel asking him to approve something, it is not an attorney-client privileged communication for a couple of reasons. First, the request seems more business in nature as opposed to legal."; "Second, there are multiple parties to the conversation that remove it from any privileged protection that might otherwise exist. Defendant has not established that any of the copied recipients are necessary to the privileged communication. This especially applies to Ms. Weston, an employee of XEROX, a copy company. A critical element of the attorney-client privilege is the concept of confidentiality; an intention to keep the communication closely-held. Parties cannot have an expectation of confidentiality -- at least not to the level that the communication could be privileged – when a non-Hertz employee is involved in the communication, and there is no treatment of the document as confidential.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "This document is not privileged."; "First, the document includes as a carbon copy a Xerox employee, Ms. Weston. Ms. Weston is not an attorney or client in any way relating to Hertz, nor has Defendant established that she is an 'agent' for purposes of expanding the attorney-client privilege."; "Second, the document itself is a training document that is not 'legal' but part of the Hertz 'business.' Thus, any attorney included in the email is acting in a business capacity, not in the capacity of an attorney providing legal advice. Thus, there is no privilege that applies."; "Third, apart from Ms. Weston, there are numerous recipients of the email (direct and cc'd) that Defendant has not established are necessary intermediaries for Hertz's counsel to provide legal advice. Only those employees that 'need to know' are permitted to be included in privileged communications and Defendant has failed to establish that each and every recipient involved 'needed to know' attorney-client privileged communications.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "Although the document is labeled 'CPCC/US CLASS ACTION/Confidential,' and although it is responding to Nuns Moodliar, an attorney, the email is written to 7 additional recipients and carbon copied to 4 more, for a total of 11 email recipients separate and apart from the attorney (Moodliar) and client (Quinquenel), neither of which, it should be noted, are employed by Defendant in this case. The document is not privileged because Defendant has not established that all of the individuals that are included on this email are necessary intermediaries or that they 'need to know' the legal communication made. The attorney-client privilege is meant to be an intimate relationship. Sending an email to 11 people, not one of whom is employed by the Defendant in this case, suggests lack of privilege and/or waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Sushi Avenue, Inc., Civ. No. 15-4112 ADM/LIB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *10 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2017)
April 12, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Illogical and Frightening 'Need to Know' Doctrine'"

Corporations face two possible impediments when claiming privilege protection for purely internal communications. First, some courts see widespread intra-corporate circulation as tending to show that the communications primarily dealt with business rather than legal matters. This approach makes some sense, although a few courts take it to an unjustifiable extreme – applying a per se rule that the privilege cannot protect communications an employee sends both to a lawyer and to a non-lawyer requesting their input.

Second, the more frightening doctrine involves the "need to know" standard. In Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Sushi Avenue, Inc., the court rejected plaintiff’s privilege claim for several internal documents – because it had not established with evidence that the documents "were not disseminated beyond those persons who needed to know their contents." Civ. No. 15-4112 ADM/LIB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *10 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2017).

Many courts follow this troubling waiver approach – which can force corporations to turn over to litigation adversaries purely internal communications simply because they were shared with a few employees who did not need them. Because this doctrine focuses mostly on lawyers' communication to their corporate clients' employees, we have the primary responsibility to limit internal circulation and re-circulation of our advice.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-15 Federal MN
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Peerless Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Sushi Avenue, Inc., Civ. No. 15-4112 ADM/LIB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2017)
("Peerless thus recognized that in establishing privilege, it had the burden to convince Judge Brisbois that the communications at issue were not disseminated beyond those persons who needed to know their contents. Peerless did not explain the corporate role of any individuals other than the four identified for purposes of the second element, electing instead to broadly assert the conclusion that the communications were not shared beyond those who needed to know their contents."; "In viewing the disputed communications in camera, Judge Brisbois discovered that many of the communications were copied to individuals whose identity and role Peerless did not explain.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-15 Federal MN

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Crane Security Technologies, Inc. v. Rolling Optics, AB, Civ. A. No. 14-124280-LTS, 2017 U.S. Dist. 15529 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2017)
("The court also finds that the communications in question were limited to those in a 'need to know' position regarding attorneys' advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-03 Federal MA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re Riddell Concussion Reduction Litig., Civ. No. 13-7585 (JBS/JS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168457, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2016)
("Many of the challenged documents involve communications between and amongst Riddell's employees that do not involve an attorney. The Court agrees with Riddell that simply sharing documents amongst corporate employees does not necessarily vitiate a privilege. These communications remain privileged if they assist the attorney to formulate and render legal advice. . . . However, the privilege is waived if the document is shared beyond persons with a 'need to know.'" (citation omitted)).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-12-05 Federal NJ

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 01-3894 Consolidated with: Nos. 01-6764,03-6872,15-1017,15-1049,15-1190,15-2602,15-2961,15-3047, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153142 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016)
(rejecting as "conjecture" plaintiffs' argument that internal Allstate documents did not deserve privilege protection because they may have been disclosed to employees who did not need them; "Plaintiffs also argue that documents for which the source is listed only as 'Allstate' may have lost their privileged status on the ground that Allstate may have disclosed them to employees who did not need to access them. . . . Here, the authors and recipients of the documents in question are known and provide ample basis for determining the applicability of privilege. Allstate has explained that the custodians of the documents are not known because no record of them was made when the documents initially were produced in 2000-2002. Plaintiffs' assertion that the documents may have been circulated widely enough to waive the privilege is nothing more than conjecture. In light of the scope of these consolidated cases and the passage of time since the initial production, this speculative possibility does not justify a waiver of the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-04 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 01-3894 Consolidated with: Nos. 01-6764,03-6872,15-1017,15-1049,15-1190,15-2602,15-2961,15-3047, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153142 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016)
(rejecting as "conjecture" plaintiffs' argument that internal Allstate documents did not deserve privilege protection because they may have been disclosed to employees who did not need them; "Plaintiffs also argue that documents for which the source is listed only as 'Allstate' may have lost their privileged status on the ground that Allstate may have disclosed them to employees who did not need to access them. . . . Here, the authors and recipients of the documents in question are known and provide ample basis for determining the applicability of privilege. Allstate has explained that the custodians of the documents are not known because no record of them was made when the documents initially were produced in 2000-2002. Plaintiffs' assertion that the documents may have been circulated widely enough to waive the privilege is nothing more than conjecture. In light of the scope of these consolidated cases and the passage of time since the initial production, this speculative possibility does not justify a waiver of the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-11-04 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Matter of Harold Peerenboom v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 162152/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2016)
(in a defamation action by a condo resident against neighbor and Marvel Entertainment CEO, holding that defendant had waived his privilege protection by using the company's server; explaining the context: "Peerenboom [Plaintiff] opposes the motions, contending that Perlmutter waived all privileges, inasmuch as Perlmutter [the neighbor and Marvel Entertainment CEO] sent or received the subject e-mail messages on Marvel's server, and Marvel's written computer usage handbook, as drafted by its corporate parent, the Walt Disney Company (Disney), provides that 'hardware, software, e-mail, voicemail, intranet and Internet access, computer files and programs -- including any information you create, send, receive, download or store on Company assets -- are Company property, and [it] reserve[s] the right to monitor their use, where permitted by law to do so."; "The court agrees with Peerenboom that use of a proprietary e-mail system, subject to an employer's computer usage policy such as the one adopted by Marvel, constitutes a waiver of any privilege that can otherwise be unilaterally asserted by a declarant or the intended audience of an otherwise confidential communication. The use of one's own personal home computer to communicate with an attorney on a private, unencrypted e-mail account does not vitiate the attorney-client privilege or the work-product privilege, inasmuch the client may reasonably maintain an expectation that the communications are private and confidential."; explaining Marvel corporate parent Disney's personnel policy ; "Disney's computer usage policy prohibits personal and other objectionable use of Marvel's server and e-mail system, Disney/Marvel had the right to monitor the use of all employees' computer usage, third parties have a right of access to the computer, Disney/Marvel expressly asserted a possessory interest in all e-mails sent and received on its servers, and Perlmutter was or should have been aware, as Marvel's Chairman or CEO, that Marvel implemented Disney's use and monitoring policies. Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, application of the factors articulated in Asia Global warrants a finding that Perlmutter did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in connection with electronic messages sent and received on Marvel's server, and has waived the attorney-client and work-product privileges in connection with them."; not addressing the different waiver rules for work product, although finding waiver of work product protection)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-09-30 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. 3:13-cv-06529, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44267, at *82 84 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2016)
("Under both West Virginia law and federal law, the withheld ASO documents are protected from disclosure under attorney-client privilege. First, Ford's OGC, specifically Mr. Logel, and Ford's ASO contemplated that an attorney-client relationship existed at the time that the OGC engaged the ASO to analyze the VOQs and TREAD Act data. Mr. Logel's affidavit, Mr. Love's affidavit, and Mr. Nevi's deposition testimony all support this conclusion. Second, as explained above, the ASO prepared and submitted the logged documents at the request of the OGC for the purpose of rendering legal advice to Ford. Although Ford's OGC may have been the initiating party by requesting that the ASO conduct an analysis of the pertinent data, that fact alone does not render the attorney-client privilege inapplicable. As explained above, communications during fact-finding investigations conducted by an attorney in his or her legal capacity are protected. . . . Indeed, even with the understanding that the privilege should be construed narrowly . . . it would be an unreasonable interpretation of the privilege to hold that a proactive, fastidious in-house attorney who seeks information from his client for the purpose of rendering legal advice cannot claim privilege over the information that he receives in response to his request simply because he was the first to act. . . . Third, and finally, the communication of the information (i.e. the sending of the documents) from Ford's ASO to the OGC was intended to be confidential. As Mr. Logel's affidavit explains, '[t]he documents identified on Ford's ASO Privilege Log have not been disseminated beyond those Ford employees and consultants working directly with Ford's counsel in this regard.' . . . There is no evidence that Mr. Logel's assertion is false or that it was 'the intention or understanding of [Ford] that the communication [was] to be made known to others.'" (citation and footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-28 Federal WV B 8/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Foster v. City of New York, 14 Civ. 4142 (PGG) (JCF), 14 Civ. 9220 (PGG) (JCF), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14594 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016)
Foster v. City of New York, 14 Civ. 4142 (PGG) (JCF), 14 Civ. 9220 (PGG) (JCF), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14594 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016) (in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Francis, finding that the defendant City triggered a waiver by seeking to avoid liquidated damages by claiming subjective good faith in attempting to comply with FLSA guidelines, and finding a broad scope of waiver that included communication with any level of City employees, but not extending to lawyer-to-lawyer communications that did not involve City employees; "[T]o avoid the award of liquidated damages, a defendant who has violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA must prove that it "acted in subjective 'good faith' and had objectively 'reasonable grounds' for believing that the acts or omissions giving rise to the failure did not violate the [statute].". . . To meet the subjective prong, "an employer must show that it took 'active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FLSA and then act to comply with them.'"; "The defendant asserts it implemented policies and procedures 'to ensure compliance with the FLSA after consultation with counsel for the City of New York.'"; "The City's good faith defense has effected an implied waiver here. . . . The question, as noted above, is the waiver's scope."; "The City has said it relied on the advice of counsel in formulating its FLSA compliance policies. It has therefore waived protection over communications related to legal advice about this compliance shared between attorneys and non-attorney employees, whether those employees are 'decision-makers' or 'lower level employees' who might provide input to the process. Indeed, to the extent that such advice was provided to employees completely disconnected from the decision-making chain, the City has waived attorney-client privilege over those communications, as well. . . . Therefore, the defendant shall produce communications between counsel working on behalf of the City (whether from the Law Department, either of the agencies' legal departments, or outside counsel) and any non-attorney employee of the agencies or the City, as long as it is relevant to advice provided to the agencies or the City regarding the agencies' FLSA compliance."; "The remaining category of information at issue is attorney-to-attorney communications. The plaintiffs contend that these are discoverable."; "The City argues that the good faith defense depends on its 'state of mind' which could not have been influenced by information it never heard. . . . To be sure, the reasonableness of the City's reliance on the advice of counsel could be undermined if, for example, the plaintiffs showed that counsel's legal analysis was cursory or otherwise obviously flawed. However, this information would be of limited use to the plaintiffs unless they could show that the City knew (or should have known) that the analysis was deficient.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-05 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: EEOC v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11-cv-11732-DJC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161929, at *5-6 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2015)
February 3, 2016 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"What is the "Need to Know" Standard?"

Under the majority Upjohn approach, the attorney-client privilege can protect lawyers' communications with any level of corporate client employee — if the lawyers need the employees' factual information before giving their corporate clients legal advice. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn focuses on clients' communications of facts to lawyers, not lawyers' communications of legal advice to clients. The latter communications implicate the "need to know" standard. The Upjohn standard expands corporations' privilege protection, while the "need to know" standard constricts it.

In EEOC v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., the court articulated the unfortunate but widely accepted principle that privileged intra-corporate "[c]ommunications retain their privileged status if relayed to other employees or officers of the corporation who need to know the information. When the communications are repeated to employees who do not need the information to carry out their work or make decisions, the privilege is lost." Civ. A. No. 11-cv-11732-DJC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161929, at *5-6 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2015).

At first blush, this "need to know" standard seems inconsistent with Upjohn. An example might explain the difference. A company's lawyer can have an Upjohn-protected interview with a company's employee who happened to see a visitor fall in the lobby. But that employee does not "need to know" the lawyer's legal advice about the company's possible liability or defenses. The "need to know" standard does not make much sense — it can force a corporation to provide a litigation adversary purely internal privileged communications simply because a few extra employees (bound by their own confidentiality duty) happened to also receive those communications.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-02 Federal MA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Cohen v. Trump, Civ. No. 13-CV-2519-GPC (WVG), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2015)
(holding that an executive of a corporate affiliate was within the privilege, so his presence did not destroy the privilege protection, and disclosing privileged communications that did not waive the privilege; "The privilege may also be waived in the corporate context 'if the communications are disclosed to employees who did not need access to them.'. . . This waiver applies only 'when the communications are relayed to those who do not need the information to carry out their work or make effective decisions on the part of the company.'"; "Because the attorney-client privilege only applies to communications made in confidence, a communication loses its protection if made in the presence of third parties, or disseminated beyond the group of corporate employees who have a need to know in the scope of their corporate responsibilities.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-09 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 12-CV-08333 (ALC) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40176 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2015)
("Corporations may be considered clients for the purposes of attorney-client privilege, and the internal communication of corporate legal advice does not necessarily waive the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-27 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 12-CV-08333 (ALC) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40176 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2015)
("The content of the messages is clearly related to implementing the advice Chipotle received from Messner Reeves [Law firm], and as a large corporation, Chipotle could not realistically have acted on that advice without communicating it to its own employees. Accordingly, to the extent that it is correct that all recipients were able to act upon or implement the information or advice they received (and given their titles the Court assumes that is the case), the e-mails and the attachments are privileged. To hold otherwise would disable corporations from implementing legal advice, exactly what Upjohn seeks to avoid.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-27 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 12-CV-08333 (ALC) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40176 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 2015)
("A corporate entity's attorney-client privilege may, however, be waived by disclosure of the communication to employees of the corporation who are not in a position to act or rely on the legal advice contained in the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-27 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re PWK Timberland, LLC, Case No. 13-20242, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 248 (W.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015)
("Courts have generally held that the transmission of privileged communications within a corporation does not automatically waive the attorney-client relationship.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-27 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Garvey v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 11-cv-03764-LB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7042 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015)
(finding that defendant Hulu did not waive its privilege by allowing employees not involved in the pertinent situation access to privileged documents; "Communications within a corporation are often distributed in ways that draw additional rules from the privilege doctrine. The plaintiffs rightly note that a 'need to know' standard generally governs whether the privilege shields communications that are disseminated to corporate employees. E.g., Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463-64 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). The test is straightforward: '[D]id the recipient need to know the content of the communication in order to perform her job effectively or to make informed decisions concerning, or affected by, the subject matter of the communication?' Id. (citing cases). 'Only when the communications are relayed to those who do not need the information to carry out their work or make effective decisions on the part of the company is the privilege lost.'"; "In neither case was the contested information disseminated too widely to maintain confidentiality. The JIRA system is not public. Only Hulu employees may access it. Both tickets, moreover, involved only those employees who were working on the given issues and who, again, sought or discussed the legal advice they needed to effectively address the problems before them. Confidentiality is not destroyed by the possibility that other Hulu employees, not directly participating in the 4328 and 1130 tickets, could have accessed those documents over the JIRA system. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142 (D. Del. 1982) ('[T]hat some unauthorized personnel may purposely or inadvertently read a privileged document does not render that document nonconfidential.'). Material need not be 'kept under lock and key to remain confidential' for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. See Dish Network, 283 F.R.D. at 425 [United States v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 283 F.R.D. 420, 423 (C.D. Ill. 2012)]. 'The privileged communications were properly limited to employees who reasonably needed the information to perform their duties for the corporation.' Id. The material was kept sufficiently confidential and is privileged.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-21 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Chevron Midstream Pipelines LLC v. Settoon Towing LLC, Civ. A. No. 13-2809c/w13-3197, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179284 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2015)
(holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine protected Chevron's "legally chartered" "root cause analysis" of a fatal pipeline accident, although in-house lawyer's affidavit explained that Chevron anticipated litigation, and as such "legally chartered root cause investigations are not routine"; "Many of these documents indicate that they were sent to non-lawyers in the company and, while Youngblood stated in his declaration that he kept information related to the RCA investigation in the 'strictest' of confidence, he did not (and likely cannot) say the same thing about the various non-lawyers who received the subject documents. Chevron has not satisfied its burden as to its claims of attorney-client privilege over these documents.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-05 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2437, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144263 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2014)
(concluding that a company's antitrust compliance policy did not deserve privilege protection; also noting the following: "CertainTeed's argument that it has maintained the policy in confidence because it has not distributed it outside the company is undermined by the wide distribution of the policy within the organization. CertainTeed distributed the policy to more than 120 employees who attended a training session and made it available to numerous employees on an internal Internet site. Moreover, there is no evidence CertainTeed labeled the document as confidential or privileged or indicated it had that status to employees when distributing the policy.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-09 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: International Cards Co., Ltd. v. MasterCard International Inc., 13-CV-02576 (LGS) (SN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125370 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014)
("A corporate entity's attorney-client privilege can also be waived by disclosure of the communication to employees of the corporation who are not in a position to act or rely on the legal advice contained in the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-27 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Int'l Cards Co., Ltd. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., No. 13-CV-02576 (LGS) (SN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125370, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014)
("A corporate entity's attorney-client privilege can also be waived by disclosure of the communication to employees of the corporation who are not in a position to act or rely on the legal advice contained in the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-27 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A, Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014)
June 25, 2014 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"How Do Courts Treat LLCs for Privilege Purposes?"

Limited Liability Corporations combine the characteristics of corporations and partnerships. Few courts have dealt with the privilege implications of these hybrid business entities.

In Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family LLC, the court acknowledged that "[t]he application of attorney-client privilege to members of an LLC is a relatively uncharted area of law." No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014). The court ultimately applied the privilege principles applicable to corporations. After reviewing withheld documents in camera, the court concluded that despite the LLC's designation of one person to be the LLC's "sole manager," several other LLC members actually "communicated with each other and with the LLC's attorneys about legal advice relating to the LLC's business." Id. at *10-11. Because these members acted as the LLC's day-to-day "managing members," "disclosure of confidential information received by one managing member of the LLC to another managing member does not, by itself, defeat the attorney-client privilege." Id. at *11-12.

Lawyers representing LLCs should explicitly articulate various individuals' roles in seeking and acting on their legal advice, laying the groundwork for both privilege and non-waiver assertions if the need arises.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-18 Federal CA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Carpenters Pension Trust v. Lindquist Family, LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335 (N.D. Cal. April 18, 2014)
("The disclosure of confidential information received by one managing member of the LLC to another managing member does not, by itself, defeat the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-18 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 7:12-CV-00578, slip op. at 6, 7 (W.D. Va. May 31, 2013)
("McAirlaids further argues that even if the redacted statements were privileged, the privilege was waived because the IAS [Intellectual Assets Strategy] document was disseminated to K-C employees beyond a 'need to know' basis."; "K-C asserts that the IAS document was treated as a confidential and highly sensitive business document, that it was disseminated only within K-C, and that it was shared with a limited number of people with a need to know the information contained in the redacted sections. . . . Specifically, based upon Mr. Rooyakkers current recollection, the IAS document was shared with the Director of Research and Engineering, the Product Technical Leader, a Research and Engineering Specialist, a Patent Strategist and a Research and Engineering Senior Manager. . . . Based upon the declaration of Mr. Rooyakkers, I find that the IAS document was disseminated only to those K-C employees with a 'need to know' the information, and thus that the privilege has not been waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-05-31 State VA B 3/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Digital Vending Servs. Intl, Inc. v. Univ. of Phoenix, A. No. 2:09cv555, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *24 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2013)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege is not waived in the corporate context, when the communication is restricted to those who need to know.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-22 Federal VA B 3/14

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: United States v. Nosal, No. CR-08-0237 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49745, at *10 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013)
("'Defendant's argument that disclosing the interview notes to the Korn/Ferry [defendant's former employer] board of directors also appears to be based on a misreading of the case S.E.C. v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371, 375 (N.D. Cal. 2008). In Roberts, the court found that the privileged nature of certain documents were lost when the law firm provided the documents to the board of directors of a company, but this was because the court explicitly found that the firm's client was a special committee of the board, and not the board itself. . . . There is no suggestion that this is the case here.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-05 Federal CA B 3/14

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 643 (D. Nev. 2013)
("After reviewing the document, the court has determined that the initial e-mail was sent to outside counsel for purposes of obtaining legal advice. The fact that it was forwarded on to Dr. Lehmann, Bard's consultant at the time, does not defeat the privilege. Plaintiff has conceded that Dr. Lehmann was considered the 'functional equivalent' of a Bard employee. . . . In addition, Bard represents that the other non-lawyer employees who were copied on the initial e-mail were given this information in order to perform their jobs. Bard has supplied the affidavit of Donna L. Passero, Esq., which indicates that Bard has a policy that communications between and among Bard employees and counsel, made for the purposes of giving or receiving legal advice and those created in anticipation of litigation are kept confidential.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NV B 3/14

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No. 09 2051 MD ALTONAGA/SIMONTON, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151014, at *66 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012)
(relying on an ex parte affidavit of a company's in house lawyer to find that the privilege protected intra corporate communications; "[A]lmost all of the persons identified on the documents as either the author or one of the recipients were either attorneys, Directors at P&G of departments relevant to the legal subjects at issue, or persons who would have access to information necessary to Mr. Franz's information gathering task. Thus, this is not a case where otherwise protected documents were distributed widely to persons who did not need to be informed of the legal advice disseminated by P&G's counsel." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-10-18 Federal FL B 12/13

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., Civ. No. 10-4413 (FSH) (PS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97515, at *8 (D.N.J. July 13, 2012)
("The attorney-client privilege is waived if the document is shared beyond those with a need to know, and '[g]eneral, group-wide descriptions such as "management" do not allow for the court to assess whether the recipients require, or have the capacity to act upon, the information distributed.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-07-13 Federal NJ B 7/13

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 247, 252-53, 253 & n.2 (E.D. Va. 2012)
("Third, 290 entries concern communications to ten or more non attorneys. Lawson does not deny this, but claims that it was required to widely disseminate information because of the injunction, which applied to a broad group of people. Communications within a corporation are only protected if the party claiming privilege can demonstrate that the persons to whom the communications were made had the 'need to know' the information communicated. Deel v. Bank of America, N.A., 227 F.R.D. 456, 460 (W.D. Va. 2005) ) (citations omitted)."; "Here, Lawson has not argued that the individuals listed in any of the 290 entries had a need to know as defined by Deel or that they should enjoy the protection provided by Upjohn. It has not even established that the listed individuals are employees or that they needed to know the information communicated. Nor has Lawson asserted that the communications were made at the direction of supervisors. Quite simply, Lawson has not satisfied its burden to establish that a privilege applies. Thus, it has waived the privilege with respect to these entries."; "This is true also of the 39 entries in which Lawson identifies the recipient as an unidentified distribution list. Whether the persons on those lists have a 'need to know' the information communicated and whether those persons are employees who knew they were being communicated with by Lawson's counsel in its capacity as legal counsel is unclear. Lawson has waived its privilege with respect to these entries.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal VA B 3/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Fields v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 954 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)
("A document protected by an unqualified privilege is not waived by a party merely by allowing its own employee to review the document in preparation for a deposition. . . . There is no dispute that Latten and Russo are employed by the defendant. Thus, if the redacted information contains confidential communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, the privilege was not waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 State NY B 5/13

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Scott & Stringfellow, LLC v. AIG Commercial Equip. Fin., Inc., Civ. No. 3:10cv825-HEH-DWD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51028, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2011)
("A review of the ten documents submitted by AIGCEF reveals that the information conveyed was confined to AIGCEF counsel and employees. Therefore, the defendant AIGCEF did not waive its attorney-client privilege by voluntarily disclosing the information to a third party.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-05-12 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Deel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 227 F.R.D. 456, 460 (W.D. Va. 2005)
("A corporation does not waive its privilege when non-lawyer employees send or receive communications because corporate communications which are shared with those having need to know of the communications are confidential for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Santrade, Ltd. v General Elec. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1993).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2005-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Lewis v. Capital One Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:04CV186, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26978, at *20-21 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2004)
("Item 15 is an e-mail with a two-page spreadsheet attached. The spreadsheets are marked 'Confidential Not for Distribution Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege.' The spreadsheets outline male/female ratios, transfers, and voluntary attrition in a particular group. Defendant has attached the declaration of Katrina C. Randolph, which shows that Item 15 was created at the direction of the assistant general counsel for the purpose of providing confidential legal advice to a business client about employment issues related to anticipated litigation. The document was intended to be confidential communication between corporate counsel and a business client, and was not distributed to individuals other than those who had a 'need to know' in connection with the data.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2004-06-10 Federal VA B 3/14
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.904
Case Name: Jonathan Corp. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 693, 696 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(noting that, because of the "failure to indicate on the face of the memorandum that the document was confidential or contained attorney-client privileged information, coupled with the fact that the memorandum was distributed to six (6) employees, this court has serious doubts as to whether [the party] has met its burden of demonstrating that the document was intended to be confidential")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1987-01-01 Federal VA B 3/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.905
Case Name: Martin v. Copeland, Cause No. 2:16-CV-59-JVB-JEM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111756, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2018)
September 19, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

Court Assesses Implications of Privileged Communications' Inclusion in Employees' Personnel Files

Attorney-client privilege protection normally evaporates when the client abandons its confidentiality expectation. Under this basic principle, does placing privileged communications in an employee's personnel file forfeit privilege protection?

In Martin v. Copeland, , a terminated employee argued that her former employer "waived any possible claim to attorney-client privilege when [it] placed the attorney communications into Plaintiff's personnel file." Cause No. 2:16-CV-59-JVB-JEM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111756, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2018). The court rejected plaintiff's argument, noting that "[i]t is uncontested that Plaintiff never received a copy of the omitted communications; thus, no waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred." Id. The obvious implication is that plaintiff's review of the file might have destroyed the company's privilege.

It is unclear whether plaintiff could have (but did not) access her personnel file while employed. If so, defendant's argument would be more difficult. But most courts would still allow companies to withhold privileged documents that employees never saw.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-07-05 Federal

Chapter: 26.905
Case Name: Becker v. Willamette Community Bank, 6:12-cv-01427-TC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88616, *13-14 (D. Ore. June 20, 2014)
(analyzing a situation in which plaintiff was interviewed by a bank's in-house lawyer when her superior sued the bank, after which the bank fired her for helping the superior; holding that the plaintiff owned any privilege protection that covered her interview; "I find that defendant waived any privilege that applies to the document when the Bank voluntarily made it part of plaintiff's personnel record in the face of state law mandating disclosure of personnel records to employees on request. O.R.S. § 652.750. . . . Thus the document was part of Becker's 'virtual' personnel file, and it is inconsequential that it was not hard-copied into a physical file. Thus I find that the Bank waived any privileges that attached to this document by including it in her personnel records.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-20 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.905
Case Name: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Warns, Civ. No. CCB-11-1846, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44507, at *5-6 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014)
("Ms. Warns has not alleged that the information is not privileged, other than to suggest that the privilege has been waived because she has already seen the documents. . . . However, she saw the documents as an Allstate employee within the scope of the corporation's privilege. . . . No waiver occurred in that context. Because Ms. Warns is no longer an Allstate employee, however, disclosure of the documents to her in discovery would constitute a waiver of the privilege. In camera review of the exhibits to determine privilege is therefore unwarranted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-28 Federal MD B 3/14

Chapter: 26.905
Case Name: Lewis v. Capital One Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:04CV186, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26978, at *18-19 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2004)
("Item 9 was clearly meant to be both protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Item 9 is a memorandum from Capital One's in house attorney to Mr. Knowles and Melanie Lewis, created at the request of Ms. Lewis and Mr. Knowles for legal advice, and clearly marked attorney-client privilege / attorney work product. The memorandum provides legal advice relating to issues of supervision of Jannon Pierce, one of Plaintiff's Counsel's other clients. Plaintiff argues that Defendant somehow waived the privilege by sharing Item 9 with her during the scope of her employment. Plaintiff argues that she announced her belief that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her sex in October 2003. Plaintiff argues further that it was unreasonable for Defendant to believe that after her announcement, she would not share privileged information provided to her in the scope of her employment with her attorney. Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant waived its privilege by assuming that she would uphold her fiduciary duty to maintain her employer's confidences is unpersuasive. Item 9 falls within the attorney-client privilege and that privilege was not waived by Defendant.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2004-06-10 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.906
Case Name: Annese v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. CIV-17-655-C, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6343 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2019)
March 20, 2019 (PRIVILEGE POINTS)

"Can Business Persons' Access to Work Product Doom a Work Project Claim?"

The work product doctrine can protect documents primarily motivated by litigation or anticipated litigation, rather than prepared in the ordinary course of business or motivated by some other non-litigation purpose. But actions occurring after the documents' creation sometimes can reflect back on that key motivational element.

In Annese v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. CIV-17-655-C, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6343 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2019), the court analyzed defendant's work product claim for documents it created while investigating a tractor-trailer accident. The court acknowledged that defendant anticipated litigation, because plaintiff's lawyer threatened litigation the day after the accident. But the court denied defendant's work product claim -- emphasizing that the defendant's Director of Safety "has access to this information for non-litigation purposes." Id. at *5. The court concluded that "the portion of the claims file available [to defendant's Director of Safety] is discoverable to Plaintiff because it is generated in the ordinary course of business and not directly in anticipation of litigation." Id. at *6.

Many if not most courts would take a different approach, properly analyzing documents' creation rather than their post-creation availability to others. But maintaining the litigation focus of appropriately created work product enhances the chance for successfully claiming that protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2019-01-14 Federal OK
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.906
Case Name: Ryan v. Gifford, Civ. A. No. 2213-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *3, *10, *10-11, *11, *12, *12 n.9, *16, *17-18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2008) (unpublished opinion)
(addressing a situation in which the law firm of Orrick Herrington and forensic accounting firm LECG conducted an investigation into possible options backdating by executives and directors of Maxim; noting that Maxim's board established a Special Committee composed of a single director, which was not an "independent Special Litigation Committee" under Delaware law; explaining that the single-member Special Committee retained Orrick, who did not provide a written report but instead presented an oral report to a Maxim board meeting attended by three directors represented by the law firm of Quinn Emanuel in the derivative action that prompted Orrick Herrington's investigation; noting that Maxim's board found that some directors received backdated options, but did not take any action to recover any damages; further explaining that Maxim "provided details of this work to third-parties, including NASDAQ and publicly to investors (through the SEC Form 8 K). Moreover, the Special Committee itself provided a number of documents to the SEC, the United States Attorney's Office, and Maxim's current and former auditors."; also noting that "the director defendants in this case have specifically made use of the Special Committee's findings and conclusions for their personal benefit and have argued to this Court that the Special Committee's exoneration of them should be accorded deference. The director defendants have made these arguments in a brief, opposing plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, in which coincidentally Maxim has expressly joined. Further, the director defendants have extensively relied upon the Special Committee's findings both in opposing plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in support of their own motion for summary judgment. At the time of the November 30 decision, in their unamended summary judgment brief, the director defendants explicitly rely upon the unwritten 'findings' of the Special Committee that purport to absolve the director defendants of liability." (footnote omitted); "[T]he director defendants have submitted an amended brief in support of their motion for summary judgment that purports to disavow reliance on the Special Committee's findings, despite their explicit reliance thereon in the first brief in support of their motion."; noting that in an earlier opinion "the Court ruled that Maxim, its Special Committee and Orrick must produce all material[s] related to the Special Committee's investigation that were withheld on grounds of attorney-client privilege."; "The Court also directed Orrick to turn over its work-product, including its interview notes, for in camera review. Orrick does not seek to appeal any aspect of this Court's ruling, including the ruling that plaintiffs have made a showing of good cause to obtain its non-opinion work product."; noting that Maxim did not appeal the court's earlier decision that the Garner doctrine overcame any privilege claim; after explaining that the court's Garner determination "provides an independent basis" for its conclusion requiring Maxim to disclose the documents; also noting the directors' essentially inaccurate description about whether they were relying on Orrick Herrington's report; "At the time of the November 30 decision, however, the director defendants explicitly asserted that the findings of the Special Committee were entitled to deference from this Court. Moreover, even if this Court ignores the suspicious timing of the director defendants' purported disavowal of reliance on the investigation, Maxim seeks to further avail itself of the Special Committee's report, which will redound to the benefit of the director defendants."; declining to certify an appeal).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2008-01-02 State DE

Chapter: 26.906
Case Name: SEC v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371, 378 n.4, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(assessing privilege issues in connection with an internal corporate investigation of possible options backdating at McAfee, conducted by the Howrey law firm; concluding that the McAfee Board and the Special Committee did not share a common interest; "The court notes that not only is the Board not Howrey's client such that the attorney client privilege does not attach, the Board also does not have a common interest with the Special Committee since it was the Special Committee's mandate to ascertain whether members of the Board . . . May have engaged in wrongdoing. In this respect, this court disagrees with the conclusion reached in In Re BCE West, L.P., No. M-8-85, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12590, 2000 WL 1239117 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000)."; finding that Howrey's disclosure to the Board triggered a waiver; "Certain instances of waiver are straightforward. When Howrey 'detailed for the Board the various stock option issues, improprieties and erroneous option grant dates that were discovered in the investigation,' . . . It waived the work product privilege with respect to its conclusions regarding which option grant dates were improper or erroneous."; ultimately finding a broad scope of waiver, although applied on an interviewee by interviewee basis so that Howrey's disclosure of its opinions about the interview or the interviewee triggered a subject matter waiver covering materials that the law firm created during that interview).

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2008-01-01 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.906
Case Name: Lewis v. Capital One Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:04CV186, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26978, at *18-19 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2004)
("Item 9 was clearly meant to be both protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Item 9 is a memorandum from Capital One's in house attorney to Mr. Knowles and Melanie Lewis, created at the request of Ms. Lewis and Mr. Knowles for legal advice, and clearly marked attorney-client privilege / attorney work product. The memorandum provides legal advice relating to issues of supervision of Jannon Pierce, one of Plaintiff's Counsel's other clients. Plaintiff argues that Defendant somehow waived the privilege by sharing Item 9 with her during the scope of her employment. Plaintiff argues that she announced her belief that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her sex in October 2003. Plaintiff argues further that it was unreasonable for Defendant to believe that after her announcement, she would not share privileged information provided to her in the scope of her employment with her attorney. Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant waived its privilege by assuming that she would uphold her fiduciary duty to maintain her employer's confidences is unpersuasive. Item 9 falls within the attorney-client privilege and that privilege was not waived by Defendant.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2004-06-10 Federal

Chapter: 26.907
Case Name: Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 643 (D. Nev. 2013)
("After reviewing the document, the court has determined that the initial e-mail was sent to outside counsel for purposes of obtaining legal advice. The fact that it was forwarded on to Dr. Lehmann, Bard's consultant at the time, does not defeat the privilege. Plaintiff has conceded that Dr. Lehmann was considered the 'functional equivalent' of a Bard employee. . . . In addition, Bard represents that the other non-lawyer employees who were copied on the initial e-mail were given this information in order to perform their jobs. Bard has supplied the affidavit of Donna L. Passero, Esq., which indicates that Bard has a policy that communications between and among Bard employees and counsel, made for the purposes of giving or receiving legal advice and those created in anticipation of litigation are kept confidential.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NV B 3/14

Chapter: 26.908
Case Name: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Warns, Civ. No. CCB-11-1846, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44507, at *5-6 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014)
("Ms. Warns has not alleged that the information is not privileged, other than to suggest that the privilege has been waived because she has already seen the documents. . . . However, she saw the documents as an Allstate employee within the scope of the corporation's privilege. . . . No waiver occurred in that context. Because Ms. Warns is no longer an Allstate employee, however, disclosure of the documents to her in discovery would constitute a waiver of the privilege. In camera review of the exhibits to determine privilege is therefore unwarranted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-03-28 Federal MD B 3/14

Chapter: 26.909
Case Name: MacFarlane v. Fivespice LLC, No. 3:16-cv-01721-HZ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68184 (D. Ore. May 4, 2017)
(holding that the privilege protected communications between defendant café's lawyer and a former employee, even though the former employee might have been adverse to the former employer café, and even though they met at the café; "Virgen [Former executive chef] had information critical to Defendant's case regarding Plaintiff's complaints and employment. In particular, he received Plaintiff's complaints regarding Ayala's alleged harassment and he was present when Plaintiff's employment was terminated. That information is highly pertinent to any defense regarding Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims based on sexual harassment and retaliation. Further, Virgen's communications concerned the scope of his former employment as Defendant's executive chef."; "Plaintiff also argues that there was animosity between Virgen and Fivespice management which precipitated his resignation. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the real reason Virgen left his employment with Defendant was because management had been critical of his performance and instituted a verbal plan for improvement. Because Virgen's interests were adverse to Defendant's interests, Plaintiff claims that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable to his post-employment conversations with Defendant's attorney. At his deposition, however, Virgen testified that he left Defendant's employ for a more attractive opportunity and that he had no hard feelings towards management. In any event, whether or not Virgen's interests were adverse to Defendant's plays no role in the attorney-client privilege determination here. Plaintiff provides no legal support for the proposition that adverse interests would render the communications at issue non-privileged. Such a requirement is absent from the attorney-client privilege analysis as announced in Upjohn and Admiral [Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1989)]. Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument as well.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-04 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.910
Case Name: California LEO 2012 183 (2012)
("While an attorney may disclose client confidences to her own attorney to evaluate a potential wrongful discharge claim against her former firm, neither she nor her attorney may publicly disclose those confidences except in the narrowest of circumstances."; "[C]ase law would permit Senior Associate to disclose confidential information both about the Firm and the Firm's client to Attorney to obtain legal advice about her rights against the Firm."; "Thus, Fox Searchlight [Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v, Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001] makes clear that lawyers have the right to disclose employer-client confidential information when seeking legal advice from their own lawyers whether for their own protection or in aid of the client's cause."; "While no case directly addresses to what extent Senior Associate may publicly disclose client confidential information to the extent necessary to further her claims in a legal proceeding, in light of the absolute language in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), amended only to allow permissive disclosure in more dire circumstances, and the case law discussed above, we conclude that Senior Associate may not publicly disclose the Firm's client's confidences in order to pursue her own civil action." (footnote omitted); "Attorney has two sets of duties to Senior Associate. First, Attorney is bound by the attorney-client privilege and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) to protect what Senior Associate reveals to him in consulting him about her potential claim against the Firm. As a consequence, unless Senior Associate can publicly disclose her former Firm's client's confidences, and only to the extent that she would be permitted to do so, Attorney is equally bound to protect those confidences from public disclosure because of his duty to protect the confidential information Senior Associate disclosed. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(e)(1); rule 3 100.)"; "Second, Attorney also owes Senior Associate a duty of competence under rule 3 110, not only to advance her interests but to avoid harming her. He is a Senior Associate's agent and generally his conduct is imputed to her. Thus, if Senior Associate cannot publicly disclose the Firm's client's confidential information, we conclude that Attorney is prohibited from engaging in such conduct." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Other B 6/13

Chapter: 26.911
Case Name: Mirra v. Mirra, Op. No. 136811, Dkt. No. 1484CV03857BLS2, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 54 (Mass. Super. Ct. April 26, 2017)
(analyzing the waiver implications of two minority shareholders in a closely held corporation (brother and sister) sharing privileged communications with another brother, who is also a minority shareholder; noting that the other brother testified that he did not seek legal advice from the lawyer representing his brother and sister, and rejecting his later affidavit claiming that he did; finding that the disclosure waived the brother and sister's attorney-client privilege; "It is undisputed that Anthony never had any express attorney-client relationship with Posternak. In 2010 Lenny, Sandra, and Anthony all met with Attorney Nicholas Nesgos of Posternak to discuss ongoing disputes with the majority shareholders in Mirra Co. (Defendants do not seek disclosure of anything said at that meeting.) Thereafter Lenny and Sandra hired Posternak to represent them. Anthony did not. He never signed an engagement letter with Posternak, never paid Posternak any money, never asked Posternak to represent him, and was never told that Posternak or Attorney Negros was representing him."; "Plaintiffs insist that Anthony nonetheless had an implied attorney-client relationship with Posternak. In an interesting twist, Anthony does not join in that argument and does not oppose the motion to compel production emails he received or sent."; "Plaintiffs' claim that Anthony had an implied attorney-client relationship with Posternak fails to meet the first requirement, because Plaintiffs have not convincingly demonstrated that Anthony ever sought advice or assistance from Attorney Nesgos.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-04-26 State MA

Chapter: 26.911
Case Name: McKinney/Pearl Restaurant Partners, L.P. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., No. 3:14-cv-2498-B, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68354 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016)
(finding that the minority owner of a limiited partnership was within privilege protection; "Plaintiff explains that Mr. Lieberman is a minority owner of Sambuca [Plaintiff]; that Sambuca's discussions with Mr. Lieberman were in his capacity as an owner of Sambuca; that Mr. Lieberman is also CEO of The Retail Connection, and certain of The Retail Connection employees were included on some of the communications as indicated in the Affidavit of Kim Forsythe; and that, to the extent these employees were included on privileged communications, they were acting at the direction of Mr. Lieberman as agents in his capacity as minority owner of Sambuca. Plaintiff asserts that, in his capacity as owner, Mr. Lieberman is entitled to attorney-client privilege, and his agents are entitled to the same."; "The Court determines that, through the Affidavit of Kim Forsythe . . .Plaintiff has sufficiently established that Mr. Lieberman and his employees were making or receiving the confidential communications at issue with Plaintiff's counsel while acting in the scope of employment with -- or, in this case, minority ownership of -- Plaintiff (or as agents of the minority owner) for the purpose of effectuating legal representation to Plaintiff. This conclusion is not undermined by Plaintiff also having retained The Retail Connection and Mr. Lieberman to negotiate on Plaintiff's behalf with Defendants. . . . Mr. Lieberman's serving as Plaintiff's agent in any negotiation does not preclude his making or receiving confidential communications while acting within the scope of his role as minority owner for the purpose of effectuating legal representation to Plaintiff, even in connection with the same negotiations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-25 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.911
Case Name: Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, Civ. A. No. 1:08-2006, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67226, at *4-5 (W.D. La. May 10, 2013)
(finding that the privilege did not protect a law firm's communications with shareholders with whom the law firm communicated in a marketing effort; "The reason the Johanson Defendants spoke to the corporations' shareholders was to encourage them to sell stock to their clients' ESOPs. It was not to gather information in anticipation of litigation as was the case in Upjohn [Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)]. It wasn't to provide legal advice regarding strategic moves the corporation should make. Rather, it was a discussion regarding an investment opportunity. While the Johanson Defendants labeled the form memoranda provided to potential investors 'privileged and confidential' and cited to cases related to tax deferral strategies, the Johanson Defendants also clearly set forth on the memorandum and supplemental memorandum that neither was an opinion letter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-05-10 Federal LA B 3/14

Chapter: 26.911
Case Name: Domanus v. Lewicki, No. 08 C 4922, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177325, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012)
(analyzing a derivative case; ultimately holding that the company and individual defendants in a derivative case did not share a common interest; "Defendant Derek Lewicki has no relationship with the KBP Entities [Company sued in a derivative case], and Defendant Adam Swiech is merely a KBP shareholder. Thus, because each document and all but one of the communications were shared with third parties, the attorney-client privilege as to these items has been waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-12-14 Federal IL B 9/13

Chapter: 26.911
Case Name: Peacock v. Merrill, No. CA 05-0377-BH-C, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24104, at *30 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 18, 2008)
(finding that disclosure to a major shareholder in connection with possible litigation did not cause a waiver; "The undersigned finds that the Floragon companies have a common interest in matters discussed between certain Floragon shareholders and their attorneys such that the attorney-client privilege has not been waived by the disclosure of such information to the Floragon companies. The specific common interest existing here between the Floragon companies and its [sic] shareholders was the potential (and then eventual) litigation with the lender, Goodrich & Pennington. Therefore, the sharing of information between counsel for the individual shareholders and the Floragon companies did not waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to these three documents and these documents need not be supplied to plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2008-03-18 Federal AL B 8/13

Chapter: 26.912
Case Name: SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, Case No. 14-CV-369-TCK-FHM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75246 (N.D. Okla. June 3, 2015)
(finding that a letter containing a lawyer's analysis sent to investors did not waive a company's privilege; "Section 2502(A)(5) clearly contemplates that attorney-client communications will retain their privileged status when shared outside of those specifically named in the statue as 'representatives of the client.' The key is whether the confidential communications were shared 'in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services.'. . . And the text of the February 2014 Investor Letter, [Dkt. 99-6], reflect that the legal advice or strategy disclosed directly affected the investors' investment in SFF-TIR, LLC and that the legal advice was paid for by the investors. The court finds that under the facts of the present case, Mr. Stuart's sharing of legal advice and strategy with the investors was in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to SFF-TIR, LLC. Under these circumstances, the court finds that the privilege was not waived by the disclosure in the Investor Letter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-03 Federal OK

Chapter: 26.912
Case Name: SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, Case No. 14-CV-369-TCK-FHM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75246 (N.D. Okla. June 3, 2015)
(finding that a letter containing a lawyer's analysis sent to investors did not waive a company's privilege; "Defendants argue that the investors themselves are not 'representatives of the client' under § 2502(A)(4)(a) because they do not have the authority to obtain professional legal services or to act on legal advice on behalf of SFF-TIR, LLC. Although the investors do not fit within the definition of 'representative of the client' if does not follow that their receipt of the legal advice rendered to SFF-TIR, LLC waives the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-03 Federal OK

Chapter: 26.1001
Case Name: Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc. v. Sawstop, LLC, Case No. 3:12 mc 00131 SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158348, at *6 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2012)
(holding that a patent holder and a potential investor did not have a sufficiently common interest to enter into a common interest agreement; "Finding a waiver in SawStop's actions by mailing its investment 'offering package' to prospective investors does not condemn every company seeking investors to choosing between making misrepresentations or waiving attorney-client privilege. Instead, as it occurred in the Case cited cases, companies can wait until they have entered into a more formal negotiating relationship and confidentiality agreement before disclosing privileged information, which would further assist in demonstrating the existence of a common interest.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-05 Federal OR B 5/13

Chapter: 26.1001
Case Name: Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc. v. Sawstop, LLC, Case No. 3:12-mc-00131-SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158348, at *2, *3-4 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2012)
(holding that a patent holder and a potential investor did not have a sufficiently common interest to enter into a common interest agreement; "SawStop, however, has not shown that it shares a sufficient common legal interest with the recipients of the two documents at issue, prospective investors, to support application of the common interest doctrine. Although SawStop argues that other courts have found a sufficient common interest in 'valid and enforceable patent rights,' such a sufficient common interest has always been found to be part of a closer and more tangible legal concern."; "There is no sufficiently close and tangible legal concern present here. The sole reason the recipients of the documents -- potential investors -- would be interested in the 'legal advice' found therein would be to estimate their opportunity for pecuniary gain, a purely commercial concern. . . . Without such a close and tangible legal concern -- aside from general economic interest in investing in a company that had valid intellectual property rights -- the common interest doctrine threatens to create an intellectual property exception to the attorney-client privilege waiver doctrine.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-05 Federal OR B 5/13

Chapter: 26.1003
Case Name: In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., Master File No. 13-MD-2460, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135753 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2017)
("Entry 4054 is a report prepared by Trinity Partners that analyzes the terms of two agreements between Kos and Barr. Kos disclosed the report to an outside auditor, Ernst & Young, for accounting purposes, and plaintiffs argue that AbbVie thereby waived any applicable privilege. AbbVie argues that disclosure to an auditor, who is not an adversary, does not waive the privilege. Indeed, '[m]ost courts hold that to waive the protection of the work-product doctrine, the disclosure must enable an adversary to gain access to the information.'. . . Ernst & Young was not Kos's adversary, and there is no indication that this disclosure allowed any of Kos's adversaries to 'gain access' to entry 4054. The Court therefore concludes that Kos's disclosure of entry 4054 to Ernst & Young did not waive any applicable privilege."; "The Court therefore concludes that AbbVie's initial two-level document review was a reasonable precaution, and given the vast scope of discovery in subsequent cases, AbbVie's decision to avoid duplicative document review was also reasonable.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-24 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1003
Case Name: SEC v. Roberts, No. C 07-04580 MHP, 254 F.R.D. 371, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64615 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017)
(analyzing Howrey's disclosures to its corporate client's board of directors and to the government about the results of its internal corporate investigation; explaining that Howrey carefully limited its disclosure in some circumstances to historical facts, but in other circumstances answered questions about privileged communications Howrey had with witnesses; finding that Howrey's disclosure to its corporate client's auditor did not waive privilege protection; "[A]ny disclosures made to the auditors does not amount to a waiver as their assistance is necessary for Howrey to properly conduct its investigation and for McAfee to restate its financial statements.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-22 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.1003
Case Name: SEC v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74979, Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1416-M, 67 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2006)
(analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues in an action by the SEC against a former corporate officer, who sought discovery of his former company's investigation into improper accounting and revenue recognition; explaining that the company's Audit Committee hired the law firm of Baker Botts to conduct an internal investigation with the assistance of KPMG, after which Baker Botts met with the company's new auditor Deloitte; holding that the company and its lawyer Baker Botts waived privilege protection by disclosing their investigation results to company's new auditor; "[I]t appears that i2 [former employer] and Baker Botts made significant disclosures of privileged information to third parties who lacked a common legal interest. First, the October 17, 2002 Deloitte and Touche [new auditor] memorandum provides evidence that on October 14, 2002, two of their partners met with Baker Botts attorneys to discuss the investigation and review the Phase I Report. Additionally the KPMG [accountant which assisted Baker Botts in its investigation] portion of the Phase I Report was disclosed to Deloitte and Touche for review the previous week. Further, the meeting concluded with a conference call with i2 management to discuss the additional allegations and the need to update the Phase I Report. Federal case law makes it clear that disclosure of confidential communications or documents to auditors for purposes other than seeking legal advice destroys confidentiality and with it, the right to claim the attorney-client privilege. . . . For this reason, the Court concludes that due to the disclosure of the privileged Phase I Report to Deloitte and Touche, and confidential communications between i2 and Baker Botts while Deloitte and Touche partners were present, attorney-client privilege over the Phase I Report, the subject of Category 3, has been waived."; finding a subject matter waiver; "Brady argues that i2 and Baker Botts' waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the Phase I Report and the Phase II investigation extends to the entire subject matter related to the disclosures."; "The 'disclosure of any significant portion of a confidential communication waives the privilege as to the whole.'. . . Moreover, waiver of an attorney-client communication waives the privilege as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter. . . . Here, Brady disclosed the Phase I Report, which summed up Baker Botts' entire Phase I investigation, to Deloitte and Touche. Additionally, they disclosed to the SEC the same oral report and power point presentation given to the Audit Committee concerning the ultimate findings of Phase II, interview observations and summaries, and exhibits used during witness interviews. Based on that evidence, the court finds that these disclosures amount to a significant portion of attorney-client privileged information, and thus, the waiver of attorney-client privilege extends to all responsive documents relating to the Phase I and Phase II subject matter. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege has been waived as to all documents responsive to Categories 3, 4, 5, and 6.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2006-10-16 Federal TX
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
March 29, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Circuit Court Affirms Key Difference Between Privilege and Work Product Protections"

Disclosing privileged communications to third parties generally waives that fragile protection, even if the third parties are friendly. In contrast, disclosing work product to third parties waives that more robust protection only if it increases the chance of the disclosed documents "falling into enemy hands."

In In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam), the Third Circuit affirmed these key principles in a common context – disclosure to an accountant. The court held that although the subject of a criminal investigation "waived the attorney-client privilege by forwarding [a privileged and work product-protected] email to his accountant, the document still retained its work-product status." Id. at 165.

These dramatically different waiver implications apply when clients disclose documents deserving both protections to other friendly third parties -- such as public relations consultants, banks, business advisors, family members, etc.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-01 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: Cytec Industries, Inc. v. Allnex (Luxembourg) & Cy S.C.A., 14-cv-1561 (PKC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81756 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with buyer's due diligence in purchasing plaintiff's coating resins business; holding that Ernst & Young and an environmental consultant were inside privilege, but that buyer's insurance broker Marsh was outside privilege protection; "'E-mail chain from client to E&Y, lawyers and others regarding the working capital adjustment mechanism under the SAPA for cash left in the business. This was a confidential communication from the client simultaneously sent to the law firm representing Allnex and to E&Y for the purpose of understanding Allnex's legal rights in the event that the cash left in the business was less than contemplated. The answer could have turned on either contract interpretation or accounting principles or both, and the simultaneous communication of the question to both a lawyer and an accountant did not destroy the privilege. Privilege upheld.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-06-23 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., Case No. 14-md-02521-WHO, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151948 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015)
(holding that a draft letter did not deserve privilege protection because they were primarily business-related, and that any privilege was waived when the company provided the draft letters to Deloitte; also rejecting work product protection for tax-related communications occurring after litigation ended; "At most, in the comments on the drafts, non-attorney individuals editing the drafts ask whether certain statements should be made or deleted based on advice from counsel. But by sharing these drafts and comments with third-party Deloitte, any privilege that might have attached has been waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-11-09 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: Cantu v. Titlemax, Inc., 5:14-CV-628 RP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139406 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2015)
(disclosing privileged communications to an accountant waived the privilege protection, and that documents an accountant created did not deserve work product protection because they would not be used to "aid" in litigation; "[T]he Texas Rules of Evidence have no bearing on whether PRIV001 enjoys attorney-client privilege. There is no federal analog to Texas Rule of Evidence 503. Accordingly, even if the recipient of PRIV001 was authorized to obtain legal services on behalf of Defendant, there is no reason to believe that finding would disturb the conclusion that under federal law a client's disclosure of documents directly to an auditor or accountant destroys the attorney client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-10-09 Federal TX

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: United States v. Sanmina Corp., Case No.: 5-15-cv-00092-PSG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66123 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2015)
(rejecting the IRS's discovery of two documents mentioned in a report that DLA Piper sent to the IRS on behalf of its client; "The voluntary production of privileged information may result in a waiver of all communications on the same subject. But Sanmina distributed the attorney memos only to its counsel and accountants. Distribution to DLA Piper did not constitute waiver because DLA Piper was Sanmina's legal counsel, even if DLA Piper sometimes provided non-legal services to Sanmina. Distribution to Sanmina's accountants, or federal tax practitioners, was also privileged, and did not constitute waiver of the attorney client privilege. Furthermore, Sanmina's production of DLA Piper's report to the IRS did not constitute waiver of attorney client privilege, because DLA Piper's mere mention of the existence of the memoranda did not summarize or disclose the content of the memoranda.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-05-20 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 4:10-md-2186-BLW-CWD, 4:13:cv-00251-BLW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33577 (D. Idaho March 17, 2015)
(analyzing privilege protection and the common interest doctrine in a trade association context; "[T]he information was freely shared with UPGA's accountants, and therefore the privilege was waived because it was shared with third parties.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-03-17 Federal ID

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Environnement N.A. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 13-mc-03-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154717 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2014)
("Although Privilege Log Nos. R215-19 also contain drafts of agreements prepared by outside counsel, an inspection of these documents reveals that the attorney-client privilege has been waived. The privilege log notes that these draft agreements, originally created in August 2000, were attached to an email from Elissa Moskowitz seven years later. Taxpayer has not shown why the involvement of Ms. Moskowitz, an employee of PWC, was essential or in furtherance of the communication. The gap in time suggests otherwise. These documents must be disclosed in their entirety.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-10-31 Federal DE

Chapter: 26.1004
Case Name: In re Myers, Ch. 7 Case No. 11-61426, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3468, at *11-12, *12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2013)
(analyzing a situation in which a bankruptcy trustee sought documents from the debtor's accountant; holding that the privilege protected communications from the accountant to a lawyer, but did not protect communications that were merely copied to the lawyer or were from the accountant to the client; "The Court finds the documents where Scott Snow [accountant] provided information to the attorneys to be subject to attorney-client privilege. In these instances, Scott Snow was acting directly as agent to Debtor and Karen Myers and communicating to their attorneys when Debtor and Karen Myers could have communicated to their attorneys themselves."; "The Court finds the documents where Scott Snow was merely copied by either Debtor, Karen Myers, or their attorneys, and where the subject was discussing litigation plans to be not subject to attorney-client privilege. In these instances, the Court finds Scott Snow was not acting as agent to Debtor and Karen Myers and that the attorney-client privilege was waived because the communications were revealed to a third party. Similarly, communications between only Debtor and Scott Snow or Karen Myers and Scott Snow are not subject to attorney-client privilege because the attorneys were not included in the communications and, therefore, while Scott Snow may have been acting as their agent in those instances, without an attorney included in the communications, the privilege does not apply. Finally, in instances where Scott Snow, Debtor, or Karen Myers, communicated with third parties, those documents are not subject to attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-08-08 Federal OH B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1005
Case Name: 3Com Corporation v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 3933-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126 (Del. Ct. Ch. May 31, 2010)
(applying Delaware rather than Massachusetts privilege law, and utlimately finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the client's communications with its investment banker Goldmman Sachs; "The case law is clear, however, that insofar as Goldman Sachs was involved in communications between 3Com and its attorneys involving legal matters, those communications are privileged. Goldman Sachs' precise role in a specific communication is not critical as long as it involved legal issues regarding the transaction and participation by 3Com's attorneys. Indeed, 3Com states that it has not asserted the privilege over communictions with Goldman Sachs that addressed purely financial or business matters.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-05-31 State DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1005
Case Name: 3Com Corporation v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 3933-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126 (Del. Ct. Ch. May 31, 2010)
(applying Delaware rather than Massachusetts privilege law, and ultimately finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the client's communications with its investment banker Goldman Sachs; "Delaware law sanctions the privilege's application to attorney-client communications including an investment banker, especially within the context of a pending transaction. . . . Following Jedwab [Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 383, 1986 WL 3426, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 1986)], Delaware courts have applied the attorney-client privilege to protect communications disclosed to the client's financial advisor in the corporate transactional context.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-05-31 State DE
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: In re Abilify Aripiprazole Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No. 3:16-md-2734, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213493 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2017)
(finding that public relations consultants were inside privilege protection; "[W]hen a public relations firm has been retained to assist the corporate client and its counsel with an ongoing investigation the public relations firm stands in the same shoes as the corporate client with regard to communications between the public relations firm and counsel for the corporate client, or between the public relations firm and the corporate client 'that were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to the corporate client.'"; "The same principles apply to marketing firms (e.g. W2 Group, Twist Marketing), retained by Defendants. To the extent these firms were retained to assist Otsuka's in-house legal departments in monitoring and analyzing media coverage as part of in-house counsel's strategies and legal advice relating to threatened and ongoing litigation and actions by regulatory agencies, the consultants would stand in the shoes of an Otsuka corporate employee. The key is not whether the entity is a consultant but rather whether the function performed by the consultant related to assisting legal counsel in providing legal advice and strategy concerning the legal position of Otsuka in the media coverage concerning the litigation. In the world today -- where a drug manufacturer may face liability in the hundreds of millions of dollars in a product liability suit -- it is not only common but necessary to involve public relations and marketing consultants to assist in-house counsel and outside counsel in responding to media inquiries regarding ongoing or threatened legal actions. So long as the role of the consultant is to assist legal counsel in responding to the media the protections of the attorney-client privilege should apply the same as where a corporate employee is tasked with responding to media inquiries. The Court has utilized these principles in making its in camera review.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-12-29 Federal FL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: Gottwald v. Sebert, 653118/2014, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2017)
(finding that a public relations firm hired by lawyer Mark Geragos on behalf of the singer Keisha was outside privilege protection; "Most federal judges that apply New York privilege law appear to approach attorney communications with public relations firms within the framework of the agency exception to the general rule that communications with non-parties waives the privilege."; "The court's in camera review of the logged documents reveal a public relations strategy that may well bear on motive and malice. The goal of that strategy, as Kesha's counsel admitted in open court, was to induce Gottwald to quickly settle, and to seek to influence the prospective jury pool. . . . It is not this court's place to opine on the merits or effectiveness of a public relations strategy. This court, however, is well suited to distinguish between a public relations strategy and a legal strategy. Most of the withheld documents reflect the former. To be sure, some of the communications do indeed reflect Kesha's counsel's legal advice and mental impressions, which ordinarily would be privileged. However, by discussing such matters with a public relations firm primarily for the purpose of advancing a public relations strategy -- and not for the purpose of developing or furthering a legal strategy -- most of the legal advice discussed with Sunshine Sachs lost the protection of the attorney-client privilege."; "[I]f (like a publicly traded company concerned with federal securities laws), counsel and the public relations firm needed to coordinate to ensure that public statements do not expose the client to further liability (e.g., further defamation liability), and the communications' purpose was to craft statements with a view toward that concern, the privilege indisputably would apply. But that is not what Mr. Geragos and Sunshine Sachs were doing. Rather, their focus was to play the public relations angle of every development in the case. That is not coordination to facilitate legal advice. . . . Simply put, for the most part, Mr. Geragos coordinated with Sunshine Sachs to ensure that the legal developments of the case were being given their desired media spin. To this court's knowledge, no court has ever held such types of communications to be privileged."; "This court will not be the first to do so. The attorney-client privilege is meant to facilitate a client's ability and willingness to communicate frankly with a lawyer to maximize the lawyer's capacity to competently provide legal advice. Extending the privilege over communications merely meant to further media spin of a case is not consistent with the policy behind the privilege. Since the privilege hinders the truth-seeking process, there must be compelling grounds to keep truth-revealing evidence from the finder of fact. Holding that a public relations campaign designed to impel settlement is not privileged does not impair a client's ability to obtain competent legal advice. Such a holding should not chill candid communication between the lawyer and client, nor should it impair a lawyer's ability to seek expert advice when necessary.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-08 State NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762, at *16 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017)
February 7, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Public Relations Consultants Are Nearly Always Outside Privilege Protection"

In an important data breach investigation case discussed in a previous Privilege Point, the court held that the privilege did not protect communications between Premera and its public relations firm, because "drafting press releases relating to a security breach is a business function," and "[h]aving outside counsel hire a public relations firm is insufficient to cloak that business function with the attorney-client privilege." In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762, at *16 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017).

A few weeks later, another court reached the same conclusion about a public relations firm hired by famed lawyer Mark Geragos, who was representing the singer Kesha in high-profile litigation. Gottwald v. Sebert, 63 N.Y.S.3d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). After reviewing communications between the public relations firm and Kesha's lawyers, the court concluded that Geragos and the other lawyers disclosed privileged communications to the PR consultant "primarily for the purpose of advancing a public relations strategy – and not for the purpose of developing or furthering a legal strategy." Id. at 826. Thus, "most of the legal advice discussed with [the public relations firm] lost the protection of the attorney-client privilege." Id. The court inexplicably failed to address the availability of work product protection for some disclosed documents, which normally would survive disclosure to a friendly third party such as a public relations consultant.

Public relations firms often play a critical role in high-profile media-covered litigation. While most courts would hold that disclosing work product to such consultants would not forfeit that protection, lawyers should remember that disclosing pre-litigation purely privileged communications normally will waive that more fragile protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-27 Federal OR
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: Bousamra v. Excela Health, No. 1637 WDA 2015, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 543 (Pa. Super. July 19, 2017)
(finding that a public relations consultant was outside privilege and work product protection, and was not the functional equivalent of an employee; "Excela relies upon various federal cases that have ruled that the attorney-client privilege is not waived when the privileged communication is disseminated to a public relations firm where the firm was the functional equivalent of an employee of the client due to the degree of work performed for the client by the firm or due to the close association between the outside public relations firm and the client."; "Herein, the record establishes that Jarrard [public relations consultant] was not treated as the functional equivalent of one of Excela's employees or of its public relations department. Ms. Cate outlined that, over the course of a three-year period, Jarrard was hired to work on six specific projects, including the one at issue. Excela had a staffed communications/marketing/public relations department. Excela was utilizing Jarrard for a situation requiring crisis management. In this Commonwealth, whether a person/entity is an employee is determined largely by whether the employer had 'control over the work to be completed and the manner in which it is to be performed.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-19 State PA

Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: Gottwald v. Sebert, 63 N.Y.S.3d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)
February 7, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Public Relations Consultants Are Nearly Always Outside Privilege Protection"

In an important data breach investigation case discussed in a previous Privilege Point, the court held that the privilege did not protect communications between Premera and its public relations firm, because "drafting press releases relating to a security breach is a business function," and "[h]aving outside counsel hire a public relations firm is insufficient to cloak that business function with the attorney-client privilege." In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., Case No. 3:15-md-2633-SI, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178762, at *16 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2017).

A few weeks later, another court reached the same conclusion about a public relations firm hired by famed lawyer Mark Geragos, who was representing the singer Kesha in high-profile litigation. Gottwald v. Sebert, 63 N.Y.S.3d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). After reviewing communications between the public relations firm and Kesha's lawyers, the court concluded that Geragos and the other lawyers disclosed privileged communications to the PR consultant "primarily for the purpose of advancing a public relations strategy – and not for the purpose of developing or furthering a legal strategy." Id. at 826. Thus, "most of the legal advice discussed with [the public relations firm] lost the protection of the attorney-client privilege." Id. The court inexplicably failed to address the availability of work product protection for some disclosed documents, which normally would survive disclosure to a friendly third party such as a public relations consultant.

Public relations firms often play a critical role in high-profile media-covered litigation. While most courts would hold that disclosing work product to such consultants would not forfeit that protection, lawyers should remember that disclosing pre-litigation purely privileged communications normally will waive that more fragile protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-01-01 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: DRFP, LLC v. The Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Case No. 2:04-cv-793, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141788 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2015)
(holding that disclosing privileged communications to a public relations firm waived the privilege, and that the firm did not have a common interest with the country of Venezuela, which hired the firm; "Venezuela has consistently maintained that disclosure of otherwise privileged documents to a public relations firm is a waiver of the privilege. That is generally true. As the court in Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) stated, 'to the extent [a PR firm] was performing public relations functions, its participation in attorney-client communications resulted in a waiver -- even if those functions were related to the various litigations in which [the client] was embroiled.' See also Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that disclosure of otherwise privileged communications to a public relations firm providing 'ordinary public relations advice' constituted a waiver). Mr. Richards, Skye's principal, has filed an affidavit saying that he did not intend to waive the privilege for the documents he shared with Sitrick, but that is irrelevant; Sitrick was simply not a party to Skye's attorney-client relationship with its lawyers, and the standard by which waiver is determined is an objective rather than a subjective one.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-10-19 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: In re Prograf Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-02242-RWZ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63594, at *10 (D. Mass. May 3, 2013)
(adopting a set of rules to govern privilege and work product determinations; ultimately concluding that disclosure to a public relations agency waived the attorney-client privilege but not the work product doctrine and that agency-created documents did not deserve work product protection; "Communications between either Astellas [defendant] or outside counsel and employees of public relations firms Hill & Knowlton and Fleishman-Hillard are neither privileged nor protected work product. Astellas has not shown that communications with either firm were necessary, or at least highly useful, for the rendering of legal advice. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 247 (1st Cir. 2002). Rather, it appears that both Hill & Knowlton and Fleishman-Hillard provided Astellas with standard public relations services related to the filing and outcome of the citizen petition and any subsequent business or media fallout. Moreover, even if the firms provided public relations advice or documents bearing upon potential litigation over the citizen petition, such materials fall outside the scope of work-product protection, which is intended 'to provide a zone of privacy for strategizing about the conduct of litigation itself, not for strategizing about the effects of the litigation on the client's customers, the media, or on the public generally.' Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-05-03 Federal MA B 8/13

Chapter: 26.1006
Case Name: Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, 290 F.R.D. 421, 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(analyzing a situation in which a defamation plaintiff's law firm had first worked with and later represented the plaintiff's public relations firm; holding that the PR agency was not within the privilege as the client's agent, and did not have a common interest with the plaintiff client; also holding that the PR agency could not create work product for the non-party, but that disclosing work product to the PR agency did not waive that protection; "Egiazaryan argues that the privilege was not waived because BGR [public relations agency] was his 'agent.'"; "'[T]he "necessity" element means more than just useful and convenient, but rather requires that the involvement of the third party be nearly indispensable or serve some specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communications.'. . . Thus, where the third party's presence is merely useful but not necessary, the privilege is lost.'" (internal citation omitted); "Egiazaryan's assertion of attorney-client privilege must be denied as to attorney-client communications shared with BGR because he has failed to establish that the privilege was not waived. Specifically, he has failed to show that BGR's participation in discussions regarding his legal strategy was 'nearly indispensable' or otherwise necessary to facilitate his communications with his attorneys. While BGR was retained to, among other things, '[d]evelop a set of key messages and compelling narrative in support of the legal cases,' BGR Agreement at 1, and 'participate[] in the development of legal strategy,' . . . Egiazaryan has not shown that BGR's involvement was necessary to facilitate communications between himself and his counsel, as in the case of a translator or an accountant clarifying communications between an attorney and client"; "Obviously, BGR was not competent to act as Egiazaryan's attorney and the mere fact that it was inserted into the legal decision-making process does nothing to explain why BGR's involvement was necessary to Egiazaryan's obtaining legal advice from his actual attorneys. Instead, it simply demonstrates the circumstances under which the waiver occurred."; "Thus, to the extent BGR was performing public relations functions, its participation in attorney-client communications resulted in a waiver -- even if those functions were related to the various litigations in which Egiazaryan was embroiled.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NY B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: FiberLight, LLC v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civ. A. No. 16-2248 (ESH), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8079 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2018)
(holding that disclosure of privileged communications to a client agent/consultant who needed the information did not waive attorney-client privilege protection; "In the above-captioned case, FiberLight alleges that WMATA has breached their 2006 License Agreement. The document at issue is a report that was prepared by Kingston Cole for WMATA in 1999. (See Kington Cole & Associates, Report and Recommendations To The Washington Area Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Regarding Strategic Development of Telecommunications Opportunities at 1 (June 1, 1999) ('Kingston Report').) It 'comprises a series of findings and recommendations regarding the current status and potential for future development of [WMATA's] fiber optic telecommunications system.' (Id. at 1.) Section IV of the document is entitled 'Problem Areas,' and WMATA has redacted the entirety of subsection A of Section IV, which is entitled 'Legal Concerns.' (Id. at 4-5.)"; "WMATA argues that the redacted material is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The Court agrees. The Kingston Report is designated on its face as including attorney-client information, the section containing the redacted material is entitled 'Legal Concerns,' and the Court's review confirms that it reflects the views of WMATA legal counsel regarding potential legal issues that could arise from the development and expansion of WMATA's own telecommunications system. Under F.T.C. v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 148, 352 U.S. App. D.C. 343 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the sharing of such privileged information with a consultant who needs that information in order to complete a project for the company does not constitute a waiver of the privilege. Accordingly, the Court concludes that WMATA properly withheld Section IV.A of the Kingston Report pursuant to the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-18 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: FiberLight, LLC v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Civ. A. No. 16-2248 (ESH), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8079 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2018)
March 28, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Courts Wrestle with Privilege Protection for Client Consultants: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point summarized two cases finding that corporate client consultants: (1) did not meet the "functional equivalent" standard; and (2) were not "nearly indispensable" for facilitating communications between the corporate client and its lawyers. Such holdings make privilege protection unavailable for communications between the corporate client (or its lawyer) and the consultant, and also normally compel the conclusion that disclosing preexisting privileged communications to such consultants waives the privilege.

However, some cases take a more favorable view. In FiberLight, LLC v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Civ. A. No. 16-2248 (ESH), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8079 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2018), defendant hired a consultant to analyze current and potential future development of its fiber optic system. Plaintiff, alleging breach of contract, sought the consultant's report to the defendant, challenging the defendant's redaction of the section entitled "Legal Concerns." Id. at *2. In a one paragraph analysis, the court confirmed after its in camera review that the redacted portion "reflects the views of [Defendant's] legal counsel regarding potential legal issues." Id. at *6. The court then upheld the redaction, explaining that "the sharing of such privileged information with a consultant who needs that information in order the complete a project for the company does not constitute a waiver of the privilege." Id. at *7.

Although this favorable approach represents the minority view, corporations and their lawyers should check the applicable court's privilege law for such helpful precedent.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-01-18 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: Blake v. Batmasian, Case No. 15-cv-81222-Marra/Matthewman, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166208 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2017)
(in an FLSA case, holding that there had been no waiver when a functional equivalent of an employee took documents when leaving the company, but the company sued to retrieve; and when a hostile witness disclosed privileged communications over the company's lawyer's objection; "In this case, Baker was a CFO/controller for Defendants, and it would seem obvious that an attorney or attorneys for a company would have the need to confer confidentially with a company's CFO/controller, thus placing those communications within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. As CFO/controller, Baker would have arguably possessed decision-making authority about the employment issues allegedly discussed by counsel, he would have been implicated in the relevant chain of command, and he allegedly had personal involvement in the relevant activity. Thus, the Court finds that Baker, whether an employee or independent contractor, was within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiffs' position is therefore without merit.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-10-05 Federal FL

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. City of South Portland, 2:15-cv-00054-JAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135704 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2017)
(holding that a real estate appraiser was outside privilege protection, meaning that the client waived the privilege protection when a protected draft was shared with the appraiser; "To summarize, the Document is an excerpt of a draft appraisal report prepared by Mr. Lloyd [Real estate appraiser] in support of PPLC's tax abatement application to the City of South Portland. A staff person at Pierce Atwood 'technically' created the Document by copying the text of the draft report into a word processor. Pierce Atwood attorneys edited the text in the Document, and PPLC sent the edits to Mr. Lloyd, who in turn incorporated the edits into his final Report. Based on these facts, the Court must determine whether the Document is entitled to protection, and if so, whether the Plaintiffs have waived that protection."; "The facts of the present case demonstrate that the exception for necessary third-parties does not apply in this case. Mr. Lloyd was not employed to assist Pierce Atwood in rendering legal advice to PPLC. Rather, Mr. Lloyd was employed to create an appraisal report of PPLC's property. . . . Pierce Atwood created the Document as a way to edit Mr. Lloyd's draft of the appraisal report. . . . As the Plaintiffs admit, Pierce Atwood sent the Document directly to PPLC, and PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd. . . . There is no indication that PPLC sent Mr. Lloyd the Document 'for the purpose of obtaining legal advice' from Pierce Atwood. Instead, it appears that PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd so that Mr. Lloyd could make the suggested changes to his draft report. . . . ('[W]e respectfully request you make the following edits to pages 5 to 7 of the appraisal reports'). Disclosing the Document to Mr. Lloyd destroyed the confidentiality upon which the attorney-client privilege is based. . . . Consequently, the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that the Document is entitled to the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-14 Federal ME

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-5151, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166723 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2015)
("Turning now to the issue of waiver, we find that Besins did not waive the attorney-client privilege by disclosing the communication to third-party consultants, Wepierre and Besse."; "'According to Besins, at the time of this communication, Wepierre 'was a professor in the pharmacy school/division of the University of Paris-Sud and an expert in pharmacological toxicology' and '[a]t the request of Besins, in the mid-1990s, he worked on early testing of a testosterone gel formulation.' 'Jerome Besse was an employee of Galenix Innovations, a research laboratory with which Besins worked in developing various hormone based products including those involving testosterone.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-14 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections v. Virginia House of Delegates, Civ. A. No. 3:14cv852, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68054 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2015)
("Intervenors also may not claim privilege for communications shared freely with, or in the presence of, outside organizations, including campaign committees and political parties.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-05-26 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: In re Lululemon Athletica Inc. 220 Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 9039-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127 (Del. Ct. Chan. April 30, 2015)
(analyzing the Garner doctrine and a common interest doctrine in connection with a retailer's investigation into the sale of its stock by the company's founder and CEO; also finding that an executive of the CEO's family office was inside privilege protection; "Trading Plan, Swinton [Employee of CEO's family office] received notifications from Merrill Lynch every time there was a trade. Moreover, even though Merrill Lynch apparently had sole discretion to sell Wilson's lululemon stock under the Plan, Swinton, as one of the agents in charge of Wilson's Family Office, had responsibility over matters relating to Wilson's trading activity generally. In that respect, the subject matter of the WSJ Email Chain, Wilson's Trading Plan and whether the sales complied with it, generally falls within Swinton's area of responsibility. As Wilson's agent for the Trading Plan, Swinton received privileged advice regarding the Plan and the particular trades in question that appears to have been directed toward crafting a coordinated response to the Wall Street Journal inquiry. Thus, I conclude that inclusion of Swinton on the WSJ Email Chain did not waive privilege as to that document.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-04-30 State DE

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A. Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A, Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: IP Telesis Inc. v. Velocity Networks Inc., No. CV 11 09950 RGK (AJWx), slip op. at 3-4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012)
("Plaintiff argues Velocity waived attorney-client privilege when the underlying transactions were discussed with Lyle Maul, a third party who is not a director or an officer, at a board of directors meeting on October 25, 2011. However, Plaintiff's argument fails because the facts show that Maul was a corporate advisor, and not merely an outsider. Velocity did not carelessly disclose confidential information while Maul was present. Rather, Maul received privileged information during confidential meetings because Velocity's CEO trusted him as a business advisor. As an advisor, Maul attended multiple board meetings and was copied on emails addressed to the board by Wolfgang. He also participated in discussions with Velocity's CPAs and attorneys. The nature and extent of these discussions, and the absence of any formal objection to Maul's involvement with the Corporation, support that he was not an outsider. Therefore Maul's presence at the board meeting furthered Velocity's interests through his role as a business advisor. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Super. Ct., 108 Cal. App. 3d 758, 771 (1980) (holding that attorney-client communications in the presence of an unpaid legal consultant remained privileged because the consultant was present to further the interest of the corporation). Thus, disclosure to Maul did not waive attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-11-05 Federal CA B 5/13

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: Ravenell v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 08 CV 2113 (SLT), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48658, at *10, *11, *13-14, *14-15, *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012)
(holding that privileged communications disclosed to a Fair Labor Standards Act consultant waived the privilege; "Courts have carved out an exception to the waiver rule, however, that applies where disclosures to a third party are necessary to facilitate communication between attorney and client."; "It is not sufficient that the third party's involvement is simply useful to the lawyer; it must be necessary 'to improve the comprehension of the communications between attorney and client.' United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)."; "Defendants in this case have failed to demonstrate that the involvement of OCI [company that conducted audits on defendants' behalf] or its corporate successor was necessary for effective communication between counsel and client. Defendants have identified two major functions of OCI during the audits of employee roles. First, OCI created a [sic] 'an online platform for the dissemination and collection of questionnaires for the 2005-06 audit.'. . . Second, OCI summarized the collected data in a chart, and, based on criteria provided by defendants' counsel, 'made a preliminary assessment of whether the individuals who completed the questionnaires met the requirements of an exempt position' under the FLSA. . . . Shoeman [defendant's Senior Counsel] and her colleagues in the legal department then made the final determinations with regard to exempt status."; "The first use of OCI's expertise -- the implementation of a system to send out questionnaires and receive respondents' answers -- arguably falls within the boundaries of Kovel [United States v. Kovel, 206 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)]. Defendants aver that they lacked the technological capability to carry out this task given the number of employees to be surveyed. . . . As such, OCI's role was akin to that of an interpreter -- a necessary facilitator in the communication between counsel and client. However, defendants do not establish why OCI had any need to review the contents of the responses to the questionnaires to perform this function."; "OCI's second role, organizing responses to the questionnaires and making a preliminary assessment of whether that data supported a classification of an employee as exempt or non-exempt, does not fit so easily into the Kovel model. . . . [D]efendants nonetheless required OCI to examine the employee responses and make initial statutory classifications that in-house counsel had the ability to make themselves. The preliminary assessments neither 'improve[d] the comprehension of the communications between attorney and client,'. . . Nor provided advice outside the general expertise of attorneys yet essential to the ability of defendants' lawyers to provide legal advice . . . . Given the strong policy mandating that the protection of privileges should be narrowly construed, . . . There is no justification for applying the privilege here. I therefore conclude that in-house counsel's communications with OCI waived the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-04-05 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: BSP Software, LLC v. Motio, Inc., No. 12 C 2100, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95511, at *5 6, *6, *7 8, *8, *9, *9 10, *10 11 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2011)
(rejecting the functional equivalent doctrine; "BSP argues that sharing the privileged information with the advisory board did not waive the privilege any more than would sharing privileged information with a duly constituted board of directors. . . . This at bottom is an argument that, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, the advisory board should be treated as the functional equivalent of a formal board of directors. However, BSP ignores that this 'functional equivalent' test has never been adopted by the Seventh Circuit, and has been treated skeptically by trial courts in this district."; "[A]pplication of the test would increase the uncertainty on the important question of when disclosure to non-employees who comprise an advisory board would waive the privilege."; "It would not be productive to increase the level of uncertainty about whether a communication with a third party -- such as BSP's advisory board here -- would waive the privilege. Nor do we see the need to do [sic] employ a functional equivalent test when a corporation such as BSP could create a formal board of directors to fulfill what Mr. Rachmiel describes as the 'central' function of deciding whether to pursue litigation, and vest that board with the authority to make that decision and not merely offer non-binding advice."; "[W]e are concerned that over time, the application of the functional equivalent test could expand the scope of the privilege by eroding the circumstances in which it can be waived."; "We therefore will not adopt that test in deciding BSP's motion. As a result, the cases that BSP cites for the proposition that we should equate BSP's advisory board with a formal board of directors are inapposite. Those cases . . . turn on the acceptance of the functional equivalent theory that we do not endorse."; "That said, we note that even if we were to apply the functional equivalent test as formulated in Asia Pulp [Export-Import Bank v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)], we would find that BSP waived the privilege when it disclosed privileged information to its 'advisory board.' BSP's submissions show that there was a 'continuous and close working relationship' with the 'advisory board,' which is a portion of the second factor of the Asia Pulp test. But, BSP's submissions fail to show that that working relationship was on matters 'critical to the company's position in litigation.' . . . To the contrary, BSP's submissions show that the advice it received from the advisory board was for business and financial matters, and not litigation."; "Moreover, BSP falls far short of showing that the advisory board meets the other two factors of the Asia Pulp test. Unlike a real board of directors, the advisory board had no decision making authority or 'primary responsibility for a key corporate job.' . . . Moreover, BSP has not offered any evidence that the advisory board possessed information that no one else at BSP would possess. . . . The four persons who comprised that advisory board were simply people whose opinions Mr. Rachmiel [officer of plaintiff] valued and trusted, akin to a 'kitchen cabinet' of trusted friends and associates to whom many presidents over the years have resorted for advice. Even under the functional equivalent test, BSP's advisory board would not fall within the scope of the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-07-09 Federal IL B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: BSP Software, LLC v. Motio, Inc., No. 12 C 2100, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95511, at *13 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2011)
(rejecting the functional equivalent doctrine; "Confidentiality alone is not sufficient to establish the privilege or to avoid waiving it by disclosure to a third party. We also must consider, among other things, to whom the disclosure was made. For example, if Mr. Rachmiel [officer of plaintiff] disclosed privileged BSP information to a respected third-party who had been giving a business lecture at a seminar on the wisdom vel non of pursuing patent litigation, all of the assurances of confidentiality in the world would not avert a waiver. Likewise, if a disclosure is made (as here) to persons outside the scope of the privilege, a promise of confidentiality is not an elixir that cures the ill of waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-07-09 Federal IL B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1007
Case Name: Green v. Beer, No. 06 Civ. 4156 (KMW) (JCF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87484, at *5, *12 13, *13-14, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010)
(reversing a portion of Magistrate Judge Francis's earlier ruling, and affirming another portion of his ruling; holding that (1) a couple did not waive their privilege protection by asking their son to print out their emails, because the son was providing necessary technical assistance to his parents (reversing Judge Francis's holding to the contrary), and (2) that the couple waived their attorney-client privilege by disclosing privileged communications to their financial advisors (affirming Judge Francis's holding); "The magistrate judge did not err in finding that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the sharing of the documents with Plaintiffs' Financial Advisors was 'necessary, let alone 'nearly indispensable[,]' to the provision of legal advice' to Plaintiffs. . . . The affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs do not establish that Plaintiffs' Financial Advisors' involvement was 'necessary,' or that Plaintiffs' Financial Advisors 'serve[d] some specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communication' and the provision of proper legal advice. . . . There is also no evidence that Plaintiffs' Financial Advisors played a 'necessary' role in the delivery of facilitation of the emails. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4548."; "Accordingly, the rejection of Plaintiffs' assertion of privilege as to the documents disclosed to Plaintiffs' Financial Advisors was not clearly erroneous, and is therefore affirmed.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-08-24 Federal NY B 7/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this case, the Court must determine whether communications between BTC [the service provider] and its insurance carrier and insurance broker are protected by the attorney-client privilege notwithstanding the fact that an attorney neither authored nor received the communications. This issue requires a discussion of the relationship between an insurance carrier and broker, an insured, and an attorney for an insured who is paid by the insurer."; "In Serrano [Serrano v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 271 (W.D. Pa. 2014)], the court did not rely on a theory of joint representation, but instead concluded that Pennsylvania law extends the attorney-client privilege to agents who assist in facilitating the relationship between the attorney and the client. . . . Accordingly, that court concluded that '[c]ommunications between an insured and its carrier. . . . are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications . . . [made] for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.'. . . With respect to communications involving the insurance carrier and broker, the Serrano court stated that the relevant question is whether the communications were made for the purpose of obtaining legal representation or advice. This Court agrees with the Serrano court that communications between an insured, an insurance carrier, and its broker, are privileged if the communications 'are necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel.' Id.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "In this context then, an attorney's ability to give sound and informed advice will depend on the assessment of the claim and other information conveyed to the client by the insurance carrier and by the client to the insurance carrier. Because the communications addressed above were 'necessary to procure and/or provide the representation in a manner necessary to maintain the availability of coverage and/or effectuate strategy and tactics of counsel in that setting fall within the attorney-client privilege,' the Court concludes that they are protected by the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Dansko Holdings, Inc. v. Benefit Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 16-324, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192230 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017)
(analyzing privilege issues in a lawsuit company against its ESOP's trustee's service provider; "Disclosures made to a third-party consultant do not constitute a waiver when the disclosure is 'necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice' or if the disclosure is made 'to an 'agent' assisting the attorney in giving legal advice to the client.'. . . Pennsylvania law recognizes that '[t]he protection of the attorney-client privilege involving communications regarding the availability of insurance can extend to those agents who are necessary to effectuating the representation [which] can include communications between an insured and an insurance carrier and their respective agents where the disclosures to the agents are in furtherance of the purpose of the privilege.'"; "Accordingly, '[s]uch communications are within the privilege to the extent that they involve communications from the client to the carrier or the carrier to the client for the purpose of obtaining legal representation and advice, effectuating the representation, and related matters such as options regarding strategy and settlement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-11-21 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 14-CV-4717 (FB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27041 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2016)
(holding that London insurance brokers were outside privilege protection because they did not meet the Kovel standard; noting the difference between New York state and New York federal court federal court law on the issue of client agents within privilege protection; "'To be sure, LMI cites an unpublished 1995 New York State Supreme Court opinion, in which a court affirmed a special referee's finding that the London broker method of distribution did not waive the attorney-client privilege. . . . New York law does not govern the privilege issues before the Court and, in any event, even if it did, the Occidental Opinion does not address the necessity of the practice -- one of the elements of the agency exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-02-19 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Smith v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, No. 15-1002, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13290 (4th Cir. App. July 30, 2015)
("This privilege also applies to communications between an attorney and a client that are shared with the client's insurance company.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-07-30 Federal

Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. FDIC, No. C12-4041-MWB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116909 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 22, 2014)
(analyzing the common interest doctrine in the insurance context; "FDIC-R argues that even if Progressive's reinsurance documents contain attorney-client communications, any privilege was waived when Progressive voluntarily disclosed the documents to the reinsurers and broker. Again, I agree. Progressive waived any applicable attorney-client privilege when it distributed the communications to its reinsurers and broker.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-08-22 Federal IA

Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: West Virginia v. Honorable Louis H. Bloom, No. 13-1172, 2014 W. Va. LEXIS 345 (W. Va. App. April 10, 2014)
(holding that privilege protected outside counsel's coverage opinions given to an insurance company, and that insurance company did not waive the privilege by communicating the substance of the letter to its insured; "In this situation, a coverage opinion letter written by outside counsel to the insurer containing legal advice 'is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it involved confidential communications.'"; "In the instant case, the Respondents content that, because the Petitioners disclosed the recommendation of the coverage opinion letters to the insureds, the attorney-client privilege was lost as to the actual coverage opinion letters. . . . Application of the third-party disclosure exception to the attorney-client privilege, in the context of the Respondents' argument, appears to be novel. The Respondents have not cited to, nor have we found, any case in the country that has held that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to a coverage opinion letter when an insurer communicates the gist of the recommendation contained in the letter to the insured.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-04-10 State WV

Chapter: 26.1008
Case Name: TC Ravenswood, LLC v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., Index No. 400759/11, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 31335(U), at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2013)
(in a first party insurance case, finding that an insured's disclosure of protected documents to its insurance broker did not waive privilege or work product protection; "Here, Marsh [plaintiff's insurance broker] was specifically hired by TransCanada [plaintiff] and its counsel to explain the complex insurance policies at issue for TransCanada and its counsel. Although TransCanada did not follow the prescribed procedure for obtaining litigation assistance from Marsh, Marsh actually performed the work requested and TransCanada had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Consequently, TransCanada's communications to Marsh do not constitute a waiver of the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-20 State NY B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Margulis v. The Hertz Corporation, Civ. A. No. 14-1209 (JMV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28311 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017)
(holding that a corporate family was not "one" client, but that a United States law firm jointly represented a U.S. company and an overseas affiliate; "Although the document is labeled 'CPCC/US CLASS ACTION/Confidential,' and although it is responding to Nuns Moodliar, an attorney, the email is written to 7 additional recipients and carbon copied to 4 more, for a total of 11 email recipients separate and apart from the attorney (Moodliar) and client (Quinquenel), neither of which, it should be noted, are employed by Defendant in this case. The document is not privileged because Defendant has not established that all of the individuals that are included on this email are necessary intermediaries or that they 'need to know' the legal communication made. The attorney-client privilege is meant to be an intimate relationship. Sending an email to 11 people, not one of whom is employed by the Defendant in this case, suggests lack of privilege and/or waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-02-28 Federal NJ

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Total Recall Technologies v. Luckey, Case No. 15-cv-02281-WHA (SK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65673 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2016)
(holding that two general partners who were in a dispute did not waive any privilege by talking to the general partnership's lawyer; "Whether Seidl and Igra have a dispute between them and whether Seidl actually consents to the lawsuit brought by TRT is an issue to be resolved between them either informally or through the pending Hawaii action. However, Seidl and Igra are still the two general partners of TRT, and thus any communications between them, as agents of TRT, regarding TRT's counsel's advice do not waive the privilege."; "Here, Igra and Seidl communicated about the merits of this litigation and the advice from TRT's counsel regarding this litigation, and thus the common interest doctrine encompasses their communications. Accordingly, the Court finds that communications between Igra and Seidl that discuss TRT's counsel's advice did not waive TRT's privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-17 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., Civ. A. No. 14-5151, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166723 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2015)
("Under the third-party consultant exception, disclosure does not waive the attorney-client privilege so long as 'disclosure is necessary to further the goal of enabling the client to seek informed legal assistance.'")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-14 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Las Olas River House Condo Assoc., Inc. v. Lorh, LLC, No. 4D15-2289, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18400 (Fla. App. 4d Dec. 9, 2015)
(finding that disclosure to a condominium's property manager did not automatically waive privilege protection, and remanding; "Under our Evidence Code, '[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of confidential communications when such other person learned of the communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to the client. § 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added)."; "'A communication between lawyer and client is 'confidential' if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than: (1) Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to the client. (2) Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.'"; "§ 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). The second exception applies to agents of the client -- for example, when a family member acts on behalf of an incapacitated relative . . . Or when a messenger is needed for a client to contact counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-09 Federal FL

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Martinez v. Liberty Insurance Corporation, Civ. A. No. 15-cv-00838-REB-MEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138169 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2015)
(holding that a homeowner plaintiff's public adjusting firm was outside privilege protection, but had a valid common interest with the homeowner; "Plaintiffs contend that, because Matrix [public adjusting firm] was their 'agent' or 'representative,' their privilege was not waived when communications with counsel were disclosed to Matrix. Plaintiffs cite primarily to two cases in support of this proposition; however, those cases interpret federal as opposed to state common law concerning the attorney-client privilege. . . . A review of Colorado case law reveals that courts have found the privilege attaches to corporations and that, because corporations must act through agents, the privilege is not waived when communications occur between the lawyer and corporate agents. . . . But, the Court found no cases in Colorado standing for the proposition that a representative or agent of an individual client is not a 'third party' for purposes of determining whether the privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-10-09 Federal DC

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, Case No. 14-CV-369-TCK-FHM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75246 (N.D. Okla. June 3, 2015)
(finding that a letter containing a lawyer's analysis sent to investors did not waive a company's privilege; "Defendants argue that the investors themselves are not 'representatives of the client' under § 2502(A)(4)(a) because they do not have the authority to obtain professional legal services or to act on legal advice on behalf of SFF-TIR, LLC. Although the investors do not fit within the definition of 'representative of the client' if does not follow that their receipt of the legal advice rendered to SFF-TIR, LLC waives the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-03 Federal OK

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, Case No. 14-CV-369-TCK-FHM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75246 (N.D. Okla. June 3, 2015)
(finding that a letter containing a lawyer's analysis sent to investors did not waive a company's privilege; "Section 2502(A)(5) clearly contemplates that attorney-client communications will retain their privileged status when shared outside of those specifically named in the statue as 'representatives of the client.' The key is whether the confidential communications were shared 'in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services.'. . . And the text of the February 2014 Investor Letter, [Dkt. 99-6], reflect that the legal advice or strategy disclosed directly affected the investors' investment in SFF-TIR, LLC and that the legal advice was paid for by the investors. The court finds that under the facts of the present case, Mr. Stuart's sharing of legal advice and strategy with the investors was in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to SFF-TIR, LLC. Under these circumstances, the court finds that the privilege was not waived by the disclosure in the Investor Letter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-03 Federal OK

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Associates, Case No. 1:13-cv-01995 (ABJ-GMH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100183 (U.S. D.D.C. 2015)
(holding that the privilege protected communications between a law firm and the client's agent who acted as "forwarder" lining up a law firm to help collect debts; "None of plaintiff's cited cases hold that a collection agency engaged in the unauthorized practice of law thereby waives the attorney-client privilege on behalf of its client, the creditor. Instead, the cases focus on whether a claim may be made against a collection agency for interposing itself between the creditor and the attorney."; "Whether or not such a claim may be made is not an issue before this Court and is not relevant to the parties' discovery dispute. As such, plaintiff’s argument provides no colorable basis on which to find a waiver of the attorney-client privilege between Arrowood and defendant.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-01-01 Federal DC

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A. Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Americus Mortg. Corp. v. Mark, Civ. A. No. 12-10158-GAO, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148820, at *11 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 2013)
("Exceptions to the principle that disclosure to a third party waives the privilege include 'the so-called derivative attorney-client privilege.'. . . The derivative attorney client privilege shields communications of a third party who is 'employed to facilitate communication between the attorney and client and thereby assist the attorney in rendering legal advice to the client.'" (citation omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-16 Federal MA B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Swift Spindrift, Ltd. v. Alvada Ins., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 9342 (AJN) (FM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104296, at *21-22, *22-23, *23 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013)
("Swift is correct in observing that the attorney-client privilege may extend to communications shared with its agents, but it makes no attempt to identify which emails it believes are protected under this theory. Rather, Swift merely states generally that all of the third parties included on the shared communications were 'acting as [its] agents.'. . . Swift does not explain, however, how including V-Ships [management company hired by plaintiff] on their attorney-client emails assisted the process, or even make clear which entries on the privilege log relate to the V-Ships communications."; "Swift similarly has failed to demonstrate that disclosure to V-Ships was necessary in order for it to obtain informed legal advice. 'Necessary,' in the context of third party disclosures, 'means more than just useful and convenient, but rather requires that the involvement of the third party be indispensable or serve some specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client communications.'. . . It does not appear that V-Ships served any specialized purpose here other than perhaps to provide factual information to Cumming [in-house lawyer] and Swift's principals. That, however, is insufficient to avoid a privilege waiver."; "Additionally, because Swift has failed to show that the disclosure of emails to third parties other than V-Ships was necessary to facilitate the attorney-client relationship, the privilege also has been waived with respect to such communications. Any communications disclosed to third parties other than V-Ships consequently also must be produced.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-07-24 Federal NY B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Fox v. Shinseki, No. CV 11-04820 EDL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82087, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2013)
("Plaintiff provides no evidence that either she or Williams [a lawyer who is also a personal friend of plaintiff] employed the union representatives at issue or that the union representatives were necessary or highly useful for an effective consultation. There is no evidence that the union representative was acting as Plaintiff's or Williams' agent. Plaintiff also cites no authority for the proposition that there is privilege for union-employee communications. . . . As a consequence, communications among Plaintiff, Williams, and union representatives are not privileged, under the attorney-client or common interest doctrines.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-06-10 Federal CA B 4/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 296 F.R.D. 323, 330 (M.D. Pa. 2013)
(analyzing issues in connection with a student's criminal prosecution for an alleged sexual assault, which apparently was dropped; concluding that the student's parents were within the privilege as the student's lawyer's agents and as joint clients, but that the student adviser was outside the privilege and the work product protection; "[T]he Bucknell University Defendants contend that otherwise protected materials that were disclosed to Martin Ligare [Bucknell University faculty member who served as plaintiff's student conduct hearing adviser] should be produced because this disclosure to an individual employed by the University constitutes a waiver of any attorney-client privilege or work-product protection that may otherwise attach to the materials. Ligare is a Bucknell University faculty member who served as Dempsey's Hearing Adviser, in which role he was charged with assisting Dempsey in preparing for his student conduct hearing and presenting his own remarks to the hearing officials. Although one might ordinarily infer a confidential relationship of some degree from this description, the University's Student Handbook makes clear that the charged student's relationship with his or her Hearing Adviser is not a privileged one, and that the Hearing Adviser is obligated to disclose to the University any information obtained from the student that supports the charges. . . . Under these circumstances, it is clear that the disclosure of otherwise privileged or protected materials to Ligare constitutes waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection with respect to that material.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal PA B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 296 F.R.D. 323, 332 (M.D. Pa. 2013)
(analyzing issues in connection with a student's criminal prosecution for an alleged sexual assault, which apparently was dropped; concluding that the student's parents were within the privilege as the student's lawyer's agent and as joint clients, but that the student adviser was outside the privilege and the work product protection; "Documents No. 21 and 22 are pages of a 'witness notebook' prepared by Attorney Simon summarizing and commenting on anticipated witness testimony with respect to Dempsey's upcoming student conduct hearing and pending criminal proceedings. Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege. Based on the Court's in camera review of related email correspondence, however, it is clear that these documents were disclosed to Martin Ligare, a faculty member of Bucknell University and Dempsey's student conduct hearing adviser. For this reason, Dempsey's claim to attorney-client privilege has been waived by disclosure of the document to a third party.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal PA B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Green v. Beer, No. 06 Civ. 4156 (KMW) (JCF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87484, at *5, *12 13, *13-14, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010)
(reversing a portion of Magistrate Judge Francis's earlier ruling, and affirming another portion of his ruling; holding that (1) a couple did not waive their privilege protection by asking their son to print out their emails, because the son was providing necessary technical assistance to his parents (reversing Judge Francis's holding to the contrary), and (2) that the couple waived their attorney-client privilege by disclosing privileged communications to their financial advisors (affirming Judge Francis's holding); "Daniel Green, the son of the Green Plaintiffs, received email communications from counsel, which he then provided to his parents. He explained in his affidavit that his technical assistance was necessary for his parents to timely receive the email communications from counsel: 'My parents are not proficient in the use [of] electronic mail and, due to the time-sensitive nature of these communications, it was necessary for these communications to be delivered to my email address to ensure a timely receipt. My parents regularly rely on me to send and receive emails for them.'" (internal citation omitted); "The magistrate judge committed clear error by failing to apply Section 4548 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, the relevant state law on attorney-client privilege and electronic communications. The magistrate judge instead applied only the two-part test for the exception to a waiver of privilege, finding that Daniel Green's involvement was not necessary to the provision of legal services given that alternative means of communication were available. This analysis is incomplete in the context of electronic communications, for which Section 4548 applies. Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence that the Green Plaintiffs lack proficiency in the use of email, and that their son's assistance was 'necessary for the delivery of facilitation' of counsel's emailed communications to the Green Plaintiffs. . . . Thus, under Section 4548, the Green Plaintiffs have not waived the attorney-client privilege based on Daniel Green's involvement in the delivery of the disputed emails."; "The magistrate judge also erred by not finding that Daniel Green served as an agent for the Green Plaintiffs, and that his involvement in the delivery of the otherwise confidential communications would not constitute a waiver of privilege. It is clear that the Green Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that the email communications would remain confidential, and that the technical assistance provided by their son, in his capacity as their agent, should not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege."; "A finding that privilege has not been waived in this case is appropriate as a matter of public policy. Email permits attorneys and their clients to engage in prompt communication, often regarding time-sensitive matters. A client lacking proficiency in Internet technology should not be prevented from enjoying the advantages of email correspondence for fear that the necessary assistance of a third party -- here, the Green Plaintiff's son -- in sending or receiving such correspondence will lead to the forfeiture of the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-08-24 Federal NY B 7/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376, 377 (D. Del. 2010)
(holding that disclosure of privileged documents to a litigation finance company waived the privilege, because the client and the litigation funding company did not share an identical interest and therefore could not have a valid common interest agreement to prevent the waiver; "[A]ccording to Leader, there was a common legal interest because the litigation financing companies were interested in financing the litigation. . . . The documents were exchanged only after a common legal interest was created, and therefore, Leader contends that Judge Stark's finding that no common interest privilege existed was clearly erroneous."; "[F]or a communication to be protected, the interests must be 'identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.' . . . Union Carbide, 619 F. Supp. at 1047 [Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036 (D. Del. 1985)]."; "Judge Stark took into consideration that Leader had the burden of establishing existence of the privilege, and the numerous policy considerations, including the need for litigation financing companies and the truth-seeking function of litigation. . . . Additionally, Judge Stark looked to ethical guidelines from both Pennsylvania and New Jersey suggesting that privilege may be waived in a situation such as this.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-01-01 Federal DE B 7/13

Chapter: 26.1009
Case Name: Berens v. Berens, 785 S.E.2d 733, 735, 736, 737, 741 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016)
("This appeal presents the question of whether a party to litigation who engages her friend as an agent to participate in meetings with her attorney waives the protections of attorney-client communications and attorney work product for information arising from the meeting with her attorney and any work product created with the assistance of or shared with the agent as a result of those meetings. Based on our caselaw and the record here, the answer in this case is no."; "Ms. Adams, an attorney who is now on inactive status with the North Carolina State Bar, is a friend of Defendant's and asserted in an affidavit that she had been 'acting as a consultant/agent on behalf of [Defendant] and the Tom Bush Law Group, and acting in a supporting role for [Plaintiff].' Ms. Adams stated that her friendship with Defendant began prior to the current proceedings."; "Attached to her affidavit was a copy of the 'Confidentiality Agreements and Acknowledgement of Receipt of Privileged Information' (the 'confidentiality agreement') that Ms. Adams entered into with Defendant, identifying Ms. Adams as Defendant's agent, emphasizing that the privileged information she received would be used 'solely for the purpose[] of settling or litigating' the divorce proceedings, and affirming the expectation that Ms. Adams's presence and involvement were 'necessary for the protection of [Defendant's] interest' and the expectation that all communications would be 'protected by the attorney-client privilege.'"; "The trial court failed to conduct the essential analysis as to whether the affidavit, confidentiality agreement, and other evidence established an agency relationship. We are aware of no caselaw, nor has Plaintiff cited any authority, that being a client's 'good friend' and being a client's agent are mutually exclusive. Nor does our caselaw prohibit a non-practicing attorney from acting as an agent for purposes of assisting another person in communications with legal counsel. Our holding would be the same if Ms. Adams had been a friend trained as an accountant, a psychologist, or an appraiser who agreed to assist with the litigation without charge. Consequently, we must reverse the trial court's order concluding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this case.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
Federal NC B 8/16

Chapter: 26.1102
Case Name: Premier Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Duhon, Civ. A. Nos. 12-1498 & -2790 SECTION: "H" (4), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160204, at *23-24 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013)
("Premier Dealer contends that Mader [non-party] was its agent because he was contracted to sell its automotive repair warranty, therefore his communications with Wolery [plaintiff's in-house counsel] are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Privilege agents include non-employees, such as paralegals and investigators. The presence of these types of third party agents does not waive the privilege if their presence was to facilitate effective communication between lawyer and client or further the representation in some other way. Privileged agents are sometimes grouped into two categories: (1) Communicating agents; and (2) Representing agents. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmts. f, g (2000) 24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5483 Supp. (2009) (discussing communicating and source agents).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-08 Federal LA B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1103
Case Name: Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. City of South Portland, 2:15-cv-00054-JAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135704 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2017)
(holding that a real estate appraiser was outside privilege protection, meaning that the client waived the privilege protection when a protected draft was shared with the appraiser; "To summarize, the Document is an excerpt of a draft appraisal report prepared by Mr. Lloyd [Real estate appraiser] in support of PPLC's tax abatement application to the City of South Portland. A staff person at Pierce Atwood 'technically' created the Document by copying the text of the draft report into a word processor. Pierce Atwood attorneys edited the text in the Document, and PPLC sent the edits to Mr. Lloyd, who in turn incorporated the edits into his final Report. Based on these facts, the Court must determine whether the Document is entitled to protection, and if so, whether the Plaintiffs have waived that protection."; "The facts of the present case demonstrate that the exception for necessary third-parties does not apply in this case. Mr. Lloyd was not employed to assist Pierce Atwood in rendering legal advice to PPLC. Rather, Mr. Lloyd was employed to create an appraisal report of PPLC's property. . . . Pierce Atwood created the Document as a way to edit Mr. Lloyd's draft of the appraisal report. . . . As the Plaintiffs admit, Pierce Atwood sent the Document directly to PPLC, and PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd. . . . There is no indication that PPLC sent Mr. Lloyd the Document 'for the purpose of obtaining legal advice' from Pierce Atwood. Instead, it appears that PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd so that Mr. Lloyd could make the suggested changes to his draft report. . . . ('[W]e respectfully request you make the following edits to pages 5 to 7 of the appraisal reports'). Disclosing the Document to Mr. Lloyd destroyed the confidentiality upon which the attorney-client privilege is based. . . . Consequently, the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that the Document is entitled to the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-14 Federal ME

Chapter: 26.1103
Case Name: Church & Dwight Co. Inc. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, 14-cv-585, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175552 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014)
(analyzing communications to and from an outside marketing firm; finding that the market firm did not meet the Kovel standard; "[T]he Court concludes that SPD has failed to satisfy its burden of showing that revealing otherwise privileged communications to its third-party marketing firm enabled counsel to understand aspects of the client's own communications that could not otherwise be appreciated in the rendering of legal advice.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-12-19 Federal NY

Chapter: 26.1103
Case Name: Premier Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Duhon, Civ. A. Nos. 12-1498 & -2790 SECTION: "H" (4), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160204, at *23-24 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013)
("Premier Dealer contends that Mader [non-party] was its agent because he was contracted to sell its automotive repair warranty, therefore his communications with Wolery [plaintiff's in-house counsel] are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Privilege agents include non-employees, such as paralegals and investigators. The presence of these types of third party agents does not waive the privilege if their presence was to facilitate effective communication between lawyer and client or further the representation in some other way. Privileged agents are sometimes grouped into two categories: (1) Communicating agents; and (2) Representing agents. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmts. f, g (2000) 24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5483 Supp. (2009) (discussing communicating and source agents).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-11-08 Federal LA B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1103
Case Name: Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 631 (D. Nev. 2013)
("The court will have to determine, in each instance, whether the non-attorneys were seeking or forwarding legal advice to non-attorneys who needed it to fulfill the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted and/or that disclosure to other non-lawyer employees was reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NV B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1104
Case Name: Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. City of South Portland, 2:15-cv-00054-JAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135704 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2017)
(holding that a real estate appraiser was outside privilege protection, meaning that the client waived the privilege protection when a protected draft was shared with the appraiser; "To summarize, the Document is an excerpt of a draft appraisal report prepared by Mr. Lloyd [Real estate appraiser] in support of PPLC's tax abatement application to the City of South Portland. A staff person at Pierce Atwood 'technically' created the Document by copying the text of the draft report into a word processor. Pierce Atwood attorneys edited the text in the Document, and PPLC sent the edits to Mr. Lloyd, who in turn incorporated the edits into his final Report. Based on these facts, the Court must determine whether the Document is entitled to protection, and if so, whether the Plaintiffs have waived that protection."; "The facts of the present case demonstrate that the exception for necessary third-parties does not apply in this case. Mr. Lloyd was not employed to assist Pierce Atwood in rendering legal advice to PPLC. Rather, Mr. Lloyd was employed to create an appraisal report of PPLC's property. . . . Pierce Atwood created the Document as a way to edit Mr. Lloyd's draft of the appraisal report. . . . As the Plaintiffs admit, Pierce Atwood sent the Document directly to PPLC, and PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd. . . . There is no indication that PPLC sent Mr. Lloyd the Document 'for the purpose of obtaining legal advice' from Pierce Atwood. Instead, it appears that PPLC forwarded the Document to Mr. Lloyd so that Mr. Lloyd could make the suggested changes to his draft report. . . . ('[W]e respectfully request you make the following edits to pages 5 to 7 of the appraisal reports'). Disclosing the Document to Mr. Lloyd destroyed the confidentiality upon which the attorney-client privilege is based. . . . Consequently, the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that the Document is entitled to the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-08-14 Federal ME

Chapter: 26.1104
Case Name: Waters v. Drake, Case No. 2:14-cv-1704, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164179 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2015)
(analyzing privilege issues in connection with Ohio State's investigation of its band's director's termination; concluding disclosing privileged documents to a public relations agency probably waived privilege protection, but finding it unnecessary to reach that issue because the requested documents were not relevant; "If Mr. Culley, even though he was legal counsel, involved the public relations firms not as part of his effort to provide legal advice to the University, but as part of an effort to craft announcements which would be more palatable to the media or the public, he was not using the consultants in order to help him as a lawyer, but to help the University as a public institution anticipating a public relations campaign. Under that scenario, sharing otherwise privileged documents with the consultant is a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and communications directly with the consultant are not privileged at all."; "On the current state of the record, it would be difficult for the Court to conclude that all of these communications were protected by the attorney-client or that providing the public relations firms with otherwise privileged documents was not a waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-12-08 Federal OH
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1104
Case Name: Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 631 (D. Nev. 2013)
("The court will have to determine, in each instance, whether the non-attorneys were seeking or forwarding legal advice to non-attorneys who needed it to fulfill the purpose for which the lawyer was consulted and/or that disclosure to other non-lawyer employees was reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal NV B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1202
Case Name: Whitney v. Tallgrass Beef Company LLC, Case No. 13 C 7322, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78956 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015)
(analyzing the privilege implications of the same lawyer representing two plaintiffs suing the same defendant company on different claims (one involving wages and one involving a contract); inexplicably holding that the privilege did not apply despite the joint representation, because of the different nature of the clients' claims; "The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs waived the attorney-client privilege by sharing information between themselves. The Court finds that a waiver exists for the reasons discussed below. The same analysis applies to the work product doctrine. Many courts have found that the common interest exception to a privilege waiver applies to the work product doctrine as well as the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-18 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1202
Case Name: Marketel Media, Inc. v. Mediapotamus, Inc., 5:13-CV-427-D, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76523 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 2015)
(analyzing a situation in which Ortiz and Hassell formerly co-owned Marketel; explaining that Marketel and one of the owners sued the other owner, who sought to discover communications between the plaintiff and his brother, who was a lawyer; holding that the fiduciary exception did not apply, and that the plaintiff could not obtain discovery of the communications even if the lawyer had represented both the company and one of the owners; "Ortiz's [Defendant] status as a shareholder and officer of Marketel does not entitle her to confidential attorney-client communications between Hassell [Plaintiff] when acting on behalf of Marketel and deRosset. Because Hassell controlled management of Marketel, he retained the authority to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege on its behalf.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-06-11 Federal NC

Chapter: 26.1203
Case Name: In re Infinity Business Group, Inc., Bankruptcy Case No. 10-06335-jw, Adv. Proc. No. 12-80208-jw, Ch. 7, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1560 (D.S.C. April 3, 2015)
(finding that a private company's bankruptcy trustee and the South Carolina Attorney General's office had a common interest; "The MK Defendants further argue that any argument that the documents were produced for a limited purpose and thus maintain the protection of the attorney-client privilege is unavailable to the Trustee as the principle of selective or qualified waiver is not recognized under South Carolina or Fourth Circuit law. . . . It is evident from the Trustee's response that he does not assert that a selective or qualified waiver was made in connection his approval of MK Defendants' production to the SCAG. The production was allowed for the purpose of furthering the Trustee and SCAG's common interest in investigating suspected violations of the law by the Debtor and individuals associated with the Debtor. Therefore, due to the application of the common interest doctrine, no waiver was made at all, let alone a selective or qualified waiver. None of the cases cited by the MK Defendants regarding selective or qualified waiver addressed situations where the common interest doctrine was applicable, as in this case. Since the Court has concluded that the common interest doctrine applies to prevent any waiver of applicable privileges, it is unnecessary to address the parties' arguments regarding selective or qualified waiver or the application of Fed. R. Evid. 502, which defines the scope of a waiver made through disclosure in federal or state proceedings.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2015-04-03 Federal SC

Chapter: 26.1203
Case Name: United States v. Veolia Envt'l N. Am. Operations, Inc., Civ. No. 12-mc-03-LPS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153245, at *26 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2013)
("[T]he government makes another waiver argument: that some of the withheld materials were shared widely among individuals who work for the Taxpayer, as well as individuals who were only employed by related entities. . . . The Court is persuaded by the Taxpayer that it had common interests with its parent and other affiliated entities and that 'the presence of the individuals participating in the communications was necessary for obtaining or acting upon the legal or tax advice sought.'. . . The government has failed to show that there was a waiver.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-10-25 Federal DE B 5/14

Chapter: 26.1203
Case Name: Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., Civ. A. No. 10 2899, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166749, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012)
(addressing a situation in which the defendant sent a subpoena to a litigation funding company's parent; quashing the subpoena, and finding that there had not been a waiver of privilege or work product protections; "Burford Group LLC is an outside consultant staffed by attorneys who evaluate a case to determine the feasibility of advancing financing to a party pursuing a claim which is expensive to litigate. Burford's indirect owners are Glenavy Capital LLC and Litigation Risk Solutions LLC. They are passive holding companies and have no direct relationship with Devon Plaintiffs (hereafter 'Devon') and apparently no involvement with this case other than through Buford."; "As part of the evaluation process, Devon shared confidential information with Buford, including legal memoranda, drafts of pleadings, motions, and briefs, and other filings on behalf of Devon. Documents selected by counsel for Devon were also sent. Finally, the documents were sent to Burford include communications and comments on draft agreements regarding the terms of potential financing. The documents were provided to Burford under the terms of a March 2010 Confidentiality, Common Interest and Non-Disclosure Agreement between Burford and Devon. In March 2011, a funding agreement was executed between a wholly owned subsidiary of Burford, Driftwood Investments, Ltd. and Devon."; "It is quite evident that the subpoenas seek the production of documents that were prepared by counsel for Devon in anticipation of and during litigation and are protected by the work-product doctrine. Litigation strategy, matters concerning merits of claims and defenses and damages would be revealed if the documents were produced. The matters directly involve the mental impressions of counsel and are protected from disclosure as work-product. Moreover, the production of the items subpoenaed would intrude upon attorney-client privilege under the 'common-interest' doctrine. The 'common-interest' doctrine protects communications between parties with a shared common interest in litigation strategy. . . . Here, Burford and Devon now have a common interest in the successful outcome of the litigation which otherwise Devon may not have been able to pursue without the financial assistance of Burford. The documents turned over to Burford were done so under a Confidentiality, Common Interest and Non-Disclosure Agreement. 'Common Interest Material' were specifically described in the Agreement in paragraph 1 as '. . . any Confidential Information that is the work product of qualified legal advisors and/or attorney work product, protected by the attorney-client privilege or any similar privilege in any jurisdiction . . .' Given these controlled conditions, there was no waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and the Joint Motion of Plaintiffs will be granted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-09-27 Federal PA B 7/13

Chapter: 26.1203
Case Name: Peacock v. Merrill, No. CA 05-0377-BH-C, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24104, at *30 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 18, 2008)
(finding that disclosure to a major shareholder in connection with possible litigation did not cause a waiver; "The undersigned finds that the Floragon companies have a common interest in matters discussed between certain Floragon shareholders and their attorneys such that the attorney-client privilege has not been waived by the disclosure of such information to the Floragon companies. The specific common interest existing here between the Floragon companies and its [sic] shareholders was the potential (and then eventual) litigation with the lender, Goodrich & Pennington. Therefore, the sharing of information between counsel for the individual shareholders and the Floragon companies did not waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to these three documents and these documents need not be supplied to plaintiff.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2008-03-18 Federal AL B 8/13

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., Case No. 3:16-cv-01214-SMY-RJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107939 (S.D. Ill. July 12, 2017)
October 4, 2017 (PRIVILEGE PONT)

"Does a Client Risk Privilege Protection by Bringing Her Mother to a Lawyer Meeting?"

Because it is absolute and can hide important facts from easy discovery, the attorney-client privilege is hard to create, narrow, and fragile. Among other things, even friendly third parties' presence can abort privilege protection.

In Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., Case No. 3:16-cv-01214-SMY-RJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107939 (S.D. Ill. July 12, 2017), a Title VII plaintiff brought her mother to her initial lawyer consultation. The court bluntly held that "the presence of her mother during the consultation waived the attorney client privilege." Id. at *5. The court also rejected two arguments plaintiff advanced to avoid such a waiver, holding (1) that the mother was not a joint client, because "there is no evidence that [plaintiff's] mother sought legal services"; and (2) that "[plaintiff] and her mother did not share a common interest." Id.

Perhaps because plaintiff's lawyer did not raise it, the court did not address possible work product protection for plaintiff's communications with her new lawyer. Because the work product doctrine is not based on confidentiality and is much more robust than the privilege, friendly third parties' presence normally does not abort that separate protection.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-07-12 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Kagan v. Minkowitz, 500940/2016, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4577, 2016 NY Slip Op 32429(U) (N.Y. Dec. 9, 2016)
(finding that plaintiff's brother was outside privilege protection, and did not share a common interest with the plaintiff; in contrast, finding that disclosure to the brother did not waive work product protection; "Here, Kagan has submitted to the Court, for in camera review, various email exchanges between himself and his counsel that were either forwarded to Gam [Plaintiff's brother and funder of the litigation] or wherein Gam was copied. Upon review of the papers submitted and consideration of the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the attorney-client emails which were forwarded to Gam are not protected by the attorney-client privilege because no counsel was present when Gam received the information. Kagan fails to provide support for the proposition that the attorney-client privilege applies to email communications between a client and his attorney that were later forwarded to a third party. Moreover, even if the attorney-client privilege were applicable, because these attorney-client emails were forwarded to Gam after the fact, Kagan cannot show that Gam served to facilitate attorney-client communication or representation at the time such communication took place so that the agency exception would apply. In any case, Kagan has failed to establish that Gam, generally, is his agent or his counsel's agent whose services are necessary for the provision or receipt of legal services.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-12-09 State NY

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Westmoreland v. Wells Fargo Bank NW, Case No. 1:15-cv-00312-CWD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151444 (D. Idaho Oct. 31, 2016)
(holding that plaintiff had not lost privilege protection for emails from her lawyer because the lawyer sent the emails to the plaintiff's account that she shared with her husband; "The e-mail communications sent by Westmoreland's counsel to the shared Saxman account were intended, unless otherwise indicated, for his client, Mrs. Westmoreland. While there may have been morsels of privileged attorney-client communications in these e-mails, Westmoreland's counsel contends the substance of the e-mails pertain to, for the most part: scheduling arrangements, copies of correspondence to or from opposing counsel, or discussion of information that ultimately was disclosed in discovery. However, Westmoreland seeks to maintain the privileged nature of these communications and contests the argument that the privilege was waived by her counsel sending communications to the shared e-mail account."; "The Court finds the Bank has not sufficiently demonstrated that Mrs. Westmoreland waived any privilege to her communications with her counsel by asking her counsel to send communications to the shared Saxman e-mail address. The Saxman email account is a private account, in which only Mr. and Mrs. Westmoreland have access. Accordingly, Mrs. Westmoreland and her husband have some expectation of privacy in messages that are sent to and from that account. . . . Although the account is shared, there no evidence to support that Mr. Westmoreland reviewed or read any e-mails or opened any attachments that were intended for Mrs. Westmoreland. Rather, to the contrary, Mr. Westmoreland testified in his sworn affidavit that it is his practice to inform his wife when he sees an e-mail in the Saxman inbox that is from his wife's counsel and addressed to her, and to not otherwise read the contents."; "In addition, even if Mr. Westmoreland read the e-mails, the Court is reluctant to conclude that Mr. Westmoreland qualifies as a third-party for the purposes of waiver of the privilege to attorney-client communications. All communications between Mr. and Mrs. Westmoreland are presumed to be confidential and protected by the martial communications privilege. If counsel communicated privileged information to Mrs. Westmoreland over the telephone or in person, Mrs. Westmoreland could theoretically share that information with her husband, and those communications would be protected by the marital communications privilege. . . . The Court does not believe, under the circumstances presented in this case, that reading a spouse's e-mail from her attorney is any different, or should be afforded any less protection, than if the wife verbally recited the same information she learned from her attorney to her husband. There is no evidence here to suggest Mr. Westmoreland waived or breached the confidentiality of either the attorney-client or martial communications privilege. Accordingly, the Court will deny Wells Fargo Bank's request")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-31 Federal ID

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Rao v. The Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., No. 14-cv-0066, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145298 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2016)
(holding that plaintiff's wife did not share a common interest with her husband, and was not within the privilege protection as her husband's agent, and had admitted that lawyer/children were not acting as her lawyer during the communications; inexplicably not addressing work product protection; "Plaintiff argues that Ms. Jasti's presence on communications between Plaintiff and his lawyers does not destroy the privilege because she 'has driven [Plaintiff] to all meetings with attorneys in this matter,' and 'has also been extremely helpful to counsel in communicating with Dr. Rao, locating and transmitting documents to his counsel, filling in factual gaps when Dr. Rao cannot recall a relevant incident, typing documents for Dr. Rao, providing information about the family's finances, conducting internet research on issues and parties in the case, among other things.". . . The Court does not believe that Plaintiff has carried his burden of proving that Ms. Jasti's role in this litigation is the type that preserves the privilege despite her third party status. This Court's review of the case law in the Seventh Circuit suggests that the privilege protects communications with third parties when the third party is an agent, employee, or outside expert retained for the purposes of litigation. . . . While the exception appears to be flexible, the Court has found no case law that would stretch the exception to reach Ms. Jasti's role in this case."; "The Court has found no case in this circuit where the privilege has extended to family members of parties who are primarily assisting with basic ministerial and administrative tasks, which appears to Ms. Jasti's role in this litigation. The Court accepts that Ms. Jasti was important to the litigation, but that alone is not enough to preserve the privilege. . . . While it is possible that Ms. Jasti was acting as an agent of the Plaintiff, neither the factual recitation nor the legal arguments in Plaintiff's brief present any such assertion. Nor has Plaintiff argued that Ms. Jasti acted as an interpreter or expert that was necessary for Plaintiff's counsel to provide adequate and meaningful legal advice. Given Plaintiff's burden to show that the privilege should apply, and the Seventh Circuit's admonition that the attorney-client privilege should be construed narrowly, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff's communications with his lawyer in the presence of Ms. Jasti were made 'in confidence.' As such, they are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Ms. Jasti is ordered to produce the documents sought in the Defendants' third-party subpoena on or before October 24, 2016.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-20 Federal IL
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: United States v. Heine, Case No. 3:15-cr-00238-SI-2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Ore. March 31, 2016)
(rejecting a former Bank executive's effort to obtain privileged Bank documents in his criminal proceeding; holding that the Bank had not waived its privilege by providing facts to the FBI, or by disclosing protected documents to bank regulators; "The Bank also asserts that several of Yates's requests seek large amounts to documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, which the Bank does not waive."; "Unlike the voluntary disclosure of the Report and Back-up Materials in Bergonzi [United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003)], the Bank produced to the FBI, or in response to grand jury subpoenas, only non-privileged information. Because the information provided to the FBI or the grand jury did not contain the Bank's confidential attorney-client communications, the Bank has not waived its attorney-client privilege."; "The Bank responds that any disclosures made to the FDIC do not waive the attorney-client privilege because such disclosures are statutorily protected. The Court agrees based on 12 U.S.C. § 1828."; "In addition, the FDIC may share otherwise privileged information with other federal government agencies without waiving any applicable privilege. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(t). Thus, any statements made by the Bank to the FDIC or any documents provided by the Bank to the FDIC cannot constitute a waiver of the Bank's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-31 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: United States v. Heine, Case No. 3:15-cr-00238-SI-2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Ore. March 31, 2016)
(rejecting a former Bank executive's effort to obtain privileged Bank documents in his criminal proceeding; holding that the Bank had not waived its privilege by providing facts to the FBI, or by disclosing protected documents to bank regulators; "The Bank also asserts that several of Yates's requests seek large amounts to documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, which the Bank does not waive."; "Unlike the voluntary disclosure of the Report and Back-up Materials in Bergonzi [United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003)], the Bank produced to the FBI, or in response to grand jury subpoenas, only non-privileged information. Because the information provided to the FBI or the grand jury did not contain the Bank's confidential attorney-client communications, the Bank has not waived its attorney-client privilege."; "The Bank responds that any disclosures made to the FDIC do not waive the attorney-client privilege because such disclosures are statutorily protected. The Court agrees based on 12 U.S.C. § 1828."; "In addition, the FDIC may share otherwise privileged information with other federal government agencies without waiving any applicable privilege. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(t). Thus, any statements made by the Bank to the FDIC or any documents provided by the Bank to the FDIC cannot constitute a waiver of the Bank's attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-03-31 Federal OR

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: L-3 Communications Corp. v. Jaxon Engineering & Maintenance, Inc., Civ. A. No. 10-cv-02868-MSK-KMT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103157 (D. Colo. July 29, 2014)
(finding that providing privileged documents to a wife did not waive the privilege protection; "Marisa Neuzil is the wife of co-defendant and Jaxon employee, James Youngman. This court agrees that in the case of Mr. Youngman, if he had shared privileged information with his wife, for instance by forwarding an email to her that was otherwise protected by attorney client privilege, that forwarded email does not act as a waiver of the attorney client privilege. This is precisely what happened with PJAX-03659798. . . . The document forwarded in this manner goes from one protected form, to wit: attorney client privileged, to another: spousal privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-07-29 Federal CO

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Brownfield v. Hodous, 82 Va. Cir. 315, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 176 (Va. Cir. Ct. March 31, 2011)
(concluding that presence of the client's husband did not destroy privilege protection; "[T]he Court found that the documents and the handwritten notations thereon were intended to be privileged communications to Plaintiff's lawyer and that they should be protected by the attorney-client privilege and the inadvertent disclosure rule, unless the presence of Plaintiff's husband at the meeting with Mr. Lowry eliminated the required confidentiality and thus defeated the privilege as a matter of law. The parties have briefed that issue at the Court's request."; "Little case authority addresses this issue. Plaintiff relies upon the legal principle articulated in the Restatement of the Law, Third, The Law Governing Lawyers § 71 (comment b)."; "Id. See also, United States v. Rothberg, 896 F. Supp. 450, 454, and n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ('Defendant asserts that his alleged conversation with his attorney about the possibility of a fire at the club was subject to attorney-client privilege. [Defendant's wife] testified that this conversation took place in her presence. Because of spousal confidentiality, it was ruled that there was no third-party waiver'); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332, n. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ('That Target's spouse was present during some of these conversations does not destroy any applicable privilege')."; "Contrary authority supports Defendants' request for a determination that no privilege attached to Plaintiff's writings despite the fact that the third party was her spouse. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 104 Misc. 2d 136, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 698, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Baeder v. Fourth of July Celebration Comm., Inc., 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 204 at *5-6 (Conn. Super. 2007)."; "The Colorado Supreme Court articulated an accurate observation on the state of the law on this issue: 'We observe, however, that the effect of a spouse's presence on a communication between attorney and client is not entirely clear.' In re Wesp, 33 P.3d 191, 199, n. 13 (Colo. 2001)."; "Virginia does indeed recognize such a privilege. The Court finds that Plaintiff intended that the communications would remain confidential and did not manifest any contrary intent by permitting her husband to review the documents or attend the meeting."; "Given the unsettled state of this law and the relative scarcity of guiding case authority, the Court resolves the issue in favor of protecting the attorney-client privilege. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, because Virginia does recognize the husband-wife privilege codified at Virginia Code § 8.01-398, the presence of Plaintiff's husband does not destroy the confidentiality required for the attorney-client privilege."; "The existence or non-existence of an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants is a jury issue to be adjudicated at the hearing on Defendants' Plea in Bar."; "The Court finds that Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing that privileged communications between Defendants and Heischman are likely to establish that Defendants jointly represented her along with her brother. The jury will be asked to determine that question at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on the Plea in Bar, and Plaintiff may at that time seek to compel production of the correspondence if she prevails. On the present record, however, the Court lacks a basis to determine that in camera review of correspondence between Heischman and Defendants will establish that the representation included Plaintiff."; "Both parties cite frequently to Virginia's own guru on the attorney-client privilege, Tom Spahn. Mr. Spahn writes: 'In today's highly nuanced legal world of fact-intensive analyses and judicial balancing tests, the attorney-client privilege stands nearly alone in offering a legal absolute.' Thomas E. Spahn, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine: A Practitioner's Guide, § 1.501 (Va. Law Foundation, 2007). The Court is reluctant to violate a privilege recognized as a legal absolute without a clear basis, which has not been presented in support of Plaintiff's motion to compel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2011-03-31 State VA

Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Green v. Beer, No. 06 Civ. 4156 (KMW) (JCF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87484, at *5, *12 13, *13-14, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010)
(reversing a portion of Magistrate Judge Francis's earlier ruling, and affirming another portion of his ruling; holding that (1) a couple did not waive their privilege protection by asking their son to print out their emails, because the son was providing necessary technical assistance to his parents (reversing Judge Francis's holding to the contrary), and (2) that the couple waived their attorney-client privilege by disclosing privileged communications to their financial advisors (affirming Judge Francis's holding); "Daniel Green, the son of the Green Plaintiffs, received email communications from counsel, which he then provided to his parents. He explained in his affidavit that his technical assistance was necessary for his parents to timely receive the email communications from counsel: 'My parents are not proficient in the use [of] electronic mail and, due to the time-sensitive nature of these communications, it was necessary for these communications to be delivered to my email address to ensure a timely receipt. My parents regularly rely on me to send and receive emails for them.'" (internal citation omitted); "The magistrate judge committed clear error by failing to apply Section 4548 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, the relevant state law on attorney-client privilege and electronic communications. The magistrate judge instead applied only the two-part test for the exception to a waiver of privilege, finding that Daniel Green's involvement was not necessary to the provision of legal services given that alternative means of communication were available. This analysis is incomplete in the context of electronic communications, for which Section 4548 applies. Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence that the Green Plaintiffs lack proficiency in the use of email, and that their son's assistance was 'necessary for the delivery of facilitation' of counsel's emailed communications to the Green Plaintiffs. . . . Thus, under Section 4548, the Green Plaintiffs have not waived the attorney-client privilege based on Daniel Green's involvement in the delivery of the disputed emails."; "The magistrate judge also erred by not finding that Daniel Green served as an agent for the Green Plaintiffs, and that his involvement in the delivery of the otherwise confidential communications would not constitute a waiver of privilege. It is clear that the Green Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that the email communications would remain confidential, and that the technical assistance provided by their son, in his capacity as their agent, should not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege."; "A finding that privilege has not been waived in this case is appropriate as a matter of public policy. Email permits attorneys and their clients to engage in prompt communication, often regarding time-sensitive matters. A client lacking proficiency in Internet technology should not be prevented from enjoying the advantages of email correspondence for fear that the necessary assistance of a third party -- here, the Green Plaintiff's son -- in sending or receiving such correspondence will lead to the forfeiture of the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-08-24 Federal NY B 7/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463, 464, 468, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(analyzing the following situation: "On June 23, 2002, Stewart composed an e mail that contained her account of the facts relating to her sale of ImClone stock. She sent this e mail to Andrew J. Nussbaum, an attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, who was at the time one of the lawyers representing Stewart in her dealings with the government. The following day, Stewart accessed the e mail from her own e mail account and, without making any alterations to it, forwarded a copy to her daughter, Alexis Stewart."; concluding that the e mail deserved privilege protection, but that Stewart waived that protection; "Stewart's June 23 e mail to Nussbaum was clearly protected by her attorney client privilege . . . . Defendant's arguments regarding Stewart's intent and the sanctity of the family notwithstanding, the law in this Circuit is clear: apart from a few recognized exceptions, disclosure to third parties of attorney client privileged materials results in a waiver of that privilege. No exception is applicable in this case."; also finding that the e mail deserved work product protection; "[A]lthough the e mail to Stewart's daughter does not realistically risk revealing the thought processes of Stewart's attorneys, I conclude that it is protectable as preparation for litigation. The Government does not claim that it has substantial need for the statements in the e mail. I must therefore determine whether Stewart waived the protection by forwarding the e mail to her daughter."; finding that Stewart did not waive the work product protection; "By forwarding the e mail to a family member, Stewart did not substantially increase the risk that the Government would gain access to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. Martha Stewart stated in her affidavit that 'Alexis is the closest person in the world to me. She is a valued confidante and counselor to me. In sharing the e mail with her, I knew that she would keep its content strictly confidential.' . . . Alexis Stewart stated that while she did not recall receiving the June 24 e mail, she 'never would have disclosed its contents.' . . . The disclosure affected neither side's interests in this litigation: it did not evince an intent on Stewart's part to relinquish work product immunity for the document, and it did not prejudice the Government by offering Stewart some litigation based advantage. Accordingly, I hold that Stewart did not waive work product protection over the June 23 and 24 e mails.").

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2003-01-01 Federal NY
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1208
Case Name: Wertenbaker v. Winn, 30 Va. Cir. 327, 330 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993)
(finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege if "confidential information concerning [husband's] estate plans was divulged to [wife], a stranger to the attorney-client relationship")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1993-01-01 State VA B 3/16
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1209
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A, Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.1209
Case Name: In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, L.L.C., Case No. 09-11116, Sec. A. Ch. 11, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1972 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014)
("A client may direct the production of documents to an agent without waiving the privilege if the production is necessarily required to prepare for the legal representation of the client."; "For example, if a client retains new counsel, delivery of former counsel's files to new counsel does not waive the privilege. Nor is the privilege waived if counsel provides privileged information to a professional in preparation for trial, as for example with an accountant assisting in the trial. Nor is it waived if provided to an employee representing the client, i.e., the president of a corporate client. Similarly, when the Disbursing Agent acts as the representative of the reorganized debtor in connection with the files, no privilege is waived.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-05-01 Federal LA

Chapter: 26.1209
Case Name: California LEO 2012 183 (2012)
("While an attorney may disclose client confidences to her own attorney to evaluate a potential wrongful discharge claim against her former firm, neither she nor her attorney may publicly disclose those confidences except in the narrowest of circumstances."; "[C]ase law would permit Senior Associate to disclose confidential information both about the Firm and the Firm's client to Attorney to obtain legal advice about her rights against the Firm."; "Thus, Fox Searchlight [Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v, Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001] makes clear that lawyers have the right to disclose employer-client confidential information when seeking legal advice from their own lawyers whether for their own protection or in aid of the client's cause."; "While no case directly addresses to what extent Senior Associate may publicly disclose client confidential information to the extent necessary to further her claims in a legal proceeding, in light of the absolute language in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1), amended only to allow permissive disclosure in more dire circumstances, and the case law discussed above, we conclude that Senior Associate may not publicly disclose the Firm's client's confidences in order to pursue her own civil action." (footnote omitted); "Attorney has two sets of duties to Senior Associate. First, Attorney is bound by the attorney-client privilege and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) to protect what Senior Associate reveals to him in consulting him about her potential claim against the Firm. As a consequence, unless Senior Associate can publicly disclose her former Firm's client's confidences, and only to the extent that she would be permitted to do so, Attorney is equally bound to protect those confidences from public disclosure because of his duty to protect the confidential information Senior Associate disclosed. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(e)(1); rule 3 100.)"; "Second, Attorney also owes Senior Associate a duty of competence under rule 3 110, not only to advance her interests but to avoid harming her. He is a Senior Associate's agent and generally his conduct is imputed to her. Thus, if Senior Associate cannot publicly disclose the Firm's client's confidential information, we conclude that Attorney is prohibited from engaging in such conduct." (footnote omitted))

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Other B 6/13

Chapter: 26.1209
Case Name: Shenandoah Publ'g House, Inc. v. City of Winchester, 52 Va. Cir. 111, 115 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
(holding that the Winchester City Manager's sharing of a document with a member of that City's Council "does not abrogate the privilege, because the Councilwoman, by definition, is a member of the City's control group, and she is entitled to see a confidential document without vitiating the attorney-client privilege which attaches to the document")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2000-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.1302
Case Name: SCF Waxler Marine LLC v. M/V Aris T, C. A. No. 16-902C/W16-959,16-1022,16-1060,16-1134,16-1614 Sec. "A"(1), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90256 (E.D. La. June 13, 2017)
(holding that a draft incident report deserved privilege protection, although the final version was intended to be disclosed; "[J]ust because a factual statement is ultimately disclosed to the public, this does not mean that all drafts of the factual statement automatically lose any privilege that is attached to them. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968) ('The situation is like that where a client gives general information to his lawyer so that the lawyer may prepare a complaint in any ordinary civil action. The fact that some of the information is thus publicly disclosed does not waive the privilege.'); Buford v. Holladay, 133 F.R.D. 487, 492 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that the ultimate publication of Attorney General Opinions did not waive the privilege as to the communications leading up to the creation of the Opinions). Often, drafts of a document exchanged between an attorney and client will reflect the client's request for advice regarding how to present the facts and the attorney's advice in response. Ideal Electric Company v. Flowserve Corporation, 230 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D. Nev. 2005) ('Drafts often contain attorney's and client's mental impressions, strategies, and either solicit or provide legal advice.'). Such drafts are protected by the attorney client privilege. Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., No. CIV.A. 09-6644, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93881, 2014 WL 3385130, at *4 (E.D. La. July 10, 2014) (holding that redacted draft affidavits were protected by the attorney client privilege); United States v. N.Y. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 03CV02139-SLT-MDG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93920, 2006 WL 3833120, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006) (holding that draft uniform policy bulletins 'need not be produced since they are draft documents that were submitted to attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice'); Ideal Electric Company, 230 F.R.D. at 605 (holding that draft affidavits were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege); Long v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding draft answer to a complaint was privileged); Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Grp. Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ('[P]reliminary drafts of documents and communications made between attorney and client during the drafting process are privileged.'); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp., No. CIV. A. 89-5940, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5173, 1991 WL 61144, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1991) (holding that a draft patent application was privileged because the draft was not intended to be publicly transmitted and contained a communication within the attorney-client relationship for the purposes of rendering a confidential opinion)."; "Genesis now knows that contrary to what he suggested in his deposition, Leone [Ship Pilot] did not appear at his counsel's office with a contemporaneous written statement of events. Rather, it has been firmly established through in camera review and oral argument, that the first narrative of the accident was prepared by the attorney based on an interview of the client, Leone. Leone then handwrote in some changes to that draft prior to it becoming a final document, which was produced to NOBRA and others. Nonetheless, Genesis continues to insist that the drafts be discoverable so it can see any changes made. As reiterated in Ideal Electric Company and as discussed further below, however, it is 'these differences [that] are protected by the attorney client privilege and the work product privilege.'"; "[T]he Court finds that the ultimate disclosure of the final draft of the NOBRA Pilot Incident Report does not result in a waiver of the privilege. Just as in Ideal Electric Company, the Court finds that the drafts and notes were never intended to be made public. They were conveyed in confidence in the course of obtaining and giving legal advice. While Leone and his counsel were obviously working towards a document that would be made public, they did not intend that their drafts and analysis would be subject to disclosure. As the Court in Buford observed, the argument raised by Genesis here would result in disclosure of every draft of a pleading, brief, or affidavit that is exchanged between counsel and client merely because such drafts concern facts and the final draft is made public. At oral argument, counsel for Genesis seemed willing to live with this extraordinary result, but the Court finds that such a holding goes too far.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-13 Federal LA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1302
Case Name: Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017)
July 26, 2017 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Cadwalader Loses Work Product and Privilege Claims for 51 Internal Investigation Witness Interview Memoranda: Part II"

Last week's Privilege Point explained that Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft's client Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA) lost a work product claim for 51 witness interviews the firm prepared during its internal investigation into self-dealing at WMATA. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, Civ. A. No. 13-391 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74155 (D.D.C. May 16, 2017).

Unlike the court's focus on the investigation's primary business motivation in rejecting the work product claim, the court's privilege analysis found that WMATA waived its privilege protection. The court noted that WMATA publicly released the final Cadwalader report -- which "disclosed counsel's legal and factual conclusions," and "cite[d] extensively to the interview memoranda throughout the entirety of the document." Id. at *18-19. The court acknowledged a Cadwalader lawyer's declaration that the interview memoranda references "were intended only for use by Cadwalader" -- but noted that "WMATA failed to remove the references . . . from the version of the [Cadwalader] Report that was made available to the public." Id. at *19 n.1. The court also noted that WMATA "has also used the [Cadwalader] Report to its advantage in this litigation" – by "us[ing] the [Cadwalader] Report and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and defenses." Id. at *19. The court therefore found a subject matter waiver, and ordered WMATA to produce all of Cadwalader's 51 witness interview memoranda except the portions which (1) "contain subjects not covered by the [Cadwalader] Report," and (2) "material and other comments, if any, as to a lawyer's mental impressions." Id. at *20.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-05-16 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1302
Case Name: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Case No. 01-cv-2252 CRB (JSC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42740, at *20, *22-23, *24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013)
(holding that a publication by the New York Times of a 1995 Akin Gump memorandum to its client Wal-Mart did not result in a waiver; also finding that Wal-Mart disclosed part of the memorandum in responding to the New York Times story, but that the disclosure did not trigger a subject matter waiver under the von Bulow (In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987)) doctrine; "Plaintiffs next argue that Wal-Mart's voluntary decision to comment on 'the substance and merits of the Memo in The New York Times,' waived the privilege as to the entire Memo."; "A review of the comments attributed to Wal-Mart in the Article reveals that Wal-Mart disclosed some of the confidential Memo's protected content."; "In only one paragraph does Wal-Mart disclose the actual contents of the Memo. According to the Article, 'Wal-Mart criticized Akin Gump's methodology, saying it had deliberately mimicked the type of statistical analysis done by plaintiffs' lawyers in class-action cases. Even using that methodology, the retailer said, Akin Gump did not find significant disparities between the hourly wages of men and women.'. . . With this statement Wal-Mart intentionally disclosed privileged information; namely, Akin Gump's methodology and the fact that the law firm did not find hourly wage disparities by gender.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-03-26 Federal CA B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1302
Case Name: ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 247 (E.D. Va. 2012)
("Waiver can occur by public revelation. See, e.g. Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19563, 2000 WL 1811606, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19563, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2000). Revelation is 'public' if 'it destroys any expectation of privacy for the disclosed information.' See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 600, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citations omitted). And, 'when a party discloses information that had been confidential before the disclosure, the privilege is waived not only to that communication, but also "as to the subject matter of the disclosure."' Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1998)). The rule prevents 'selective disclosure for tactical purposes.' Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982)).")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.1302
Case Name: United States v. Jones, No. 82-5209, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23313 (4th Cir. App. Dec. 14, 1982)
(holding that a company's inclusion of a legal opinion in a brochure released to the public triggered a subject matter waiver; "Assuming . . . that the attorney-client privilege applies to the subpoenaed documents and testimony, the privilege was nevertheless waived by the appellants. The success of appellants' business venture depended upon convincing potential investors that purported tax benefits existed in fact, and this rested on interpretation of the tax laws. The appellants not only obtained the tax law opinions for the ultimate use of persons other than themselves, but also publicized portions of the legal opinions in brochures and other printed material. They cannot now assert a right to quash the subpoenas (1) to block the grand jury's access to documents substantial portions of which the appellants have published to the public at large, or (2) to prevent the revelation of the factual communications between the appellants and their attorneys underlying the published opinion letters.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1982-12-14 Federal
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96852 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2017)
(holding that a due diligence report prepared by a forensic firm for Uber before it purchased Ottomotto did not deserve privilege protection because it was shared with Ottomotto who did not enjoy a common interest with Uber in discovering whether Ottomotto 's counsel had engaged in wrongdoing by purloining information from Google; "Uber's theory is not that Levandowski [former Google executive accused of purloining Google's automated car technology], as a client of MoFo [Law firm which represented Uber] and OMM [Law firm which represented the acquired company], communicated in confidence to Stroz Friedberg so that he could obtain legal advice from MoFo and OMM. Nor is it that the due diligence report reflects any information communicated in confidence to Stroz Friedberg by Uber or Ottomotto for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from their attorneys. Instead, Uber's carefully-worded objection suggests the remarkable proposition that information communicated in confidence by anyone to Stroz Friedberg for the purpose of enabling Uber and Ottomotto to obtain legal advice from MoFo and OMM should be covered by the attorney-client privilege. That suggestion has no basis in the law.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2017-06-21 Federal CA

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Father Doe v. Phillips Exeter Academy, Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding a waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "As PEA has described the reports, they consist of Attorney McGintee's 'factual findings,' as to what occurred between John and Jane, 'including credibility determinations in instances where there were disputes of fact.'. . . This suggests that the reports consist largely of facts acquired from the three minor witnesses. Facts and statements by third parties do not enjoy the protection of the attorney-client privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Father Doe v. Phillips Exeter Academy, Civ. No. 16-cv-396-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141877 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 2016)
(finding that defendant Phillips Exeter Academy could not successfully claim privilege protection for a lawyer's investigation into possible sexual misconduct by a student; noting that defendant called the lawyer an "independent investigator," which meant that the lawyer was not assisting the defendant's lawyer in providing legal advice; also finding an implied waiver because the defendant relied on the investigation report in disciplining a student; also finding that defendant waived any possible privilege protection by disclosing portions of the investigation report to parents; inexplicably failing to deal with the work product doctrine; "Even had PEA not put the reports into issue in this litigation, PEA waived any privilege by disclosing their contents to third parties -- specifically, the Does -- and in filings with this court. . . . Dean Mischke disclosed portions of the reports to John Doe's parents before this litigation began. On March 3, 2016, Dean Mischke emailed Father Doe to set up a phone call 'to review the general findings of Ms. McGintee's investigation . . . .' Not 'want[ing] to be cagey about the conclusion' of Attorney McGintee's report, Dean Mischke disclosed Attorney McGintee's conclusion that 'while she has concerns about [John Doe], his attitude and his lack of reading the situation as well as not obtaining expressed consent early on, concludes no malice and no forcible action.' Id. During the ensuing phone call, plaintiffs allege, Dean Mischke also disclosed certain of Jane's allegations. . . . PEA further described the reports' contents -- including Attorney McGintee's conclusions -- in several filings with this court, including Dean Mischke's declaration and its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in advance of a subsequently-cancelled hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-10-13 Federal NH

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: United States v. Salerian, Case No. 1:13CR00017, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9938, at *3 4, *17 18, *18, *19 20 (W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2014)
(finding that a criminal defendant waived privilege protection by giving communications between him and his lawyer to a third party; "'Bockhorst [AUSA] stated that the first time she saw the notebook containing the communications between Salerian and his counsel, ('Notebook'), was on May 15, 2012, when she met with L. Rash [undercover informant] for a proffer session. L. Rash brought the Notebook to the meeting with Bockhorst and offered it to her. Bockhorst testified that she opened the Notebook in order to peruse the contents. Bockhorst stated that the first document she saw was some nondescript correspondence. The next document she saw, however, was on the letterhead of Salerian's counsel, Glen Donath, and contained a heading stating 'Privileged Communication.' Bockhorst stated that she immediately closed the Notebook and did not read the contents of this letter or any other document contained in the Notebook. Bockhorst testified that L. Rash told her that she had been given the Notebook by Salerian. Bockhorst stated that neither she, nor the case agent present at this meeting, Nick Worsham, took custody of the Notebook that day. A subpoena was obtained for L. Rash to appear before the grand jury on the next day and to produce all records regarding Salerian in her possession'"; "Dr. Salerian's conduct does not evince an intent to maintain the confidential nature of the notebook. While he contacted Brammer [lawyer for informant's son] on a single occasion and indicated that he may want to retain her for representation in a matter unrelated to this criminal case, no such representation was ever undertaken. After several weeks or possibly months, Dr. Salerian disclosed the notebook to L. Rash, who in turn delivered the notebook to Brammer. However, according to Brammer, Rash never suggested that she was delivering it for the purposes of securing representation for Dr. Salerian. In fact, at the request of Brammer, Dr. Salerian had previously turned over other documents -- including records of her son's medical treatment -- in order to aid in Brammer's representation of R. Rash. In this context, there is nothing to suggest that Dr. Salerian intended this notebook to be treated differently than the previously provided materials that had been transmitted to Brammer via L. Rash. At most, Salerian's conduct shows the intent to continue aiding L. Rash in her son's criminal prosecution, with the attendant hope that Brammer may represent him in unrelated proceedings."; "Furthermore, the defendant's asserted standard for confidential agency does not negate Dr. Salerian's conduct supporting waiver."; "Assuming it would be reasonable for the defendant to believe L. Rash would hold the notebook in confidence, L. Rash's participation was not reasonably necessary to facilitate Dr. Salerian's communication with the lawyer. The illustrations of reasonable necessity in the Restatement include scenarios where the police refuse a client access to regular counsel or where the client and attorney do not speak a common language. L. Rash was not reasonably necessary in this sense or any conceivable sense, for that matter. Dr. Salerian could have as easily transmitted the notebook directly to Brammer as to L. Rash. In fact, he had spoken directly with her about representation some time before. Moreover, in consideration of the factors listed in the Restatement, it was not customary for L. Rash to assure the confidentiality of Dr. Salerian's materials, and indeed, the materials that he had previously divulged to aid in the defense of L. Rash's son. Other than Dr. Salerian's indicated interest in helping her son (a former patient) and the similar charges that he faced, there was no link between L. Rash and Dr. Salerian. For these reasons, I find that Dr. Salerian waived the attorney-client privilege as to the communications contained in the notebook.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-01-28 Federal VA B 6/14

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Rein v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 376 (4th Cir. 2009)
("[T]he attorney client privilege can be waived if the document is published, or disclosed to private individuals or to nonfederal agencies. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 566 F.2d at 253.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2009-01-01 Federal

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Commonwealth v. Miller, 66 Va. Cir. 470, 470-71 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2001)
("The attorney-client privilege may be waived by the client either expressly or implied from the client's conduct. Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra, at 509; Grant, supra. at 648-49. In the instant case, the defendant told the police officer transporting her to the Albemarle Regional Jail on September 13, 2001, that Bruce K. Tyler, her former lawyer, told her that she need not legally change her name to get a home equity loan or insurance benefits. I find that this constitutes an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. It is a communication to the police officer of information that would otherwise be privileged because it was a communication from her lawyer to her in the course of his employment. This waiver not only waives the privilege as to any transmitted data, but also as to the details underlying that information. Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra, at 509-10.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2001-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 178 F.R.D. 61, 72 (E.D. Va. 1998)
("[T]he Court holds that the attorney-client privilege attached to the communication at the meeting on September 6, 1990, but then Stephen Halliday waived the privilege by talking to Ralph Reed about the substance of the meeting four days later on September 10."; finding waiver of communications that were initially protected by the attorney-client privilege), aff'd in part, modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Va. 1998)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1998-01-01 Federal VA

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: O'Dell v. Cedar Lakes, L.P., 44 Va. Cir. 164, 165 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997)
("The O'Dell statement is a chronology of the events and problems the O'Dells allegedly experienced with Unit 2, lot 50, at Cedar Lakes Condominium. It was prepared at the O'Dells' counsel's request, and Mr. Brincefield asserts that it is protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Apparently, the document was also provided to one of Ms. O'Dell's physicians, Dr. Grace Ziem. The O'Dells signed a release, and Dr. Ziem produced the statement to defendants. There is no argument that Dr. Ziem was working with the O'Dells' lawyer, see Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988); thus the delivery of the statement to the doctor destroyed the confidentiality leg of the attorney-client privilege. Likewise, the work product doctrine does not preclude the defendants' use of the statement. Rule 4:1(a)(3) specifically exempts party statements from the work product doctrine. Thus Defendants may use the statement without running afoul of the doctrine."; finding that disclosure of a previously privileged document to a doctor waived the privilege because the doctor was not working with the parties' lawyer)

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1997-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.1303
Case Name: Wertenbaker v. Winn, 30 Va. Cir. 327, 330 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993)
(finding waiver of the attorney-client privilege if "confidential information concerning [husband's] estate plans was divulged to [wife], a stranger to the attorney-client relationship")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
1993-01-01 State VA

Chapter: 26.1401
Case Name: United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), No. 17-4183, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17613 (4th Cir. App. June 27, 2018)
("The Fraud Section and EDVa each agree that it will not assert that the disclosure of any Protected Information by [Doe] provides the Fraud Section or EDVa with additional grounds to subpoena other privileged materials from [X Corp. and its directors] or [Doe] although any grounds that exist apart from such disclosure shall remain unaffected by this agreement."; "The Government concedes that the Agreement precludes it from seeking additional information not disclosed in the interview."; "Applying these principles, we conclude that the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges as to the Government. Holding otherwise would require us to discount the plain language of the Agreement's First Clause, which expressly reserves those privileges. The Government argues that, because the Agreement's Second Clause permits the Government to share the information it received from Doe with third parties in carrying out its responsibilities, the First Clause cannot mean what it says. Instead, the Government contends, the First Clause provides a basis for X Corp. to assert privilege only against third parties. We find nothing in the Agreement or the law to support such a construction."; "[H]ere, the First Clause prevents that result; it preserves X Corp.'s privileges, at least as to the Government, even if Doe disclosed the information in the interview and even if the Government in turn disclosed it to a third party."; "In essence, the Agreement maintains the status quo regarding X Corp.'s privileges. It nullifies the effect of both Doe's initial disclosure of privileged information and the Government's later disclosure of the same information on X Corp.'s ability to assert privilege against the Government. As a result, X Corp. may assert privilege here as if Doe had never disclosed the information in the first instance."; "Construing the Agreement to preserve X Corp.'s privileges also serves important policy considerations. Cooperation between private entities and the Government furthers the truth-finding process. Such negotiations 'give potential defendants an opportunity to explain away suspicious circumstances, give the government an opportunity to avoid embarrassing and wasteful mistakes, and give the public a greater likelihood of a just result.'. . . Declining to hold the Government to the terms of an agreement it struck would discourage private entities from cooperating with the Government in the future."; explaining that the court need not decide whether a third party could claim there had been a waiver; "We do not decide whether the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges vis-à-vis a third party to whom the Government disclosed information from Doe's interview, as that is not the question before us. For the same reason, we find inapposite the cases the Government cites involving attempts by third parties to access information a company shared with the government under a confidentiality agreement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 26.1401
Case Name: Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424 (N.D. Ms. April 11, 2018)
(upholding a private agreement among litigants that disclosure of some protected documents would not result in a subject matter waiver; "After a discussion with plaintiffs' counsel about disclosing some confidential information, and after counsel agreed that such disclosure would not waive all claims of privilege, the defendants produced over 800 pages of the Sedgewick James claims file with redactions."; "[T]he court finds that the motion should be denied on the merits. The plaintiffs agreed that production of some privileged documents would not operate as a waiver of all privilege claims. While selective production of documents or privilege information can result in a waiver of the privilege . . . the court sees no compelling reason to excuse the plaintiffs from the agreement they made with defense counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-11 Federal MS

Chapter: 26.1401
Case Name: Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 11, 2018)
July 4, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Should Litigants Count on Private Non-Waiver Agreements?"

When negotiating their respective privilege claims, litigants sometimes face the temptation to agree among themselves that producing some arguably protected withheld documents will not trigger a subject matter waiver requiring them to produce additional withheld documents. Is that wise?

Courts generally honor such private agreements. In Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., the court noted that defendant had "produced over 800 pages of . . . claims file[s]" – "after counsel agreed that such disclosure would not waive all claims of privilege." Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 11, 2018). The court rejected plaintiffs' later waiver argument, explaining that "[w]hile selective production of documents or privilege information can result in a waiver of the privilege . . . , the court sees no compelling reason to excuse the plaintiffs from the agreement they made with defense counsel." Id. at *6.

In one-off commercial litigation where there are no other adversaries or would-be adversaries, such private non-waiver agreements might make sense. But in pattern litigation or other situations where there are existing or possible future adversaries, such private agreements are too risky. They only bind signatories, and do not prevent third parties from claiming a subject matter waiver. In those circumstances, the only safe bet is to incorporate such agreements into court orders.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-11 Federal MS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1402
Case Name: Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424 (N.D. Ms. April 11, 2018)
(upholding a private agreement among litigants that disclosure of some protected documents would not result in a subject matter waiver; "After a discussion with plaintiffs' counsel about disclosing some confidential information, and after counsel agreed that such disclosure would not waive all claims of privilege, the defendants produced over 800 pages of the Sedgewick James claims file with redactions."; "[T]he court finds that the motion should be denied on the merits. The plaintiffs agreed that production of some privileged documents would not operate as a waiver of all privilege claims. While selective production of documents or privilege information can result in a waiver of the privilege . . . the court sees no compelling reason to excuse the plaintiffs from the agreement they made with defense counsel.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-11 Federal MS

Chapter: 26.1402
Case Name: In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 1566, Base Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61371 (D. Nev. May 5, 2016)
(finding that Dynegy waived its privilege protection by giving the federal government documents about a gas price fixing investigation, but did not waive its work product protection; "The Ninth Circuit has plainly held that a party may not selectively waive the attorney-client privilege. It has held that voluntary disclosure to one waives the attorney-client privilege as to the world at large. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012). There, the court noted that only the Eighth Circuit had adopted the selective waiver doctrine in its decision in Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Id. at 1127. Every other circuit to have addressed the issue had rejected the doctrine of selective waiver. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the selective waiver theory finding that, if it was 'to unmoor a privilege from its underlying justification' it would be failing to construe the privilege narrowly.' Id. at 1128. It observed that since the Eighth Circuit decided Diversified, there had been multiple legislative attempts to adopt the theory of selective waiver which had failed. Id. It cited the report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and portions of the Congressional Record in which Congress declined to adopt a new privilege to protect disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government. Id. As Congress had declined to broadly adopt a new privilege protecting disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government, the Ninth Circuit also declined to do so. Id.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2016-05-05 Federal NV

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand Jury 16-3817 (16-4), No. 17-4183, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17613 (4th Cir. App. June 27, 2018)
("The Fraud Section and EDVa each agree that it will not assert that the disclosure of any Protected Information by [Doe] provides the Fraud Section or EDVa with additional grounds to subpoena other privileged materials from [X Corp. and its directors] or [Doe] although any grounds that exist apart from such disclosure shall remain unaffected by this agreement."; "The Government concedes that the Agreement precludes it from seeking additional information not disclosed in the interview."; "Applying these principles, we conclude that the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges as to the Government. Holding otherwise would require us to discount the plain language of the Agreement's First Clause, which expressly reserves those privileges. The Government argues that, because the Agreement's Second Clause permits the Government to share the information it received from Doe with third parties in carrying out its responsibilities, the First Clause cannot mean what it says. Instead, the Government contends, the First Clause provides a basis for X Corp. to assert privilege only against third parties. We find nothing in the Agreement or the law to support such a construction."; "[H]ere, the First Clause prevents that result; it preserves X Corp.'s privileges, at least as to the Government, even if Doe disclosed the information in the interview and even if the Government in turn disclosed it to a third party."; "In essence, the Agreement maintains the status quo regarding X Corp.'s privileges. It nullifies the effect of both Doe's initial disclosure of privileged information and the Government's later disclosure of the same information on X Corp.'s ability to assert privilege against the Government. As a result, X Corp. may assert privilege here as if Doe had never disclosed the information in the first instance."; "Construing the Agreement to preserve X Corp.'s privileges also serves important policy considerations. Cooperation between private entities and the Government furthers the truth-finding process. Such negotiations 'give potential defendants an opportunity to explain away suspicious circumstances, give the government an opportunity to avoid embarrassing and wasteful mistakes, and give the public a greater likelihood of a just result.'. . . Declining to hold the Government to the terms of an agreement it struck would discourage private entities from cooperating with the Government in the future."; explaining that the court need not decide whether a third party could claim there had been a waiver; "We do not decide whether the Agreement preserves X Corp.'s privileges vis-à-vis a third party to whom the Government disclosed information from Doe's interview, as that is not the question before us. For the same reason, we find inapposite the cases the Government cites involving attempts by third parties to access information a company shared with the government under a confidentiality agreement.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-06-27 Federal

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 11, 2018)
July 4, 2018 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

"Should Litigants Count on Private Non-Waiver Agreements?"

When negotiating their respective privilege claims, litigants sometimes face the temptation to agree among themselves that producing some arguably protected withheld documents will not trigger a subject matter waiver requiring them to produce additional withheld documents. Is that wise?

Courts generally honor such private agreements. In Butler v. Mueller Cooper Tube Co., the court noted that defendant had "produced over 800 pages of . . . claims file[s]" – "after counsel agreed that such disclosure would not waive all claims of privilege." Civ. A. No. 1:17CV-19-DAS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61424, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 11, 2018). The court rejected plaintiffs' later waiver argument, explaining that "[w]hile selective production of documents or privilege information can result in a waiver of the privilege . . . , the court sees no compelling reason to excuse the plaintiffs from the agreement they made with defense counsel." Id. at *6.

In one-off commercial litigation where there are no other adversaries or would-be adversaries, such private non-waiver agreements might make sense. But in pattern litigation or other situations where there are existing or possible future adversaries, such private agreements are too risky. They only bind signatories, and do not prevent third parties from claiming a subject matter waiver. In those circumstances, the only safe bet is to incorporate such agreements into court orders.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2018-04-11 Federal MS
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Hostetler v. Dillard, Civ. A. No. 3:13-cv-351-DCB-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167374 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2014)
("Plaintiffs argue that the Court's Order [21] and Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) are not applicable to the intentional disclosures at issue. The Court agrees. Although Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) is not expressly limited to unintentional disclosures, the purpose and intent of Rule 502 is to protect litigants from inadvertent disclosures.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-12-03 Federal MS

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160747 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014)
(analyzing privilege issues in a trade association context; explaining that defendant trade associations produced privileged documents to one category of plaintiffs, but resisted efforts from other plaintiffs to obtain the same documents; relying on a magistrate judge's earlier Rule 502 order, which permitted the first plaintiff category "to inspect the ostensibly privilege documents, consider their import, and use them in determining future action"; but finding no waiver that would entitle the other plaintiff category obtain the same documents; "This provision does not, however, permit DPPs to disseminate the supposedly privileged documents to the public or to those outside the scope of the Court's Order (which, of course, is why IPPs and DAPs are asking the Court to compel disclosure of these documents). Rather, DPPs agreed to maintain the confidentiality of these documents, meaning that their 'use' of the documents is limited to their absorption of the information and reliance on the documents in determining future actions in this litigation. That is, DPPs can inspect the ostensibly privileged documents, consider their import, and use them in determining future action."; "This agreement to produce the privileged documents saves UEP, USEM, and DPPs the expense and time of litigating which documents can properly be withheld as privileged. Such an exchange fits naturally within the context of a settlement agreement, which aims to abruptly resolve disputes so as to reduce the costs and risks that typically accompany discovery and/or settlement features in lengthy litigation. Had UEP and USEM not agreed to produce their privileged documents as part of the settlement agreement, the parties would have had to expend time, effort, and money determining which documents were privileged and would not be disclosed. Such determinations could easily have sparked a costly, lengthy dispute that would have, at the least, mitigated the benefits of the settlement agreement and, at the worst, derailed it. This type of production, therefore, is precisely the type of efficiency-maximizing production that the Court's 502(d) Order seeks to protect from claims of waiver of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-11-17 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation , MDL No. 2002 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160747 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014)
January 28, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

“The Strange History of Rule 502 and Selective Waivers: Part III”

The last two Privilege Points (Part I and Part II) discussed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which contains a non-waiver provision intended to allow producing parties' retrieval of inadvertently or even sloppily produced privileged documents without triggering a waiver. The Rule's legislative history and Explanatory Note indicate that the provision does not allow for selective waivers.

However, several courts have entered or offered to enter Rule 502 orders allowing litigants to disclose protected communications to their adversaries — without triggering a broader waiver permitting other third parties to obtain those documents. Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2012); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of Christian Bros. of N.M., No. Civ. 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144756, at *23-26 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). Most recently, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania took this approach. In In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation , MDL No. 2002 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160747 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014), defendant trade associations produced privileged documents to one category of plaintiffs, but resisted efforts from other plaintiffs to obtain the same documents. The court denied the other plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, pointing to a magistrate judge's earlier Rule 502 order. That order permitted the first plaintiff category to "inspect the ostensibly privileged documents, consider their import, and use them in determining future action." Id. at *21. The court did not address Rule 502's legislative history — which indicated that traditional waiver doctrines apply when a producing party "acquiesced in the use of otherwise privileged information." Addendum to Advisory Comm. Notes, Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding R. 502 of Fed. Rules of Evid. (Sept. 14, 2009), subdivision (d).

An increasing number of courts have entered Rule 502 orders purporting to allow selective waivers. Time will tell whether other courts will honor those orders. Despite Rule 502's legislative history and Explanatory Note, courts relying on comity and their inherent power may well do so.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-11-17 Federal PA
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002, 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147819 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2014)
(noting that another judge had earlier entered a Rule 502 order allowing a selective waiver (although not using that term); "UEP and USEM also are not required to produce their attorney-client privileged communications simply because they produced documents containing privileged communications to the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs ('DPPs') pursuant to a proposed settlement agreement with the DPPs. The DPPs that UEP and USEM agreed the production of privileged documents would be governed by a December 20, 2012 Order entered by the Honorable Judge Gene E. K. Pratter (the 'Rule 502€ Order'). . . . That Order states that 'production of a document in this Litigation may not be used to argue waiver in any other litigation or proceeding of UEP's attorney-client privilege or work product or any other document, information or communication.'. . . The settling parties also agreed that the DPPs could not disclose the privileged documents to any other person or party without UEP's and USEM's consent or a Court Order."; "Although a voluntary disclosure of privileged communications to non-client third parties waives the privilege associated with those communications, UEP and USEM sufficiently protected against the waiver of the privilege in the proposed settlement agreement by making the production subject to the 502€ Order and requiring that the documents be kept confidential. Any further disclosure or use of these privileged documents by UEP, USEM, or the DPPs, however, may result in a waiver of the privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-12 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Zorek v. CVS Caremark Corp., Civil No. 1:13-cv-1949, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127742, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2014)
("The primary difference between the two proposed orders concerns the applicability of conditions set forth in FRE 502(b) governing the effect of disclosing privileged information. Plaintiff's proposal would implement the Rule 502(b) clawback provisions while Defendant's proposal expressly rejects those provisions. Plaintiff's proposed order is preferable because: (i) it is in accord with the default provisions of Rule 502(b); and, (ii) it provides appropriate incentives for both parties to comply with discovery requests in a fair and efficient manner. Accordingly, Plaintiff's proposed Stipulated Protected Order will be adopted.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-11 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Zorek v. CVS Caremark Corp., Civil No. 1:13-cv-1949, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127742, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2014)
("Defendant expressly rejects the clawback provisions set forth in FRE 502(b). Instead, Defendant proposes an order pursuant to FRE 502(d) and € whereby disclosure of privileged information does not operate as a waiver irrespective of the degree of care taken by the producing party in either preventing or rectifying disclosure. Instead, the producing party need only follow certain provisions in order to clawback privileged information. Those provisions do not require that the producing party engage in any pre- or post-production privilege review, and further impose upon the receiving party certain affirmative obligations.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-11 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Zorek v. CVS Caremark Corp., Civil No. 1:13-cv-1949, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127742, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2014)
("As the Advisory Committee explains, allowing for non-waiver of privilege regardless of the degree of care exercised by the producing party can avoid potentially large costs of pre-production review. This is particularly true, for example, in litigation involving ESI and large amounts of documents. Where large amounts of data or documents are responsive but only a few of which may turn out to be useful, it is less costly in terms of time and labor to conduct privilege review after the relevant documents have been identified. . . . In this case, large amounts of documents are not involved. As Plaintiff points out, 'the number[] of documents produced by [Defendant] will be measured in the thousands of pages, not in terabytes of data.' Hence, the efficiency rationale of forgoing pre-production review does not apply. And to the extent that Defendant's proposed clawback provision would shift the burden of privilege review to the receiving party, inefficiency would result since presumably the producing party is better positioned to identify which documents are privileged. For similar reasons, under Defendant's proposal, needless uncertainty would obtain: the receiving party could never be sure which documents might be later subject to a claim of privilege.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-09-11 Federal PA

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Beck v. Shinseki, C/A No. 3:13-cv-00999-TLW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88538, at *2 (D. S.C. June 30, 2014)
(entering a Rule 502 order; "Each party is entitled to decide the appropriate degree of care to exercise in reviewing materials for privilege, taking into account the volume and sensitivity of the materials, the demands of the litigation, and the resources that the party can make available. Irrespective of the care that is actually exercised in reviewing materials for privilege, the Court hereby orders pursuant to Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that disclosure of privileged or protected information or documents in discovery conducted in this litigation will not constitute or be deemed a waiver or forfeiture-in this or any other federal or state proceeding-of any claims of attorney-client privilege or work product protection that the disclosing Party would otherwise be entitled to assert with respect to the information or documents and their subject matter.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2014-06-30 Federal SC

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Earthworks v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Civ. A. No. 09-1972 (HHK/JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49873, at *8, 9 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2013)
("Rule 502(d) permits the parties to enter into any agreement they see fit pertaining to the privilege questions, and makes their agreement good against the world. Used creatively, it can save the parties and the court great expense and burden. As to the latter, in these days of finite resources, courts can no longer justify spending many hours resolving privilege claims, document by document, when a party can achieve the protection it needs by use of Rule 502(d). Thus, I will order DOI to meet with plaintiffs' counsel to ascertain whether a 502(d) order could not promptly resolve the outstanding privilege claims so the parties can once again focus on the merits of the controversy."; "I expect the parties to report to me within ten days from the date of this opinion on whether they can forge such an agreement. If they cannot, I will then decide whether I will order the DOI to prepare a revised privilege log or enter a Rule 502(d) order myself, sua sponte.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-04-02 Federal DC B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Goldstein v. FDIC, 494 B.R. 82, 88 (D.D.C. 2013)
(in an opinion by Magistrate Judge Facciola, suggesting a Rule 502 order as possibly allowing production of privileged documents without triggering a waiver; "I will therefore order that, if there are such documents, petitioner-trustee identify them and assert any claim of privilege in a privilege log that complies with the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), i.e., that the description of the withheld document be sufficient in itself 'to enable other parties to assess the claim.' Id. I have expressed my impatience with privilege log entries that do not meet this requirement. . . . Counsel are advised that any log entry that fails to meet this requirement will be disregarded and the claim of privilege rejected."; "Alternatively, I encourage the parties to meet and confer regarding whether a protective order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) may suffice to protect the privileged information. Such an order would allow the parties to go forward with discovery without waiving any claim of privilege over a particular document. See F.R.E. 502(d) ('A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court. . .')")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2013-01-01 Federal DC B 3/14

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2012)
(encouraging a litigant to produce privileged documents that are "meaningless," but not addressing the privilege waiver and subject matter waiver implications; "I hope by this process to accomplish several things. First, the discipline I am imposing on Weinberg will, I hope, lead it to claim the privilege only where it is justified, i.e. when it would be a useful expenditure of the parties['] and this Court's resources to devote any more effort to that document. I also hope that Weinberg will see the wisdom of abandoning any claim of privilege as to meaningless documents that might be technically privileged but which are insignificant. To that end, I will gladly issue, on its application, an order pursuant to Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that would alleviate any concern it has about such a disclosure constituting a waiver in any other state or federal proceeding.")

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC B 10/13

Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2012)
January 28, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

“The Strange History of Rule 502 and Selective Waivers: Part III”

The last two Privilege Points (Part I and Part II) discussed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which contains a non-waiver provision intended to allow producing parties' retrieval of inadvertently or even sloppily produced privileged documents without triggering a waiver. The Rule's legislative history and Explanatory Note indicate that the provision does not allow for selective waivers.

However, several courts have entered or offered to enter Rule 502 orders allowing litigants to disclose protected communications to their adversaries — without triggering a broader waiver permitting other third parties to obtain those documents. Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2012); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of Christian Bros. of N.M., No. Civ. 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144756, at *23-26 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). Most recently, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania took this approach. In In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation , MDL No. 2002 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160747 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014), defendant trade associations produced privileged documents to one category of plaintiffs, but resisted efforts from other plaintiffs to obtain the same documents. The court denied the other plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, pointing to a magistrate judge's earlier Rule 502 order. That order permitted the first plaintiff category to "inspect the ostensibly privileged documents, consider their import, and use them in determining future action." Id. at *21. The court did not address Rule 502's legislative history — which indicated that traditional waiver doctrines apply when a producing party "acquiesced in the use of otherwise privileged information." Addendum to Advisory Comm. Notes, Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding R. 502 of Fed. Rules of Evid. (Sept. 14, 2009), subdivision (d).

An increasing number of courts have entered Rule 502 orders purporting to allow selective waivers. Time will tell whether other courts will honor those orders. Despite Rule 502's legislative history and Explanatory Note, courts relying on comity and their inherent power may well do so.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2012-01-01 Federal DC
Comment:

key case


Chapter: 26.1403
Case Name: Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of Christian Bros. of N.M., No. Civ. 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144756, at *23-26 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010)
January 28, 2015 (PRIVILEGE POINT)

“The Strange History of Rule 502 and Selective Waivers: Part III”

The last two Privilege Points (Part I and Part II) discussed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which contains a non-waiver provision intended to allow producing parties' retrieval of inadvertently or even sloppily produced privileged documents without triggering a waiver. The Rule's legislative history and Explanatory Note indicate that the provision does not allow for selective waivers.

However, several courts have entered or offered to enter Rule 502 orders allowing litigants to disclose protected communications to their adversaries — without triggering a broader waiver permitting other third parties to obtain those documents. Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2012); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of Christian Bros. of N.M., No. Civ. 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144756, at *23-26 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010). Most recently, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania took this approach. In In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation , MDL No. 2002 08-md-02002, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160747 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2014), defendant trade associations produced privileged documents to one category of plaintiffs, but resisted efforts from other plaintiffs to obtain the same documents. The court denied the other plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, pointing to a magistrate judge's earlier Rule 502 order. That order permitted the first plaintiff category to "inspect the ostensibly privileged documents, consider their import, and use them in determining future action." Id. at *21. The court did not address Rule 502's legislative history — which indicated that traditional waiver doctrines apply when a producing party "acquiesced in the use of otherwise privileged information." Addendum to Advisory Comm. Notes, Statement of Congressional Intent Regarding R. 502 of Fed. Rules of Evid. (Sept. 14, 2009), subdivision (d).

An increasing number of courts have entered Rule 502 orders purporting to allow selective waivers. Time will tell whether other courts will honor those orders. Despite Rule 502's legislative history and Explanatory Note, courts relying on comity and their inherent power may well do so.

Case Date Jurisdiction State Cite Checked
2010-10-22 Federal NM
Comment:

key case